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
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X. A. F. ZIBIKER POLACEK Sc.

EMPEROR FERDINAND II.

CLETON

Thirty Years On

AND

THE
ANNALS OF

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FROM 1840 TO 1870

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HISTORY

OF THE

THIRTY YEARS' WAR

BY
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WITH AN INTRODUCTORY AND A CONCLUDING CHAPTER BY THE TRANSLATOR

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
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
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THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

CHAPTER I.

THE DIET OF PRINCES AT REGENSBURG.

I. Further Complaints of the League against the Imperial Army. II. The Removal of Waldstein at the Electoral Diet at Regensburg, and the Reorganization of the Imperial Army. III. The Transactions in regard to the Italian Peace. IV. The Refusal to elect Ferdinand III. and the other Transactions at Regensburg. V. The Negotiations of France in regard to a Comprehensive Alliance against the Hapsburgs, and in particular those with Maximilian of Bavaria and Gustavus Adolphus.

I.

THE envoys sent to Vienna by the Heidelberg Diet of the League to make complaint of the imperial army, arrived there in May, 1629, and demanded that all quartering of soldiers upon the lands of the Princes of the League should thenceforth be avoided, and that to this end the imperial troops should be withdrawn from the Circle of Franconia and Swabia; furthermore, that the troops of the League should not be molested and crowded in their quarters by the imperialists, and that there should be no further enlistments. Their demands were refused.

The Emperor was willing to relieve the Circle of 1,000 mounted men, but it should still provide for 4,000 of the same. He would not, in view of the dangers which were threatened on account of the execution of the Edict of Restitution by Sweden and other countries, abandon all further enlistments, and would only promise to maintain a better discipline and to protect the soldiers of the League against violent expulsion from their quarters. The envoys of the League were obliged to return home without having effected their purpose.

In view of the enmity which gradually arose between the soldiers of the League and the imperialists, it is easy to explain why the Heidelberg Diet rejected also the repeated applications of Spain to Duke Maximilian and the League for aid against the United Netherlands. It had been, since 1623, Spain's most ardent desire to involve the League and the Emperor in a war against the Netherlands. As we have already seen, Philip IV. had hoped to effect this in the negotiations in Brussels in 1626. The League, however, refused on any condition to undertake any other enterprise until it should have freed itself from the imperialists, and therefore rejected the Spanish application.

When the Emperor's rejection of the demands of the League became known, the relations between the two grew worse, and especially when it appeared that Ferdinand did not perform even the little he had promised. The imperialist troops still as before forcibly crowded those of the League from their quarters, and that too, as Maximilian expressed himself to Count Collalto, for the very purpose of starving out and breaking up the army of the latter. The four Catholic Electors now agreed to make another complaint to the Emperor. In the paper

which they sent him (October 15, 1629) they warned him of the perils which he had invited by the conduct of his soldiery and by his sentence of ban against the Dukes of Mecklenburg. They referred to Sweden and Holland's alliance with the Hanse Towns, to Bethlen's watching for an opportunity to fall upon the Emperor, as also to the danger that the German Estates, in case these enemies should proceed to hostilities, would join them, tormented as they were to desperation by his soldiers. They urged that the Emperor would be obliged to "adjust the matter of Mecklenburg in a milder way"—that is, to withdraw the ban of the Dukes and divest Waldstein of the Duchy, and unconditionally introduce a better discipline into his army. This message Maximilian supported by sending as special ambassador to Vienna his court chamberlain, Mandl, with instructions to picture still more strongly the threatening dangers.

Ferdinand was not indifferent to these complaints and recitals. He shed tears when he received the Bavarian ambassador, and persisted in stating that nothing was dearer to him than his alliance with his old friend, the Elector of Bavaria. This, however, was the extent of his power; he could not direct his general to reduce the army, for he had no money for its back pay, and the want of money was perpetual in Vienna. While the envoys of the Heidelberg Diet were still in Vienna, the imperial counsellors advised the Emperor to demand the money from the Catholic Estates; but the apprehension, that such a demand would be promptly rejected, prevented its being made, and the case grew worse as the indebtedness increased. There was still less hope of success in a demand for money from the Protestant Estates, because the League and the imperialists had robbed them of everything, and

especially in Brandenburg had this been done in a most frightful manner. Nothing more than the ordinary needs could now be extorted. The Emperor was helpless: the League, on the one side, demanded that he disband his army; on the other, the men to be discharged would demand their pay, and he could not pay them! In this stress there was but one man who could help him, and that man was Waldstein.

Waldstein knew but too well the extreme hatred which he had drawn upon himself, and as he was daily increasing this by his continued enlistments, the question arose, What can be his motive, and why does he thus imperil his sovereign's interests? If he desired to maintain his position in Mecklenburg and secure it by new acquisitions, he must be armed for the purpose; for if peace were concluded and the army disbanded, he would be exposed to an attack from Mecklenburg, in which the Emperor would be unable, and the other Princes of the Empire certainly unwilling, to come to his relief. By various artifices, which we have already mentioned, he had awakened in the Emperor a desire, which had scarcely, however, become earnest, for an extensive dominion in Germany; he had persuaded him to pronounce the ban against the Dukes of Mecklenburg, and now, himself established here, his covetous eyes were turned upon Brandenburg. If he should not win all this, all was for him lost. He set, therefore, his previous successes in the stake, and forced the Emperor to help him play a game of which he was himself to pocket all the winnings. His interests alone decided in Vienna against a favorable answer to the complaints of the League. It was thought that the Emperor was planning the subjection of all Germany, and many were the charges and complaints of both the Protestants and the League on this

account. Only a few, and among these Maximilian of Bavaria, correctly judged the situation, and laid the blame, not upon the Emperor, but upon Waldstein, whose courtly splendor left the princely houses of Germany quite in the shade. For his personal needs he required in every place where he took up his temporary residence 646 horses to be kept in readiness, 6 horses each for 46 princely carriages, 4 each for a like number, 86 palfreys and 40 horses for the saddle, and so in other respects. He required 413 horses for his attendants, who consisted of the chief court steward, the chancellor, several chamberlains and stewards, 4 Jesuits, numerous pages, waiting-men, and lackeys, and 15 cooks—in all 225 persons; to which must still be added the saddlers, harness-makers, tailors, and a body-guard of 100 Croats. For the care of this entire court he provided most lavishly, and indeed the requisitions for meats, game, butter, flour, and the various delicacies which were made in their quarters are quite astonishing. The envoys and petitioners who visited this court, and always retired without gaining their ends, were made to feel, in the regal entertainments given them, but a doubling of that distress which they labored in vain to ameliorate.

Although Waldstein did not allow himself to be diverted from his purpose by the complaints of the League, these did, nevertheless, produce an effect upon him, and, as we have already indicated in the account of the transactions with the citizens of Magdeburg, he began to assume another attitude, and to let fall other utterances in relation to the questions of religion, which could not but be interpreted favorably to a milder treatment of the Protestants. He cannot be charged with having previously shown a special zeal in the persecution of the Protestants; he regarded religion as a question of the

State, and not of the conscience ; but nevertheless he willingly carried out Ferdinand's reformatory decrees, tolerated upon his lands in Bohemia no Protestants, and only employed these in his army and in important matters in which intelligence and talents were requisite. For this course he pleaded in Vienna the necessity of the case, although he represented it to the Electors of Saxony as but an utterance of his impartial sense of justice that he was unwilling to make any distinction between Catholics and Protestants. Perhaps this was really true ; it may be that he became indifferent to ecclesiastical distinctions and contests, and that the more he followed out his ambitious plans the more he despised those who were willing to serve as his tools. But his not keeping his views more concealed than he did showed that he desired to let matters come to a break with the League. His remarks could not injure him with the Emperor, who was entirely in his hands. According to his own statement to the Saxon ambassador, he had under his command at the moment more than 100,000 men, some of whom, for reasons hereafter to be touched upon, had been sent to Italy. His design was to raise his force to 150,000, increase the men sent to Italy to 50,000, and retain 100,000 in Germany. Thus prepared, he designed to hold the League, as he had previously held the Protestants, in his power.

The Emperor, in the autumn of 1629, made known his purpose to call an Electoral Diet, from which he desired to obtain help in his financial difficulties, and to bring about the election of his son to the imperial throne. The Catholic Electors concurred in his wish to summon a Diet, because they desired on their part to force the removal of Waldstein. In a Diet of the League, held in

Mergentheim in the winter of 1629-30, it was determined, notwithstanding that peace had been concluded at Lubeck, to support an army of 20,000 men until the issue of the Electoral Diet should be known. These troops were to be employed for defence against the imperialists, if the trouble should continue. This action may have caused some headache in Vienna. The Emperor, indeed, desired to pay regard to it, and to proceed to Waldstein's removal; at least Tilly was asked (March 23, 1630) if he would accept the chief command. The old marshal, indeed, referred, by way of excusing himself, to his "age and incompetency;" was, however, willing in the extremity to obey such call if the League would give its assent. After this half-refusal the Emperor dropped the subject, and hastened to direct the Elector of Mentz to summon the Diet. His design was at this Diet to throw the burden of the support of the army and the costs of finally disbanding it upon the Empire, and to bring to a settlement still other contested points, to which we shall hereafter refer. The financial difficulties were to be removed by making the Empire answerable for the burdens of the war. The failure of this plan in Regensburg—which was foreseen by all sagacious men—must be charged to the short-sightedness of the statesmen of Vienna, shared also by those of Spain, who really thought that the Emperor would be able to secure in Regensburg an acknowledgment of his sole right to raise an army. To such a height they supposed the imperial authority to have risen, when in fact it was tottering to its fall!

While the imperial party was cherishing such brilliant expectations, the Princes of the Empire were preparing themselves to make a fierce opposition. France, from the beginning of the year 1630, had been fomenting the gen-

eral hatred to the army of Waldstein, inciting the Electors to urge his removal and offering them aid to the extent of 50,000 men. Richelieu's design in these offers was to end the war, which, in 1629, had broken out in Italy between France, Spain, and the Emperor, to the cause of which we shall hereafter make further reference. At the opening of the Diet the Cardinal sent to Regensburg two tried diplomatists, M. Leon de Bruslart and the noted Capuchin, Joseph, with instructions designed and adapted to bring about the Italian peace. The two Frenchmen carried out their instructions with great skill. They formed the link of connection between the Catholic and Protestant Electors, were the trusted counsellors and friends of both parties, and acted the part of natural friends of Germany.

II.

The Diet of the Electors met at Regensburg in June, 1630, and was attended by the Catholic Electors in person, but by ambassadors only from Saxony and Brandenburg. The Emperor himself, the Empress, his eldest son, and two daughters made their entry into the city on the 19th of June. Afterwards appeared there representatives of the Palsgrave Frederic, the English ambassador, Anstruther, the two French ambassadors, and the Papal Nuncio, while in behalf of Spain appeared the Duke of Tursi and James Bruneau. Such an attendance showed that the importance of the occasion was recognized, and that weighty decisions were expected. In fact, here was fought the greatest diplomatic battle of the century. Maximilian did not conceal from his friends his purpose to force the removal of Waldstein, and he became thus the centre of the whole action in Regensburg; for all

present, except the imperial servants and the Spanish ambassadors, belonged to the inexorable opposition, of which this Elector was the intellectual head and the only man fitted for the rescue. Richelieu, who may have recognized in him a nature kindred with his own, prepared the way for his action by admonishing through his ambassadors the individual Electors to confide implicitly the lead of the transactions to the Duke of Bavaria.

The business was opened on the 3d of July by the Emperor's personal statement of his propositions to the Electors. In this he did not touch the question of the election; he expressed his desire that a better plan should be drafted for regulating the affairs of the army relatively to the necessary contributions, the billeting of soldiers, and the right of passage through the lands of the Empire, so that the needed provisions might all be made. Had this demand been conceded without opposition, then that which Spain expected would have been obtained, and the imperial authority would have stood upon a firm foundation. With this plan before us, we can conceive why the Elector of Saxony, when he learned that the Emperor intended to offer such a proposition at Regensburg, expressed the hope that he might not do so, for the result, said he, could not be otherwise than that "all the liberties of the Empire would be overthrown," and it would be "an unexampled innovation if the free Estates of the Empire should be subjected to this kind of contributions."* The

* The reader should here supply a fact which the author supposes to be understood, viz., that the Emperor raised his immense army without the concurrence of the Estates of the Empire, used it against them and for their oppression, and then desired an arrangement by which the Estates should pay the expenses of the engine which he had gotten up without their consent and was employing at will. This is the chain of reasoning, the last link of which is the conclusion that German liberty is buried.—*Tr.*

apprehensions of the Elector were well founded. If the Empire was bound to assume the support of the imperial soldiery, and if this, according to the Spanish view, should become the rule, then there would be no longer any room left for princely power, as it had previously existed, and that which had been called German liberty would lie in its grave.

Of the other matters submitted, the *first* was the question, In what manner can "a just union" among the Estates of Germany be secured in case peace should not be established? The *second* involved the proposal that the door of grace should, on account of his intrigues, be finally shut to the Palsgrave. On two other points—how the Dutch should be driven from the Empire, and how the Mantuan contest should be settled—the opinion of the Electors was also desired. For the better understanding of these matters, we remark that the Dutch, in the course of the Lower Saxon and Danish war, seized several strong places in Jülich, and that a contest for the possession of the Duchy had, since the death of Vincent, the last Duke of Mantua, arisen between France and the Emperor. The Emperor regarded Mantua as a vacant imperial fief, of which he might dispose at pleasure, that is, according to the desire of Spain. France, on the contrary, unwilling to allow any increase of Spanish influence, was in favor of giving it to the Duke of Nevers, an agnate of the ducal family of Mantua, whose son, also, to make the case superfluously strong, had married a daughter of the third from the last Duke of Mantua. This quarrel had already led to a war in Italy, between Spain and the Emperor, on one side, and France, on the other, and Waldstein had on this account sent a portion of his troops, in 1628, to Italy.

The Electoral College did not settle all these questions at once, but first answered, as being most urgent, that relating to the imperial army. This action was the more hastened, because the Electors designed Waldstein's removal.

The removal of Waldstein was the one part of the programme in which, not only the members of the Diet, Catholics as well as Protestants, but all the foreigners in attendance, were united. The only exception, besides the Spanish ambassador, who favored Waldstein, was the Elector of Brandenburg, who was neutral—held in this attitude, however, only by his fears. He had such a terror of Waldstein's lust of robbery, that he not only avoided instructing his envoys to labor for his removal, but distinctly ordered them to maintain their neutrality, and it was only the example of the other Electors that caused the envoys, and afterwards their sovereign, to attach themselves to the majority. Maximilian assumed the lead of the diplomatic battle that ensued, and took his place in the front, because he was convinced of Waldstein's fatal influence in German politics, and was sure of the aid of France in case his course should cause a breach between him and the Emperor. There had been negotiations going on since the previous autumn between France and Bavaria in regard to a treaty, which, according to the desire of Louis XIII., should sever the League from the Emperor and subject its forces to his own direction. The treaty was, indeed, not yet concluded when the Diet came together at Regensburg, but Maximilian had assured himself that he could receive aid against any invasions by the Emperor at the moment of his need of such aid. In his confidence of French aid, Maximilian destroyed all the bridges in his rear, and, on this

ground, declined Waldstein's request for a personal interview, which the latter addressed to him from Memmingen, where he was residing during the session of the Diet. What statements and what offers would he probably have made had the desired interview been granted?

Under the ruling influence of the Elector of Bavaria, a proposition was made to the Emperor in answer to this part of his general plan (July 16) to the following effect: He should, in case he deemed it necessary longer to keep up the full strength of his army, confer with the Electors on this point, as also in regard to the manner of paying the men, and not leave the making of requisitions to the arbitrary action of the army officers; they should seek the concurrence of the Diets of the several Circles. Thus it was desired to hold the imperial army strictly within the limits of the laws of the Empire, and, to ensure this, consent to its action should first be obtained in the Circles, a course which could, however, give small consolation to the Emperor. The Electors appended to this motion a request for Waldstein's removal, on the ground that "all depended upon the head," and unless there were chosen to this place a man in whom the Estates had confidence, no other decisions would be of any avail.

When this paper came to the Emperor's knowledge, he expressed his readiness to make the strength of his army dependent upon the concurrence of the Diet of Electors; but he had no confidence in the Diets of the Circles for the granting of contributions, nor was he willing to promise Waldstein's removal, but simply to provide against the excesses of his army. This was his old and oft-repeated promise, which had, however, never been followed by acts. The College of Electors rejected the offer, with the declaration that the request

for the removal of excesses had reference, above all, to the "excesses in the chief command." That a marshal should be appointed without the concurrence of the Estates of the Empire and entrusted with absolute power, that he should be furnished with no regular supply of money for the support of his men, and be left free to make new enlistments, they held to be subversive of the fundamental law of the Empire; they therefore requested the Emperor to appoint a new commander, "one born in the Empire, of the German nation, and a member of its Estates."

On the 2d of August, in pursuance of imperial instruction, counsel was taken in regard to this matter—Count Fürstenberg, Baron von Strahlendorf, and MM. Rech, Nostitz, and Arnoldin being the counsellors, who decided that each person should hand in to the Emperor, in writing and secretly, a statement of his views. This action admits of no other explanation than that the counsellors were afraid of one another, and were unwilling to advise Waldstein's removal, lest, if he should not be removed, they would be surrendered to his vengeance. The majority of the opinions given, or all of them, may have been unfavorable to Waldstein; these opinions were not, however, alone decisive in a matter which occupied all the prominent members of the imperial court. The chief of these were the Empress, Father Lamormain, Prince Eggenberg, Count Trautmansdorff, and the Abbot of Kremsmünster, at that time minister of finance. These had all accompanied Ferdinand to Regensburg, and their opinions must have had a ten-fold weight upon the scale. Eggenberg may have been alone in favoring Waldstein; this seems to follow from an acknowledgment in regard to his course at Regensburg, which was afterwards made

from the side of Spain. Lamormain opposed Waldstein, and that, as the Spanish dispatches suppose, in pursuance of instructions received from Rome. The Empress seems also to have acted on this side, because she desired that Mantua should be given to her nephew, the son of the Duke of Nevers, which could be effected only by opposing Spain and Waldstein. The Abbot of Kremsmünster had been deemed a faithful adherent of the imperial commander; but, as he enjoyed no special regard, his opinion had little weight, if he even expressed it. Count Trautmansdorff may safely be reckoned with Waldstein's opposers.

Of the prominent persons, therefore, only Eggenberg is known to have raised his voice in favor of the much-assailed general, and even he could not do this with the sharpness and decision which would have characterized his action if he had been laboring in a better cause. He could only call attention to the dangers to the imperial army which might follow in the train of Waldstein's removal; but he could not deny that both the man whom he defended and the course which he was pursuing were loaded with curses. We cannot wonder that the weak Emperor was in real agony of soul. On the one side, his own interests, on the other, the whole Empire—not only the Protestants, but also the Catholics, who had as yet remained true to him—were environed with dangers.

In order to effect a favorable decision, the four Catholic Electors determined to go with their request to Ferdinand in person. In the audience granted them (August 1), the Elector of Mentz—at this time Anselm Casimir von Wambold, who ascended the archiepiscopal throne in the year 1629—took a bold stand for the common cause, and pro-

tested, both in his own behalf and that of his colleagues, and with much the same recklessness which had been shown towards them, against the continuance of the oppression. Ferdinand, more convulsed by this audience and the remarks made on the occasion than he had been by all the complaints previously made, assured the Electors, on the "honor of a cavalier," that he would provide relief, and immediately summoned his privy council to advise him. In the deliberations all the members then present in Regensburg, except Baron von Werdenburg, took part; these were Eggenberg, Slawata, Meggau, Strahlendorf, the Abbot of Kremsmünster, Mansfeld, Trautmansdorff, Fürstenberg, Nostitz, and Rech. These unanimously advised Waldstein's removal: the general was to be sacrificed, and a new organization of the army attempted. The Emperor concurred.

On the 13th of August he called together the whole Electoral College, including probably the ambassadors of Saxony and Brandenburg, and informed them that he had determined to remove his marshal. Catholic and sometimes even Protestant historians have held the opinion that this action brought upon him the bitterest consequences and precipitated him from an acme of assured power. Aside from the fact that his power was rather apparent than real, as is quite clear from our narrative, we are compelled strongly to contest the correctness of this view. Those who accurately understand the state of affairs at that time must be convinced that, if Ferdinand had not yielded, there would perhaps have been formed against him a coalition, embracing all the German Princes, together with France and Sweden, from which his power would have suffered severer blows than were afterwards dealt to it. The Emperor could have

made a bold stand against the hatred of his opposers only by placing himself at the head of his army and by keeping at his side able and intelligent officers, instead of those homeless swordsmen and those Italian thieves and robbers with which his army swarmed. In short, he would have had to take upon himself the burden of the contest, instead of entrusting it to such a servant as Waldstein, whose eyes saw nothing but his own interests. We now understand this matter clearly, and are therefore able with much certainty to determine the consequences which would have followed an unyielding course on the part of the Emperor. There was then, however, too much terror of Waldstein, and it was judged that there was no safety but in his removal, and so the judgment of that time was as greatly confused as is that of some at the present day. John George of Saxony held Maximilian in grateful memory on this account, and declared, many years later, that he ought to be thankfully remembered in connection with Waldstein's removal, which he had brought about.

Having formed his determination, the Emperor was obliged to give notice of this to his general, who was then in Memmingen. Nothing more strikingly shows the degrading attitude which the Emperor assumed towards Waldstein than the manner in which the envoys sent to him were instructed to discharge their duty. Ferdinand bade them inform the general as carefully as possible of his removal, and request him in his own interests to yield to this and make no unacceptable conditions for the maintenance of the dominion which he had won. There rings through these instructions the prayer that Waldstein may not permit his wrath to precipitate him into a violent exercise of power, while they indicate, on the

other hand, that he would have to make concessions in regard to Mecklenburg.

The two envoys expected, on account of the nature of their message, an unpleasant reception; and so it would doubtless have turned out unfriendly enough, if Waldstein had not already been, by his cousin, Count Maximilian, informed of his removal, and so had had the leisure to adjust his behavior to the occasion. Severely as he may have felt the blow, he perceived that it would not do to resist the Emperor's decision, since he could not enter into a contest with him and all the German Princes combined. He determined, therefore, to accept with dignity that which was inevitable. He received the imperial envoys in the most obliging manner, and did not permit them to go through with their address, but interrupted them by remarking that he had already read his destiny in the stars.* "The Elector of Bavaria domineers over the Emperor, and I cannot, therefore, lay any blame upon the latter; I am only sorry that His Majesty has given me so little support; I will, however, yield obedience." Having added the request that Ferdinand would not permit any reduction of his territorial possessions (referring specially to Mecklenburg), he dismissed the envoys with royal presents.

Even before the departure of Werdenburg and Quesenberg for Memmingen, discussion had already been opened as to Waldstein's successor in the command of the army. The Electors proposed Maximilian of Bavaria, and deemed themselves safe in this; the Catholics were pleased with the nomination, because they knew that.

Waldstein always kept with him an astrologer, named Seni; and it is evident in his whole career that with his reckless daring and contempt of ethical laws was combined a curious element of superstition.—TR.

jointly with Maximilian, Tilly would be in command, and so an able general would be at the head of the entire force. But the Emperor's ministers felt little favor towards the proposition, for they apprehended that the imperial influence would remain in abeyance in Germany if Maximilian should control the army as Waldstein had done. For this reason they advised the sovereign to accept the suggestion of the Electors, but to give the command to the Duke with limited power, allowing him neither to appoint colonels and other officers, nor to institute enlistments, nor to assign quarters and select the places of muster, nor to act his option in other important matters, but require him to act from instructions sent on from Vienna. The Emperor accepted this advice, and desired also that the troops of the League and the imperialists should be united in a single body and be regarded as the imperial army. Against this demand and the limitations of his authority the Elector of Bavaria made the stoutest resistance, and was in this supported by his colleagues. In the negotiations on this occasion between the imperial ministers and the Catholic Electors, the former declined to make any contribution whatever to the keeping up of the army, because the Emperor would require all his resources to guard Hungary and maintain his court.

The deliberations on this subject were continued for several weeks, but brought the League and the imperialists no nearer together. The Emperor persisted in his determination to furnish no aid, to limit the powers of the commander-in-chief; and, on the other hand, the Elector of Bavaria did not, with these limitations, desire the command. Finally, the following points were agreed upon: (1) The army of the Emperor should be reduced

to 40,000 and that of the League to 20,000 men, and both should be supported by contributions to be obtained from the Diets of the Circles; and (2) the chief command should be given to Tilly, who should be equally obligated to the Emperor and the League, and be content with the exercise of limited powers. The concession in relation to sustaining the imperial army at the expense of the Empire was made by the Catholic Electors only in view of the danger which threatened from Sweden, whose King had landed in the month of July at Stralsund. In the same view the Catholics strongly urged the Emperor to make an end of the war in Italy, and thus enter into friendly relations with France. If this request should be granted, the Mantuan quarrel would be settled.

III.

We have stated above that after the death of Vincent, Duke of Mantua, the Duke of Nevers, an agnate of the Gonzaga family, who, upon his marriage with a French heiress, had changed his name, laid claim to the possession of Mantua. In order not to be thwarted in his purpose, he had, in the beginning of the year 1628, taken possession of the Duchy, and afterwards sought the imperial investiture. The Empress, who was of the family of Gonzaga, allowed the Duke of Nevers the acquisition of Mantua, and brought it about that his son, who during the same year visited Vienna, was kindly received and encouraged with hopes. These the Emperor would perhaps have fulfilled, if Spain had not set up claims and proposed the Duke of Guastalla for the investiture. Philip IV. could support his claim, not only by referring

to the services which he had rendered to the Emperor, but by an appeal also to the treaty concluded in the year 1617, by which Ferdinand had purchased his claims to the thrones of Hungary and Bohemia with the promise to convey to him all the vacant fiefs in Italy. From regard to Spain, Ferdinand refused, therefore, to the Duke of Nevers the immediate investiture, and forbade him to exercise any dominion in Mantua, and bade him await the imperial decision.

Nor were the Dukes of Nevers and Guastalla the only claimants of the inheritance. The Duchess of Lorraine and the Duke of Savoy sued for a part of it, that is, Montferrat, on various grounds of relationship. Spain was unwilling to come out empty-handed, and so the Spanish Regent in Milan made arrangements to besiege Casale, the strongly-fortified capital of Montferrat, which had been garrisoned by so-called French volunteers, and was by them defended against the Spanish assault. The Duke of Savoy also occupied parts of this territory under the pretext of obedience to imperial instructions, which naturally gave occasion to the Duke of Nevers to attach himself more intimately to France and Venice, which two governments desired to employ all their power to establish his claim.

Cardinal Richelieu, who, after the surrender of Rochelle, had his hands free, determined to take up the war in Italy, because he felt sure that in the course of it he should win Savoy to his side and should have the moral support of the Pope. On the 15th of February, therefore, Louis XIII. arrived in Grenoble, where was collected the army at the head of which he intended to enter Italy. But the Duke of Savoy set himself with determination against the French, as they attempted at Susa

to advance into Piedmont, because France would not pay for his alliance the price which he demanded. He was, however, repulsed, and was under the necessity of concluding a treaty by which he abandoned his alliance with Spain, and, in return for some insignificant assurances, obligated himself to further the claims of the Duke of Nevers. His zeal for his new ally soon cooled when he perceived no inclination to support him in the plans he had formed of aggrandizement at the expense of Spain.

Louis XIII. could not, therefore, prosecute his Italian expedition, but had to withdraw the greater part of his force in order to end the war with the Huguenots in Languedoc. Richelieu had hoped that these would, by the fall of Rochelle, have been so discouragingly affected that they would lay down their arms; but the Duke of Rohan, their leader, would consent to this only on condition that the King of England should be admitted to the peace negotiations, and should guarantee the observance of the terms which should be agreed upon. These demands the Cardinal would on no account concede, preferring still to continue in a state of war with England, if, as appeared, peace with the Huguenots and with England could be secured only in union. Charles I., however, would not, on account of the increasing internal troubles of his own kingdom, longer burden himself with the affairs of other countries, and so concluded an independent peace (April 4, 1629), and left the Huguenots to their fate. Against these, in the course of the spring, the war was prosecuted with an overwhelming force, and as the result they were everywhere beaten, and compelled in the end to make peace and surrender their fortified places. Thenceforward they were to be tolerated only as a religious party, and, as a general amnesty was granted them, they might,

for the present, adjust themselves to their new situation.

When the King of France, in the beginning of the year 1629, undertook his expedition into Italy, and thus openly, by his interference in the settlement of the Mantuan question, invaded the imperial authority, many advised the Emperor to receive the blow quietly, and invest with the fief the Duke of Nevers, who was ready to ask pardon for his encroachments. The Emperor would have done so, but his regard for Spain, his grudge against France, and his desire to find employment for Waldstein's great army, led him, in concurrence with his general, to send to Italy 26,000 men, which force, under the lead of Collalto, took the way of the passes of Graubunden and entered Mantua in October.

While Collalto was occupied with vain attempts upon Mantua, Richelieu, having subdued the disorderly movement in Languedoc, prepared a new expedition to Italy, which he not only himself accompanied, but the King also joined him in the course of the following year (1630). He first employed his troops in taking possession of several cities of Savoy and Piedmont, for in the meantime Savoy had violated the former treaty and turned against him. The French charged the Duke of Savoy with deception, and treated him therefore as an enemy. The expedition did not, however, bring any aid to the Duke of Nevers, who was for the second time besieged in Mantua, and the city fell, after an obstinate resistance, into the hands of the imperialists, who made frightful havoc in it, and even robbed the palace of its valuables. The damage suffered by Mantua and the value of the stolen jewelry have been estimated at 18,000,000 scudi.

The occupation of Mantua occurred at the exact time

of the landing of Gustavus Adolphus upon German soil. The Catholic Electors, who had indeed considered, though not perhaps in its full gravity, the danger with which they were threatened by this man, sincerely desired, in view of it, a peace with Italy, and therefore favored the claims of Nevers and were disposed to show gratitude to France for the help offered. Ceaselessly they urged the Emperor to peace. Their verbal and written petitions attained their end in this instance the more easily because Ferdinand himself, since Waldstein's removal, longed for peace—a peace, too, which should not only affect Italy, but prevail in Germany, so that France might not give support to his enemies there. The French ambassadors in Regensburg entered upon negotiations to this end in the beginning of August—remarked, however, that they were not authorized to subscribe the articles which they had agreed to, and would be obliged first to report these to the home government. But, as they were disposed to apply for an enlargement of their powers, the transactions were continued, until finally a treaty of peace was concluded, though their plenipotentiary commission had not yet arrived.

The Catholic Electors cannot be charged with having been influenced to recommend peace by a mere desire to satisfy France. The very first article shows clearly that they did not forget either the Emperor or themselves. They demanded, in return for their favor to the interests of France in Italy, that France should abandon the support of the Emperor's enemies—including, therefore, of course, Gustavus Adolphus; and indeed the first article of the treaty of peace contained this assurance. In the remaining articles Mantua and Montferrat were promised to the Duke of Nevers, while the Dukes of

Savoy and Guastalla were provided for by assigning to them certain lands, the net annual incomes of which were supposed to be to the Duke of Savoy 18,000 and to the Duke of Guastalla 6,000 scudi. It may be a matter of wonder that the French ambassadors, who were aware of the transactions between Richelieu and Gustavus Adolphus, showed themselves ready without authority to subscribe the first article. But, aside from the fact that the Emperor and the Elector were in favor of the peace only on this condition, and they might hope that the aid which France rendered to Gustavus Adolphus, being only in money, might remain a secret, they were also perplexed and moved to sign the treaty by the news of the King's dangerous illness. They foresaw that, if he should die, the control of State affairs in France would fall into other hands than those of Cardinal Richelieu, and that no grand schemes would any longer be pursued. In any case, however, they secured to the King the final decision by expressly declaring, before giving their signatures, that they were not invested with plenary power.

The fate of this adjustment was as follows: Louis XIII., when the war undertaken by Gustavus Adolphus was in successful progress, was more than ever intent upon forming a treaty with him, and would not allow the Regensburg treaty to stand in the way of this, and therefore refused to ratify it. Bruslart was sent to Vienna with instructions to justify this refusal by stating that the articles, in regard to indemnifying the Dukes of Savoy and Guastalla and in regard to the enfeoffment of the Duke of Nevers, were deemed to be wanting in clearness and susceptible of an interpretation to the detriment of the latter, and would therefore have to be revised. The imperial ministers would not indeed admit the objec-

tions, and could not seize the only means of help left them—that is, the more vigorous prosecution of the war in Italy—since the Catholic Electors would not, under any circumstances, have approved of this course, and because Gustavus Adolphus was already giving full employment to the imperial arms, so as to make the recall of the troops from Italy an urgent necessity. Not only, therefore, were the negotiations prosecuted with Bruslart in Vienna, but General Gallas, who, on the death of Collalto, had succeeded to his command, was empowered to negotiate with the French, with whom he concluded, not without difficulty, a new treaty at Chierasco, which satisfied the desires of the French by securing the surrender of the passes of Graubunden, and thus terminated Austrian control in this canton. This did not meet the Emperor's views; he refused to ratify the treaty, and directed Gallas to open with the representatives of France, Servien and Marshal Toiras, new negotiations, which resulted in another treaty. This modified treaty also favored the desires of France, as appears from the fact that Gallas immediately sent 21,000 imperial troops to Germany, and thus evacuated Italy. The second treaty of Chierasco the Emperor ratified, because he could not do otherwise.*

* We take the liberty to divide and insert here and in connection with the Waldstein tragedy at the close of Chapter V. of this volume, in the form of notes, the statements which the author has placed as a preface to his third volume, which began with the chapter numbered V. in this volume: "My investigations in Rome proved to me anew the fact, known to all historians, and yet too often forgotten by them, that the policy of a State is best explained and most adequately justified by its archives. I have found in the Vatican library the proof that the Pope, from having at first simply an unfriendly and jealous feeling, was driven, by the contest in regard to the Mantuan inheritance, to a malevolent one against the Hapsburgs, and that

When Ferdinand had determined to yield to the French demands in Italy, and thus also to the desires of the Pope, he deemed himself justified in asking Louis XIII. to abandon his alliance with Gustavus Adolphus, the terms of which had then become quite well known. For this purpose he sent Imperial Counsellor Kurz to Paris, and demanded of the King that, in accordance with the promises made by his envoys at Regensburg, he would send no support to the Swedes. Richelieu might, in the usual way, have denied the alliance with Gustavus Adolphus, as France aided him only with money, and the payments could be kept secret; but in this instance the Cardinal deemed it inexpedient, especially with reference to the moral impression, to make any concealment. The ambassador received the dry response that the King could not abandon an alliance with an old and friendly kingdom like Sweden, and could not therefore accede to the imperial desires.

IV.

The Emperor thought that the removal of Waldstein and the favor which he had shown to the peace negotiations entitled him to claim in return the satisfaction of the desire which influenced him in calling the

the pretensions raised by Spain and gladly supported by the Emperor were such as might well have excited the hostility of even the kindest of Popes. The detailed portrayal of the Mantuan contest will supply one of the best elucidations of the history of that period, still enveloped in so great obscurity. Important disclosures in relation to this may be expected soon, as, at the same time with me, Dr. Pieper was occupied with this subject, and will soon publish the result of his studies in 'A History of the Pontificate of Urban VIII.'—TR.

Diet—the election of his son to succeed him on the throne of the German Empire. That the imperial court would pursue this purpose was known for months at Regensburg; but the Electors, without exception, were as fully decided to refuse this, as they had been—Brandenburg excepted—to act as they did in the matter of Waldstein. Cardinal Richelieu advised them to give their votes for no other candidate than the Elector of Bavaria, unless they should feel inclined to elect the King of France. Joseph, the Capuchin, acted in the sense of the instructions given several months before, and his agitations increased with time. The Electors, however, kept their opposition a secret until in the month of August, so that Prince Eggenberg expressed to the Duke of Tursi the hope that the election would be effected without special difficulty. On the 1st of September he addressed directly to the Saxon ambassador, and probably to the others also, the appropriate request in relation to this business. No definite answer was returned until after the Italian peace had been concluded, and then written answers came to hand from Saxony and Brandenburg, both declining to favor the election. The Catholic Electors did the same.

Bitterly as Ferdinand felt his defeat and clearly as he perceived his loss of power by Waldstein's removal, the court of Madrid felt this still more deeply, for there the Emperor's defeat was taken as an insult to the interests of Spain. With what brilliant hopes to this court had the Diet opened! The Duke of Tursi had been instructed to form with the Empire a treaty offensive and defensive against Holland. It had been expected that the Emperor would incorporate a proposition to this effect in his opening message, and that it would be among the subjects of earliest action. The Emperor did indirectly

do this in putting to the Diet the question as to what measures should be taken against the Hollanders, who were invading the territory of the Empire. But the answer which he received cut off all hope of favor to the wishes of Spain. The Electors carried their opposition so far as to place the Hollanders and Spaniards upon the same level. They charged that the two nations had equally violated the imperial territory, and therefore proposed that Spain should withdraw from the soil of the Empire before making this demand in relation to Holland. The request for an alliance could not have been more contemptuously rejected than with such remarks.

Among the propositions made by the Emperor at the opening of the Diet, one suggested the definitive closing of the door of grace to the proscribed Elector of the Palatinate. This met with no material opposition in the Electoral College—Brandenburg excepted—because none were willing on any account to offend the Elector of Bavaria, and also because France had specially instructed its envoys against any invasion of the new Elector's rights. The Electoral College also advised the Emperor to receive the Palsgrave into favor and restore to him a part of his territory only in case of his abandoning all hostile alliances and asking pardon. No one but the King of England—who sent Sir Robert Anstruther to Regensburg, and at the same time requested the admission of Herr von Rustorf as his brother-in-law's ambassador—took up without reserve the cause of the interdicted Prince. The Colmar game was now repeated in Regensburg. The representatives of the Palsgrave were unwilling that Frederic should renounce his electoral dignity and a portion of his inherited lands, and the imperial side would surrender to him no more at most than the Lower

Palatinate. The parties came no nearer together, and Frederic's representatives were obliged to leave Regensburg without having been of any use to their master, though the Emperor gave proof of his inclination to peace by so far removing the ban of the Palsgrave as to allow him to sojourn in Germany. Rustorf, who with all his diplomatic ability could effect no more, laid the blame of his failure entirely upon the Elector of Bavaria. The respect which was then felt for this Elector we learn not only from the instructions to the French ambassadors, already referred to, but also from the testimony of Rustorf, which is certainly much less liable to suspicion. "The Duke of Bavaria," so he wrote to the Hague, "is so mighty and so feared that the Emperor, his counsellors, and the Electors look up to him and feel themselves bound by his authority and his decisions. I should never have believed that this Prince could have possessed so high regard, respect and honor, and at the same time have been so feared."

The Emperor was satisfied that he could obtain nothing more from the Diet; and therefore closed it on the 12th of November. Two days before this he had sent a paper to the League, in which he declared his assent to the reduction of the combined army to 60,000 men, to be supported by the Circles; which declaration he now repeated—though without specifying the number 60,000—in his farewell address to the Diet. In reference to the Hollanders, he gave assurance that he should not assail them, if they should advance no further into the Empire; he deferred therefore to the wish of the Electors, who were unwilling, for the mere sake of pleasing Spain, to break with Holland. In his farewell he made mention of the landing of the King of Sweden in Germany as the

only reason why the Empire might not wholly disarm and entire peace be restored. We add to the above statement, in relation to the reduction of the army, the remark, that, by a subsequent understanding with the League, the promise was not fulfilled. Instead of the stipulated 20,000, the League retained perhaps 10,000 more, and the Emperor also may have discharged but few of his troops, as the increase of danger since the landing of Gustavus Adolphus made the reduction impossible.

Still another matter was in a confidential manner spoken of in Regensburg—the Edict of Restitution. Saxony and Brandenburg requested the Catholic Electors to exercise also in relation to this Edict those friendly sentiments which they had brought forward for exhibition in connection with the questions of Waldstein and the election. George William of Brandenburg instructed his chancellor, during the latter's stay in Regensburg, to seek an interview with the Electors of Bavaria and Treves, and declare to them that he could not enter into the alliance proposed by France, to be formed between the Catholic and Protestant Princes of the Empire, except on the condition that this Edict should be no longer enforced; if he was to be further oppressed, he should be obliged to resort to extreme measures of self-protection. He directed that this threat should be repeated to the other Catholic Electors, which caused the latter to request of Landgrave George Lewis of Darmstadt, a son of the recently deceased Landgrave Lewis, a proposition for a mediation in this matter. It was not, however, their earnest intention to deal justly with the complaints of Brandenburg, and so the subject was not thoroughly entered into at Regensburg. All that the Catholics finally agreed to was that they would consent to hold a meeting

with the Protestants, in the coming month of May, in Frankfort-on-the-Main, previously to which they should have determined to make at the most a few unimportant concessions.

V.

While the French ambassadors were officially prosecuting the Italian peace and the surrender of Mantua to the Duke of Nevers, they labored, as appears from our narrative, to determine the Electors to a decided resistance to the imperial wishes, and through them to compel the Emperor to remove Waldstein. If the purpose of the French had been simply to limit the influence of the Hapsburgs to their own territorial possessions, they might now have rested contented. The Hapsburgs had suffered in Regensburg a complete diplomatic defeat; none sought their alliance, or offered them aid. But neither the Emperor's isolation nor his consequent loss of influence in Germany satisfied any longer French ambition of power. Richelieu intended to inflict upon the Emperor and upon Spain some positive loss, and was for this purpose negotiating with the King of Sweden and stirring him up to an offensive course, which, if successful, would of necessity reopen the Bohemian question, and decide it against the Emperor. With the same end in view, he renewed his endeavors for an alliance with England and Holland. According to the French minister's plan, the war was not to enter the interior of Germany at all; here Catholics and Protestants were to live in mutual toleration, and, indeed, form an alliance with each other, while Gustavus Adolphus, supported by

French, English, and Dutch subsidies, should invade the Emperor's hereditary possessions.

This plan of robbing the Emperor was attended with many difficulties. Could it be expected that the Protestant Princes would, when affairs should turn in their favor, meekly bear the injustice inflicted upon them by means of the Edict of Restitution, or become reconciled to the robbery committed upon the Palsgrave? And could it, on the other hand, be supposed that the Catholics would voluntarily surrender the advantages of this Edict, or that the Elector of Bavaria would give up his acquired Electorate or the Upper Palatinate? How, then, could France hope to unite the German Princes so as to employ them against Ferdinand? And, finally, could the Catholics abandon the Emperor a prey to the assaults of Gustavus Adolphus, and surrender the crown of Bohemia to the Protestants, without danger to themselves? If not, then it need not surprise us that France could not accomplish its intricate aim and effectually separate the Catholics from the Emperor. But a remarkable skilfulness was shown in the negotiations, and the various phases which these passed through are full of significant turns, so that they deserve to be presented, and, more especially, because the French did so far succeed as to humble the Hapsburgs still more deeply than was done at Regensburg, and so as to obtain possession of Alsace at the cost of the German line. The transactions, as is apparent from the above narrative, branched out in four directions: *first*, the alliance between Maximilian and France; *secondly*, the Swedish-French alliance; *thirdly*, an alliance between the Catholics and Protestants of Germany; and, *fourthly*, an alliance of France with England and Holland.

The negotiations with Bavaria began a year before the Regensburg Diet, and through the medium of Cardinal Bagni, the Papal Nuncio in Paris, who acted in the matter as the Pope's confidential agent. In this way a draft of a treaty was completed in the French Chancery as early as October 5, 1629, which formed the basis of all later discussions. Maximilian entered warmly into the matter, for his hatred and fear of Waldstein were then at their height, and he would have allied himself to the devil, if, through the latter as an ally, he could have maintained the dignity he had won and secured himself against the vassalage threatened by Waldstein. According to his express desire, none but Louis XIII. and the two Cardinals, Richelieu and Bagni, were to be allowed to share the secret of these negotiations, which related not simply to the establishment of an auxiliary force against the Emperor, but to the election, eventually, of his successor upon the imperial throne, who, according to Richelieu's wish, should be no other than Maximilian himself. But the latter could never quite suppress his doubts as to the propriety of a French alliance, and was also personally convinced of the Emperor's honorable intentions, and so his desire for a union with France diminished when Ferdinand removed his distrust by giving way, dismissing Waldstein, and entrusting Tilly, who was faithfully devoted to the interests of the League, with the command of his army. Maximilian's hesitation in regard to the proposed alliance afterwards increased; for, in spite of the assurance from France that the King of Sweden would join it, and that he would, in all his aggressive movements, spare the possessions of the League, he, after having landed in Germany and obtained his first successes, had declared openly that he would restore matters in the

Lower Saxon Circle to their former condition—that is, that he would abolish there the changes effected by the Edict of Restitution. But in relation to this Edict, the League was unwilling to yield an inch, and Maximilian, therefore, hesitated more and more to obligate himself definitively to France. It was not till after the King of Sweden was found to be making rapid progress in Germany, and it had become evident that the German Catholics would be obliged to unite, not with but against him, that the negotiations with France were resumed, and led to an alliance which, according to Maximilian's intention, was to be directed against Sweden. In its proper place a more distinct account of this will be given.

The negotiations between France and Sweden were opened in earnest in the winter of 1629–30. Richelieu's purpose in the alliance was not merely to invade the Hapsburgs and restore the Dukes of Mecklenburg, but to strengthen the Protestant party in the Empire. The French ambassador, Baron de Charnacé, was directed to inform Gustavus Adolphus that Richelieu was negotiating in order to secure the neutrality of the League, and that it would therefore be necessary that he should avoid any invasion of the territories of its Princes. Nothing was said of the Edict of Restitution. France, therefore, did not wish either to defend or to contest the changes which it had brought about. In the draft of a treaty, on the contrary, which Gustavus Adolphus laid before Charnacé for his acceptance, he declared that he would enter Germany with an army, if Louis would support him to the extent of 300,000 thalers annually, and that the purpose of his invasion would be to restore former relations there. He was ready to conclude a treaty of friendship and neutrality with the League, if it would not oppose

him in this attempt at restoration. This proposition did not exactly agree with Richelieu's wishes. Charnacé therefore thought that the end of the treaty should not be designated as the "restoring of the old relations," since this would imperil Bavaria, but that it should aim at the restoration of "German liberty." The King should obligate himself, furthermore, not only to a contest with the Emperor, but to assault the Spaniards in their possessions in the Palatinate. Charnacé was, moreover, willing to satisfy the King's entire demand for money, and even to make the amount 400,000 thalers, which however, was finally fixed at 1,000,000 francs.

Gustavus Adolphus did not, however, enter into the wishes of France, and declined in particular the proposed war against Spain, as assuming an obligation quite too extensive. It was, on the other hand, suspected in France that he designed only to hold Stralsund, and to appropriate the French subsidies without any service in return. The conclusion of the treaty was therefore delayed until January, 1631—that is, to the moment when it became evident that the King of Sweden would direct his arms against the imperial troops. Finally (January 23, 1631) a treaty was concluded at Bärwald, the contents of which prove the respect which Gustavus Adolphus had won, for its very first article contained an admission which might, at some time, cause great embarrassment relatively to Bavaria. It expressly declares the purpose of the alliance to be the "restoration of the oppressed," referring not merely to those who had been injured by the Edict of Restitution, but also to the Palsgrave, and would therefore admit of an abridgment of Bavaria's interests. The King of Sweden bound himself to raise an adequate army, while France was to pay a yearly subsidy of

1,000,000 francs. Neutrality was to be observed towards the League, if the latter would agree—that is, on its part, would not oppose Gustavus Adolphus in his work of restoration.

While these negotiations were in progress between France, Sweden, and Bavaria, what was the state of the alliance planned by Richelieu to be formed between the Catholic and Protestant Princes? Charnacé attempted to gain Brandenburg to it, and obtained the Elector's consent on the condition that the Catholics should first have returned a favorable answer to the complaints relating to the Edict of Restitution which had been brought before them at Regensburg. As this was not done, George William could attach no importance to an alliance which to him was worthless, and sought his sole rescue in one with the Elector of Saxony, whom he addressed in the beginning of September (1630) and again after the close of the Regensburg Diet, in regard to the course to be pursued. At their first interview he declared that he should pay no more contributions for the imperial troops, nor connect his own troops with them—that is, that he would resist the action of the Diet. He at the same time recommended the calling of a Protestant Diet for deliberation in regard to the steps to be taken. In the second interview George William still persisted, and with increased decision, in what he had before proposed, and even thought of a mutual understanding with Sweden. The Elector of Saxony was not, however, willing to form an alliance with Gustavus Adolphus, nor to call a Protestant Diet, because it would not do to forestall the action of the conference of Catholics and Protestants to be held at Frankfort-on-the-Main. Nothing but the threatening peril and the victorious march of Gustavus Adolphus moved him to yield (September

24, 1630), and call a Diet of the Protestant Estates of Germany to meet in Leipsic. This was the most momentous of resolutions. It effected a union of the Protestants of Germany, dissolved the relation between Saxony and the Emperor and his party, brought about extensive armaments by which the Catholic forces were paralyzed, and prepared the way of a future alliance with Sweden. None of these things would have been done if the Catholics had promptly and fully yielded in the matter of the Edict of Restitution; the Protestants would then have joined with them, and especially with Maximilian of Bavaria, who had for a short time won their confidence, and the King of Sweden would have been unable to continue his expedition, because he would have met with decided opposition from Brandenburg and Saxony.

After these events Richelieu perceived that an alliance between the Catholic and Protestant Estates of the Empire could not be effected, and so sent a special ambassador, by the name of Delisle, to the Leipsic meeting, instructed simply to prepare the way for a neutrality on the part of the Catholic and Protestant Estates, for which he offered the mediation of the King of France, and the abrogation of the Edict of Restitution. In regard to the latter point, therefore, Richelieu threw off his reserve, and placed himself on the side of the Protestants, but demanded in return that they, and especially the Elector of Brandenburg, should show themselves decided, raise an army, provide for its support, join the King of Sweden, and call upon the King of France for aid. His programme was almost identical with that for which the Elector of Brandenburg and the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel labored in vain at the Leipsic meeting, of which we shall hereafter give account. The carrying

out of this programme awaited the compulsory power of events.

In relation to Holland and England, Richelieu labored first of all to bring Charles I. into an intimate alliance which should embrace France, England, and Sweden, and should be concluded for a term of four or five years. These efforts had at least the result that Charles I. determined upon raising an armament of six thousand men, which should co-operate with the King of Sweden for the restoration of the Palsgrave. This was actually carried out, so that, in the year 1632, English mercenaries took part in the war in Germany. Richelieu concluded an alliance with Holland in the year 1631, for the purposes of which France paid subsidies to the amount of one million francs annually. By the efforts of the Cardinal a confederation was therefore brought about, embracing Sweden, England, France, and Holland, with the certain prospect of bringing in the German Protestants, against which formidable power the house of Hapsburg was thrown upon its own resources with but the aid of the League.

CHAPTER II.*

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, MAGDEBURG, AND BREITENFELD.

- I. Gustavus Adolphus and his Landing in Germany. II. His first Successes. Treaty between Maximilian and Louis XIII. Tilly's Measures for carrying on the Contest with the Enemy. Frankfort-on-the-Oder. III. The Fall of Magdeburg. IV. The Meeting at Leipsic, and that at Frankfort-on-the-Main. V. The Swedish Negotiations for an Alliance with Hesse Cassel and Brandenburg. VI. Gustavus Adolphus' Alliance with Electoral Saxony, and the Battle of Breitenfeld.

I.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, of whom we have already made frequent mention, was born in the year 1594, at Stockholm. His father afterwards came to the throne, under the name of Charles IX. His knowledge, obtained by a careful education, and the high order of his natural gifts, early drew to his person the attention of those near him. The rest of the world first knew him when he distinguished himself as a soldier and commander in the war with Poland. At that time the Spanish general, Spinola, recognized in him the genius of the future field-marshal, and warned his companions in the Catholic faith against irritating him and being drawn into conflict with him. In his youth Gustavus Adolphus was deeply in love with the beautiful Emma Brahe, and wished to marry her, but sacrificed his own feelings in deference to his mother's persuasions and prayers, and afterwards sued for the hand of the elder sister of the Elector George William, of Brandenburg, because the latter's alliance seemed to him

* For author's additions to this chapter, see Appendix.

important in his contest with Poland. Not love, therefore, but considerations of policy, controlled in this marriage.' He was a sincere Protestant, and ready to make great exertions and sacrifices in support of his convictions; and yet it should not be forgotten that his own safety was bound up with Protestantism, for it was only this that secured him against the just hereditary claim of the King of Poland to the throne of Sweden; nor can there be any doubt that this circumstance augmented his spirit of sacrifice as well as his energy in action. It is not easy to penetrate the secrets of a man's soul, and know with certainty what are the springs which control his actions: how ambition and conviction conceal themselves, the one under the other, or where the one gains the upper hand of the other—where, in short, defence ceases and ambition of conquest begins. Judging from the various phases of Gustavus Adolphus' development, which can indeed be followed with exactness, these two springs of action were of about equal power in the shaping of his course. It was only in the later years of his life that ambition preponderated, and when he represented himself to his adherents as the avenger of injustice done him, he knew best how to avenge himself in his own interests.

Even as a young man, Gustavus Adolphus showed himself reserved, rigid, unapproachable, and cold towards all around him; he was, however, passionately excited when checked in his plans, and then with ill-considered vehemence would strike down his opposer. Temperate and capable of every exertion, he demanded the same qualities in his assistants and servants. He showed no less prudence in his decisions than energy in their execution, and so indefatigable was he in this that the most brilliant results were realized. He shared, indeed, most of his capabili-

ties with thousands of highly gifted men, but that he knew how to retain these, while others destined to crowns lose them through their education and manner of life, was the fact which secured his pre-eminence upon the throne. And to so much the greater elevation this trait could not but lift him, when to it was added that rare gift, shared by few mortals—the genius of a military commander. When we look around us for a historical person with whom he can be compared, we find but one—Alexander the Great. Both attained to unforeseen results, and with this advantage over men who have by their own energy risen from low to high positions: they did not achieve their eminence by violent and criminal means, and were consequently not obliged to retain them in this way. Their measures were not therefore contested and carped at by the envious and inimical whom, in their career of life, they had left behind them. In their character and development we find no such moral vacuum as in men like Waldstein and Napoleon. Their brilliant successes concealed from view no adverse shades, unless, indeed, their ambition should be imputed to them as a crime. But even here both careers have excellent apologetic resources: the one triumphed over Asiatic barbarism; the other averted the overthrow with which Protestantism was threatened in Germany.

In outward form the Northern Lion, as Gustavus Adolphus was called, was distinguished by a stately largeness, broad shoulders, and light hair and complexion. In his motions he was surprisingly slow, and, after he became somewhat corpulent, even clumsy. The determination of his will, however, did not at all sympathize in this infirmity, for he always knew how to surprise his enemies by the quickness of his assaults. Gustavus Adolphus

awakened no little interest by his utterance of thought in writing. Of that circumlocutory style, by which both the learned and the unlearned of his time in Germany distinguished themselves so much to their disadvantage, no trace is found in his autograph letters. He was often called upon by his situation to represent to prominent persons the weightiest matters in a confidential way ; his letters in these instances may be taken as models of clearness and precision in style, as also of the exactness with which his aims were directed to his ends.

Our accounts of the negotiations of the year 1624 show that Gustavus Adolphus did not now, for the first time, take an interest in German affairs : he had long given them his attention ; indeed, as early as the year 1620 he desired to support the Palsgrave in maintaining his Bohemian crown, and in his enthusiasm formed the plan of a Protestant confederation. Although this was not realized, he nevertheless showed his attachment to the common cause by sending the Palsgrave a few cannon. When, at a later period, the defeat of the King of Denmark matured in Vienna and Madrid the Baltic project, by which the behests and interests of the Hapsburgs were to rule also in this sea, Gustavus Adolphus felt not only wounded in his Protestant views by the augmenting preponderance of the Emperor, but also imperilled as to his possessions ; for he regarded himself as the hereditary lord of the Baltic, and would never consent to share this lordship with another, and much less to wholly surrender it. The alliance of the Emperor with the King of Poland, who still continued to claim a right of inheritance to the crown of Sweden, might be fraught with further dangers to him, and he therefore determined no longer to observe in quietness the progressive development of events. In

order to secure himself and Sweden, he endeavored to gain possession of several ports of the Baltic coast of Germany; and we shall see how this plan was gradually matured in his mind, and how he enlarged it after his brilliant successes.

During the peace negotiations in Lubeck, Gustavus Adolphus requested admission to them as representative of the interests of the city of Stralsund, which he then held. The Emperor and Waldstein, however, excluded him, and, in the year 1629, sent 16,000 imperialist troops to take part against him in the war in Poland. The Poles were beaten, however, in spite of this aid, and King Sigismund concluded an armistice of several years with Sweden (September 26, 1629), which left the King free to appear with force in Germany. The King of Denmark, though as jealous of Sweden as was the Emperor, still offered his interposition to settle peaceably the differences of the two parties, and, in the following spring, negotiations were accordingly opened between the Emperor's representative, Hannibal von Dohna, who resided in Dantzic, and the Swedish chancellor, Oxenstiern, who lived in Elbing, which, however, led to no results, because Gustavus Adolphus insisted upon some unacceptable conditions. A few of the more important of these, which we shall here introduce, and which he desired also to present on the occasion of the negotiations at Lubeck, will show why they were unacceptable to the Emperor, for they were of such nature that they could have been wrung from him only by a series of heavy defeats. He required the Emperor to give up his interest in the German ports of the Baltic, to build no ships of war in them, to withdraw his troops from both Saxon Circles, and to restore all ecclesiastical property to its former holders; he was

not, of his own will, to punish transgressions against himself and the Empire, but to submit them to the judgment of the Estates, and, at the most, to inflict only pecuniary fines. This was mixing in German affairs in a way which neither Protestant nor Catholic Emperor would have consented to, and upon this basis Ferdinand would not negotiate, nor Denmark mediate, and so the negotiations failed.

In the meantime Gustavus Adolphus was preparing for his German expedition. As early as the spring of 1629 he presented to the Estates of Sweden the proposition that, for security against the aggressive plans of the Hapsburgs, and for the defence of the imperilled faith, they should provide for the fitting out of an effective army and an adequate fleet. The Estates granted all that he desired, and he was able to act effectively in his arming, and especially as the Polish armistice had untied his hands. At the same time he opened negotiations for an alliance with France and the United Netherlands; but the caution which he showed here makes it evident enough that his chief dependence was upon his own resources. He raised an army of 43,000 men in Sweden, but set out on his expedition at the head of only about 13,000. The Swedish Estates, before his departure, took leave of him with wishes for his success and prayers for God's blessing upon all his majesty's heroic and Christian endeavors, and that he might be so led that not alone they (the Estates), but all their friends also, and their oppressed kindred in the religious faith in neighboring lands, might have consolation and amelioration brought to them by the expedition. When Gustavus Adolphus, at the end of May, 1630, on the occasion of taking his leave, stood holding for a few moments his daughter Christina, then one year old, in his arms, he assured the Estates

that he was not plunging inconsiderately and under the impulse of transient humor into this war, but that he was doing this for his own protection and the defence of the religious faith which the Emperor was trampling in the dust. The German Estates were urgently imploring his aid, and, if it pleased God, he proposed to furnish it to them. On the 6th of July he landed on the island of Usedom at the head of the force of 13,000 men originally determined upon, which, however, before a year had passed by, he had strengthened to 40,000 by having troops sent on to him from Sweden.

The question will naturally be asked, Why did not the imperialists and the League, whose forces together amounted to nearly 100,000, prevent the landing of the King with his little armed company, or, immediately after their landing, meet them with an overwhelming force? But when we remember that Waldstein had not then been removed, and that the Princes of the League were possessed with the deepest enmity towards the imperial army, and would sooner have drawn up their line of battle against them than against Gustavus Adolphus; if, further, we do not forget that the generalissimo of the army was not on the theatre of the war, but was sojourning in Memmingen in order that he might prevent his own removal,—then we shall perceive that there could have been made by the Catholic troops no systematic defence against the enemy. Further, the imperial troops were living only by robbery and forced contributions, which did not admit of their remaining together in large bodies, and were scattered over Germany. The King of Sweden, therefore, met with no resistance at his landing, and the little garrison which held the redoubt on the island of Usedom over against Wolgast, thought, when

threatened with an assault, of nothing but flight. This island therefore fell without resistance into his hands, as, also, the island of Wollin. Not until he reached the main land was he obliged to be more on his guard in attacking the larger forces commanded by the two imperial generals, Prince Savelli and Torquato Conti, the former commanding the troops of Western Pomerania (Vorpommern) and Mecklenburg, the latter those of Eastern Pomerania (Hinterpommern).

II.

On the 19th of July the King embarked with his troops in order to reach Stettin by way of the Oder, designing to take possession of this important city and to obtain thereby a firm footing in Germany. Here he met for the first time those difficulties which were founded in the fear then felt by the Protestant Princes towards the Emperor, who was still mighty. The King had hoped that the Elector of Brandenburg would have greeted his landing with joy and joined him. Instead, however, of doing so, he sent an envoy to dissuade him from further hostilities, representing that he could better gain his end by negotiation with the Emperor, and preferred to conclude an armistice, and to confide to the Electors to mediate a peace. As we perceive, no support was offered to the King, and his offered aid was even declined. The same course was taken by Boguslas, Duke of Pomerania, when Gustavus Adolphus requested his surrender of Stettin during the war and his alliance. Boguslas was unwilling to surrender Stettin, and desired to remain neutral. But in this instance the King paid

no regard to his faint-heartedness, but forced the Prince to yield and conclude with him a treaty, not only surrendering Stettin, but granting conditions which placed Gustavus in the way of realizing the dream of his life—which was the extension of his dominion to both shores of the Baltic. In order, however, to bring the realization nearer, a provision was inserted, which prevented the Elector of Brandenburg from ever entering with his whole soul into the Swedish alliance, and which caused him in the end to abandon it. One of the provisions of the treaty was that the alliance between Pomerania and Sweden should be valid for all time, and that after Duke Boguslas's death Gustavus Adolphus and his successors should hold Pomerania in sequestration until the Duke's heir should have paid the King of Sweden, from his own means, without the aid of the Estates, the costs of the war. By this condition it was certainly placed beyond the range of possibility that any prince, though ever so rich, should, by settling Gustavus Adolphus' account, wrest the Duchy out of his hands. As Boguslas was childless, and his territory was, by virtue of old treaty provisions, to fall to Brandenburg, the Elector saw himself threatened with heavier losses than the imperialists had as yet inflicted upon him.

After Gustavus Adolphus had established himself in Stettin, he endeavored to dislodge the imperial garrisons from the fortified places of both West and East Pomerania, and succeeded in effecting this without much loss of time, and especially in Anclam and Wolgast. Having thus prepared the way, he advanced to Mecklenburg, that he might liberate this land from Waldstein's dominion and turn its resources to his own ends. In the month of September the invasion was undertaken by land

and sea. At Ribnitz, a city of Mecklenburg, the King assaulted the imperial garrison, put them to flight, or took them prisoners, and thus forced an entrance into the Duchy. He now issued a proclamation to the inhabitants, informing them of his arrival and summoning them to the defence of their former ruler and the slaughter of Waldstein's adherents.

When the imperialists learned of Gustavus Adolphus' departure for Mecklenburg, they attempted an assault upon the Swedish camp at Stettin, but were repulsed. The Swedish general, Horn, experienced, however, a like fate in an attempt to take Kolberg, one of the most important points on the Baltic coast. The King of Sweden did not now press his way further into Mecklenburg, because he feared that his force, weakened as it was by the hardships of the war, might not be equal to the purpose, and, instead of rushing from place to place, preferred to fight a pitched battle with the imperialists, which could be done only where these were most numerously concentrated—that is, at Greifenhagen and Gartz, on the Oder. He returned therefore from Mecklenburg, advanced at the head of 14,000 men from Stettin to Greifenhagen, and attacked the enemy stationed there under the command of Count Schaumburg, the numbers of which would have been about equal to his own, but that the difficulty of procuring provisions necessitated their being quartered at different points. The condition of the imperialists, who suffered extreme want of provisions and clothing, must have been, beyond all description, wretched. Although their circumstances were so pitiable that there could be little thought of spirited determination on the part of either officers or men, they did, nevertheless, when the King assaulted Greifenhagen

(January 3, 1631), bravely stand on the defensive. It was, however, of no avail; they were dislodged, and the King proceeded to an attack upon Gartz, where a like result crowned his efforts. Here for the first time the Swedes had come into collision with considerable imperialist forces, and the successful issue so elevated the feelings of the King that in a triumphant spirit he sent the intelligence to his chancellor, Oxenstiern.

After the successes of Greifenhagen and Gartz, Gustavus Adolphus removed his headquarters to Bärwald, where he brought the alliance with France, of which we have already given an account, to its conclusion. He at the same time issued an order that the soldiers should, in the conquered territory, make no demands outside of the camp for anything but salt and vinegar, and that they should arbitrarily levy no contributions. The chief command provided for the subsistence of the troops, and, as this allowed no plundering at will, a sense of quiet succeeded to the desperation which years of oppression had produced among the inhabitants of the Baltic coast.

The imperial general, Schaumburg, had, after his defeat, withdrawn to Landsberg and Frankfort-on-the-Oder, whence he addressed to Tilly letters of deepest complaint as to the condition of his troops. The new general-in-chief of the combined army of the Emperor and the League had, in view of his advanced age, but reluctantly assumed the command, and proved his real disinclination to this service by his small activity. In regard to this, however, several things should be pleaded in apology for him. His former lord, Maximilian of Bavaria, was laboring, through the mediation of France, to negotiate a treaty of neutrality with Sweden, and therefore viewed the first defeats of the imperialists with a degree of indiffer-

ence. The neutrality of Sweden was not, indeed, brought about, though an alliance was concluded (May, 1631) between Louis XIII., Maximilian of Bavaria, and the League, by which Louis and the Elector bound themselves to mutual aid in troops against all enemies. The King of France was to furnish 17,000 men, Maximilian and his allies—the League, though unnamed, being meant—were to furnish 12,000. It was stipulated that, in case the Elector should have no allies, he should be obliged to supply but 7,000 men. Furthermore, Louis agreed to support the Elector and his heirs in maintaining his newly acquired possessions and electoral dignity. All the promises were made on the supposition that Maximilian should remain neutral in the contest between Ferdinand and Gustavus Adolphus, with which supposition agreed also the secret articles of the treaty, in the first of which Louis reserved to himself the right to give support to the alliance of several German Princes for the protection of their freedom. This article pointed chiefly to the union of German Protestants contemplated by the Leipsic meeting.

Regarding Maximilian as carrying on these negotiations in the name of the League, we can conceive why his troops did not, immediately upon the landing of Gustavus Adolphus, make all possible exertions to support the imperial regiments against the Swedish invasion. Furthermore, Tilly was not near the theatre of the war, for he was detained until November in Regensburg, by the transactions in regard to his assuming the chief command. No reproach, therefore, really belonged to him; indeed, he opposed the carrying out of the resolution in regard to the reduction of the combined army of the League and the Emperor to 60,000 men; for he did not

underestimate the danger threatened by Gustavus Adolphus, and was not in the secret of the treaty of neutrality designed to be brought about with Sweden. After having effected the decision that the League should retain 10,000 men more than had been originally determined upon, he left Regensburg for his headquarters at Hameln, and proceeded thence to Halberstadt. Maximilian placed nothing in the way of his showing the same fidelity to the Emperor that he had shown to himself, for, since the removal of Waldstein, the Elector's distrust of Ferdinand had quite vanished, while, on the contrary, he did not, after all their negotiations, trust the French King or his minister, and, least of all, was he willing to consent that Gustavus Adolphus should establish himself upon German soil.

On the 12th of January, 1631, Tilly broke up his camp at Halberstadt, designing to join Count Schaumburg, and end the latter's complaints. The junction took place at Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and Tilly desired to march to Landsberg, in order to protect this city against the threatened attack of the King of Sweden; but such was the misery and dejection which prevailed among the imperialists, that he was deterred from an undertaking which might place his "whole reputation at hazard." Landsberg was not however lost, for Gustavus Adolphus had, a few days before, advanced before the place and again retired, because he had overestimated the strength of some preparations for defence which Colonel Kratz, the commander of the imperialist garrison, had made. Tilly, at the end of January, proceeded to Landsberg, and convinced himself of the pitiable condition of the men and the city's insufficient provisions for defence. As a considerable stay there would have exposed him to

an attack from the King of Sweden, to whose 18,000 men or thereabouts, in open field, he could oppose but 16,000, he determined to withdraw to Frankfort-on-the-Oder; and to do this the more promptly, because the Elector of Brandenburg was growing constantly more hostile in his attitude, and allowed the King of Sweden to pass the fortress of Custrin, although he refused to surrender it to him.

Gustavus Adolphus, now still more convinced that he could not succeed in taking Landsberg, the garrison of which Tilly had strengthened, determined, before spreading his conquests over more territory, to take possession of the places still held by hostile garrisons in Pomerania and Mecklenburg. He divided his army equally, and gave the command of one-half to General Horn, with directions to cover Pomerania and the Neumark—that is, the part of Brandenburg which lies east of the Oder—while he himself, at the head of the other, marched into Mecklenburg. On his way thither, General Kniphausen, who was occupied in the siege of Greifswald, joined him. He first attacked Demmin, one of the most important passes between Mecklenburg and Pomerania, and so terrified Prince Savelli, who had shut himself up with a numerous garrison in this fortress, that, out of cowardice, he betrayed his trust and capitulated in two days (February 25, 1631). Tilly now placed himself in the way of his farther successes by advancing from Frankfort-on-the-Oder, as soon as he observed what the Swedes designed, directing his march at the head of 15,000 men to New Brandenburg, which place Gustavus Adolphus had just taken. Kniphausen, who held the place, was encouraged by his King to hold out in expectation of being reinforced. The King could more readily make this promise, because

Kolberg had meanwhile fallen into his hands, enabling him to draw to himself the greater portion of Horn's troops and leave a smaller body to watch Schaumburg. He marched to meet Horn, and united his whole force at Pasewalk ; divided it again, however, and moved southward with his division, because he did not believe that Tilly's force was really destined against New Brandenburg. Perhaps, also, he retired from the imperial general because he did not wish to come to a battle with him, for, according to the statements of his colonels, his cavalry was inferior to Tilly's, and he was not disposed to stake successes already won upon the chances of a battle. Under these circumstances it was not difficult for Tilly to take New Brandenburg by storm, as the place was but badly fortified.

The King feared that after this success the hostile commander would turn his forces against him, and arranged for repelling the attack. But Tilly, instead of advancing, returned, in order to obey the wish of Maximilian, and, according to General Pappenheim's advice, to attack Magdeburg with his entire force and take possession of this strongly fortified and finely situated city. Pappenheim thought that success could not be long delayed, and, although Tilly did not share this hope, he yielded and left the King of Sweden a free field of action in the North of Germany ; and the latter, on hearing of Tilly's expedition, determined to turn his steps towards Frankfort-on-the-Oder, in the immediate vicinity of which he arrived on the 12th of April with 14,000 men. The command of the garrison of 5,000 to 6,000 men—large enough, of course, to sustain a long siege—was held by Field-Marshal Tiefenbach, who, only the day before, had succeeded Schaumburg. On the following morning Gustavus Adolphus had

complete success in an attempt to storm the city, and it fell into his hands. The Swedes instituted a fearful carnage among the soldiers of the garrison in return for the butchery which, under Tilly, had been wrought in New Brandenburg. Of the imperialists 1,700 were slain, about 1,000 taken prisoners, and the remainder forced to take refuge in Silesia. This stroke caused a great sensation in Germany. When the Emperor was informed of it, he sighed deeply, and in his bewilderment asked those near him what consequences would follow this misfortune, and why the colonels had not given earlier information of their ill condition. He then fell upon his knees and prayed, and when he arose was driven to St. Stephen's Church to continue his prayer. He regarded but the one-half of the old classic proverb: "Pray and labor." In his situation, prayer brought little; it was necessary that he should labor—that is, maintain order in his finances, newly organize his dismembered army, and, as he was not formed for such a work, his subsequent rescue was not due to his own merit, but to the working of events over which he exercised but little influence.

The misfortune of Frankfort loosened the tongues of the imperialist colonels for the utterance of their complaints against Tilly, as if he had intentionally neglected the interests of their sovereign. The King of Sweden made use, however, of the success he had won by attempting to force the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony and the Protestant party in general to an alliance. He was unwilling to concede that any one might remain neutral. If he could but control the one-half of Germany as his enemies did the other, he thought that he might be sure of success, and he deemed the moment to have arrived for compelling their accession to him, since the meeting

at Leipsic had just decided upon such a union of Protestant Germany.

III.

The loss of Frankfort and the severe defeat of the imperialists were due solely to Tilly's marching against Magdeburg, and leaving the King of Sweden an unobstructed field. The siege and capture of Magdeburg had formed, since the past December, one of the most important subjects for consideration in Tilly's councils of war. When he, at that time, joined Pappenheim, at Hameln, the latter requested the free control of 2,000 horse and 2,000 foot for the conquest of Magdeburg. Tilly laughed at this sanguine utterance, and, instead of the 2,000 foot demanded, gave him 3,000, which the field-marshal—for he had just been raised to this rank—united with the imperialist soldiers already lying before Magdeburg. But although he, in connection with the imperial general, Wolf of Mansfeld, had 10,000 men under his command, he could effect nothing more than an investment of the city.

Since this city, in the year 1629, had been exposed to an attack from Waldstein, from which peril it was saved only through the latter's quarrel with the League, it was more than ever watchful of its liberty, and greeted with satisfaction every new danger which threatened the Emperor, but still held fast externally to its neutrality.

The former Administrator of Magdeburg, Christian William of Brandenburg, wandered meanwhile about the world, a prey to cruel want, everywhere offering his services for the contest against the Catholics. He even went with his offer to Sweden, the Hollanders having supplied

him with the needed means for his journey. He made to Gustavus Adolphus the promise that he would raise an army of 20,000 in the Archbishopric of Magdeburg without the knowledge of the imperialist troops quartered there, and would then attack them by surprise and annihilate or capture them. Christian William promised too much, and the cautious King had no inclination to open his purse in furtherance of so romantic a scheme. But his attention was thus drawn to Magdeburg, and he considered what an important aid it would be to him, in the campaign which he had planned in relation to Germany, if this city would join him, tie up a part of the hostile forces, and stop the commerce of the Elbe. Immediately before his landing, therefore, he placed himself in connection with an agent of the Administrator, Stalman by name, and promised to become security for the payment of 100,000 thalers, which Christian William might anywhere borrow. Some adherents of the latter attempted the advocacy of this plan in Magdeburg, and to prepare the way of his restoration as Administrator; but they had neither that respectability of standing, nor did they win such numbers to their support, as to effect their purpose. Gustavus Adolphus cherished, however, more and more the thought of stirring up Magdeburg against the Emperor, and called upon the Margrave to lay all his plans with reference to securing the city.

Meanwhile a bankrupt merchant, named Pöpping, made a public attempt in behalf of the Administrator, a letter from whom, containing definite assurances and making mention of aid from the King of Sweden, he laid before the City Council; but he nevertheless failed to move the members to forsake their neutral position and throw

down the gauntlet to the Emperor. Now, however, came Stalman as official envoy of the King, and was unsparing in his promises of Swedish aid. In this way he raised the sunken spirits of the people of Magdeburg, and brought them to hazardous determinations. And yet they would not, perhaps, have taken the extreme step, if Christian William had not, in the disguise of a merchant's clerk, come with Stalman to Magdeburg, and then thrown off his incognito when he observed the revolution of public sentiment. The agitation in the city rose; the lower class of the people became enthusiastic for the Swedish alliance; and even in the Council many voices were raised in its favor. In this manner the final decision was brought about. Stalman, accompanied by the Administrator, entered, on the 11th of August, the hall of the Council-house, gave a glowing description of the King's resources and his numerous allies, placed golden mountains in prospect before the members, and at the same time threatened them with the fists of the populace, who were gathered by thousands about the door of the Council-house, in case they should not conclude the treaty with Gustavus Adolphus. Fear, hope, and a knowledge of the fact that the Swedes, since their landing, had won many successes, put an end to all calm deliberation. The alliance was concluded, and the Administrator again recognized in his former dignity.

Gustavus Adolphus was much pleased with the course of the movement, and sent to Magdeburg—for he had before promised the sending thither of a military aid—the marshal of his court, Diedrich von Falkenberg, with directions to enlist 6,000 men, and to aid the Margrave in all his defensive measures. The exultation of the King over the accession of Magdeburg was vented at that

time in numerous utterances, and he rejoiced most of all that he had inflicted a deep wound upon the enemy. He ratified, without objection, Stalman's treaty of alliance, which expressly relieved the city from all contributions to the expenses of the war. His joy was further augmented, as the Administrator at first energetically prosecuted the work of enlistment, and, with the soldiers thus raised, was to some extent successful against several imperial garrisons within the diocese. It soon, however, became evident that he would scarcely be able to hold the places taken, and indeed would be obliged to confine himself to Magdeburg only. The Administrator could not, however, keep his troops together except by providing for and paying them; the city refused him the means for this, and the King but fed him with hopes, and so his men began to scatter. Circumstances were becoming in this way very threatening, when Falkenberg's arrival infused new life into the organization of the war forces, for some money was furnished him, though the supply was not large. By his energy and manifest knowledge of the situation, Falkenberg brought the city to resolve upon considerable sacrifices which the treaty did not require of them, and especially that the burghers should take larger numbers of soldiers into their houses and care for them, and if these, in the course of a few weeks, became again more burdensome—for the burden was a growing one—this fact is but too easily explainable.

We have stated that Tilly placed under Pappenheim's command, for his use against Magdeburg, 3,000 infantry. With these, near the middle of December, he left Hameln and moved, for the execution of his plan, towards Magdeburg. Tilly instructed him not to unite with the imperialists, but to post his men on the opposite side of the

city. Pappenheim commenced his operations by an assault upon Neuahaldensleben, about eight miles distant and commanding the way to Magdeburg, which surrendered to him on the 15th of December (1630). When Tilly passed on his march by way of Halberstadt, he found this enterprise, for which he had deemed Pappenheim quite too weak, accomplished, and desired to take advantage of the alarm which might be felt in Magdeburg, and effect by peaceable measures the removal of the Administrator and his aid. His attempt, however, failed, and, as he was unwilling to be delayed in his advance against the King of Sweden, he ordered at the time only the investment of the city, in which Pappenheim and Wolf of Mansfeld were to unite.

To Pappenheim's fiery nature, which demanded quick results, the blockade, drawing itself out as it did for weeks, without the promise of success, gradually grew tiresome. He made an attempt to bribe Falkenberg with the offer of 400,000 thalers and a landed estate to betray the city, which offer was rejected with disdain, leaving Pappenheim standing just where he had stood before. During the months of February and March he busied himself with all sorts of adventurous plans, such as the strengthening of the besieging force, or taking possession of the city by a sudden attack; but Tilly, who, in his march to New Brandenburg, had been in the vicinity of Magdeburg, disapproved of the proposed surprise, as likely to end in loss. Finally the field-marshal's impatience was ended by Tilly's abandoning, after the capture of New Brandenburg, any further conflict with the Swedes, and determining to protect his rear by the taking of Magdeburg. This conclusion was of extraordinary import; it enabled the King of Sweden to attack Frankfort-on-the

Oder and annihilate its numerous garrison, which result alone proves that Tilly's determination to disregard his enemy and content himself with the mere investment of Magdeburg was an error.

Before Tilly's junction with Pappenheim, Falkenberg attempted to defeat the enemy by a sortie (March 10 or 11, 1631), which, in fact, was successful, as Pappenheim was not himself present at the place during the engagement. On the 5th of April, Tilly arrived, bringing a decided increase of strength to the investing force, the number of which in the course of a few weeks rose to about 30,000 men, and the blockade could accordingly become a regular siege. The outer works of Magdeburg now fell into his hands; his troops gained one redoubt after another, and, what was worse for the people of Magdeburg, they lost many pieces of ordnance, much ammunition, and some of their best men. Pappenheim deserved the most merit for these successes; but the imperialist general, Wolf of Mansfeld, of whom there had before been much complaint, shared in the credit, for in the night of the 10th to the 11th of April he took three redoubts by storm. Falkenberg had, in the planning of his redoubts and intrenchments, placing them as he did at a distance outside of the gates, committed an error, as they could not be defended against a strong besieging force, or at least could be held only by employing the whole garrison; but as Falkenberg would not stake so much in this way, he was obliged to suffer for his half-done work in heavy losses.

Gustavus Adolphus, who was informed of these disasters, and could not but perceive that Magdeburg was in a perilous situation, repeatedly gave hope of his aid, especially after he had taken Frankfort and Landsberg. The

letter which he wrote (April 27th, 1631) from the latter place to Falkenberg was not, however, very assuring, for he only promised to come after a couple of months, until which time he desired Falkenberg to lead in the defence. The King's letter relieved this sad prospect only by suggesting that his successes could not but draw Tilly's attention in some other direction. His supposition, that the imperial commander would be obliged to divide his forces, was erroneous. Tilly looked upon it as a point of honor that the stronghold to which the attention of all Europe was now turned, and the capture of which was the only issue that could offset the blow sustained at Frankfurt, should be overcome, and he directed his measures with energy to this end. He first removed his headquarters from the right to the left bank of the Elbe, and strengthened himself by fresh auxiliaries and new enlistments, that he might at every point withstand the enemy and keep him distant from Magdeburg. The besieging army rose to 40,000, which, however, increased the difficulty of obtaining sustenance to such a degree that nearly half of his men were lying sick as the consequence of their wants.

On the 28th of April, Tilly issued an order to Pappenheim to attack the *tête de pont* of the fortification, the so-called Toll Redoubt.* The attack was made with such energy that Falkenberg determined to evacuate the redoubt, carried out this determination in the night of the last of April, and at the same time destroyed the bridge, so as to make the crossing of the Elbe by the enemy at that place impossible. This result was of the greatest


* This was probably the point where the tolls of vessels passing up and down on the Elbe were collected.—Tr.

importance to Tilly; he did not now need to keep more than 2,000 or 3,000 men on the right bank of the river, and could use all the rest of his troops in the besieging work on the left bank. Falkenberg burned the suburbs, as he could no longer hold them, and the enemy established themselves in the posts thus given up, and drew themselves as an iron band around the city itself. Its threatened fate would soon have been averted, if Tilly had obeyed an order of the Emperor, divided his troops, and sent a part of them—for such was the wish in Vienna—to repel the menacing descent of the King of Sweden. But Tilly did not yield: he prosecuted the siege only the more vigorously; but he, at the same time, addressed a communication to the Administrator and the burghers, summoning them to capitulate. This summons to capitulation was, by Falkenberg's zeal—for he thought not of yielding, and silenced the fearful—rejected; but the citizens did offer to negotiate, by which their evident intention was to gain time. To this Tilly assented, but did not remit his attacks, as Gustavus Adolphus was already on his way, for which reason Tilly ordered the destruction of the bridge at Dessau, that he might make it more difficult for the King to cross the Elbe there. Whatever progress the commander might have been making, he had not made a breach in the walls, and the besieged might hope that the King would rescue them. Pappenheim was, however, determined to hazard a storm, in order that the result of so great efforts might not remain in doubt; and his words of fire, uttered in the council of war held on the 19th of May, won the other officers to his view. Even Tilly consented, perceiving that, in the event of success, he was spared the most harassing of uncertainties.

Was there, in Magdeburg, no apprehension of the catastrophe which was in preparation? Was there, indeed, hope of Gustavus Adolphus' immediate coming? A few citizens discerned the threatening danger, for the uninterrupted cannonade had so shattered and undermined the walls that their fall might at any moment occur, and the Syndic, Dr. Dernhardt, on the day before the fall protested against further useless resistance, and earnestly advised the opening of negotiations for a capitulation. One of the most prominent friends of the Swedes, Conrad Gerold, agreed with him, and the view of both was shared by one of the highest officers. But Falkenberg was deaf to all these admonitions and warnings; he affirmed that the Swedish succor would arrive at longest in two days, and in order to defeat the attack of the enemy, which he himself feared, he watched the following night upon the walls. Early in the morning he betook himself to the Council-house, that he might incite the assembled counsellors to continued resistance. But this time his words were without their wonted effect, for, great as might be his endeavors, and strongly as he might be supported by the threatening behavior of his adherents, the majority were in favor of negotiating a capitulation. Nevertheless he did not allow himself to be intimidated, and while he was seeking to silence his opponents by a long speech, in which he did not weary in assurances that the King's arrival might be hourly expected, messengers came announcing that the imperialists were storming the north and south sides. Undaunted by the news, though this made it clear that the enemy was attempting to bring the matter to a final decision, he uttered the wish that the storm might be earnest, for he would so receive the imperialists as to make it go hard with them. His

heroic determination imparted its inspiration to his hearers, for, as he threw himself upon his horse to hasten against the enemy, the citizens, so far as they were able to bear arms, followed him to the decisive contest.

According to the agreement to which Tilly and his council of war came on the 19th of May, the storming was to be opened very early in the morning; but towards sunrise he revoked the order, because he had no confidence of success, and did not renew it until after the full daylight. Just this delay favored the attempt; for the sentinels on the walls, having watched sleeplessly through the night, had resigned themselves to rest, so that scarcely the half of them were at their posts when Pappenheim began his assault at the high gate. With an impetuosity which defied restraint, he threw himself upon that part of the city to which he had been directed, forced his way in, was however hard pressed by Falkenberg, who at the moment came rushing up. At that point a fearful struggle followed: the mutual religious hate, the thought of hardship suffered, the anxious love of life, all contended together and steeled the strength of each man to deeds of heroism. Naught but the onward rush of other forces saved Pappenheim and wrought the defeat of Falkenberg's few and exhausted men. It was reported that the victors offered him pardon, which he did not however accept, and that he sought death in the struggle. This most at least is true: that in him died a man who deserves to be ranked with the greatest heroes of all time. The enemy now spread themselves increasingly in the city, and were able to open from within the gate through which Wolf of Mansfeld sought to force his entry. Now ensued a slaughter, than which a more awful cannot be conceived. Soldiers and



25- Ghost. 9. St. Ulrich's. 10. St. John's. 11. Rath-house. 12. Barefoot
 25- place'. 22. St. Peter and Paul's. 23. Sudenburg. 24. The New City.



citizens, with their wives, boys and girls, old and young, were all mercilessly butchered. A portion of the citizens bethought themselves not to wait until this fate should come upon them, and determined to be buried under the ruins of the city rather than endure the threatened servitude. They had already for more than a week been making preparations for the catastrophe, and in penitential garments had visited the churches and performed other like services of piety. Now, as the final hour had come, they were determined to transcend the example set them by Rochelle, and not to survive the loss of home. When it became certain that the enemy could no longer be kept off and that Falkenberg had fallen, they executed their determination. At more than twelve points the city was at the same time set on fire, and, except the cathedral and about fifty houses, sank into soot and ashes. It was not Tilly and his men, therefore, but Magdeburg's own people, who kindled the city to its conflagration. What part Falkenberg had in this tragic catastrophe, whether he gave the command for firing the Council-house, cannot be established by authentic testimony. But numerous statements make it probable that he had made preparations to this end with the purpose of leaving to the foe but a heap of ruins.

The opinion, that the defenders of Magdeburg themselves caused the destruction of their city, is established by contemporary Protestant testimony and by the most thorough and eminently successful investigations of a recent Protestant historian (Wittich). Tilly's report also will, according to the testimony of his enemies and the critical investigations just referred to, have the more weight from its having been addressed to Maximilian of Bavaria, from whom he would certainly conceal nothing

in regard to the measures employed by him. After mentioning that the city, by divine aid, had been taken by storm, he further relates "that on this occasion a great misfortune occurred, in that a conflagration arose during the storming, which the enemy, according to the universal testimony of the prisoners, intentionally and wickedly kindled, in order that the city might not bring us any good." *

The Margrave was taken prisoner in the capture of Magdeburg, delivered to the Emperor, and by him removed to Austria. The terrors of the siege and the ensuing catastrophe made, according to his statements, such an impression upon his mind that it was an easy matter for some Catholic priests, among whom was Father Lamormain, when they had got him away from his associates, to convert him from his former faith. His change of faith had for him the good effect that the Emperor afterwards, in the peace negotiations of Prague, took an interest in him, and requested for him a pension from the Elector of Saxony as an offset against the loss of Magdeburg; and so his bodily needs were met.

Gustavus Adolphus was, by the news of the fall of Magdeburg and its cruel fate, deeply moved, and, although he was doubtless informed that Falkenberg and

* Two views will be taken of the moral question here involved: Was not Tilly to be blamed—if, indeed, there was to be blame attached to any one—for the burning of the city, even though the people of Magdeburg themselves set it on fire? Were the citizens, about to be robbed of all they possessed, blamable for placing it beyond the conqueror's reach? There is no word in these volumes which speaks more of the perverted sense of right which then prevailed than does the word "wickedly" (*aus Bosheit*) which Tilly here uses. It shows that he regarded the property as all belonging to the Catholics by right, and deemed it wicked to deprive them of it. The Protestant party often showed similar feeling.—TR.

the people themselves caused the burning of the city, he represented the matter in his later proclamations as if the guilt belonged to the imperialists. The terrible fate of the city too well justifies the complaints, and the King did not hesitate, against his better knowledge, to lay the burden upon Tilly. He repeatedly called upon his adherents to avenge the cruel proceeding of Tilly in the treatment of Magdeburg; but he never went so far as to charge him with the burning.

IV.

We have, in its proper place, stated that the Elector of Saxony, after his personal interview with his colleague of Brandenburg (close of 1630), determined, as head of the Protestant party in Germany, to call a meeting of those of his own faith in order to deliberate in regard to the stand which the Protestants should take in their meeting with the Catholics, which was to take place at Frankfort-on-the-Main for consultation in regard to the Edict of Restitution. John George labored to convince the Emperor that the meeting was only in anticipation of that which was to meet in Frankfort, and endeavored, as far as possible, to clothe it in the garments of loyalty. But in spite of the undoubtedly peaceful feeling of the Elector, it was certain that a convention of the Protestant Estates would not, in considering what they had suffered, form conclusions favorable to the Emperor, and that they would, at all events, deliberate also in regard to entering into friendly relations with the King of Sweden.

At the meeting which took place February 20, 1631, at Leipsic, there were, besides the Electors of Saxony and

Brandenburg, eight Princes present in person, twelve more were represented by envoys, as also six imperial cities, and besides these were numerous counsellors, jurists, and theologians, as representatives of their respective sovereigns.

The first subject of deliberation appears in the question, whether—and if so, under what instructions—the Protestant Princes should send representatives to the coming Diet at Frankfort. In considering this question, regard for the Emperor did not long prevail. The Elector of Brandenburg, who for years had shown no special energy, and had cautiously abstained from joining the Swedes, now made the motion that in the meeting at Frankfort the revocation of the Edict of Restitution should be demanded, and that the Emperor should be requested to withdraw his troops from the Protestant territories. When John George afterwards put the question as to the ground which should be taken in regard to the imposition of war burdens for the future, the Elector of Brandenburg again came forward with determination and advised against the toleration of further violence, and that no payment of contributions, no billeting of soldiers, no mustering and no passage of troops through their territories should be granted, and that the Princes should appeal to arms in support of this action. The offering of propositions of such boundless range, by a Prince who had been so cautious and timid, broke the spell which had hitherto held the assembly bound. His spirited language was approved by the Diet, with the exception of the representatives of the imperial cities, who excused their making no expression on the ground of insufficient instruction, but who, nevertheless, gave assurance that their parishes would certainly not separate

themselves from the others. The Elector of Saxony now declared that he would, at his own cost, raise 11,000 foot and horse, and thus aid those Estates who would assume reciprocal obligations, which offer was accepted by all the Princes represented in the Diet, while the delegates from the cities gave hope of the same. The motion was then made that this alliance be not limited to the members present, but extended to all Protestant Germany, North and South, and that it be organized in the manner of the League. All these declarations and motions received a unanimous approval. The Elector of Brandenburg stated that he would arm 5,000 men. The Saxon princes and the counts and nobles of the Upper Saxon Circle mentioned the sums of money which they would raise for the general arming, which sums were chiefly to pass through the hands of Electoral Saxony. This readiness for sacrifice was shown on all sides, and, if John George had possessed more determination, he would at this moment have declared war against the Emperor and assumed among the Protestants the place occupied by Maximilian among the Catholics. But John George would not consent to an immediate assault, and therefore persistently set himself against a proposition of the Elector of Brandenburg, who seemed to have lost all his faint-heartedness, recommending the conclusion of an alliance with Sweden, in which he found the warmest support from Landgrave William of Cassel, who, true to the example of his father, charged with cowardice all who should not seize their weapons. The determination of the two latter Princes did not, however, meet a corresponding response from the members of the Diet, who seemed to think that they had done enough in deciding to arm. We here remark that this decision was followed

by all the Protestant Imperial Estates which had not taken part in the Leipsic meeting. Württemberg, Baden, and the South German free cities armed and forcibly refused all contributions to the imperial troops, and thus prepared for the Catholics many uncomfortable hours. The Landgrave of Darmstadt alone remained true to the Catholic alliance.

Before they separated, two members of the Diet addressed a communication to the Emperor, in which they declared that they regarded the Edict of Restitution as illegal, and that they could attend the meeting at Frankfort only with this view. To this the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg added that they would pay no contributions and tolerate no mustering-places. Indeed, the latter of these Princes rose to such a height of boldness as to declare that he regarded the further payment of contributions, which should be applied solely to the suppression of Protestantism, as an outrage, for the words which Tacitus applied to Britain—that it was always paying for and feeding its own servitude*—might well be used of him and his allies. A similar but rather milder paper was addressed also by the Diet to the Catholic Electors. It was designed to admonish them that they should give to the envoys who were to represent them at Frankfort-on-the-Main temperate instructions. Germany could be preserved from the atrocities of war only by an adjustment between the Catholics and Protestants, and an adjustment, too, to which the Emperor, as well as the King of Sweden, should be obliged to conform.

The Frankfort meeting was to take place in the month of February, 1631, and in fact the instructions were made

* "*Servitatem suam quotidie emat et quotidie pascit.*"

out at the imperial court for the envoys to it in January. By the meeting in Leipsic, however, a delay was caused, and the Catholics would perhaps have allowed the Frankfort meeting to fail entirely, and would have paid no attention to the Leipsic warning, if the events of the war had not daily assumed for them a sadder aspect. In July, however, it was determined to hold the meeting, for even Saxony was not opposed to it, but the endless delays then connected with the conducting of business made it August and the beginning of September before the representatives of both sides appeared in Frankfort, and the imperial commissioners did not arrive until the 15th of September, but two days before the battle of Breitenfeld.

As the Frankfort meeting forms but a dumb episode, we shall quickly dispose of it here. On the Catholic side were fourteen, on the Protestant twenty-one, Estates represented. From the instructions which the imperial and Catholic commissioners had received, no good result was to be expected. The Emperor's representatives were instructed to surrender no point of the Edict of Restitution, and at most only to concede somewhat in regard to the manner of execution.* The envoys of the Princes of the League were to make the Treaty of Passau and the Edict of Restitution their starting-point, and to enter into no transactions until this basis should be accepted by their opponents. On the contrary, the Protestants desired absolutely to ignore the Edict of Restitution, and demanded that their possessions be restored to the condition of 1620. When, accordingly, Counsellor Hildebrand, acting for the chief imperial ambassador,

* The original has the Latin : "*Modo executionis.*"—TR.

Baron von Stadion, who had been taken ill, opened the session, he expressed himself in the sense of the imperial instructions, and as the Protestants did not skulk behind the mountain, but demanded the restoration of the condition of 1620, the antagonisms rushed into collision with each other. When the news of the defeat at Breitenfeld reached Frankfort, it made the Catholics no more yielding, and the imperial ambassadors even threatened that Ferdinand would refuse to ratify any concessions which those of the League might make; the latter needed, however, no threatening, for they were equally stiff and inflexible in regard to the Edict of Restitution.

This irrational stubbornness was shared, after the battle of Breitenfeld, neither in Vienna nor in Munich. The Emperor and the Elector were ready for new negotiations, and upon another basis, as appears from a letter of Maximilian to his representatives, in which he expressly declares that the Catholic side has now every reason to make use of kind means. He does not say this because he was "disposed at once to let his hand drop, and surrender to the discretion of the opposite party, but because he simply desired to meet the threatening danger." This declaration contained, however, no definite directions, nor had the imperial ambassadors, on account of the dismay which prevailed in Vienna, received any other instructions, and the course of the business took, therefore, no better turn, so that the Catholic ambassadors, on the 13th of October, broke it off, on the ostensible ground that the parties were insufficiently instructed. Not this discovery, however, but probably the fear of falling into the hands of the Swedes, who already held Würzburg, precipitated the breaking up of the meeting.

V.

Gustavus Adolphus, who would have been glad to be invited to the Leipsic meeting, cherished great hopes from its action, and expected that the Protestant Estates would join him. He was in this respect deceived, but he could feel sure that the armaments determined upon would in a measure paralyze the movements of the Catholic war force, and in the end lead to a collision. He desired, however, not to rest upon unsafe presumptions, but to feel firm ground under his feet. He negotiated, therefore, with Landgrave William of Hesse Cassel in regard to an immediate union, into which William warmly entered. This treaty, though but provisionally concluded, was of weighty significance. Aside from Gustavus Adolphus' engagement to attempt the restoration to the Landgrave of the territory which had been taken from him by an imperial decision in favor of his brother, in an inheritance process, and to defend his right to the lands and cities which the League had wrested from him, the Landgrave bound himself to a "steadfast alliance" with Sweden, to last just as long as he should not be secure against religious oppression—that is, probably forever. In this treaty was conveyed to the King of Sweden the chief command of the troops of the two parties and the control of the common funds. By this alliance, after the model of which Gustavus Adolphus afterwards concluded several others, a wound was inflicted upon the German state system, for which the Elector of Brandenburg afterwards made his Saxon colleague responsible. According to his view, the King of Sweden could not justly have made stipulations of this nature if the Leipsic Diet had con-

cluded with him the desired alliance. But for the time Gustavus Adolphus had concluded his federations only with Hesse Cassel, Pomerania, and the city of Magdeburg, and was laboring, half by persuasion, half by force, to add to these his brother-in-law, the Elector of Brandenburg, accordingly employing to this end his transactions in reference to a free passage by way of Custrin and Spandau.

The King could not, indeed, feel safe in Frankfort-on-the-Oder unless a way of possible retreat along the Oder—that is, by way of Custrin—were constantly open to him and this fortress at the same time closed against the imperialists. He was not satisfied with the free passage which the Elector offered him, but demanded the surrender of Custrin and Spandau, by which latter place his advance along the Havel towards the Elbe was to be supported. This the Elector—partly with reference to the Emperor, of whom he was still in constant dread, and partly from fear of Gustavus Adolphus—was unwilling to grant; and so the negotiations were prosecuted for fourteen days without results. In order to bring these to a conclusion, the King went from Frankfort to Berlin, and offered the Elector a “complete union,” accompanied with the threat that, if George William should not consent to this, he should be obliged to regard him as an enemy, since he could tolerate no neutrality. The result of this threat was that the Elector received a Swedish garrison in Spandau, and in relation to Custrin executed a contract by which the fortress was to be always open for him to pass, while it was to be closed against the imperialists.

Scarcely had the two Princes completed this agreement, when the news of Magdeburg's fall reached Berlin. The King was now more than ever dissatisfied with the con-

cessions made, and again demanded a complete union with him, and at the same time the chief command of the united army. Even now the Elector did not fully come to these terms: he was ready, indeed, to take upon himself higher obligations; he would furnish daily 15,000 loaves of bread, or a corresponding amount of grain, but would not join with the Swedes until he should have agreed with Electoral Saxony upon this point.

Since the Leipzig meeting, Gustavus Adolphus had repeatedly requested the alliance of the Elector of Saxony, and supported his request by the remark that only by this alliance could he command a force sufficient for an attack upon Tilly and save Magdeburg. But John George would not consent to the alliance; he thought he had already done quite enough for the Protestant cause, and had moreover a distrust of the King of Sweden and his lust of conquest. Furthermore, the Emperor had, by an envoy who brought with him a vague declaration—by no means a positive promise—in regard to the Edict of Restitution, awakened in him new hopes of a peaceable adjustment. As nothing favorable arrived from John George, George William fell again into doubts, and demanded that Spandau be surrendered back to him, and so the negotiations again took a bad turn. This put an end to the King's patience. He sent from Spandau a categorical demand that the Elector should join him, or be treated as an enemy. George William was not brought by this threat to yield, but repeated his declaration that he could make no definitive promise without the concurrence of Electoral Saxony; and the King sent him word that on the following day (June 19, 1631) he should evacuate Spandau, and thenceforward treat him as an enemy. In fact the King advanced against

Berlin with his army, and was already arranging for its bombardment, requested, however, still a final declaration from the Elector. He received this, and rejected it as unsatisfactory, at which point the mother of the Elector, and all the other princesses, went out to his camp, and besought him to abstain from hostile acts. Encouraged by the friendliness with which he received the ladies, the Elector himself went to him in the afternoon, and by a personal interchange of views, the King succeeded in obtaining the Elector's concurrence in all his demands. In the treaty which was now concluded between Sweden and Brandenburg, the Elector obligated himself to aid the King with 30,000 thalers monthly and to convey to him the control of his army and his fortifications. He was obliged also to concur in the treaty of Gustavus Adolphus and the Duke of Pomerania, and thus to give the death-blow to his claims upon this Duchy, as it was improbable that he would ever be able from his own means to pay the immense costs of the war so as to release it from the Swedish sequestration. These were bitter pills which the Elector was made to swallow, and the more bitter as he distinctly perceived that his brother-in-law was aiming at the dominion of the Baltic and its ports, and was thus menacing his interests in the extreme. But the conviction that complete ruin awaited him from the success of the imperial arms, and Gustavus Adolphus' assurance that he should do him no harm, helped him to swallow the dose.

VI.

The war was now resumed by Gustavus Adolphus with fresh courage. First, he rejoiced in the intelligence that

Greifswalde had, on the 15th of June, fallen into his hands and that the Dukes of Mecklenburg, with some men enlisted by them, had begun to act on the offensive, designing to expel the remaining imperial garrisons from their territory. He issued orders from Spandau, whither he had returned, for the concentration of larger bodies of troops at Old Brandenburg, and moved thence towards the Elbe (July 9th). He would gladly now have ascended the stream, in order to wrest Magdeburg out of the hands of the enemy, but felt too weak, and accordingly decided for the present to establish himself at Werben, and there await the arrival of the English auxiliaries which King Charles I. designed to send in aid of the restoration of his brother-in-law. If Tilly had promptly, after the reduction of Magdeburg, pressed forward, as the eager Pappenheim urged, he would, perhaps, have beaten the King of Sweden, who had, at that time, but the weak support of Brandenburg's forces. But the gray-headed general was no longer so quick and bold as he had been, and felt, moreover, cramped in his movements by the military preparations of the Protestant Princes. He was, therefore, unwilling to hazard a decisive stroke until the imperialists should be sent back from Italy, and he should have routed the forces of the Duke of Würtemberg and the Margrave of Baden, and then filled up his own ranks. Further, the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel gave him, by his energetic war preparations—which disregard of the imperial admonitions he excused by referring to the resolutions passed at Leipsic—an ever-increasing concern. The Landgrave was supported by Dukes William and Bernard of Weimar, in union with whom he collected, in June, 1631, 7,000 men, and placed them in the fortresses of Cassel and Ziegenheim. Tilly decided first to rid himself



of this enemy, and advanced for the purpose, towards the end of July, to Mühlhausen, but remained inactive there for three weeks, and finally marched back again towards the Elbe to Wollmirstedt without an assault upon his feeble enemy.

Gustavus Adolphus, who was at Werben, only about forty miles distant from Tilly, whose attack he was expecting, determined to draw to himself all his troops, so far as he was not obliged to use them in holding important places between the Elbe and the Oder. On the 27th of July he received the news that the enemy had been seen at Burgstall, and instantly took three brigades, with which he gave battle to their vanguard, consisting of three regiments, and nearly annihilated them. He then returned to prepare, at Werben, for the reception of the main body. Tilly advanced, notwithstanding this discomfiture, with his whole army, numbering about 21,000 men, towards the Swedish camp; but having received (on the 6th of August) another similar check, withdrew again. For the first time Gustavus Adolphus and Tilly had confronted each other, and no general battle had been brought on, and yet engagements, not indeed insignificant, had taken place, in which the Swedes had been victors. The general sensation which the sudden fall of Frankfort-on-the-Oder had awakened was, by these successes, though they were indcisive, augmented. The German Protestants already discerned in Gustavus Adolphus their invincible hero. Successes were now multiplied in Mecklenburg, where but three places remained in the hands of the enemy; so that the Dukes, in the presence of Gustavus Adolphus, were able to make their formal entry into their old residence. All these successes were, however, transcended when a revolution

took place in the course of the Elector of Saxony, and drove him also into the arms of the King.

It is clear from our narrative how John George, by the calling of the Leipsic meeting, and the arming which immediately followed, was drawn into a course hostile to the Emperor, in which, however, he hesitated to draw the last conclusion and join the Swedes. To say nothing of other reasons of his hesitation, he looked upon the King as a foreigner, who had stepped upon German soil with the bearing of a ruler; and so his patriotism, and those kindred impulses which admonished him of the obligation of fidelity to the common fatherland, fettered his decisions. To this was added that the Emperor placed before him the prospect of some, though by no means well-defined, concessions in the Edict of Restitution, and in the reconsideration of the Mecklenburg process—that is, the restoration of the Dukes of Mecklenburg. Finally, the fall of Magdeburg also disheartened him in regard to a union with Sweden, and led him to assure the imperial ambassador then with him that he should remain neutral. This assurance was not, however, satisfactory in Vienna. It was demanded of him that he should unite his arms with those of the Emperor, or, at the least, disarm. Tilly was instructed to act in this sense, and as he in his advance was constantly checked by the apprehension that the Saxon troops might fall upon his rear, this direction was welcome to him, and he made the categorical demand of the Elector to act accordingly. Whether John George would have obeyed, if the circumstances had not been changed, may be reasonably doubted; but now he had a special reason for not doing so. A few weeks before, Tilly had embittered him by demanding of him to restore all the ecclesiastical possessions, thus pay-

ing no regard to the promise made him (1620) in Mühlhausen. The Elector's answer to the demand for disarming was a negative.

Tilly threatened violent measures in case his demand was not conceded ; and so the Elector was obliged to take the step in regard to which he had so long hesitated, and negotiate an alliance with Sweden. Before this was concluded he had an interview at Torgau with the Elector of Brandenburg, discussing there the conditions which John George should demand of Gustavus Adolphus. While they were together, M. Delisle arrived in the place for the purpose of mediating in behalf of Louis XIII. an adjustment between the League and the Protestants. A few weeks before, France had concluded with Maximilian the treaty already mentioned, the purpose of which was that the League should neither make war with the Protestants nor protect the Emperor. Delisle was not instructed to mediate an alliance between the Catholics and Protestants such as was projected in the year 1630, but merely to effect a state of amity between them, with a condition which France had not up to this time expressly conceded to the Protestants—that is, that the Edict of Restitution should be “adjusted and moderated,” in effect that it should, in their further negotiations, be in reality nullified. As long, however, as the Catholic Estates should not manifest the desired spirit of concession, the King of France consented that the Protestants, in union with Sweden, should advance with fire and sword into the territories of the League. These declarations were greeted with satisfaction in Torgau, and hastened to their conclusion the negotiations with Sweden.

The alliance was concluded on the 1st of September, and bound the allies in the closest union, conveyed to

the King the chief direction of the army affairs, and was in this respect more advantageous to the Elector of Saxony than was to the Elector of Brandenburg the one previously concluded with him, in that it bound John George to no subsidies, and still Gustavus executed an obligation, that he would in no wise imperil the Elector's governmental authority. A few days before the treaty was concluded, Tilly had issued the order to his troops to advance into Saxony. The moment in which the treaty was to stand its trial had therefore arrived before the treaty itself was complete. Gustavus Adolphus now caused his troops to enter the Electoral territory, having somewhat earlier allowed some small detachments to pass the boundary. On the 15th of September the two allies met for the first time at Düben, and here also their two armies, numbering about 20,000 each, united. A council of war was now held. It was the wish of the King to reduce the enemy to straits and compel his withdrawal. John George, however, favored an open field-fight. This bold counsel finally won the King's approval, and he determined to advance to Leipsic, and there attack the enemy, who in the meantime had forced this city to pay a contribution and receive a garrison. On the day after the entry of the imperial troops into Leipsic, the Swedish army, which by new auxiliaries had been raised to nearly 27,000 men, made its appearance, and together with the Saxons formed an army of 47,000, upon the great plain which spreads itself out from Wolkau towards Leipsic. Tilly had also drawn to himself all the forces which he had at his control, and especially by forming a junction with Count Fürstenberg, who had returned from Italy with 10,000 men and had on his way compelled the South German States to disarm. But the imperial commander

numbered a few thousand less than his enemy, over whom, however, he had an advantage in the placing of his men. He occupied the heights, and thus rendered the attack more difficult. He was also favored by the direction of the wind.

It was on the 17th of September that the King of Sweden opened, by some manœuvres which gained for him the "half-wind" of the enemy, the battle which is designated in history as the battle of Breitenfeld, or Leipsic. A dangerous way by which his army must pass, crossing the Loderbrook, offered the enemy the welcome opportunity to damage him greatly by a lively cannonade. At the same time Pappenheim made an attempt, by one of his customary dashing cavalry attacks, on the left wing where he commanded, to decide the battle at once, but in his heat ventured too far and fell into a position which was rendered critical by the fact that Gustavus himself commanded the wing thus attacked, and had so fitly placed some select companies of infantry, alternately with his cavalry, as to give their weapons the advantage. Pappenheim saw that he was lost unless he should be largely supported by Tilly, and sent to the latter for the aid of several thousand men. The commander obeyed his wish, but ordered him to withdraw immediately. Pappenheim could not, however, execute this order as was desired, and sustained heavy losses, which drew after them consequences still worse. Tilly now saw himself compelled to enter the contest and to give up the advantageous position which till then he had held. It was about the hour of one to two o'clock in the afternoon when the battle with "great fury" began. Tilly, by advancing, masked his own batteries, and lost their support, but yet in attacking the enemy's left wing exposed himself to its



severest fire. He was thus forced to sway to the right, by which he was first brought into collision with the Saxon troops. The violent attack which he ordered with a couple of cuirassier regiments, commanded by Colonel Kronenburg, had quite a different result from the unfortunate one of Pappenheim. The Saxons forsook their cannon and fled, in spite of the entreaties of their Elector, who was finally also compelled to join the flight, and did not come to a stand until he reached Eilenburg. This caused the greatest distraction in a portion of the artillery train, a part of its men having joined in the flight. Only the Saxon general, Arnim, with the troops under his command, bravely stood his ground throughout the day.

It was just this defeat of the Saxons that prepared Gustavus Adolphus' way to victory. The imperialists, commanded by Count Fürstenberg, pursued the flying Saxons, and the rest of the army followed in the same direction. The King seized upon this moment for an assault. The imperial cavalry were the first to give way before this stroke and take to flight. It was otherwise with the infantry, which, in spite of the rising danger, maintained their resistance. Now came the crisis of an obstinate and desperate struggle, which increased in intensity, so that it was long doubtful which side would be victorious. The decision was finally brought about by General Horn, who, at the head of a cavalry regiment and a section of infantry, attacked the enemy's battalions with such contempt of death as to break, finally, their ranks. Only four regiments escaped with a degree of order, while all the rest who had not fallen upon the field, or been captured, fled in broken bands. If Leipsic had not served the flying as a shelter, and night had not spread its protecting mantle over them, nearly the whole imperial army would have

been lost, for Gustavus reaped on this day the fruits of his victory by the most energetic pursuit of the enemy.*

This battle had for the imperial army the saddest consequences: 10,000 to 12,000 of its men had fallen in the battle or been wounded, 7,000 were taken prisoners, and a part broken up. Tilly, who was himself wounded, escaped to Halle, and the next day to Halberstadt, attended by about thirty officers. Pappenheim sought, by his activity after the defeat, to repair the loss occasioned by his error. After having personally taken part in the battle, and "slain about fourteen of the enemy with his own hand," he endeavored to collect the scattered men, and succeeded in bringing together to himself about forty cavalry companies, and entered with them upon a retreat. It was a result of his efforts that twelve days later Tilly was able to report to the Emperor that he had over 8,000 foot and 5,000 horse again under his command—adding, however, that these were mostly without arms, that he was also without the necessary artillery, and that rescue could be expected only by a junction with the remainder of the troops which had returned from Italy and been stationed in Hesse, together with which, new forces should at the same time be raised by the Emperor.

This battle had, in fact, a boundless import in two

* It would seem from other accounts—that of Schiller, for instance—as if the King's disposition of his troops had been made with reference to just such a course as the battle finally took, that he not only disposed his sections at considerable intervals, so as to extend his lines and make the necessary movements easy, but placed quite an interval between the Swedes and the Saxons, in order that the retreat of the latter might not carry his Swedes with it. This plan made it possible for him to end the battle as he did. The result cannot, therefore, be numbered with the pure accidents of battle. The King had planned beforehand to turn a partial defeat, should it occur, into a victory.—*TR.*

directions. It showed beyond dispute that Gustavus Adolphus was, as a commander, far superior to his antagonist, and that the improvements first introduced by him in the disposition and use of his troops stood the test and menaced the ablest antagonist with new defeats. The further result of the battle was this, that the war need no longer be carried on in Protestant territories, but might be transferred to those of the Princes of the League (which for many years had been visited by no enemy), and prosecuted at their cost. What could Gustavus Adolphus effect if he commanded the resources of the Catholics, and in using these were bound by no regard for them? No small dread of his ambition now came into the minds of his Protestant allies. For the common man, however, in North Germany, who only remembered the robberies committed upon him by the imperialists, and the untold sufferings which followed in their train, and with these bore in mind also the threatened religious oppression, and who had no apprehension of the anxieties of the Princes in regard to Gustavus Adolphus' plans of extension, but yielded himself trustingly to his proclamations, announcing that he drew the sword only for the faith,—the victory won at Leipsic had no drop of wormwood. He looked up to Gustavus Adolphus as to a redeemer, and as such deified him; this deification was the more easy to him when he knew that he and the King, who spoke excellent German, could agree together in conversation. The King was to him no foreigner, but was one with himself.

CHAPTER III.

THE NEUTRALITY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEAGUE AND THE BATTLE ON THE LECH.

- I. The further Progress of the War and the Alliances after the Battle of Breitenfeld. The Taking of Mentz. II. The Neutrality Negotiations. Extensive Plans of Gustavus Adolphus. III. The Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg desire to open Peace Negotiations, in order to check the growing Ambition of Gustavus Adolphus. End of the Neutrality Negotiations. IV. Endeavors of the Vienna Statesmen to form new Alliances. Pope Urban VIII. V. The War to the Battle on the Lech. South Germany overrun by the Swedes.

I.

THE news of the defeat caused, perhaps, in Munich even a greater sensation of alarm than in Vienna, because the Elector of Bavaria felt himself in special danger. He had not approved of the imperial order for an invasion of Electoral Saxony, but had rather desired that the Elector should by all means be spared, that he might not be driven into the arms of the King of Sweden; and now he was obliged to learn that Tilly had made the attack and had employed in it the troops of the League, and that the Elector of Saxony declared all the League's friendly assurances to be but pretences. Upon the other Catholics the first effect produced by the defeat was, as we have already stated, that they broke off their negotiations at Frankfort-on-the-Main and left the city. They could not, in fact, expect to persuade their opponents to make the smallest concession, and, as they could not themselves decide to

give way at all, the business must come to an end. On the other hand, the Landgrave of Darmstadt felt called upon to offer himself as a mediator of peace, and proposed a meeting at Mühlhausen for the settlement of the questions of difference between the Catholics and the Protestants. When the Emperor and the Elector of Bavaria were informed of this, they were disposed to send representatives to the meeting; Saxony would have done the same, and it would perhaps have resulted in the withdrawal of the Edict of Restitution: but Gustavus Adolphus would hear nothing of negotiation. To his ambition now lay open a boundless field of activity; the prospect of acquiring the Baltic coast no longer satisfied him; the agitation went on within him, and filled him with thoughts of founding a dominion on Catholic territory. All negotiations could not but be unpleasant to him, because he would not even have been able to come out openly with his desires in regard to the Baltic, much less with his other plans, and the war must, therefore, be further prosecuted.

Gustavus Adolphus could now at will carry on the war decisively in two directions: he could pursue and destroy Tilly, and invade the possessions of the Princes of the League, or he could enter the almost defenceless hereditary lands of the Emperor. If he had left the former of these problems to be solved by his German allies, they would scarcely, indeed, have effected the solution, but certainly would have wrought so much as to have left their enemies with no great advantage over them, while, by himself advancing into Bohemia and Moravia, he would have overthrown the Emperor, who had at his command but the wretched remains of an army, and the many thousands of enemies of the new system of govern-

ment which these lands still continued to harbor would have been able to render him the most important services in his march to Vienna. The overthrow of the Hapsburgs, and the restoration of the Elective Kingdom of Bohemia, did not, however, occupy the first place in the King's active mind. He was lured by the wealth of the bishoprics on the Rhine and the Main, by the conquest of which he hoped to gain the means for the founding of that dominion of his dreams which should have its centre, not in Austria, but in Germany. In his counselings, therefore, with the Elector of Saxony, in regard to the prosecution of the war, he so assigned the parts as to reserve the contest with the League to himself and commit to John George the expedition to Bohemia.

It may not be without interest to our readers to learn that the Elector of Saxony, before accepting this task, sought an opinion from his council and his court preacher, Hoë, as to whether he, as a Christian and a vassal of the Empire, was justifiable in making war upon the Emperor. Important decisions were not made in Dresden, any more than in Vienna and Madrid, until they had received also the concurrence of the theologians. The laity always looked only at the actual or supposed advantage of the State, and what their counsel would be was a matter of reasonable conjecture. The theologians based their judgments upon Christian principles, and these, therefore, might have always been definitely determined beforehand. But in cases of pressing necessity the theologians accommodated themselves to the lay judgment, although, to save appearances, they sought theological reasons for their fluctuations. We shall, in this respect, adduce interesting proofs from Vienna and Madrid, and it is hardly worthy of special mention here that

Hoë knew how to so interpret the Christian precept in regard to obeying higher powers, as not only to make it the Elector's right, but his duty, to take up arms against the Emperor. John George could now, with a quiet conscience, accept the task assigned him.

Scarcely had Gustavus Adolphus entered upon his campaign on the Rhine and the Main, when he attempted to make use of his victory at Breitenfeld for the purpose of rendering his various existing alliances with the German Princes more intimate, and of forming also new ones. His first attempt was with Brandenburg, whither he sent his counsellor, Salvius (end of September, 1631), instructed to demand not only the continued payment of the subsidies as hitherto, but also to present the draft of a treaty by which the federation between Brandenburg and Sweden was to be of perpetual duration, the King to have the absolute command in the war, and the Elector to be bound to recognize the Pomeranian treaty. There was no inclination in Berlin to accept these conditions, because they not only involved a surrender of all hereditary claims upon Pomerania, but also placed Brandenburg in a worse condition relatively to Sweden than that which it occupied in relation to the Empire. The negotiations ended without result, and the previous alliance remained in force, with but the modification that Brandenburg no longer paid the stipulated subsidies. Fewer difficulties, as it appeared, were to be met in the conclusion of an alliance between Sweden and the Lower Saxon Circle. At the Diet assembled in Hamburg, at the end of October, Salvius asked for the raising and support by the Circle of an army of 6,500 men, which should be united with the forces of the Dukes of Mecklenburg, and be under the command of Gustavus Adolphus. In regard to this latter condition, all sorts of

doubts arose ; there was a preference for giving the chief command to Electoral Saxony, and for the time no fixed decision was made. The arming was, however, immediately completed, and several of the Estates accepted for themselves the conditions, so that Gustavus in this way was soon in command of a portion of the forces of the Lower Saxon Circle. Still earlier was matured an alliance with the Princes of Weimar on the basis of an auxiliary force subject to the command of Gustavus Adolphus, which was followed by one with the Princes of Anhalt. These preparations made it possible for the King to think of placing in the field a second army, which should be made up of the scattered garrisons of the North, collected and strengthened by new reinforcements, which army, under the command of Banér, was to undertake the siege of Magdeburg. A third, which was being raised on the Lower Elbe, under Tott's command, was to take possession of Stade and the other places of Mecklenburg, and establish itself in the Archbishopric of Bremen. Gustavus Adolphus reckoned upon having, in a very short time, 68,000 men of his own and his allies under his command, not including with these the contingents of Saxony and Brandenburg. We may remark here that the Swedes had no trouble with the siege of Magdeburg, for the imperialists voluntarily surrendered the place.

During the next ten days after the battle of Breitenfeld the King marched only to Halle. On the 27th of September he moved against the city of Erfurt, in the Electorate of Mentz, and entered the same, it having been surrendered the day before without resistance to Duke William of Weimar. From Erfurt he passed on to the Bishopric of Würzburg, the bishop having fled before his arrival, thus setting an example for numerous bishops

and canons. On the 10th of October the city of Würzburg offered to surrender. The castle, however, stood a siege, which ended in its capture by storm on the 18th of October. With the castle an immense booty fell into the victor's hands, for the most valuable treasures from far and near had been placed there in fancied security.

After this success Gustavus Adolphus took some steps indicating the plan for establishing a dominion in the interior of Germany, which had within a few days been developed in his mind. He organized the government of the bishopric, now deserted by its ruler, and proclaimed to all the Estates and subjects of "his Duchy of Franconia"—he gave this name to the bishopric and the other ecclesiastical possessions which he conquered—that he demanded from them the homage of a hereditary sovereign, and that they were accordingly to regard him as such. In view of the oath of homage no doubt could arise as to his intention, for every one was to swear to recognize the King of Sweden and his posterity as the sole and hereditary sovereigns of the land, and yet, in a precautionary way, was added that this oath should be in force only until the King should have formed some "other connection." This word, so broad in its meaning, pointed to a renunciation of Franconia in favor of the old German Empire, but under the word "connection" (Ger., *Vereinigung*) any new arrangement which further successes on the battle-field might enable him to make might be hidden. The new government sought to apply all the incomes of the land to the King's uses, and paid no regard to the ecclesiastical possessions; the monasteries were secularized, and their lands given to individual Swedish officers, or bestowed upon some prominent adherents whom the King had found among the German nobility. The Catholics were

compelled to taste in their own experience the sorrows under which they had, by their confiscations, caused their antagonists to sigh.

How was Tilly occupied during these events? After his defeat he had gone to Halberstadt, there collected his troops, and with them proceeded to Corvey, where he formed a union with the soldiers of the Archbishop of Cologne. When he learned here that Gustavus Adolphus was not in pursuit of him, but had gone to Thuringia, he marched to Hesse, received there the rest of the troops returned from Italy, and there stationed under the command of Aldringen, and those also of Fugger, thus raising his force to 18,000 foot and 182 platoons of horse. He now desired to attempt the relief of Würzburg. On his way thither the Duke of Lorraine joined him with 12,000 men. Duke Charles had for years been preparing to connect himself with the imperial cause: we have already learned how he desired to declare against Louis XIII., at the time of the siege of Rochelle. In April, 1630, while the war in Italy still raged, the Emperor requested his support in the attack then contemplated upon several fortresses on the French frontier, and the Duke may, as early as that time, have given him favorable assurances, for his plan involved nothing less than a separation from France, and union with Germany. It was now, however, that he first came decidedly, and in spite of the danger with which the alliance of France with Sweden, and the victory of Gustavus Adolphus might threaten him, to the Emperor's aid.

When the King of Sweden was informed of the approach of his antagonist, he left his camp at the head of about 6,000 men, fell upon the enemy by night, and inflicted upon them such damage that they no more ventured near him.

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Tilly, in his retreat, was so cast down that no further hope was set upon him, and his relief from duty seemed an urgent necessity. Fortunately for the defeated army, the King pursued them now as little as he did after the battle of Breitenfeld, but moved, the middle of November, from Würzburg to Frankfort-on-the-Main, forced this city to conclude a treaty with him, on the terms already stated, and finally closed one also with Landgrave George of Darmstadt, by which the latter bound himself to the surrender of the fortress of Rüsselsheim for the war. That Gustavus treated this Prince, who was regarded as an apostate from the Protestants, so mildly, had its ground in the fact that the Landgrave had married the daughter of the Elector of Saxony. The King could not treat as an enemy the son-in-law of his ally, when the latter imploringly intervened, and so he contented himself with plucking the finest feather from his plumage. He came now to the taking of Mentz, the central point of the provinces of the Main and the Rhine. The Elector of Mentz endeavored to avert his fate by negotiations, in which he would probably have bound himself to some payments, but the King declined these, and pleaded in apology that the Elector "had so lightly declined his proffered friendship." What was the nature of this friendship, which the King had sent from Würzburg, and offered to the three ecclesiastical Electors, appears best in the demands which he made conditional to it. Each of the three was to pay him monthly 40,000 thalers, and all were to open their passes to him, to render no aid to the Emperor, and to tolerate the adherents of the Augsburg Confession in their territories.

As the Elector could expect no friendly treatment from his enemy, he left Mentz, having committed the defence

of the city to a Spanish garrison of 2,000 men. The Swedish troops swept around until they reached the Lahn, levied everywhere contributions, and finally established themselves in Kastel, which lies on the opposite side of the river from Mentz, and prepared for the assault. It almost seemed as though this would not be made, for Tilly was threatening Nuremberg, which city had formed an alliance with Gustavus; the inhabitants were calling upon him for help, and, as he wished to obey their call, he broke up his camp and moved to Frankfort. But at this latter place he received news of the withdrawal of Tilly, whose troops were incapable of any great undertaking, and "melted away like the snow in the sun." The King therefore turned his attention again to Mentz, and forced the Spanish garrison at Oppenheim to surrender the fortifications which they had built there, thus bringing him in a direct conflict with Spain, which continued to hold a part of the Lower Palatinate, and was now therefore rendering to the Elector of Mentz the above-mentioned aid. Gustavus' measures were successful. The garrison, on the 23d of December, surrendered the city of Mentz in accordance with an agreement, and now the King made use of this success by laying a heavy contribution upon the people, and by establishing here, as he had done in Würzburg, a civil and military administration.

Nearly three months had passed since the battle of Breitenfeld, and what had the King accomplished in this brief period! He had formed many alliances with parties who, in dealing with others, would never have ceased to make observations and raise objections; he had established governments in the conquered provinces, and under many difficulties had triumphantly marched through a country of about 300 miles in extent, a labor, which, considering that

it was in the winter and that the roads were in a wretched condition, must be deemed prodigious, and becomes still more so when it is borne in mind that he was in conflict with the enemy, and had a thousand other subjects demanding his counsel and decision. Is it a matter of wonder that Gustavus Adolphus, in view of such successes, and in the consciousness of his own strength, forgot the original purpose of his landing and drew his sword no longer for the protection of his oppressed kindred in the faith, but from a desire of conquest? The neutrality negotiations which now follow furnish the most convincing evidence of this charge.

II.

The transactions between France and Bavaria were concluded, as already stated, in May, 1631, by the signing of a defensive treaty of alliance. Maximilian had long hesitated, but the increasing war-dangers determined his action, and he immediately addressed to Louis XIII. the request to furnish him the stipulated aid for defence against Gustavus Adolphus. The terms of the treaty did indeed obligate the King to furnish aid against all enemies which might threaten Bavaria; but in Paris there was the less inclination to do so in this instance, because Maximilian might at any moment, by the mediation of France, conclude a treaty of neutrality with Sweden. To this Maximilian could not agree, and so France was dumb to his applications, and let the war take its course. The battle of Breitenfeld changed the situation, and inclined Maximilian to claim the French mediation for bringing about an acceptable peace. His anxiety was shared by the

Electors of Mentz and Treves, who wrote King Louis, most earnestly requesting his interposition, and placing before him such prospect of reward that the French monarch might naturally regard it as offering him a kind of protectorate over them. We do not, indeed, know whether the latter ever reached France, for it was sent to Maximilian for his signature, which he delayed in giving.

The transactions with France were now carried on through the Bavarian counsellor, Jocher, whose sovereign was unwilling to abandon the Emperor, and therefore instructed him to endeavor to convince the French that the ultimate purpose of Gustavus Adolphus was not in harmony with that of France, since he designed the overthrow of the Catholic Church and the seizure of several provinces from the Emperor, and that it would, therefore, be better if France would mediate a general peace. To this Cardinal Richelieu would by no means consent, for, if a peace should now be concluded, it would leave the Emperor without loss of territory, since Germany would have to be restored to its condition of 1621, and even that not entirely, because it was not desired that the Elector of Bavaria should be deprived of his acquisitions. The Cardinal had given support to the peace negotiations only that he might permanently reduce the power of the Hapsburgs, and the reasonings of the Bavarian plenipotentiary did not therefore meet his approval. Still hoping, however, to gain his end, he sent M. de Charnacé to Munich, in order there to bring the neutrality negotiations to a close, and thus detach the League from the Emperor. But Maximilian would on no condition abandon the Emperor, and declared that he would conclude no one-sided treaty of neutrality with Gustavus Adolphus, who would then turn his arms against the Emperor and take

from him Bohemia, and himself mount the imperial throne. He desired France to mediate a general armistice, and thus prepare the way of negotiating a peace (December 12, 1631).

Maximilian did not, however, pressed as he was by necessity, persist in his determination, though this was at least an honorable one. He had, in December, gone to Donauwerth for a personal conference with Tilly. He desired exact information from the general as to the state of the war and the prospects in regard to a further resistance. The bent form and depressed demeanor of Tilly opened the matter to him more impressively than any detailed report could have done. The old general was himself a picture of distress. He showed himself "quite perplexed and irresolute in all his counsels, declared that he knew no means of surmounting the great obstacles, that the Emperor had no resources at command except those sent by Spain, and with these complaints came an uninterrupted flow of tears." Why should not Maximilian be seized with a still greater anxiety when he learned that after the departure of the 10,000 imperialists, whom Ferdinand had called away for the defence of Bohemia, the League would have but 6,000 men left? If he entered into negotiations with France on Richelieu's basis, he knew that he not only abandoned the Emperor and his possessions, and brought upon the Catholic Church an incurable wound, but that he also dealt the death-blow to the German governmental system. But the impossibility, with the dwindling forces of the League, of a defence against the constantly growing power of the Swedes, forced him to the bitter conclusion to yield to the circumstances, declare for the neutrality, and leave the Emperor to himself.

On the 24th of December he sketched a draft of a treaty which would at least secure the League, and delivered this to St. Etienne, who, in connection with Charnacé, was invested with full power, desiring that he should lay it before King Louis, while Charnacé should go to Gustavus Adolphus to obtain his concurrence to the treaty. Maximilian obligated himself and the Princes of the League, so far as they should accede to it, to neutrality; he demanded, however, in return, that the Swedes should immediately evacuate all the territories of the League, not contest with him his dignity or the possession of the territory of the Palatinate, and that he should allow the imperial troops now dispersed in Germany an unhindered return to Ferdinand's hereditary lands. The French ambassadors agreed to these conditions, and gave assurance that their King would immediately send troops to aid in securing the League against any attack of Gustavus Adolphus; but they did not say that Richelieu had ordered the march of the troops through Alsace, the occupation of which was a matter already determined. Charnacé demanded of Maximilian the cession of Mannheim, in case the French troops should advance; which demand Maximilian did not dare decline, painful as it was to him. France had taken hold of German affairs, and desired now to establish itself in Germany, not again to withdraw. For the greater clearness of our statements in regard to these diplomatic relations, we add here that Louis XIII. (December 21, 1631) concluded a separate treaty with the Elector of Treves, by which the latter and his country were taken under the King's protection. And, on the other hand, Maximilian sent an ambassador to Ferdinand, and informed him frankly of the negotiations into which he had entered,

and of the impossibility, after what he had learned at Donauwerth, of his taking any other course. He gave assurances that he would not separate himself from the Emperor, but would in the meantime arm anew, in order that, if Gustavus Adolphus should violate his obligations of neutrality, he might turn against him; at least he would seize every opportunity to serve the Emperor. In conclusion he urgently advised to peace and the acceptance of the French mediation.

When Gustavus Adolphus received the first intelligence of the drafted treaty of neutrality, he was residing in Mentz, whither his wife had come to him, and where he held his court, which, in the numbers of the persons of princely rank who visited it, excelled all like assemblies of the time. The King was not at all inclined to enter into the neutrality which was expected of him; he was willing only in case of the Elector of Bavaria, whose lands he had scarcely touched, to concede this; the possessions of the other Princes of the League, however, in which he fed and clothed his army, he would at no price surrender. The Marquis of Brézé, who, in connection with Charnacé, was to labor for his concurrence, encountered in him an invincible persistence. He rejected every suggestion in regard to sparing the League, and thus so embittered the Marquis that he, as a Frenchman and Catholic, warned his sovereign against the ambition of the King of Sweden. Nothing brings more distinctly to light the latter's attitude at this time, and the ambitious thoughts which occupied his inner being, than the report which Brézé sent home. "The appetite," he says, "has been so sharpened in Gustavus Adolphus by the conquests which he has achieved that it *already has no bounds*, and his confidence in his fortune has risen to such

a height that he no longer doubts in regard to any supposable success, and regards assault and victory as of one meaning to him. . . . He is not concerned to diminish the number of his enemies, but maintains that this would but deprive him of quarters for his soldiers; nor is he any more willing that the French troops should enter Alsace, and to none of our [Brézé's and Charnacé's] representations does he yield, except in points of no importance—never when the matter is essential. He desires to rule the whole course of the Rhine, occupy Coblenz and Mannheim, extend aid to the Hollanders, and to cut off our access to Germany. If he is spoken to concerning any restitution, he promptly refuses it."

In the personal bearing of Gustavus Adolphus, more distinctly than in his high aims, it now became evident that he deemed himself free from the obligations of deference to others, and regarded his own aspirations as his sole standard of action; he expressed himself to the Marquis as disapproving of the French King's course because he did not set himself up as the reformer of his Church, and he spoke derisively of the Pope. He had begun to despise the instruments which had helped him to rise to his dizzy height. At a banquet, where, as usual, several Princes, and among them the unfortunate King of Bohemia, who had arrived from the Hague, and the Landgrave of Darmstadt, were present, the King began a monologue (for there could be no general conversation when Gustavus Adolphus began to speak—all others devoutly listened) in which the King expressed his disapproval of all peace negotiations, and declared that he troubled himself as little about the Emperor as the latter had formerly done in regard to him, and then added, addressing himself derisively to the

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Landgrave, that the latter, being a good imperialist, might report this to Ferdinand. The derided Prince turned pale and swallowed in silence the remark, but Gustavus did not give himself any concern about the danger of making him an embittered enemy, so sure was he of continued success, and so fully did he deem himself discharged from all considerations of regard for others: he had begun to be haughty.

Richelieu, who, with Louis XIII., at the head of nearly 20,000 men, had gone to Vicq, and afterwards to Metz, in order to be nearer the scene of the war, and at the same time to force the Duke of Lorraine to an alliance and a provisional surrender of Marsal, had not as yet been informed of Gustavus Adolphus' unyielding attitude. Although he believed that the King of Sweden would accept the offered neutrality, he did already so far mistrust him as to send to the Elector of Bavaria, requesting that he should arm and raise his army to at least 20,000, so as to be secure against all eventualities. Richelieu did, therefore, think of an alliance with the League against Gustavus Adolphus. There was offered to the Elector, in the carrying out of this advice, the fittest opportunity to fulfil his promise made to the Emperor without awakening mistrust on the part of France. When the evil report, above referred to, afterwards came on from Mentz, counsel was taken at the French court whether the alliance with Gustavus Adolphus should not be dropped, and an attitude of hostility to him taken. The proposition was rejected, because it would result in favor of the Hapsburgs; but that it could even be a matter of debate whether that should be done which would favor the Hapsburgs, shows clearly enough the apprehension then felt from Gustavus Adolphus' lust of dominion. Finally it

was determined to advise the Elector of Bavaria to conclude the treaty of neutrality with the King of Sweden, and to accept the conditions just formulated by the latter. The King demanded the cession of the Bishoprics of Mentz, Würzburg, Fulda, and Bamberg, the surrender of all the Protestant places held by the League, and the reduction of its army to 12,000 men. Richelieu gave the same advice a few days later to the Bishop of Würzburg, who came to Metz in the name of the League, and requested an acknowledgment of the treaty of neutrality and the surrender, by the King of Sweden, of the ecclesiastical territories. The Cardinal sweetened the bitterness of his advice only by promising that France would at a later day take the part of the League if, in the future peace negotiations, its members should not be fully indemnified.

When Maximilian received the message bringing this advice, he was stupefied as perhaps never before in his life. That France should surrender the Catholic interests in the manner indicated in the counsel sent, and should be thus without influence over Gustavus Adolphus, he regarded as impossible, and thought, therefore, that he had been betrayed and abandoned. He was now determined to stake his whole existence and ally himself again with the Emperor if he should perceive in him but half-way earnest preparations for the defence. The admonitions and assurances which he to this end dispatched to the imperial court were as earnest as they were sincere in their intentions, while the negotiations which he carried on with France and afterwards with Sweden were but a pretence.

III.

Before stating the final result of the negotiations for a treaty of neutrality, we should mention the obstacles which Gustavus Adolphus had to encounter from his German fellow Protestants. It has been related that the Landgrave of Darmstadt proposed, after the battle of Breitenfeld, the calling of a meeting in Mühlhausen, at which the dissensions between the Catholics and Protestants should be settled, and that the King of Sweden declined to have anything to do with it, if he did not indeed directly oppose it. Now, however, the two Protestant Electors were more than tired of the war, and as there existed the possibility of a favorable peace, they determined to request the King to prepare the way of negotiation. The two Electors, therefore, sent each (February, 1632) an embassy to the King to lay before him this request, and ask his concurrence in the previous calling of a meeting of Protestants, which might agree as to the conditions of the peace. The Saxon ambassador was further specially instructed to make complaint that some of the participants in the Leipsic meeting had promised subsidies to John George, and excused themselves from making the payments on the ground that requisitions had been exacted from them by the Swedes; he was therefore to demand of Gustavus Adolphus the remission of a part of the stipulated subsidy. Neither of the ambassadors found a hearing for their statements or requests. We learn, however, that he had meanwhile demanded of the Dukes of Mecklenburg that they entirely dissolve their connection with the Empire, and acknowledge him for all time as their feudal lord. This demand he so far pressed through

that they formed with him a perpetual alliance. We learn, further, that he promised to restore the Palsgrave to his former possessions only on the condition that the latter should accept him as permanent protector. We are, too, informed that in regard to the ecclesiastical possessions occupied by him, he asked the Marquis of Brézé: "What will your King say if I shall declare myself King of Franconia?" thus disclosing, as the Marquis thought, but a part of the plans relating to the dominion of the Baltic which he desired to accomplish. When we consider all this, we perceive why he was not disposed to enter into negotiations for peace; for all this, or, indeed, any considerable portion of it, he could demand only in case if he should stand forth as pre-eminently lord over all others. When, therefore, the Brandenburg ambassadors were admitted to an audience, the King promptly declared to them that there was no prospect of peace, because his victories were not yet sufficiently decisive.

The two Electors were still without information of the failure of their endeavors, when, in anticipation of this, they came together in Torgau to determine what should be their further course. They agreed that there had been no time so favorable as the present for the conclusion of a peace, because the abrogation of the Edict of Restitution and other concessions might be expected, and that they should, therefore, in connection with the commission chosen in Leipsic, earnestly prosecute the peace negotiations. As it did not come to that, we shall not further state the concessions which Brandenburg desired to force from the Emperor and the Catholics, and only observe that some of these were such as could only have been obtained after a further successful prosecution of the war. There was, however, still a possibility that the Protestants,

in view of the universal demand for peace, would have voluntarily renounced their claim to these. We shall mention simply one of Brandenburg's demands, because this may be a matter of universal interest: it is that George William desired to propose that religious liberty should prevail throughout Germany, and at least that the private exercise of religion should be free to every one.* But as the Elector of Saxony did not concur in this, it was dropped. The two Electors finally agreed to call a meeting of the Protestant Estates for the settlement of the ultimate conditions of peace, and in order to gain some support against the extravagant demands of Gustavus Adolphus.

The demands of Gustavus Adolphus! Then the Protestants were finally forced to the conviction, at which Brandenburg had before arrived, that the King expected to be rewarded for his services, not only at the expense of the Catholics, but from their own possessions, and that they must assume their positions in accordance with his plans. The Elector of Saxony inquired of his colleague if he did not know the extent of the King's claims; to whom George William replied that the latter had never

* The original has the Latin words of George William: *Privatum exercitationis religionis*, for which the author gives "*die häusliche Religionsübung*" as the German equivalent. This fact alone ought to assign to George William a high place—indeed, a solitary one for the Continent of Europe, so far as the governing class is concerned—in the evolution of right views of religious liberty. This was in 1631, the very year of Roger Williams' settlement at Salem, and when nothing was probably known at Berlin of his views or those of Sir Henry Vane. It was eight years after this, that is, in 1639, that Lord Baltimore, while establishing Catholicism as the religion of his American colony, enacted this *privatum exercitationis religionis* of the Elector George William of Brandenburg. And the Prince says, "*at least the private exercise*;" his real view went quite beyond that limit, including also the public exercise of the same.—TR.

distinctly stated these to him, but he supposed him to wish: "(1) a perpetual federation with those of the Estates whose possessions lay upon the Baltic; (2) free entry and stations for his ships in the Empire; (3) a portion of the sea-coast—it might be only the Principality of Rügen, or the Port of Stralsund, either more or less; perhaps his first aim may have included the whole Dukedom of Pomerania; (4) a toll for the navigation of the sea or some of the rivers which enter it; and (5) the retention of the territories taken from the Catholics, until he should have been indemnified for the costs of the war." These are the words of the Elector of Brandenburg, and from them it is perceived that Gustavus Adolphus desired by that perpetual federation to dissolve the German system, and to establish himself on the Baltic coast and in the Catholic territories of the interior of Germany, since there could be no thought of indemnifying him for the costs of the war. We add still the remark that Gustavus Adolphus' plans were far more comprehensive than George William supposed.

From the subsequent conduct of the Elector of Saxony it is apparent that this information violently agitated him, and that he began to look upon the King of Sweden as an enemy, and would, therefore, gladly have come to an understanding with the Emperor. At all events he agreed with his colleague in the calling of a meeting of the Protestant Estates. Before they had communicated this decision to the King, who was also to be invited to represent himself in the meeting, George William received from him, under date of March 10, 1632, a declaration which agreed in import with the statement given to his ambassador. The King deemed peace negotiations, in view of the enemy's ill feeling, to be of no use, and indirectly, there-

fore, rejected the plan of calling a meeting of the Protestants, which he had already surmised. Saxony and Brandenburg, had they persisted in their decision, would now have been obliged to place themselves in opposition to the King, which they were unwilling to do, because this would have made them allies of the Emperor. They therefore left the King free to pursue his further determinations, and abandoned the calling of the meeting. So the interview in Torgau effected nothing, though it excited at the time a great sensation. Gustavus Adolphus felt that it was directed against him, and gave vent to his displeasure.

From this digression we now return to the neutrality negotiations. Such were the ambitious plans of the King of Sweden that the negotiations for a neutrality with the League, which were in progress at Frankfort-on-the-Main, led to no result. Gustavus Adolphus did not even spare the Elector of Treves, although he knew that he had concluded a special treaty with France, but distressed his territorial possessions, and would not concede the neutrality to the Bishop of Bamberg, whose territory he had not yet entered. The sending of the Bavarian ambassador to Frankfort effected therefore nothing more than to convince Maximilian that for him and his party there was no hope of rescue except in energetic action in union with the Emperor. He did not, however, cease to call upon France for aid in pursuance of the treaty of May, 1631. The perplexity in which Louis XIII., or rather Richelieu, was involved, was quite extraordinary: Ought he to abandon the League to further invasion by Gustavus Adolphus, at the very moment when it was ready for peace, and had, in fact, dissolved its connection with the Emperor, and the latter

had withdrawn all his troops into his hereditary lands? An invasion of the League now no longer injured the imperial but merely the Catholic interests, and these interests France, in view of its relations to Rome, was not at liberty to expose to damage. Richelieu labored to extricate himself from this perplexity by unceasingly admonishing the King of Sweden to concessions, and by holding out to the Elector of Bavaria the prospect of aid in case his enemy should not moderate the conditions of neutrality. This did not, however, prevent Gustavus Adolphus from making an energetic advance movement with the opening of spring, and thus preparing for the forces of the League a second catastrophe.

IV.

Maximilian was desirous, through the mediation of France, to enter into negotiations with Sweden, and informed the Emperor of this, as stated above, which awakened in Vienna the profoundest alarm. Ferdinand did not dare condemn the Elector, but simply demanded that the latter should interest himself in his behalf, and required that the King of Sweden should not invade the imperial hereditary possessions; he also declared himself ready in return to make all concessions in German matters, and expressly offered to accept the French mediation. When, however, Maximilian now learned the demands of Sweden, and how small was the moderating influence of France in the matter, he set no hope on the French mediation, and informed the Emperor, through his chancellor, Donnersperg, that he was willing further to remain at his side if the arming should be energetically

prosecuted This renewal of the old relations awakened in the imperial statesmen a profound sensation of joy, and they did not tire in giving assurance that with the aid of Waldstein in chief command, an army of 150,000 men would be raised and an aggressive war prosecuted on three sides. If these hopes were extravagant and called forth doubts as to their trustworthiness, then another plan of rescue, which was communicated to the Bavarian ambassador, must awaken similar doubts as to the Vienna statesmen being of sound mind. They wished to form a grand confederation, in which should be included, not only the Princes of the League and Spain, but also France, the Pope, Venice, Parma, Tuscany, Lorraine—in short, almost all Europe—for the contest with Gustavus Adolphus and the restoration of the old relations which existed before his invasion. That it should be deemed possible to form an alliance of such heterogeneous members, that there could be any hope that France, whose hostility was known to all, might be gained to this plan, shows a stupidity which we lack words to describe. In fact, effort was made from Vienna to win the various Princes by means of special embassies and letters. Baron von Schwarzenberg went to France to awaken there the memory of former friendly relations and give activity to religious motives. All his observations were, however, either answered with evasions or firm assurances were demanded from him in relation to some designed acquisitions. King Louis was indeed willing, in case of a giving way on the imperial side, to undertake the mediation with Sweden, but never to form an alliance with the Emperor (May, 1632). It was from this embassy sent to him that Louis took occasion to send a special ambassador to Vienna to offer his mediation, the issue of which shall be given hereafter.

The Archbishop of Gran, Cardinal Pazman, was sent to Rome to gain the Pope for an alliance and for the furnishing of new subsidies. Urban VIII., of the house of Barberini, who mounted the Papal throne in the year 1623, no longer pursued the policy of his predecessor, Gregory XV., but had adopted that of those Popes who, in the sixteenth century, in alliance with France, contested the dominion of the Spanish Kings in Italy. The same reasons which have controlled the Popes of all ages, prevailed in this instance. Urban detested the attempts of the great powers to establish themselves in Italy, and therefore opposed Spain, just as his predecessors in the Middle Ages had contended with Germany. He sought to separate Italy from the sympathies and conflicts of the other States, prepare the way of perpetual peace there, and, by his position, play the chief part in the affairs of the peninsula. If in those days the political passwords of our time had been known, it would be said that this effort was directed to the removal of the dominion of foreign powers and the acknowledgment of the neutrality of Italy.

With such state of feeling on the part of the Pope, it may be conceived that he viewed with disfavor the triumphs of the Hapsburgs, and that his ambassadors, since the year 1626, had acted towards them a part more or less hostile. His resentment rose when, after the death of the Duke of Mantua, the Emperor did not place the Duke of Nevers in possession of the Duchy, but attempted to dispose of it in the Spanish interests, and it culminated when finally the war in regard to this matter broke out with France, and Upper Italy was subjected to the most outrageous oppressions of hostile bands. He would therefore have nothing to do with the proposed alliance, but

took refuge in support of his adverse decision under religious scruples, which, he declared, would not permit him to join a confederation in which heretical Princes also were to be received ; still less would he recognize the treaty of Passau, by which, in his Edict of Restitution, the Emperor had limited his reforms. All Ferdinand's prayers to be aided, at least with money, were promptly denied (May, 1632). The most that he would do was to send the Emperor and the Catholic League a small sum, which looked more like a charity than a subsidy ; but he would enter into no obligation. He only took account of the Emperor's pressing need of peace so far as to entreat Louis XIII. not to decline any negotiations to that end, urging that the situation of France had never been so favorable as now for acting the part of an umpire in German affairs, and he should not therefore surrender a prey to doubtful contingencies what had already been gained.

We cannot but mention the contest into which the Pope fell at this time with Spain. In this he gave free utterance to his hostility to Philip IV. When the news of the battle of Breitenfeld reached Spain, it was perceived there that not merely the arms of the Swedes and Hollanders, but the cupidity of the French, had been concerned, and that all possible resources would have to be called into use. The King sent an autograph letter to the Pope, asking leave to raise the needed amount by a tax upon the Spanish clergy. He referred to the services which his ancestors had rendered to the Church, and declared that he would for the future make every effort to conserve the dignity of the Papal throne, and would permit no diminution of this, though its maintenance should cause the flow of rivers of blood. At the same time he instructed his ambassador in Rome, Cardinal Borgia (December 19,

1631), to support his application to the Pope, and to specify with exactness the various payments which he wished to assess upon the clergy. If he should not find a ready compliance, he was to make the Pope responsible for all the misfortunes which might ensue, to protest against his course, and, in order to give augmented power to his protest, he was to make it in the presence of the Spanish cardinals.

Borgia endeavored worthily to carry out his instructions in order that he might gain the desired subsidies; he addressed himself, however, to deaf ears. Urban refused to grant permission to the King to raise from the ecclesiastical incomes more than 600,000 ducats. This sum was very far below the amount expected, for the King desired to raise, during the year 1632, 19,500,000 ducats in his European possessions, and it is clear that the clergy, with their enormous landed property, should be required to pay at least a third of this amount. Borgia now sent a memorial to the Pope, requesting that the year's income of all the benefices and some of the ecclesiastical taxes which came to Rome should be transferred to the King. But when neither his own endeavors nor those of the cardinals who favored the object resulted according to his desire, he followed out his alternative orders. In a session of the consistory, with the Spanish cardinals around him (March 8, 1632), he brought forward his protest, and solemnly declared that, by refusing his aid, the Pope, and not the King of Spain, was responsible for all the harm that should fall upon the Church. These words caused an immense sensation among the other cardinals, and raised a storm of indignation in those who favored the Papal policy. One of these caught hold of Cardinal Borgia's robe as if to expel him from the place, while the

Pope, in extreme agitation, branded the complaint as simply a lie.

When the news of these occurrences and the offensive utterances of the Pope reached Spain, the embitterment increased there, and was formulated in various written memorials addressed to the King by prominent members of the clergy. All these regarded the protest as well grounded, and praised the cardinal for it. One advised the seizure of all the Papal incomes in Spain; another the abolition of all the abuses forbidden by the Council of Trent; another suggested that the calling of an œcumenical council should be looked forward to, and in the meantime a Spanish council should be convened, and other things of the kind. These counsels were in themselves significant; but when it is borne in mind that they were given in a country which emphasized on all occasions its unconditional submission to Papal authority and gave frequent proof of this in its acts, it will be readily conceived that it never went further than the words, and that there was a shrinking back from the execution of threats which might lead to a schism. As the stress, however, increased, Philip instructed his new ambassador in Rome, the Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo, to make request again for the desired tax grant, and, in case the Pope should not yield, to declare that the tax would be levied without his permission. The Pope now at last yielded; partly in order not to provoke the King to an extremity, and partly because the situation on the war theatre was such as to give France the preponderating influence in all future peace negotiations.

From the above narrative it is evident that Ferdinand did not accomplish his desires either with Louis XIII. or the Pope. That the Emperor was no more successful in his other negotiations scarcely needs to be stated; he

could only throw himself upon his old allies—that is, upon Spain and the League.

V

When Maximilian learned that the Emperor had authorized Waldstein to enlist a new army, he concurred in this step, placed his reliance upon the imperial forces, and did not let a week pass without expressing with ever-increasing energy in letters addressed to the Emperor his determination to hold out. Ferdinand in return informed him of Waldstein's progress in arming, and promised to order his army to Germany as soon as the Saxons, who meanwhile had invaded Bohemia, should have been driven back. Maximilian had sent an envoy to Waldstein, and received from him the intelligence that he would, by the 18th of April (1632) have 120,000 men at command, would send to the Elector's aid as soon as possible 3,000 mounted men, and would force Saxony and Brandenburg to dissolve the Swedish alliance. These promises gave new courage to Maximilian, whose own efforts were directed to the raising of 14,000 men to strengthen Tilly's army, and to the constant increase also of Pappenheim's command in North Germany. He was, also, endeavoring to protract, at least to the month of April, the neutrality negotiations in Frankfort, a manœuvre in diplomatic tactics which might have succeeded with another antagonist, but not with the King of Sweden, who wasted no time, but passed quickly from negotiations to assault. The result was that Waldstein's succor had not come when Tilly was again obliged to cross swords with the King of Sweden.

Gustavus Adolphus sent from Frankfort an order to Field-Marshal Horn to invade and occupy the Bishopric of Bamberg. Horn entered upon his march the middle of January (1632), and on the 10th of February arrived before the city of Bamberg, which he took, after a weak resistance, and subjected it to the usual contributions. Tilly, who had meanwhile been reinforced, was unwilling quietly to allow Horn's plunderings, and so left his camp at Nördlingen at the head of nearly 18,000 men, received during the following days about 2,000 more, and proceeded towards Bamberg, where he arrived on the 9th of March, and by a successful attack took the city out of the hands of the Swedes. Nor was this the only advantage which he gained. His cavalry pursued the Swedes with such energy as to cause them a loss of 3,000 to 4,000 men in killed and wounded. This was the first considerable check which the Swedes had suffered since their landing, and it naturally created a sensation. The King of Sweden felt moved by this occurrence on the 15th of March to leave Frankfort and offer battle to the general of the League. When it is considered that the Bavarian envoy remained in Frankfort during this time, occupied with negotiating for neutrality, the departure of Gustavus will of itself show how the negotiations would end.

The Elector of Bavaria desired Tilly to direct his march to Bohemia, unite there with Waldstein, and so carry on the war in a foreign country. But the general, unwilling, by a concurrence in this plan, to leave to the Swedes the free plunder of all South Germany, marched, indeed, from Bamberg in the direction of the Upper Palatinate, but only with the design to turn southward again towards the Danube. He was obliged to enter upon this retreat, because he did not feel himself equal

to the King of Sweden, and he reached the river on the 3d of April at the strongly fortified city of Ingolstadt. Here he met his sovereign, the Elector, who, in these perilous days, endeavored by his presence to refresh and incite the wounded spirit of his general. After counselling together, they determined to cross the Danube and march in the direction of Rain and Donauwerth, in order, if possible, to prevent the enemy from crossing the river. But the garrison of Donauwerth yielded to the Swedes, the crossing could not be prevented, and there remained now but the river Lech as a protection against the advancing Swedish army.

The troops of the League were encamped on this river between Rain and Augsburg, which latter place had been, a short time before, compelled to receive a garrison of 1,200 men. As Tilly's force could not apply the necessary watchfulness along this whole line of fourteen miles, the King succeeded, by careful search, in finding a fordable place in the river, and was not deterred by the evident danger from an attempt to set his forces over the river at Oberndorf (April 15), having, by a feint, deceived the enemy and confined their attention to a point further up the river towards Augsburg. When Tilly became aware that the Swedes were attempting the passage, and was also informed as to its place, he sought to prevent this, though without success, for the Duke of Weimar, during the engagement, discovered a ford, where he crossed with the Swedish cavalry, and put the enemy's troops to flight. The action now became general: Gustavus and Tilly shunned no danger; they were present everywhere, and by their own example incited their men to valor and persistence. The King remained unhurt. His antagonists were not so fortunate; for both Tilly and Aldringen, who led

the imperialist auxiliaries which had joined Tilly, were wounded, and the former's injury was, from the beginning, in view of his advanced age, regarded as dangerous. This misfortune wrought decisively on the spirits of the men; they were already cast down by former failures, and gave up for lost, after nearly six hours' fighting, the battle of the Lech, as it was called from this time forth, and retired under the friendly protection of the on-coming night towards Ingolstadt.

Tilly was carried in a litter in the rear, and met Maximilian on the 18th of April in the fortress. Twelve days later he died of his wound; and thus, worn out and defeated, ended a career which, up to the day of the Swedish King's appearance in Germany, had been attended with glory. He was a skilful, not to say eminent, general, but he was educated only in the tactics and strategy of his time; while his antagonist, superior to him, not only in genius for the inventive, but in the higher endowments of a field-marshal, as also in elevation of personal position, possessed in advance important advantages over him. It could not therefore be otherwise than that the aged man, broken down in body and spirit, should have been beaten, to the loss of all his laurels, in the contest with his vigorous antagonist. There remains to him, however, still undiminished, the name of a faithful servant of his sovereign. He never sought to enrich himself, was temperate in his habits, shunned ignoble gratification, and the pay which the League and the Emperor appointed him was more than sufficient for the satisfaction of his needs. Just as, after the battle of the White Mountain, he had protected the inhabitants of Prague against the robbery of the imperialists, so did he act afterwards in Germany, and was not accustomed to augment the horrors of war by tyrannical

severity.* That the burning of Magdeburg, for which his memory has been cursed for centuries, was not his act, we have already shown. In the fearful contest which lacerated Germany we cannot judge of individuals by the parties to which they belonged, because but very few really had right perceptions as to the range and correctness of the principles which they represented. Each must be judged by his private life and his personal services. In both these respects Tilly is deserving of regard.

The defeat on the Lech was to have been expected, since the King of Sweden had as numerous a force as his antagonist; but, though this serves, indeed, in the minds of later ages as an apology for the defeated, the recognition which lay in the future could be of no service to them, and their demoralization still went on making rapid progress. No choice was left to the Elector but to shut himself up in Ingolstadt, and leave his land a prey to the enemy's expeditions for booty. His family took refuge first in Burghausen; afterwards in Salzburg. Gustavus Adolphus added to his victory first by compelling Augsburg to capitulate and helping to restore the city government to the Protestants, who had before been compelled to yield this to the Catholics. The city was required to receive a Swedish garrison, promise the payment of a monthly subsidy, and take the oath of loyalty, in which they bound themselves to the King and crown of Sweden. A few days later Gustavus Adolphus directed his march towards Ingolstadt. Maximilian, who feared that he might not be able to hold the fort until

* The author, of course, does not mean that there was no tyranny in the orders under which Tilly acted—he has frequently declared quite otherwise—but that he did not, like most generals, add a tyranny of his own.—TR.

Waldstein's expected arrival with relief, left a garrison, and withdrew to Regensburg. The endeavors of the Swedes, however, to obtain possession of the fortress, defended by a garrison of 7,000 men, were not successful. They lost to no purpose a few thousand men, and retired without having gained their end.

France took advantage of this period to pursue its mediation between Sweden and Bavaria. The French ambassador, St. Etienne, who resided in Munich, offered himself to the Elector as a mediator, and went for the purpose directly to the camp of Gustavus Adolphus before Ingolstadt. Here followed a scene of vehemence, which was circumstantially described in the fugitive sheets of the day, in which the King harshly, not to say coarsely, rejected the desired neutrality. According to an account which came from Oxenstiern, St. Etienne felt called upon to answer the adverse decision by a threat, and so declared that his sovereign would support the Elector of Bavaria with an army of 40,000 men if the King of Sweden should continue his hostilities. To this the King replied that he was better informed in regard to the designs of Louis than was his ambassador. If, however, St. Etienne's view was even correct, it was a matter of indifference to him; he could defend himself, whether he had the Bavarians alone against him, or both them and the French. St. Etienne ceaselessly boasted of the Elector as a statesman and prince of ability, which affected the King as disagreeably as did his threat, and he replied that there was no great art in boasting of any one's particular traits; and that there were people who would even praise a louse. St. Etienne was offended, asked whether the King designed to compare the Elector to a louse, and received from Gustavus Adolphus the reply that he had heard

enough of his praise, and was weary of the interview. After this not very promising introduction the King finally showed himself inclined to concede the neutrality, but under conditions which he could scarcely have made harder if the crown of the German Empire had already been upon his head. He required that the Elector should disband his army, surrender all his strong places, and especially Ingolstadt, indemnify his allies for all the damages which he had ever inflicted upon them, and pay, in addition to this, a war contribution of 4,000,000 florins.

Maximilian would not agree to these conditions, and the war continued. Gustavus Adolphus raised the siege of Ingolstadt, and marched by way of Landshut to Munich, marking his way by deeds of violence, which brought to mind the conduct of the imperialist troops in North Germany. On the 17th of May, attended by the Palsgrave Frederic and several other Princes, he entered the Elector's capital city, and promised the importuning citizens that he would secure their property against plunder and violence, but he laid upon them a contribution of 300,000 thalers. After having remained three weeks in the city, oppressing and robbing the burghers, and having secured with their other booty many pieces of artillery, the Swedes withdrew, directing their march to Swabia, where Gustavus Adolphus took Memmingen, and was making preparation to overrun the whole hostile portion of South Germany with his bands, when the news of Waldstein's victorious progress against the Saxons compelled his change of plan. How brilliant had already been his successes! Not quite two years had as yet passed since his landing on the Baltic coast, and he had marched from victory to victory through the enemy's lands, until he had reached the borders of the Tyrol.

CHAPTER IV.

THE CONTEST BETWEEN WALDSTEIN AND GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

- I. Waldstein placed in Chief Command. II. Gustavus Adolphus' ultimate Plan as to his Dominion in Germany. The Saxons in Bohemia. III. Waldstein and Gustavus Adolphus before Nuremberg. The Transactions of Gustavus Adolphus with Frederic of the Palatinate. IV. Insurrection of the Peasantry in Upper Austria, and Change of Rulers in Transylvania. V. The Battle of Lützen. VI. Did Gustavus Adolphus meet his Death at the Hands of an Assassin?

I.

MAXIMILIAN'S determination to break off the negotiations for a treaty of neutrality was caused chiefly by the news that the Emperor had placed the Duke of Friedland in chief command of his army, and that the latter was carrying on his war preparations on a large scale. The Elector forgot his former ill-will, hoped that the Emperor might have successes in the battle-field, and use them for the immediate conclusion of a peace, and that Waldstein, having learned wisdom from experience, would take care no longer to irritate friend and foe by maltreating both alike. He flattered himself the more that the Friedlander was reconciled because he had voluntarily addressed him as Duke of Mecklenburg, which title he had till then persistently withheld, and so he supposed that he had satisfied all his reasonable demands. But the ambitious and proud spirit of the Bohemian nobleman was

too sorely wounded by the occurrences at Regensburg to be so easily reconciled; nay, perhaps even the dazzling assurances, which the Emperor gave him on his second assumption of the command, did not tickle him so much as did the prospect of being able, in this position, to take vengeance on the author of his overthrow.

Moreover, the thought of a change in the chief command did not first arise in Vienna from the battle of Breitenfeld. As early as the arrival of the news of the taking of Frankfort-on-the-Oder and the heavy losses which his army had sustained there, the Emperor began to be occupied with this plan. He ascribed this mischance to the fact that Tilly had the chief command not only of his forces, but of those of the League also; he desired therefore to secure him for his own exclusive service, demanded that he resign his place as marshal of the League, and that the latter appoint a new leader of its troops. Neither Tilly nor the Elector would readily consent to this, but deferred their final decision, which led the Emperor justly to doubt whether they would concur in his wish, and to consider to whom he should entrust the chief command of his troops. There was no want of applicants for the place. Duke Victor Amadeus of Savoy, a son of the old and now deceased antagonist of the Hapsburgs; then their new and daring friend, the Duke of Lorraine; and, finally, the young King Ferdinand III.,—were all three among these. There appears in Vienna to have been no special thought of the two former; but the case of the young King was different: he not only earnestly strove to obtain the place, but promised to “exert himself to the extreme” to comprehend the nature and duties of the station, and expressed the hope “that he should have officers enough who would faithfully support him in council and in deeds.” Although

this added remark ought to have excluded him from all regard, for it could not but seem strange to bestow upon a tyro a place to which only a master was equal, yet to his application was given in the meeting of the privy council (June, 1631) the more weight because it was most probably supported by the Spanish ambassador, who but gave expression to a desire of Philip IV. The result of the many counsellings, recommendations, and prayers was that the Emperor determined, about the middle of August, to confer the command upon his son. Ferdinand III. immediately announced this to his brother-in-law, Philip, who in a special letter to the Emperor commended him for having taken this step. There was, however, delay in Vienna in giving publicity to the appointment, because the increasing perils on the war theatre awakened the conviction that the young King was not equal to the situation, and also because the friends of Waldstein did not cease to point to him as the sole deliverer. Thus the greater part of the month of September passed away without anything decisive, when the news of the defeat at Breitenfeld arrived, and the thought of placing an inexperienced youth at the head of an army, which was yet to be called into being, was definitively dropped. Public opinion in the higher circles pointed out Waldstein as the only man able to bring deliverance.

Waldstein had, on his removal, retired to Gitschin, the capital of his Duchy of Friedland, and had thence made arrangements for the defence of Mecklenburg against Swedish invasion; in which, however, he had not been successful. That he had been an attentive observer of the progress of events, and had felt a mischievous satisfaction in the mischances of the imperial arms, needs no proof. There was in this joy, however, a bitter after-taste; for if

the successes of the enemy increased, Mecklenburg would not only be permanently lost to him, but he might also be disturbed in his Duchy of Friedland—made up as it was chiefly of confiscated lands—in case the Emperor should sustain still heavier defeats, and be compelled to make restitution of these lands, or should perhaps even altogether lose Bohemia. It may have been partly to evade this danger, and partly to gratify his revengeful feeling, that, as early as 1631, he entered into relations with Gustavus Adolphus, whom he encouraged to hope that he would join him. If the Emperor should be beaten in the contest, the victor must, of course, reward the services of his auxiliary, and assign him the dominion of a definite province, and he could then quietly restore his private property to those from whom it had been taken by confiscation. These are, however, but conjectures. It is only to be accepted as a probable fact that in the above-named year he entered into relations with the King of Sweden, and that this course could only have been intended for the Emperor's injury.

Meanwhile events were in rapid development. Tilly was beaten at Breitenfeld, and now another opportunity beckoned the discharged marshal again to seek power by the plain way of a faithful service. The Emperor, who but reluctantly yielded to the demand of the Elector, had, even after his removal, treated him kindly, and as early as the end of 1630, and several times afterwards, sought his counsel, and had not disregarded the opinion of those who saw deliverance only in his recall to his former position. He had, however, notwithstanding his misfortunes, delayed in taking this step, and for a time, as we have seen, was even inclined to invest his own son with the chief command, and was first moved by the de-

feat at Breitenfeld to dismiss all further consideration of the general hatred which Waldstein had drawn upon himself in Germany, and to restore him to the command. War-Counsellor Questenberg travelled to see Waldstein in the month of October, and formally offered him the place on the former conditions. But, contrary to confident expectation, the offer was declined. The profound perplexity which was felt in Vienna showed itself in the Emperor's refusing to accept his non-compliance as final, and sending to him by a new envoy a request to meet a secret agent of the Emperor at an appointed place. Waldstein agreed to this; the interview took place at Znaim, December 10, 1631, and the importance which Ferdinand himself attached to the mission will appear in the fact that no other than Prince Eggenberg was sent upon it. But even now the Emperor did not effect his purpose. Waldstein was willing only to accept the command for three months—that is, for the time necessary to enlist a new army. This partial concurrence in the Emperor's wishes wrought wonders; from all sides streamed in officers and soldiers, increasing daily the ranks of the army which was in process of organization. In view of this result, Ferdinand could not think of conferring the command upon any other than him who had wrought this miracle. Eggenberg was again sent to him; and to his diplomatic skill it was due that the resentful commander, having been appeased by the concession of all his conditions, was finally persuaded to assume the chief command (April, 1632).

The original statement of these mutual conditions agreed upon between the Emperor and the marshal has never been seen, and it is not therefore certain what degree of credit should be attached to the rumors circu-

lated in regard to it. Several points, however, of the agreement can be stated with certainty, because they were brought to light in later transactions. In one of these, Waldstein had reserved an unconditional control over the entire army; the Emperor was to give no orders to other officers, but to confer with Waldstein alone in regard to his designs. Furthermore, the Emperor had promised his commander an extraordinary reward, which, according to the report of the Spanish ambassador, was to consist in an elector's hat, and, finally, had conveyed to him, to be controlled to his own advantage, all the confiscations in the Empire. It is apparent that there beckoned to him, in the direct way of his agreement, hopes than which no more seductive ones could have been given to any commander, and he determined to proceed upon this line. He could no longer agree with Gustavus Adolphus in the insatiable ambition which he was evincing, and must take up the contest against him. In order to make this easier, he first attempted to win Saxony and reconcile the Elector with the Emperor. For this purpose he approached General Arnim, who had once served under him, in the year 1629 had abandoned this service, and two years later had entered that of Saxony. All indications go to show that the negotiations contemplated a restoration of peace upon the basis of a sincere reconciliation between Saxony and Brandenburg, on the one side, and the Emperor, on the other, and that the Edict of Restitution was, therefore, to be revoked. How Waldstein, in case this had been effected, would have attained to the electoral dignity, if indeed it had already at this time been promised him, is, indeed, a question which can be answered only by the supposition that he may have moderated his demand for reward. •

II.

In Dresden no doubt was entertained that the Emperor was earnest in his offers of peace. Hoë, when asked by the Elector whether he should enter into the peace negotiations, gave an affirmative opinion, and Arnim recommended the same, though with the addition that the King of Sweden would have to be invited to take part in the negotiations. But the King was no more willing to listen to this proposal, when made by them, than to the similar ones made in Mentz and Frankfort. He sent to Dresden, to counsel the Elector against this measure, Count Philip von Solms, who did as directed, and somewhat more ; for he gave John George a note of warning against Arnim and his relations with Waldstein. The warning did not fall upon fruitful soil, for the Elector was inclined to peace, and did not doubt the fidelity of Arnim. But as he did not dare to enter upon an independent policy towards the King of Sweden, he abandoned the negotiations with Waldstein. In consideration of this action, Gustavus Adolphus promised to come to his aid with 16,000 men, that he might not be crushed by the imperial army. It was this circumstance, together with his concern lest the Elector might still perhaps come to an understanding with the Emperor, that led him to suspend his operations in South Germany and proceed to Nuremberg.

Gustavus Adolphus deemed it, at the same time, necessary frankly to inform the Elector, as the most prominent of the Protestant Princes, of his views as to the future terms of peace, and to let him know that he did not intend to retire with empty hands from the Empire. For this

purpose he sent to Dresden Palsgrave Augustus, accompanied by Löffler, the chancellor of Würtemberg, to state in his behalf that, for the security of peace against the attacks of the Catholics, he should insist upon the forming of a *Corpus Evangelicorum*, that is, a Protestant confederation, of which he should be sole and absolute director; that he should further lay claim to a satisfaction, which should consist in the possession of Pomerania and the territory which should be conquered from the Catholics, and in the recognition of those special treaties with individual Princes by which these had formed a perpetual alliance with Sweden. Gustavus Adolphus, then, demanded the possession of a portion of Germany and the erection of a Directory in his interests, which should leave the imperial sham-government quite in the rear and was clearly designed to be hereditary, and which must, if carried out in the manner indicated, lead to a division of Germany. This was sad information for the Elector, although he had for a long time conceived the King's intention. This did not, indeed, cause him to renew his negotiations with Waldstein, though it did not meet his approval, and in his answer he relieved himself for the time by declaring, in relation to the "satisfaction," that he was ready to support, though to a limited extent, the desires of the King of Sweden. As to the erection of the *Corpus Evangelicorum* and the absolute Directory, he uttered not a syllable (July 19, 1632). While, therefore, Gustavus Adolphus was encamped before Nuremberg, intent upon the contest with Waldstein, he knew not what shape his relations with Electoral Saxony would afterwards assume.

In relation to the Elector of Brandenburg, it was reported, in the month of April, that he would join in Sax-

ony's negotiations with the Emperor ; and, although this report was not true, the Swedes were, nevertheless, concerned lest it might be so. In order to prevent this, Oxenstiern attempted to bait the Elector with the suggestion of a marriage of his son and successor to Christina, heiress presumptive to the throne of Sweden, by which an elevation quite beyond what could otherwise be expected would be given to the house of Brandenburg. For the founding of a state, which should extend itself to both coasts of the Baltic, this marriage was the best expedient, and it is conceivable that it was not regarded with indifference in Berlin ; the friendly relations with Sweden were therefore not disturbed. Saxony was thus left alone, and did not dare accept the offered hand of the Emperor.

It was the good fortune of the Emperor and his marshal that they were able, during the winter of 1631-32, to strengthen by new enlistments their forces, which had been reduced to a minimum, and that in this they were not much hindered by the King of Sweden or the Elector of Saxony, the latter of whom stood in doubt whether he ought to be more on his guard against the ambition of Gustavus Adolphus or the tyranny of the Edict of Restitution. In Silesia, Moravia, Austria, and Southern Bohemia the recruiting drums were so industriously beaten that Waldstein, by the spring of 1632, had an army in readiness, which, as soon as it should advance to the attack, could without difficulty drive the Saxons out of Bohemia and then advance into the Empire. Before we give an account of Waldstein's campaign against the Saxons, we must go back to relate how and when they entered Bohemia.

After the battle of Breitenfeld, Gustavus Adolphus chose Western Germany as the theatre of his operations,

leaving for the Elector of Saxony to take the Eastern route and invade the possessions of the Emperor. The Saxon general, Arnim, desired to proceed to Silesia, but was overruled by the Elector's council of war, and must turn his course to Bohemia. On the 4th of November, 1631, the Saxons passed at Schluckenau the Bohemian frontier and advanced, after seizing the cities of Tetschen and Aussig, without interruption on both banks of the Elbe upward to Leitmeritz. After resting two days in this city, Arnim marched to Raudnitz, of which he took possession, forced from the numerous Jews settled there considerable contributions, and then advanced towards Prague, in the immediate neighborhood of which he arrived on the 14th of November. The Regents, to whom the Emperor had entrusted the government, had previously fled from the city, and on the 9th of November, Marradas, too, who commanded the imperialist troops there, determined to leave Prague and withdraw with his command to Tabor. Waldstein, who up to that time had occupied his splendid palace in Prague, also withdrew from the city, and the people were thus left to themselves.

As none but the burghers remained for the defence, and they had neither the weapons nor the decision to offer any resistance to the enemy, it was very easy for Arnim to demand the capitulation of the city. A deputation of the burghers came to him at once to enter into negotiations, and met him as he sat upon his horse with several men around him who had formerly played important parts in Bohemian affairs, among whom was Count Henry Matthias von Thurn, now in hope of regaining his old position. The deputation, with a desire to gain time, proposed to the Saxon general an armistice, which being

declined, they presented a draft of articles of capitulation; these Arnim, after running them hastily over, accepted, and the formal entry into the city followed immediately (November 15). On the following day already some exiles made their appearance, and their numbers grew without interruption.

A few days later the Elector arrived also, attended by a division of troops. He had again from Aussig asked the opinions of his council and his court-preacher as to his moral right further to prosecute the war against the Emperor. Their approving answer reached him in Prague. Dr. Hoë now dismissed all doubt as to whether the Elector's action was in violation of his oath as a subject of the Emperor, and declared that "the Elector himself and his sword would have been cursed had he refused to draw it," for he was bound by his oath to the Emperor only so far as the latter should observe his own oath. But in spite of these counsels, the Elector had no special interest in the war, confined himself to the conflict with hostile forces, and had no thought of revolutionizing the country, in which, with the aid of the exiles, he would doubtless have been successful.

The people of Prague were obliged, after the entrance of the enemy, to submit to much annoyance, violence, and robbery, which did not, however, amount to a real sacking of the city. On the 22d of November, Dr. Samuel Martinius of Dražov, whom the returned exiles, "the three Evangelical Estates," as they called themselves, had elected as Administrator, took possession of the Tein Church, and on the same day the weather-bleached skulls of those who, on the 21st of June, 1621, had been executed, and which had up to this time been exposed upon the bridge tower of the Old City, were

taken down and consigned to the earth. The Vicar of the Archbishopric of Prague entered a complaint before the magistrate against the arbitrary seizure of the Tein Church, and the exiles violently replied to the reproach of arbitrary procedure. In the belief that the Elector would no more defend the Emperor than he would the Catholic Church against their attacks, they took possession of their own confiscated property, so far of course as the power of the Saxon arms extended. John George took care not to meddle with either of these matters. He was dumb to the appeals which the contesting religious parties addressed to him, and equally so to those in regard to seizures of property.

While Marradas was encamped at Tabor, the imperial field-marshal, Baron von Tiefenbach, advanced from Silesia and took a position at Nimburg, about thirty miles from Prague. As the Saxon garrisons eastward of Prague were thus threatened, Arnim marched, on the 5th of September, with a few regiments to Nimburg to put an end to this intolerable state of things. Tiefenbach was informed of this movement, awaited it in a state of preparation, and so repulsed all attacks that Arnim was obliged to return, after having sustained heavy losses, without the accomplishment of his purpose. It was evident that the Saxon army, which may have numbered about 10,000 men, was insufficient for the holding of numerous cities, and at the same time carrying on the contest with the enemy. The Elector therefore diligently prosecuted the enlistments which he had before instituted. On the 15th of December he left Prague to return to Dresden, as did also Arnim—the latter in order to clear the northwest part of the land of the enemy, and afterwards to be employed in the diplomatic service outside of Bohemia. Colonels Solms

and Hofkirchen were appointed to the command of the garrison of Prague.

After the departure of their two heads the situation of the Saxons in Bohemia grew daily more unfavorable. In the first place, the imperialists whom Ferdinand had withdrawn from Tilly gradually advanced from the west towards Prague. Colloredo came on in advance, and was followed by Gallas with 10,000 men. Aldringen requested to be called back with his troops; but his wish was not granted, because the Emperor must consult Maximilian's desires if he would avoid driving him into the arms of France. Gallas, who in union with Colloredo numbered about 11,000 men, moved with these by way of Pilsen to Prague, while Marradas promised to come on from Tabor. The Saxon garrison would not have been able to repel the united attack if Marradas had kept his word; but Gallas had overestimated the Saxon strength, and therefore did not make the attack. He obeyed now the orders of the Duke of Friedland, who had been entrusted with the organization of the imperial army, and had encamped in the vicinity of Prague.

The Saxon enlistments had not been equal to expectations, and the Saxon troops in Bohemia suffered from insufficient care, so that their numbers were daily diminished by diseases and desertions. If Waldstein advanced with his army from Moravia to Prague, the Saxons could save themselves only by a hurried retreat. Towards the end of April the imperial commander-in-chief did, in fact, advance into Bohemia and assault Prague, and the Saxons not only surrendered the city, but promptly retreated to the mountains of Northern Bohemia. Waldstein now continued his march westward, and on the 27th of June united with Maximilian of Bavaria, who came on with his

forces to meet him. At Eger (July 1st) took place the first meeting of the two, formally allied, internally hostile, commanders. When they came face to face—so reports an eye-witness—"all eyes were directed to them, for every one knew that the Duke of Friedland charged the Elector with his removal, and that the Elector, on the other hand, fancied that the Duke could never forget this of him and would not remain unrevenged. But the interests of both and the preservation of the lands and the people made a virtue of necessity, and both suppressed their feelings and met in a friendly manner." The curious, however, observed that the Elector understood much better than did the Duke of Friedland the art of dissimulation.

III.

The command of the two armies, which together numbered 60,000 men, was now assumed by the Duke of Friedland with Maximilian's concurrence. It was partly the Elector's judgment that a divided command is unfavorable to success, and partly his fear of wounding the imperial commander's sense of honor, which caused him thus to yield. The combined army now moving to Amberg came in collision at Neumarkt with a Swedish, regiment which Gustavus Adolphus had sent out to reconnoitre, annihilated it, and then directed its march towards Schwabach, where the King was encamped with his troops, but, being informed of the superior force of the enemy, withdrew to Nuremberg. On the 16th of July, Waldstein arrived at Fürth, in the immediate vicinity of Nuremberg; but instead of attacking his

weaker enemy, he set up a fortified camp with the evident intention of cutting off from the Swedes with his greater cavalry force their supplies, and driving them by starvation to a further retreat.

The King of Sweden did not like this kind of warfare, for he was weaker than his antagonist, could not fully use the resources of a country partly hostile, and so preferred to bring on a speedy decision by battle. To this end he detached two small corps for the purpose of enticing Waldstein, with the hope of an easy victory from his camp and then attacking him; but he failed of the expected result, because the imperialists won a point of support upon the fortress of Lichtenau which they had taken. Gustavus Adolphus was therefore compelled to provide for strengthening as much as possible his army. His desire was answered, in fact, by the arrival of about 36,000 men from Electoral Saxony, Hesse, Weimar, and elsewhere; these joined him at the end of August. Waldstein also received reinforcements to the number of about 6,000. The two armies were now about equal in strength, and the day of decision could not be distant. All Germany and all Europe waited with anxiety and hope for news from Nuremberg. As usual, a decisive import was assigned to the coming issue of the contest, and the parties foresaw either themselves or their enemies hurled into the abyss. Seldom perhaps has the Deity been, by the parties arrayed against each other, more fervently invoked than on this occasion, and still more seldom has each party been more fully satisfied than here of the righteousness of its cause. The chiefs themselves, Gustavus Adolphus and Waldstein, were, nevertheless, compelled, if they would be sincere, to confess that, although they did not share the guilt of kindling

the fire, naught but their own interests had fanned it to its present fearful intensity, and that they could not with purity of conscience join in this prayer. The one, from being a defender of his kindred in the faith, had become a conqueror for the sake of conquest ; the other, from the beginning, had kept his eye upon naught but his own emolument.

It was impossible that the King of Sweden should possess the genius which he really had for the command of armies, without being impelled by this, after being joined by his reinforcements, to resolve upon attacking Waldstein as he stood there immovable in his well-fortified camp. The attack was made on the 4th of September with the thunder of more artillery than had till then ever been seen in a battle. But the troops of the Emperor and the League were excellently fortified, and the supreme exertions of the Swedes and the self-sacrificing heroism of several regiments failed of the end. The King was obliged to abandon the attack as a failure ; he had lost 3,000 men and a number of able officers, while the loss of the imperialists was scarcely 1,500. The greater losses on the Swedish side were not therefore material, but the adverse moral effect upon Gustavus Adolphus was, for this reason, the greater. The world took no account of the fact that he had made, under the most difficult circumstances, an attack which could have been successful only against a disorganized army. It was only considered that the lots had been drawn and he had drawn the shorter, and this fact wiped the charm of invincibility from his brow. He made no second attempt, but, having remained still fourteen days at Nuremberg, broke up his camp there, because provisions began to fail him and sickness to decimate his men, and left the

region, having stationed in the city a garrison of 4,500 men.

In this march he took leave, at Neustadt on the Asch, of the Palsgrave Frederic, who had been for eight months constantly with him. To his mediation he was indebted that the King of England, in the hope of his brother-in-law's restoration, supported him with an auxiliary force which had been enlisted in England, and had contributed to the Swedish successes. Frederic had, in the month of January, joined Gustavus Adolphus at Frankfort, and since that time had uninterruptedly besieged the ears of the King, who recognized him as a friend and ally and as King of Bohemia, with requests for the reconquest of the Palatinate. The King was willing to do this on certain conditions, which, shortly before the separation at Neustadt, he definitively stated, and thus aroused the Palsgrave's extreme displeasure. Gustavus Adolphus made of him the same demand which he had originally made of the Dukes of Mecklenburg—that his own ascendancy should be recognized as a permanency, and that for this purpose a confederation should be formed which should not have the loose character of the relation between the German Princes and the Emperor. Against this condition Frederic's pride rebelled, and, under the pretext that he might not justly prejudice the rights of the Empire, he refused compliance. Two other conditions were likewise distasteful to him: he was required to repay the costs of the aid rendered him, and to allow full freedom to the adherents of the Augsburg Confession in his dominions. The adverse reply of Frederic, which he sent to the King of Sweden from Frankfort-on-the-Main, the latter answered, by referring, not without irony, to the Emperor's paying for Saxony and Bavaria's aid by relinquishing

Lusatia and Upper Austria to them. How could, then, the Palsgrave demand, he asked, the gratuitous restoration to him of a conquest made without his help? With this answer, which Gustavus Adolphus delivered on the 7th of November, the negotiations were ended, and, a few days later, he fell at Lützen, the news of which event, as a misfortune imperilling his restoration, fell with extreme severity upon Frederic. He was already unwell, and his illness increased to that degree that, fourteen days later, he died at Frankfort-on-the-Main.

We remark right here that negotiations between the Palsgrave's heirs and the Swedish Chancellor were resumed, and, five months afterwards, led to a treaty which placed at the disposal of the Swedes the incomes of the Lower Palatinate, delivered all the fortified places into their hands, and secured the full restoration to the Palsgrave's children—only, however, in the event of peace. The Palsgrave's brother was required to accept at once the guardianship of the heirs, to secure to the adherents of the Augsburg Confession the free exercise of their religion in the Palatinate, to promise to take part in the alliance which a number of the Estates of the Empire should permanently conclude with the crown of Sweden, and to assume the obligation to furnish troops for the common army. Sweden, therefore, still designed to separate, by a new obligation, the Electorate from the Empire, and now obtained the concurrence of the guardian. It should not, however, be forgotten that this treaty was concluded in 1633, while the Swedes, in spite of the King's death, were still powerful. In the ensuing years they were forced to renounce the dominion of their dreams and restrict themselves to the acquisition of such territory as they purposed to conquer and incorporate into their kingdom.

Five days after the withdrawal of Gustavus Adolphus from Nuremberg, Waldstein and the Elector of Bavaria also left their camp and together marched to Coburg, where, however, they parted—the former designing to proceed to Saxony and subdue its Elector, while the latter was obliged to remain in his own territory for its defence against Gustavus Adolphus, who had passed the Danube and was on the Lech. In Coburg the two commanders agreed that the imperial general, Aldringen, with about 10,000 men, should join Maximilian and remain with his command, while Pappenheim, who was stationed in Lower Saxony at the head of 12,000 men, should belong to Waldstein's command. This agreement made, they separated about the middle of October. Maximilian was heartily glad that he could now dissolve this union. He had been obliged to put up with many humiliations, which he did, indeed, patiently, although they rendered his connection with Waldstein every day more intolerable.

IV.

It appears singular that Gustavus Adolphus, by his withdrawal from Nuremberg, should have left his antagonist out of view and free to direct his movements at pleasure. He, however, supposed that Waldstein would turn towards Saxony with the design of subduing the Elector, and therefore divided his army and sent to the Elector's aid about 7,500 men, while he himself, with the remainder of his troops, repaired to the Danube with the apparent intention of carrying the war into Austria, where a new rising of the peasantry gave promise of

great success. As early as in the preceding spring about 6,000 men had gathered there under the leadership of a certain Grindel, made resistance to the imperialist force sent against them, and were here and there successful. If the King of Sweden should advance into Upper Austria, the movement might spread thence into Lower Austria, and Waldstein would be obliged to hasten at once to the rescue. As the King did not pursue this course, the peasants were finally subdued by the imperial forces at Efferding. The investigations which were instituted against them ended in the execution of some, the imprisonment of 300, and the banishment of many, while all the rest were, in the severest manner, forced into the bosom of the Catholic Church. Many peasants sought refuge in Germany, but returned in the ensuing year to Austria, attracted by the prospect of a new insurrection then threatening; this movement, however, resulted only in some scattered outbreaks, and was finally suppressed.

It was not, however, the aid of the Upper Austrian peasants alone which beckoned the King of Sweden to this supposed movement against Vienna. The Prince of Transylvania desired to join him in the contest with Ferdinand. We have not touched the affairs of Transylvania since Bethlen's death in 1629: to these, therefore, we return. His widow, the Brandenburg Princess Catharine, assumed the government. It was indeed difficult enough for a woman to maintain a government on this undermined ground, and the difficulty became greater by her yielding herself to the influence of a favorite, and at the same time falling under the suspicion of being a secret Catholic, which suspicion was afterwards confirmed by her open confession. The unpopularity of the Princess was used

by the brother of her deceased husband, whom the latter had, in order to limit her power and prepare the way of her overthrow, placed at her side as Governor. He appeared to have attained his end, for a Diet, which met at Klausenburg in September, 1630, set aside the Princess and clothed him with the princely dignity. But another candidate for the place, and a much abler one, appeared in the person of George Rákóczy, and, as the Governor had himself called upon Rákóczy to make suit for it, he found himself in no small perplexity, and was obliged to prepare for a contest. His younger son, who had no confidence that his father would hold out, persuaded him to have a personal meeting with his rival, that they might agree to call the Diet together for a new election. The Diet met in Schässburg, and, in a severely contested election, decided for Rákóczy, in favor of whom Catharine, moved by malice against Bethlen, used her entire influence. The Turks acknowledged him as Prince of Transylvania, he having purchased their favor by rich presents. Catharine remained but a short time after this in Transylvania, then went to Vienna, where, as a Catholic, she was well received, and was afterwards married to Duke Francis Charles of Saxe Lauenburg.

The Emperor had, in the canvass for the princely throne, favored another candidate, and then had inclined to the side of Stephen Bethlen, because the latter inspired him with more confidence than Rákóczy. The Palatine, Eszterhazy, also favored Bethlen; but Cardinal Pazman, from jealousy of Eszterhazy, favored Rákóczy. Eszterhazy's influence triumphed, and Ferdinand refused to acknowledge the new Prince. He then began a war, in which, however, for want of money, he won no laurels, so that he entered into peace negotiations with Rákóczy,

and not only recognized him as Prince of Transylvania, but also conveyed to him those counties which his predecessor had held.

Scarcely was Rákóczy seated in his position, when he began to canvass for alliances to aid him in a contest with the Emperor. For this purpose he wrote to the Elector of Saxony (December 1, 1631), offered him and the King of Sweden his support, and asked in return that an army of 14,000 men should be sent him, to pass by way of Moravia to the Hungarian frontier, and unite with him. The Elector of Saxony sent the message to the King, and the latter sent an envoy to Transylvania to arrange with the Prince the conditions of a united attack upon Austria. Rákóczy showed himself in every respect ready, promised to procure the aid of the Turks, and made various preparations, so that the report spread in Vienna in October, exactly at the time of Gustavus Adolphus' march from Nuremberg to the Danube, that Rákóczy would, at the head of an army of 26,000 of his own men and 20,000 Turkish auxiliaries, make war upon the Emperor. If Gustavus Adolphus had proceeded to the invasion of Upper Austria, this rumor would indeed have been verified; but the peace between Ferdinand and Rákóczy was not interrupted in the year 1632.

V.

Zealously as Oxenstiern, with the knowledge of these facts and with Upper Austria in a state of insurrection, may have advocated an invasion of this territory, he was unable to persuade Gustavus Adolphus to stand to his original determination. The King marched to Lake Con-

stance, in order to free South-western Germany from the enemy and to subject to contributions the Catholic sections, which had hitherto been spared. After passing the Danube at Donauwerth, he advanced along the Lech ; but here the news reached him that Waldstein was moving northward, and would probably unite with Pappenheim, who was moving against Hesse. If this union should take place, Waldstein would be so far superior to every antagonist in the north that he might crush them. Gustavus Adolphus therefore hastily abandoned his operations in South Germany to follow up Waldstein. He had, indeed, made a blunder by dropping his enemy from view, undertaking a useless expedition to South Germany, and not promptly carrying out his original plan of an invasion of Austria.

The Elector of Saxony, who in the spring appeared for the first time to be threatened by Waldstein's approach from Moravia, was left with his hands free, after the imperialists set out for Nuremberg, to prosecute the war in Bohemia ; he had, however, sent a portion of his troops to Nuremberg in aid of the King of Sweden, and was obliged to withdraw from Bohemia, which was defended by Marradas with a force superior to his own. General Arnim now united with the auxiliaries, made up of men of Brandenburg, together with the Swedes, commanded by Colonels Kötteritz and Duwall, and with a force of 16,000 men, advanced into Silesia. He had considerable successes, and could only with difficulty be held in check by Marradas, who had pursued him to Silesia. In order to prevent the further progress of the Saxons, Waldstein sent 6,000 men under Holk and 10,000 to 12,000 under Gallas' command into Saxony, and afterwards joined these with the rest of his army at Altenburg, and then


moved upon Leipsic, which, after a short bombardment, he forced (November 1, 1632) to capitulate, and two days later took possession also of the Pleissenburg. His intention and effort were now directed to a union with Pappenheim. We have hitherto but slightly referred, in connection with the rising of the peasantry in Upper Austria and the siege of Magdeburg, to this bold and conspicuous man, who may indeed have deserved a more distinct and thoroughly appreciative notice. After the defeat at Breitenfeld he was sent to the Weser, where, with the small means placed at his disposal, he formed a corps of 5,000 men, and by a bold stroke liberated Count Wolf of Mansfeld, who was hard pressed in Magdeburg by the Swedish general, Banér, and was on the point of capitulating. When Banér united with Duke William of Weimar, and thereby raised his army to 20,000 men, Pappenheim was obliged to abandon all offensive operations, until the withdrawal of a portion of Banér's men to aid Gustavus Adolphus against Tilly, set him free, and inspired him for the assault. He was now the Everywhere and the Nowhere. At Höxter he fell upon four Hessian regiments and completely annihilated them. His bold marches made his enemies, who outnumbered him, hold their breath in apprehension. He baffled all their attempts to draw him into a trap, and finally advanced from the Weser over the Rhine to Maestricht, to bring aid to this city, then besieged by the Hollanders. Here he was able to effect nothing, because he received too little support from the Spaniards; he returned, therefore, to the Weser, forced the Duke of Lüneburg to raise the siege of Wolfenbüttel, and finally, at the head of a force which had meanwhile increased to an army of 12,000 men, set out to unite with Waldstein and supply the place of

the men withdrawn by Aldringen. The junction was effected, although Gustavus Adolphus endeavored through Duke Bernard of Weimar to prevent it, and the combined forces advanced over the Mulde to Wurzen, where Waldstein learned that Gustavus Adolphus was approaching; he now returned by way of Leipsic and encamped at Weissenfels. Pappenheim was detached with eight regiments of horse and five of foot to Halle, with orders to watch the Duke of Lüneburg. The King meanwhile advanced from Erfurt, by way of Raumburg, to Pegau, without being opposed by Waldstein in the crossing of the Saale at Raumburg. The energy with which Gustavus Adolphus entered upon the conflict, on the 15th of November, left Waldstein in no doubt that he meant to make the battle a decisive one; and so he sent an order for Count Pappenheim's instant return, which the latter obeyed as promptly as was possible, for he set out at 2 o'clock in the morning of the 16th on his march back.

On the same day Gustavus Adolphus drew up his army in two divisions. The left wing stood in the rear of Lützen, the right rested on the so-called canal, and the front of the entire line was northward. The right wing of the imperialists, with its front southward, rested upon Lützen, the left upon the canal, by which it was covered. The King desired to assault the enemy before the dawn of day, but was hindered by a dense fog, and was compelled to wait until this was somewhat dispelled by the advancing sun. After a solemn morning devotional service, conducted by his court preacher, Dr. Fabricius, Gustavus Adolphus rode along the ranks, encouraged the regiments severally, addressing the Swedish and German, each in their respective mother tongues, to valor and

steadfastness. He chose as watch-word of the day the same words which had been used in the battle of Breitenfeld: "God with us." The battle-cry of the Catholics was made up of the two names: "Jesus, Mary." Towards 10 o'clock in the morning the King advanced to the attack, which the imperialists sought, partly by a furious artillery fire and partly by setting Lützen in flames, to repel. The King, who commanded on the right, took upon himself the most difficult task, that is, the taking of the canal, which he finally accomplished. The contest now until 2 o'clock in the afternoon swayed hither and thither, with increasing advantage, however, to the Swedes, who captured many pieces of artillery, and already supposed the battle to have been won. Then came Pappenheim, between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon, rushing forward with his eight cavalry regiments; he proceeded instantly to a furious assault and brought the battle to a stand, for the imperialists took new courage and made stout resistance. Above all, Pappenheim himself, unmoved by concern for his own safety, forced his way heedlessly in upon the enemy's ranks; in doing which, however, he fell mortally wounded. This casualty brought some disorder into his regiments, of which the Swedes attempted to take advantage, but, on account of the intervening fog, were not fully successful, and indeed were partly repulsed. The King now placed himself at the head of a regiment, rushed upon the enemy's cuirassiers, and put them to flight. But the continued fog caused a separation in the Swedish ranks; the King came unprotected in collision with some hostile musketeers, and received from them a wound in the arm. While an attempt was being made to apply a bandage to his arm, several of the enemy's cavalry came galloping up, one of whom shot and

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EXPLA Ordnung der Keiserischen Armeen (Order of the Imperial Armies).



mortally wounded the King, a second shot struck him in the head, to all which were added blows, so that his death immediately followed. Pappenheim had not yet breathed his last, when intelligence of the fall of his great antagonist reached him. The knowledge of this supreme disaster inflamed the Swedes to vengeance. Led by Duke Bernard of Weimar and General Kniphausen, they continued with desperation the conflict until evening put an end to it. The battle was left, in a sense, undecided, though the imperialists, because they were in greater need of refreshment, and had no provisions, withdrew to Leipsic; while the Swedes did not leave the battle-field until the next morning, and so laid claim to the honor of the day.

VI.

The death, however, of the King of Sweden outweighed a thousandfold this apparent advantage. Never appears the value of one man in a more striking light than when he is called from a half-finished work, and the proud structure which reached into the clouds falls in ruins. It lies not beyond the range of possibility that he would have gained his purpose, which he indeed never openly confessed, and yet often indicated, of founding a dominion in Germany, and thus hastening by more than a hundred years the political and mercantile evolution of the country's resources. If he had, however, even gained this, and this only, which, according to Oxenstiern's declaration, was his sole aim—that is, the establishment of a dominion over Norway, Denmark, and the lands on the Baltic, with a design to form from these a Scandinavian empire—the results of his career upon the destiny of these lands would,

indeed, have been ineffaceable, but would scarcely have been salutary. This empire would have had no immovable centre, since the Germans, notwithstanding their greater numbers, would have occupied in it but a secondary position. All these plans were now dissolved in mist, and shrank to this one: the desire of the Swedes, for their intervention in Germany, to come out with as much money as possible and the possession of Pomerania and Magdeburg. In the place of the towering ambition of Gustavus Adolphus, came now the greed of Oxenstiern. The intimate confidant of his sovereign, whose wise counsels exerted the greatest and perhaps the only influence upon his determinations, spent the night following the receipt of the news of the King's death, sleepless and a prey to sad forebodings.

It is known that, from the very beginning, various opinions were entertained as to the cause of this most painful loss sustained by Sweden, and that there were those who ascribed it, not to an enemy's ball, but to an assassination, which they supposed to have been committed by Duke Francis Albert of Lauenburg, in whose arms the King died. This charge rests on the idle talk of the excited multitude; for it was never earnestly made by those who stood nearest, and the historians do not attach any importance to it. It has never been understood, however, until now* that a person, not known by name, did, after the battle of Breitenfeld, occupy himself with the thought of procuring the King's death by violence. To the confessor whom the Spanish Infanta, the wife of Ferdinand III., brought with her from Spain to Vienna, the Capuchin monk, Fray Diego de Quiroga, came a man

* Here the author indicates that he has discovered documents hitherto unknown to historians.—TR.

who offered to assassinate the King of Sweden on the condition of being paid for this act, after its execution, the sum of 30,000 Hungarian ducats. The monk took counsel with the two Spanish ambassadors accredited at that time to the imperial court, the Marquis of Cadareita and the Brussels counsellor, James Bruneau; and, as they concurred in the project, he accepted the offer, and made report of the matter to Count Olivarez (January 3, 1632).

That the confessor and the ambassadors could concur in so unscrupulous a transaction will be conceivable when we bear in mind the theory which had been evolved in Spain since the days of Philip II., that the King is bound by no forms in condemning to death for sufficient reasons a subject, and might, therefore, with good conscience, cause a subject to be assassinated, since the observance of the usual forms of trial are a favor which need not be shown in case of notorious criminals. This theory had grown up in the contest with the Hollanders; it was to be applied to rebels and heretics whom it was desirable to get rid of by assassination. When a descending path of this kind is once entered upon, it cannot be a matter of wonder if there should be a desire to apply the same theory also to the King of Sweden, and to bring him as a heretic before the tribunal of the King of Spain. Similar views, the fruit of heated brains or unscrupulous minds, have sprung up more plentifully than has generally been supposed. It was maintained in the presence of Louis XIV. by one of his most conspicuous counsellors, that to him alone belonged the property of his subjects, who could enjoy but the usufruct of a possession granted them by the King. With this theory he quieted his conscience when, in the latter half of the war of the Spanish Succession, he laid upon the country unheard-of burdens.

When Quiroga's letter reached Spain, a council was held over the matter, and it was determined to decline the assassins's offer and direct the monk not to enter into the plan. The following was the royal answer: "Although the deed might be decided upon without violating conscience—of which, however, there may be doubt—such a transaction does not seem worthy of a mighty and just King, and the royal servants ought not, therefore, either knowingly or by their counsel, participate therein." We may assume that this command was respected, and that Quiroga revoked his promise; at all events, Gustavus Adolphus fell in no other way than by the shots of the enemy in the turmoil of battle. It shows, however, what passions are kindled and what criminal theories are brought forward when the parties are contending for each other's annihilation.

CHAPTER V.

THE CATASTROPHE AT EGER.

- I. Oxenstiern organizes at Heilbronn and Frankfort-on-the-Main the Protestant Forces. II. The Danish Peace Mediations. Waldstein's treasonable Plans. His Quarrel with Maximilian in regard to Aldringen. III. The Engagement at Steinau. The War in South Germany. The Fall of Regensburg. IV. The Emperor determines to take Action against Waldstein. The Attitude of Spain towards Waldstein. V. The Agreement at Pilsen. The last Transactions of Waldstein with Saxony. VI. The Assassination of Waldstein in Eger.

I.

IF the German state system had not been deeply undermined and shattered, the death of Gustavus Adolphus would have reduced the influence of Sweden at once to the smallest measure. The Chancellor Oxenstiern, however, who with his great prudence and energy stepped into the breach, might hope to put at least a portion of the plans of his deceased King and lord into operation, provided that he should be able to control the forces of Germany as the King had done. This he designed to effect at first by the voluntary concurrence of the Estates; and as he was sure of the approval of the smaller Princes, with whom Sweden had concluded a close federation, his concern was only in regard to Saxony and Brandenburg. In order to seize the bull by the horns, he went to Dresden, whither he arrived on the first day of the Christmas festival, and without much ceremony presented his

demands. He declared that, if the war was to be further prosecuted, either Sweden must have the sole direction of the common forces, or Electoral Saxony, in connection with Sweden, should at most direct its own troops. If the Protestant Estates did not agree to these conditions, they should agree as to a "recompense," which need not, however, consist in money, to be rendered to Sweden for its aid, and then its forces might be withdrawn and the Estates left to direct their own affairs.

None of these conditions were to the taste of the Elector, who was unwilling on any consideration to tolerate Sweden's further prosecution of the part hitherto so arrogantly played, and which was directed to the subversion of the old German state system, so dear to the Elector of Saxony as well as to him of Bavaria. Nor was he less unwilling to consent to the proposed recompense of the Swedes—that is, the giving up to them of Pomerania and Magdeburg. If any land and people were to be given them, it should be at the expense of the Catholics, and not at that of Saxony and Brandenburg—the former of which expected to come into possession of Magdeburg, the latter into that of Pomerania. The answer which Oxenstiern received in Dresden was therefore a negative. The Elector was unwilling to state what he would do until after a consultation with Brandenburg.

Oxenstiern now went to Berlin, where he presented the same demands, and was not dismissed in quite so cool a manner at least as in Dresden. The Elector consented that he should summon a meeting of the Protestant Estates, which John George had refused on the ground that this was his own prerogative. Nor did George William decline to recompense the Swedes, although he desired that Pomerania should not be included in the

compensation. His admissions, however, went no further, and how much the prospect of a marriage between his son and Christina, of Sweden may have contributed to them is uncertain. Oxenstiern perceived that he could as little attain his end with Brandenburg as with Saxony, and determined, therefore, to pursue his own course, independently summon a meeting of the Evangelical Estates, and lay before them the question as to the manner of their further union with Sweden and the compensation to which they would consent, with a determination to defend and carry out their decisions, even though Saxony should oppose them. John George, in the meantime, had resort to an interview with his colleague of Brandenburg, in which he more sharply than before emphasized his demand that Sweden should not be permitted to act the leading part and to call a meeting, while George William remained yet true to his medium view, and the Electors separated without a fixed determination as to their course of action.

The Swedish Chancellor divided his action in two parts. Instead of calling a meeting of all the Protestant Estates in common, he decided first to assemble the four Upper Circles in Heilbronn, and not to call the two Saxon Circles, which he intended to have meet at Frankfort-on-the-Main, until his negotiations with the four Circles to be called at Heilbronn should have effected their purpose. The meeting at Heilbronn took place the middle of March (1633), was attended by all the Estates concerned, and, after a session of several weeks, agreed upon an alliance with Sweden by which the direction was conveyed to Oxenstiern, who, however, in military matters was to avail himself of the counsel of a commission to be elected by the Estates—that is, a so-called, *consilium formatum*.



For the raising and keeping up of an adequate army to serve the Swedes and the Estates, the latter were to be responsible. No Estate was permitted to remain neutral, but all who should not join the federation were to be treated as enemies. In Heilbronn appeared also, as envoy of Louis XIII., the Marquis of Feuquières, and renewed the old alliance between France and Sweden, in which the former obligated itself to the continued payment of the subsidy of a million francs, and threw off all obligations to the League, unless the latter should agree to remain neutral. In this manner Oxenstiern had obtained all that was obtainable.

The Chancellor proceeded from Heilbronn to Frankfurt-on-the-Main, where he made arrangements for the calling of a meeting of the two Saxon Circles for the purpose of bringing them into the Heilbronn alliance. Before this meeting assembled, ambassadors came to Oxenstiern from the Landgrave of Darmstadt, demanding permission to remain neutral in behalf of their sovereign, who sought thus to escape the threatened compulsion. An interview with Oxenstiern took place, attended with angry violence, in which he flatly declined the demand for neutrality and refused the Landgrave more than a brief period for further consideration, and if the Landgrave should not yield he would, at the time fixed, enter his territory with an army. As the appointed day drew near, the Elector of Brandenburg sought to persuade his colleague of Saxony to represent himself at the meeting and even to join the Heilbronn alliance, which gave to Sweden the sole direction. He had himself indeed been half and half won over to this policy by a French ambassador. John George, who was just at that time carrying on an important negotiation with Waldstein, did not, on account

of his unwillingness that German "liberty" should be harmed, follow this advice.

The meeting assembled in the beginning of August (1633) in Frankfort, and was attended by several representatives of the four Upper Circles and by the Estates of the Upper and Lower Saxon Circles, though not by representatives of Electoral Saxony, and joined without reserve the Heilbronn alliance. Sweden was invested with the direction, received promises of money and supplies for the keeping up of the army; all was fixed by exact rules. Neutrality was not conceded to the Landgrave of Darmstadt, and so he was obliged to adjust himself to the demands which were laid upon him. Oxenstiern had, by the Heilbronn and Frankfort alliances, obtained control of the resources of the Protestant Estates of the Empire, with the exception of Electoral Saxony, and might therefore securely carry on the war until he should be able to close it by a satisfactory peace. The situation of the Swedes was still further improved by the fact that they had control of the incomes of the Catholic possessions held by them, and made, therefore, half Germany tributary to themselves. Thus they and their allies commanded large and well-armed bodies of troops. Horn was stationed in Swabia, the Rhinegrave Otto Lewis on the Upper Rhine, the Palsgrave Christian of Birkenfeld on the Middle Rhine and in Alsace, and General Baudissin commanded on the Lower Rhine. William of Hesse Cassel, George of Lüneburg, and General Kniphausen commanded large bodies of troops in Westphalia and Lower Saxony. A considerable force was commanded by Duke Bernard of Weimar, who had his headquarters in Franconia. Finally, in Silesia, the troops of Brandenburg and Saxony were strengthened by a Swedish corps. In all

these bodies of troops the high positions were held chiefly by Swedes, who now began to regard the war only as a means of their own emolument, in the same shameless manner in which this had been done for years by the Spanish and Italian officers in the imperial service. Their example wrought as an infection upon the rest of the army, and we need not therefore wonder that a kind of conspiracy arose in it to make sure beforehand of their pay. On the 30th of April (1633) all the officers and soldiers resolved not to draw the sword until their back pay and their promised rewards should have been secured, which condition they delivered in writing to General Horn and the Duke of Weimar. Oxenstiern was at first exasperated by this, but was compelled in the end to surrender to the dissatisfied parties lands to the value of many millions of florins, which had been taken from the Catholics. Even Bernard of Weimar demanded his pay, and his brilliant talents as a commander added a strong appeal in support of his demand, which Oxenstiern satisfied by a conveyance to him of the Duchy of Franconia (July 20, 1633). It was always felt, not only on the Catholic but also on the Protestant side, as a disgrace that a foreigner could issue such an order and that a German Prince could be found to accept this present from a foreign hand.

II.

In Silesia, Marradas was in command of the imperialists in contest with the Protestant forces. On the Lower Rhine and in Westphalia, Count Gronsfeld commanded for the League, and was supported by the Spaniards. Against

Horn and Bernard of Weimar the imperialists under Aldringen and the Bavarians under Maximilian carried on the defence. To all these was added the army of Waldstein, which, in the winter of 1632-33 was strengthened by new enlistments in Bohemia.

Waldstein had, as we have stated, withdrawn from Lützen, and gone, after leaving garrisons in several strong places, to Bohemia, to set up there, to the Emperor's great grief, his winter-quarters. In Prague he instituted a court-martial to investigate the conduct of various persons with reference to the cowardice which they had shown at Lützen. Eleven officers and four mounted privates were beheaded in pursuance of the judgments of this court, nine servants were hanged, and the executions took place on the same spot with those of the year 1621. On the other hand, the rewards which Waldstein gave to those who distinguished themselves at Lützen were splendid. Several warriors received large sums of money. Holke was presented with a memorial estate. In the course of the winter the imperial general made extreme efforts to fill up his army, that he might, in the spring, with a force twice or thrice as strong as any one of his antagonists, break forth and bring victory to his banners.

Not so confident was the Emperor. The death of the King of Sweden filled him at first with great hopes; but these were dissipated when he perceived that Waldstein took no advantage of the favorable situation, but even withdrew to Bohemia and consumed his own resources, instead of reducing those of the enemy. There was, therefore, in Vienna a great longing for peace and even a willingness to accept the mediation offered by the King of Denmark and the Landgrave of Darmstadt. The Landgrave desired to promote peace, because this alone



could make him feel secure against his cousin of Cassel and the Swedes, and Denmark saw its own existence threatened by every conquest which the Swedes should make upon German soil, and had therefore shown an uninterrupted, though unsuccessful, hostility to the undertaking of Gustavus Adolphus. The Landgrave, at the Emperor's desire, made a journey to Leitmeritz, where he met the two imperial envoys, the Abbot of Kremsmünster and Baron von Questenberg, and was informed by them that the King of Denmark had offered himself, and been accepted, as mediator, and that he desired to open the negotiations in Breslau in the beginning of May (1633). The Landgrave wished first to be informed upon three points: What view would the Emperor take of the remuneration of the Swedes? Would he restore the Palsgrave? And, finally, how would he satisfy the Evangelical Estates in regard to the Edict of Restitution? The statements made by the imperial envoys in regard to the last point showed that an agreement between the contesting parties was possible. In regard to the Palsgrave, they promised that a part of his possessions should be restored to his children. In relation to the Swedes, they declared themselves not adequately instructed. They offered, in case the peace negotiations should be successful, to the Elector of Saxony the prospect of acquiring Magdeburg. The Landgrave now made haste to inform the Elector of the substance of the concessions offered by the Emperor, and with these John George was so pleased that he invited all the Protestant Estates of Germany to take part in the negotiations at Breslau, by which measure he desired to offer an opposition to the meeting called by Oxenstiern for Heilbronn. Brandenburg, too, was invited by the Landgrave to Breslau, and the time of meeting

was by the Emperor put off to the 3d of July. There was afterwards a further postponement; the Emperor did not complete his instructions to Trautmansdorff, Quesenberg, and Gebhard, who were to represent him at Breslau, until the 26th of August; but notwithstanding all this, the negotiations were not opened, because, in the meantime, Waldstein had on his own account entered into transactions with Saxony, which so occupied the Elector's mind that he became indifferent to the Danish mediation.

We cannot greatly blame Waldstein if he showed himself lukewarm towards the negotiations in preparation by the Emperor, because he, as commander, hoped to gain great victories. But under his lukewarmness was hidden something besides the hope of victory. Treason lurked there in ambush. The single threads from which this was woven it would be impossible to trace; it would require much labor and the support of many documents, of which not a few have not yet been made known, and of the future appearance of which we here give notice.* We remark only that our charges rest chiefly upon the following grounds: *First*, upon the undeniable alliance, in hostility to the Emperor, which Waldstein originally entertained with Gustavus Adolphus through the agency of Count Thurn, which alliance, however, he afterwards gave up; *secondly*, upon the transactions of Count Kinský with the French ambassador, Feuquières, in which Waldstein offered to abandon the Emperor on the condition that Bohemia should be guaranteed to him; *thirdly*, upon the transactions of Waldstein with Arnim, from which we learn his plans, not through another, but directly from

* The author here indicates that he has discovered documents not hitherto known to historians, and which will be given to the public in his large work.—TR.

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himself, and ascertain that he intended to prescribe to the Emperor conditions of peace which he could not possibly accept; *fourthly*, upon the falsehoods under which Waldstein concealed from the imperial court his transactions with the Elector of Saxony, and which could not but awaken against him extreme suspicion, since they would have been quite unnecessary if his intentions had been honorable; and, *finally*, upon his efforts to break up the army of the League, that he might secure to himself the control of the Catholic and imperial forces. Some of these points will receive additional light from the ensuing narrative, and will be in part established. The proof of the whole, however, we leave to our future detailed work.

While the imperial general was able to prosecute quietly in Bohemia the work of strengthening his army, for there were none to assault him, Horn was attempting, in union with Banér, to establish himself in Swabia, and Bernard of Weimar advanced from Franconia towards the Danube. Opposed to Horn was Aldringen; to Bernard of Weimar, the forces of Maximilian. The latter urgently besought Waldstein to send a reinforcement to Aldringen; instead of which, however, he sent him an order to withdraw to Ingolstadt on the Danube, and there to remain until the strength of the army should be sufficient to meet the enemy. Aldringen was unable to obey this order; he was obliged, because Horn had united with Bernard, to abandon his march to the Danube and retire to Dachau and Munich. In the latter part of April, Waldstein finally sent to Bavaria the four regiments called for, but renewed his order to Aldringen to act only on the defensive, and not assume the offensive, "let the enemy do what he might." This order, which condemned Aldringen to absolute inactivity, surcharged with

indignation the Elector of Bavaria, who could not be reproached with staking land and people upon the venture of rash undertakings, for he was compelled to provide, not only for his own, but also for the imperial army, from which latter he could reap no advantage, and his territory was abandoned without resistance to the enemy, who had already pushed forward as far as to the Lech. The orders of Waldstein were to the Elector the more unexpected, because they ran counter to the agreement made at Coburg, by which Aldringen was to be subject to Maximilian's command, while the soldiers of the League stationed in North Germany were to obey Waldstein. Maximilian had strictly observed the terms of this agreement, while Waldstein paid as little regard to it as if it had never been entered into.

Maximilian made complaint in Vienna in regard to the directions sent to Aldringen, and received, through his ambassador, the promise that the Emperor would instruct the Duke to grant his wish. He now insisted that Aldringen should join him in the contest with the enemy; but the latter still continued to excuse himself on the ground that this would be in disobedience of the strict command given him. Thus the situation in Bavaria constantly grew worse. The result was that the Elector directed his ambassador peremptorily to call upon the Emperor for a change of the order given to Aldringen, otherwise there would be nothing left him but to "avail himself of such ways and means as were at hand to save and secure his land and people from the ruin and subversion which now threatened them."

The fault of not having the order changed by Waldstein was not Ferdinand's; he had given and repeated his direction to his general-in-chief at the very time of the

ambassador s presenting his complaints and threats. The Emperor did indeed declare to the ambassador that he could not believe that Aldringen's hands were so tied that he might not aid the Elector in his defence ; but the Emperor's incredulity did not help the matter, when the enemy might seize each day some new place, and Aldringen either stood immovable or retired before him. Desirous of helping his friend Maximilian, Ferdinand sent Colonel St. Julien to Silesia, where the imperial headquarters then were, with an urgent request to his general that he change the order. This time Waldstein yielded ; St. Julien triumphantly wrote that the Duke had directed Aldringen to obey all commands of the Elector.

Maximilian's desire was satisfied, the point of his complaints was removed, and a good understanding seemed to be restored. But it only seemed so, and gave place to so much the greater alienation. It came out a few days afterwards that the order to Aldringen was not as St. Julien had stated, or if it was, it was changed again on the very same day, and the changed form was in fact the order which was to govern Aldringen's action ; it was that "he should undertake no siege, and offer no battle to the enemy, whoever might command otherwise." That Aldringen was not thus made more free to aid the Elector is quite clear. The reason for this course of action, by which Waldstein could not but fatally damage the Elector of Bavaria and the Emperor, is to be sought only in the treasonable negotiations which he had at this time opened with Saxony and France.

Waldstein, having spent the winter in Prague, had, on the 3d of May, broken up his camp there, united with Gallas, and marched to Silesia. His army was reckoned at 50,000 men, though he did not in Silesia command

this number, for he had sent Holke with an army corps to the west of Bohemia. The Saxons, Brandenburgers, and Swedes, commanded by Arnim, Burgsdorf, and Thurn, did not number more than 24,000, and the imperial general might, therefore, with great probability, have hoped for a complete victory. He advanced to Schweidnitz, and there first came upon the hostile army; instead, however, of striking the blow which was expected, and by the Catholics earnestly desired, he sent Count Trčka to the Saxon general, and requested an interview with him. Arnim, attended by Colonel Burgsdorf, obeyed the call; and thus, on the 6th of June, took place that memorable interview which forms the starting-point of Waldstein's treasonable combinations. The imperial general assumed the attitude of a defender of religious liberty, and was ready to open peace negotiations with the enemy upon the basis of restoring all to the condition of 1618, and giving the Swedes for their services some fortified places on German soil.

With these terms the Emperor might reconcile himself, if they were not directed against him, and did not indeed include the restoration of the confiscated lands in Bohemia, Moravia, and Austria. In the conference with Arnim and Burgsdorf this was not expressly said, at least Arnim says nothing of the kind in his report, and this silence is indeed significant, and yet Waldstein's designs towards the Emperor were not honorable. Even before the interview here described took place, Count Kinský, a confidential agent of Waldstein, had visited the French ambassador, Feuquières, who went from Heilbronn to Dresden for the purpose of bringing Electoral Saxony to join the Heilbronn federation, and informed him that Waldstein was intending to separate himself from the

Emperor and take from him Bohemia, and desired to this end the concurrence and help of France. Nor did this suffice; the imperial general at the same time entered into relations with Thurn, and with him brought the matter to a kind of decision. In regard to this latter transaction we have but indirect information, and can therefore only conjecture that Waldstein, in holding Bohemia, designed to avail himself of the co-operation of the Bohemian exiles, and offered them in return the restoration of their property. Trčka wrote to Vienna—this was done in order to remove from the negotiations with Thurn all suspicious appearances—that Thurn desired to surrender to the Emperor the 8,000 men which he commanded in the service of Sweden. If this lie proves anything, it proves that the negotiations with Thurn were carried on only to damage the Emperor.

✓ To what extent Arnim and Burgsdorf were at this early time informed of Waldstein's purpose, is not known, though it was certainly not concealed from them that his intentions towards the Emperor were not honorable. They agreed upon a cessation of arms for fourteen days, and went each to his sovereign with a report of the proposition made them. The courts of Dresden and Berlin held their counsellings as to whether they should, or should not, declare themselves satisfied with the offers made; but neither of them took hold of the matter with decisive energy, and so the armistice, although it had been extended to the 10th of July, expired without any decision of the matter in negotiation. Oxenstiern was at first disagreeably affected by the intelligence of the armistice negotiations. When he was afterwards informed that Waldstein's purposes were hostile to the Emperor, he said to the French ambassador, *Lagrange aux Ormes*,

who was with him, that it seemed as if the imperial general was about to break with his sovereign and seize Bohemia for himself; that no one, however, could trust his assurances until he was in some way bound (July 15, 1633).

In Vienna the news of the armistice was received with distrust, and the more displeasure was felt in regard to it because Waldstein had not himself given information of the negotiations, but had instructed Gallas to make the report. In the army itself no little wonder was felt that the commander did not make better use of his superiority and fall upon the enemy. As but few thought of treason, and still an explanation of his neglect was sought, judgments prejudicial to his capacity have been accumulating ever since that time. When information of the extension of the armistice to the 16th of July was received at Vienna, the opinion prevailed with some prominent persons that, under one pretext or another, he ought to be removed from the chief command; but the consciousness of an extreme danger connected with the attempt was so deeply felt that action was delayed.

After Maximilian of Bavaria had learned of Waldstein's trifling with him in the matter of the supposed change of the order to Aldringen, he did not exhaust himself in useless complaints, but proposed to the Catholic Electors that they unite their prayers to the Emperor that Waldstein be again removed. In the memorial it was to be plainly stated that a power so unlimited as that which had been given to Waldstein over the army, such that he was not bound to obey the imperial commands, was by no means admissible, and could not but be ruinous in its working. It appears that this petition was not delivered to the Emperor. Maximilian made, therefore, the more

energetic endeavors to secure his rights, at least in the matter of Aldringen. He directed Richel, his ambassador in Vienna, categorically to demand of the Emperor the subordination of Aldringen to his command, in the failure of which, he said he should be compelled to protect his own interests in another way, and he repeated, therefore, his threat that he would himself desert the cause. Ferdinand laid the demand of Maximilian before his council of war and also before his privy council, and, as both favored the granting of the demand, he "requested" his general to satisfy the desire of the Elector, though it appears that in his subsequent autograph letter he changed the draft, and instead of the word "request" employed "command." The letter was sent on the 1st of August, and an immediate answer was expected; but as this had not yet come to hand on the 12th, Count Schlick, president of the court war council, was despatched on the evening of the same day to Waldstein. Schlick was instructed to labor, not only for the satisfaction of Bavaria's desires, but also to gain exact information as to the condition of war matters; to counsel with the commander-in-chief as to the disposition to be made of the Spanish auxiliary troops then returning from Italy, under the command of the Duke of Feria. Further—and this was most important—to assure himself, by inquiry of "Gallas and Piccolomini," that they themselves, "if, on account of his infirmity"—Waldstein suffered often and severely with gout—"or for any other reason, a change affecting the Duke of Friedland should be made, would, in any case, remain ever and immovably true."

How far Schlick fulfilled his mission we are unable to state; we know only, in regard to the first point, that the result was the same as that obtained by St. Julien. Wald-

stein informed the Emperor that Aldringen should be free to do what he wished, except that he might not undertake any important siege. To Colonel Rupp, whom Maximilian sent on a like errand, and at the same time, he gave, on the contrary, a negative answer, and this governed Aldringen. The general could not have acted in more profound contempt of Ferdinand than he did in this repeated double-dealing.

However low an estimate of the Emperor's energy he might form, he could not conceal from himself that such behavior might exhaust the patience of a lamb, and might drive Ferdinand to extreme measures. But he felt sure of his army, and gave the less heed to this thought, because he supposed the time to be near when he could throw off his mask. He had just requested another interview with Arnim, and concluded with him, on the 22d of August, an armistice for four weeks, which was maintained, although Count Schlick, who arrived the day after it was concluded, protested against it. On this occasion Waldstein said to Arnim that he intended to turn his arms against the Emperor, to restore to Bohemia the right of a free election to the throne, and place Holke's command at the disposal of the Swedes, for use against the Elector of Bavaria. Arnim travelled from Silesia to the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony to give them information of these offers, and then went to Oxenstiern, whom he found in Gelnhausen. The Chancellor was satisfied with this statement, thought, however, that Waldstein would be obliged first to throw off his reserve, and might then expect all necessary aid. For this reason the transactions between Waldstein and the Emperor's enemies did not even now attain their end. The Elector of Brandenburg said at that time to the French

ambassador, Baron de Rorté—and he may have referred to Waldstein's declarations as the authority for his statement—that he did not design directly to declare himself against the Emperor, but rather to continue to irritate him until he should give him occasion for an open break. Ferdinand's forbearance was such that it could not be fore-known when this point would be reached.

The news of a fresh armistice strengthened in Vienna the ever-augmenting indignation against Waldstein. When the Spanish ambassador asked Ferdinand what was the real meaning of the negotiations with Arnim, he was obliged to confess to his shame that he knew nothing definitely of the matter. This sense of shame, together with the conviction that his general's purposes in regard to him were not honorable, caused the Emperor to issue an order, which may be deemed equivalent to a dissolution of his covenant with Waldstein. One point in this, as will be remembered, was that the Emperor should refrain from any exercise of authority in the army, and that he should direct all his commands to Waldstein alone. The Emperor now issued an order to Aldringen direct that he subject himself to the command of Maximilian, and only avoid important sieges. To Waldstein the Emperor could explain this proceeding by saying that his order was but a repetition of that which he himself was supposed to have sent to Aldringen.

III.

As Saxony and Brandenburg did not seize at once the offers made, Waldstein felt compelled to strike a blow at the enemies of the Emperor. The Saxons had withdrawn

from Silesia into their own territory, upon which Waldstein sent Gallas to Bohemia to repel any incursion which might be made into that land. He himself stood opposed to the Swedes of Thurn's command at Steinau, and there made an attack which was attended with perfect success (October 11, 1633). The news of this victory reached Vienna in the night, and was brought directly to the Emperor privately. In his joy over the victory and the removal of his doubts as to Waldstein's loyalty, he hastened to Eggenberg, who lived in the castle, and thumped at the door of his sleeping-room. When Eggenberg awoke and recognized the Emperor's voice, a great horror seized him, for his fancy brought up before him the picture of those secret and sudden executions which kings sometimes bring upon their ministers. The conviction which he felt of the Emperor's personal kindness of heart quieted indeed his fears, as did still more the story which followed, but he paid for this well-meant surprise by an illness which ended in an attack of gout of extreme violence.

Waldstein, after the victory at Steinau, left Silesia and went to Lusatia, where he took Görlitz and Bautzen, while his light cavalry made an expedition as far as Berlin. His position was now again better than before, and, trusting to this, he desired to renew his relations with the two Electors, to the exclusion, however, of the Swedes. In case the alliance with Saxony and Brandenburg should be effected, he demanded from them the command of their troops, which condition caused the failure (end of October) the second time of an agreement into which both Electors would otherwise gladly have entered. Yet again after this Waldstein opened conferences with Saxony; to this course he was led as much by his ambition as by his differences with the Emperor,

though these were gradually advancing towards a break.

In South Germany, matters had meanwhile so developed that Aldringen and the Bavarians had united with the troops returning under Feria from Italy, and marched into Swabia, where Horn and Bernard of Weimar were advancing against them. When the two armies had observed each other for some days, Aldringen and Feria broke up their camp, passed the Rhine, and relieved Breisach from a siege of more than three months' duration. The Swedes now separated, the part under Horn's command marching in pursuit of the enemy to the Upper Rhine, while the part under Bernard of Weimar passed downward along the Danube for the purpose of necessitating, by threatening Bohemia, the Duke of Friedland's withdrawal from Lusatia. When Maximilian was informed of the direction of Bernard's march, he became anxious in regard to Munich, because he could oppose to the Duke nothing but an insignificant force under Colonel Werth, and therefore pressed his requests upon the Emperor to order Waldstein with Gallas to advance to the Upper Palatinate, for the purpose of arresting Bernard's progress.

The Emperor was the more ready to issue the desired requests and commands to Waldstein when he afterwards learned that Bernard was marching against Regensburg, and distressing the city, since, in case of its capture, he might gain an easy access to Upper Austria. Waldstein, in reply to the Emperor's entreaties, declared that he attached no importance to Bernard's movements, as they were designed only to cause his withdrawal from Lusatia, and that he deemed it therefore necessary to form a junction with Gallas at Leitmeritz, in order to meet the prospective invasion of Bohemia. He would, however,

notwithstanding this, send Colonel Strozzi with twenty companies of cavalry (November 9, 1633) to the Danube. This letter of non-compliance had not as yet reached Vienna, when the Emperor issued an order direct to Gallas to send all the troops stationed at Eger, without waiting for further orders from Waldstein, and subject them to Maximilian's command. Thus a second time the Emperor allowed himself to violate the covenant made with Waldstein, and in this instance in a decisive manner. Maximilian at the same time requested the Duke of Feria either to send Aldringen back to him, or to send him about 3,000 mounted men.

While these various orders were being distributed, Bernard of Weimar had proceeded with his wonted energy to the execution of his purpose, besieged Regensburg, and in a few days forced the city to capitulate. He made use of his success to lay upon the clergy a requisition of 100,000 thalers, and to send marauding expeditions into Bavaria, which lay defenceless before him. When Waldstein heard of the fall of Regensburg, he perceived that his former evasions would no longer help him, and that, unless he was ready to lay aside his mask, he would be obliged to move against Bernard. He wrote, therefore, to the deeply anxious Emperor that he should march with his army from Bohemia to the Upper Palatinate in order to make it impossible for the Duke of Weimar to undertake anything further, and requested only that Aldringen, who was then in Alsace, might be called thence and united with him. Maximilian, who had originally desired that Aldringen should be called back, was however now opposed to this, for if Waldstein came, he alone was more than equal to the Duke of Weimar, and Aldringen had enough to do in union with Feria to

hold Horn in check. As Waldstein, however, advanced only as far as Cham, and then again (early in December, 1633) withdrew to Bohemia, the plan of a union with Aldringen came to its end.

IV.

The extraordinary fact that the expedition which Waldstein had undertaken against Regensburg was again abandoned, and that he declined the battle which Bernard offered him in the neighborhood of Cham, he could partly excuse on the ground that he was obliged to direct his attention to Arnim, and prevent an irruption by him into Bohemia. Suspicious circumstances, however, accumulated, indicating that Waldstein would not again on any account attack the Protestants, and that he desired to bring his union with them to a conclusion. The *first* ground of this suspicion was that he determined to establish his winter-quarters in Bohemia, instead of advancing into the Upper Palatinate, Franconia, or Saxony, and living at the cost of the enemy. *Secondly*, when Aldringen, on account of scarcity of provisions, at the end of November left Alsace, Waldstein sent him a strict order not to establish his winter-quarters in Würtemberg, and thus forced him, to the infinite grief of the Elector, to go to Bavaria for the maintenance of his troops. *Thirdly*, he forbade Colonel Suys, who, with four regiments of foot and several companies of horse, was inactive in Upper Austria, and upon whose aid Maximilian was relying to check the foraging expeditions of the garrison of Regensburg, to leave his station and attempted to carry through his prohibition against the Emperor's contrary order. If

these measures, which all ran counter to the imperial interests, and were nevertheless pursued in spite of repeated warnings and contrary orders, could not but excite the indignation and even the suspicion of the Emperor, how much must these feelings have been augmented by the many signs of his marshal's treasonable combinations which continued to pour into Vienna? These came from Brussels and from Turin, where Waldstein was charged with dangerous transactions with France, and from Gallas, who, as early as in October, had expressed himself doubtfully, as to Waldstein's loyalty, to Navarro, the agent of Spain, which charge probably did not until later reach the Emperor's ears.

The Elector of Bavaria had, when informed of Waldstein's withdrawal from Cham to Bohemia, complained, as usual, to the Emperor, but had expressed no suspicion of the general's loyalty. His counsellor, Richel, whom he sent for this purpose to Vienna, and who, on the 16th of December, arrived there, and was received at once by Ferdinand, soon observed in the latter's remarks, as he did also afterwards in those of Eggenberg, that the day of patient forbearance was past. He learned from Eggenberg that the Emperor had, through Count Trautmansdorff, called upon Waldstein to leave Bohemia instantly and fix his winter-quarters in the enemy's territory. If Waldstein should not follow this direction, then "His Majesty would immediately resolve and act, so as to make it abundantly manifest that His Majesty was Lord and the Duke his servant." The Emperor would not on his account allow himself to be ruined, and he also (Eggenberg) would abandon the friendship with which he had hitherto been bound, which friendship had meant simply, "Plato is dear, Socrates dear; but dearer are my religion

and my country." * The determination of Waldstein, in the presence of the enemy (at Cham) to retire, no one could approve. Maximilian had as yet no knowledge of that decision of the court of Vienna, which the words here reported require us to explain as now directed to Waldstein's removal; he stood forth independently and in this sense completed his instructions to Richel, by directing him to address this demand promptly to the Emperor. When Richel appeared before Ferdinand with this proposition, the latter referred him to Eggenberg, who again gave him the desired assurances. Count Schlick, whom Richel also visited, told him that in the privy council it had repeatedly been proposed that Waldstein be superseded by the King of Hungary, Ferdinand III., though no final decision had been reached on the subject and all action had been put off until after Trautmansdorff should have returned and made his report.

Before we proceed with the narrative, we desire to indicate in few words the attitude of the Spanish government in the Waldstein question, and especially the course pursued by the Spanish ambassadors in Vienna in relation to it. It may surprise our readers to learn that the two ambassadors, then accredited in Vienna, the Marquis of Castañeda and James Bruneau, expressed in their reports to Spain suspicions as to Waldstein's fidelity as early as May, 1633—that is, at a time when he had entered into no relations with either Saxony or France. In a session of the council, in which this matter was mooted, Olivarez energetically maintained Waldstein's innocence, and dismissed with decision all suggestions of suspicion. He could not, however, repudiate the various intelligence

* The original has the Latin words: "*Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, amicus autem religio et patria.*"—Tr.

received, and he deemed himself justified in regarding Waldstein, not as a traitor, but as a "fool." This opinion he built upon the fact that Waldstein was buried in astrological reveries, that he deemed it possible to form an alliance for driving the Turks from Constantinople, and was doing unlimited service to his ambition. Olivarez held that in a certain sense all men yield themselves, more or less, to foolish thoughts, without justifying their being treated and condemned as fools, and so neither should Waldstein be so promptly charged with treason.

The purpose of entrusting the King of Hungary with the chief command in Waldstein's place, Olivarez declared to be a mistake, which would surely result in the injury of the German Hapsburgs; he deemed Waldstein the sole pillar upon which the hope of improving the sad condition of affairs, the triumph of the Catholic Church, and the conservation of the dominion of the Hapsburgs in the lands of Austria, rested. To relieve him of the command would be to incur the guilt of the blackest ingratitude, for he alone had in former years saved Austria. On these grounds, and because there was no one capable of taking the chief command in his place, he advised that the Emperor close an eye to his faults, and continue further to tolerate them, although he was, as above indicated, but a fool. In accordance with this judgment of Duke-Count Olivarez, an admonition was sent to the Spanish ambassadors in Vienna to preserve the best possible understanding with Waldstein; it was at the same time resolved to send him 50,000 florins monthly for the support of his war operations.

In spite of these instructions and admissions, the reports of Castañedas in regard to Waldstein did not afterwards become more favorable; nay, he reported that the

imperial confessor, Father Lamormain, had requested him to warn the Emperor in regard to Waldstein. Still, however, the ambassador received from the King express instructions on no account to declare himself in opposition to Waldstein, unless the treason should be fully revealed. The King sent Count Onate, the former ambassador to the imperial court, to Vienna, for the sole purpose of representing through him this policy of consideration for Waldstein and of admonishing the other ambassadors to silence. In a despatch to Onate, authority was given him to renounce in Waldstein's favor Spain's claim upon the Lower Palatinate, if the Emperor would be pleased to invest him with it. We remark right here that Onate, on his arrival in Vienna, concurred fully in the views of Castafedas, regarded Waldstein as a traitor, energetically stirred up the Emperor to take measures against him, and as early as December, on his own responsibility, refused to send him the Spanish subsidies and retained them in his own hands.

V.

We now return to our report in regard to the measures of the court of Vienna. When the mission of Trautmansdorff had proved a failure, and it was found that Waldstein was not to be moved to evacuate Bohemia, counsel was taken as to the further steps to be pursued. Some friends of Waldstein—for he continued to have such—advised against his removal, and were willing only to limit his authority; but this course was thoroughly impracticable, and could not be followed. The Emperor was himself determined upon his removal, but did not

know how to bring it about, and repeatedly took counsel, but only with a few of his privy counsellors, of whom, in addition to Eggenberg, only Trautmansdorff and the Bishop of Vienna were named. Count Ofiate and Father Lamormain labored also assiduously for Waldstein's overthrow, and always recurred to this subject in all their personal intercourse with the Emperor. Still a definitive conclusion was never formed; it was hoped that Waldstein would perhaps himself determine to resign, since he was not uninformed of the depreciatory judgments which prevailed in Vienna in regard to his action, and had been confidentially advised by Father Quiroga, confessor of the wife of Ferdinand III., to resign his place. Waldstein declined to accept these suggestions, and decisive action in regard to him would still have been delayed, if the Pilsen combination had not admonished to promptness and energy in action.

Waldstein had, on his withdrawal from Cham, fixed his headquarters at Pilsen, and there, on the 12th of January, assembled all his generals and colonels at a banquet, on which occasion, trusting in their devotion to him and presuming upon their assurance that they could obtain their demands and reimbursement of the advances which they had made in the Emperor's service only by a combination with him, laid before them a paper for their signatures, which may be regarded as a conspiracy between him and them. This paper opened with a statement that Waldstein, on account of machinations which had been on all sides gotten up against him, was weary of the service and desired to resign, but had, at the importunity of a deputation, consisting of a field-marshal and four colonels, abandoned this intention and promised that he would not, without the knowledge and concurrence of his

highest officers, thus give up his position, and after further adding that these had besought him to remain in chief command, on the ground that the officers could expect only in this way to receive their pay for services already rendered, the generals and colonels who signed the paper pledged themselves to remain true to him, in no wise to separate themselves from him, and to pursue any one who should separate himself from this alliance and take vengeance upon his life and property. To give this declaration the mildest interpretation, it means that the officers denied the Emperor's right to remove his marshal so long as their demands were not perfectly liquidated. Thus was utterance given to the rebellion against the supreme authority of the Emperor. The news of this transaction arrived near the 20th of January at Vienna, and put an end to all delay. On the 24th Ferdinand signed a patent declaring Waldstein's removal, and obligating the entire army to obey Count Gallas, who was provisionally to assume the chief command. Prince Eggenberg communicated this important decision a few days afterwards to a highly respectable confidential agent, and added the remark that a similar order for Waldstein's removal had been prepared several weeks before, and that it now depended upon the persons who should be entrusted with the execution how they should carry it out. "The Emperor has not prescribed," such were his words, "when and how the command is to be executed; this the persons charged with the execution must determine according to the nature of the case [Latin, *ex re nata*], and be governed by the question whether by violence or in some other way they could carry out the order with most certainty and least danger. His Majesty himself has awaited the issue with deepest concern, and for several days

now past has been, from sheer anxiety, scarcely able to sleep at all, because the action is so long delayed." From these words it appears that the trusted colonels and generals had received instructions from Vienna to do what they should deem best in the circumstances; they were not, therefore, to spare Waldstein's life, if the Emperor could not without taking it be secured against his plans. It was nearly a month before the patent of January 24th was made public; it was communicated only to those colonels whose loyalty was deemed certain. That this patent was designed to be kept secret appears from the fact that the Emperor continued his correspondence with Waldstein in the usual way to the 13th of February, which he could not have done if he had publicly branded him as a traitor. On the 13th of February all relations between the Emperor and his marshal ceased. Five days later the Emperor signed a patent, which was published at once, charging Waldstein, Illo, and Trčka with high treason, and commanding the army to obey Gallas, Aldringen, Marradas, Piccolomini, and several other generals named. From this day forth Waldstein was preached against in the pulpits of Vienna and branded as a tyrant and traitor. As confidence was felt in the loyalty of the greater half of the colonels, so hope prevailed in the imperial court that Gallas would succeed in shutting up Waldstein in Pilsen and making him a prisoner.

In what way did Waldstein meanwhile manage his own affairs? Did he take no forward step upon the descending way? The supposition that he at this time allowed his negotiations to stand still is contradicted already by the account of the banquet at Pilsen; he could not have thrown down the gauntlet as he did to the Emperor unless he had meant to complete the transactions with

Saxony, Sweden, and France. In fact, in the beginning of the year 1634 he sent information to Count Kinský, in consequence of which the latter caused a request to be made of the Elector of Saxony for a secret interview, of the tenor of which, however, we have unfortunately no account. That it had in view a decisive break with the Emperor is shown by a letter of Count Adam Trěka, who well knew what Waldstein's plans were. The letter states that the Duke of Friedland desired to come to an understanding, not only with "the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, but also with France. We shall not, indeed," so it proceeds, "need the soldiers of France, but we shall need its money. The gentleman [Kinský] should first make all speed to come hither, that no time be lost, for we are laboring to bring our forces together within fourteen days, and are determined fully to lay aside the mask, and with God's help make a thorough beginning of the work. It would be best and safest that Herr von Arnheim [Arnim] should come hither in person; but, as there is hesitation, so let Duke Francis Albert [of Lauenburg] and the gentleman [Kinský] come, and the matter shall be settled in brief. If this occasion is not seized, no such will again offer itself forever." On the 5th of January, Trěka addressed the letter to Kinský; on the 12th occurred the banquet at Pilsen. We perceive that Waldstein did not neglect his arrangements abroad, while he was securing to himself, so far as possible, the army.

The Elector of Saxony sent, on the 13th of January, the Duke of Lauenburg to Waldstein in order to receive his further communications. Before the Duke had executed his commission, Colonel Schlieff came to Dresden bearing intelligence of so weighty import that the Elector did not dare to trust his pen, but called Arnim to him

that he might counsel with him orally in regard to the matter. In a conference at which, together with the Elector, were present also Counsellors Miltitz and Timäus, the colonel stated that he had held a personal interview with Waldstein, and that the latter had determined to restore peace in the Empire upon the basis of an indemnification to Sweden and France, the restoration of the children of the Palsgrave, and the giving of a part of, Alsace or Bavaria to the Duke of Weimar, while the Duke of Bavaria was to be shorn of all his possessions. Saxony was to have Lusatia and the Bishoprics of Magdeburg and Halberstadt. Of the part which Waldstein would reserve to himself, nothing was said. Schlieff reported also that Waldstein desired that Arnim should come to him, and, furthermore, he wished still a personal interview with the Elector. Upon this information John George gave Arnim permission to go to Pilsen, but first sent him to the Elector of Brandenburg, without whose concurrence he was unwilling to close the negotiations with Waldstein.

Thus Arnim's journey to Pilsen was delayed ; instead of arriving there on the 9th of February, as Waldstein expected, he did not return until the 13th of February from Berlin to Dresden, and there spent a few days still in making his report. This delay enraged Waldstein, and he uttered his impatience to Duke Francis Albert, who was at the time his guest, and who wondered not a little that there was this continued delay in Dresden in closing the alliance. "I beseech you, for God's sake," thus he closed his letter to Arnim, "come quickly; there is not a moment to be lost; everything is established; do not stand in waiting as though it were possible that it could be defeated; it must then be God's will." The

Duke wrote at the same time that Waldstein had for the second time ordered all the colonels of his army to Pilsen that he might be "more sure" of them than he had been. Schlieff, who had again journeyed to Pilsen, reported, as to the purpose of the summoning together of the colonels, in a more detailed manner: "The Duke of Friedland," he says, "desires to assure himself more perfectly and form a firm and indissoluble confederation with them, so that neither the Emperor nor Spain shall be able to break it." It was undoubtedly Waldstein's purpose to bind the colonels more closely to him. Nevertheless the second contract of Pilsen, which was signed on the 20th of February, does not admit of so hostile a meaning as that of the 12th of January. For although in the second action the colonels obligate themselves to remain true to Waldstein and obey all his commands, they still give assurance, as does he also, that they do not intend to fail of the loyalty which they owe to the Emperor.

Until the second meeting at Pilsen took its action, Waldstein seems to have felt sure that the army would remain true to him, and only in relation to a few high officers, as Aldringen, Gallas, Piccolomini, and Diodati, does there seem to have come to him a whisper of doubt. He had in his reckoning made deductions for the loss of a few regiments; but he felt sure of the greater part of his army, especially on the ground that the higher officers were indebted to him for their rank and honors, and most of them for their property. He reckoned upon the gratitude of his subordinates, but did not take into account that his own ingratitude to his sovereign, who had heaped upon him honors and wealth, and had never denied a single one of his more or less just desires, released his own subordinates from their obligations to him. He had

determined to concentrate his troops at Prague, then to act according to circumstances, and especially to seize the disloyal. But he grew constantly more impatient on account of Arnim's delay, and his being obliged to rest satisfied with Lauenburg's assurances. In fact, the Elector of Saxony did not complete until the 18th of February the instructions by which he desired his general to govern the negotiations; in these instructions also appeared an evident disinclination to authorize him to negotiate with Waldstein a peace, the terms of which might not be agreeable to the Emperor, and of which it might therefore be necessary to compel his acceptance. As Arnim tarried still in Dresden for some days after he had received his instructions, the news of the generalissimo's assassination overtook him soon after he had entered upon his journey, and so the union did not take place.

VI.

During the period of his hourly expectation of Arnim's arrival at Pilsen, Waldstein was affected with an ever-increasing feeling of insecurity, and under this pressure had sent the Duke of Lauenburg in haste to Bernard of Weimar with a request that the latter hold in readiness a few thousand men for him in case he should declare against the Emperor. Finally, on the 21st of February, he received the news that the Emperor had broken with him and that several generals, among them Gallas and Piccolomini, adhered to him and had issued orders to the troops no longer to obey the Friedlander. He now determined to set out for Eger, in order to be nearer Duke Bernard, and at the same time he requested the latter to

advance with his cavalry to Eger and extend to him a helping hand. He also informed Arnim of his departure, adding the entreaty that he hasten as quickly as possible to Eger. He himself entered upon his march to this city on the 23d of February, attended by ten companies of cavalry and three hundred musketeers. Within the last twenty-four hours he had satisfied himself that a great part of the army had abandoned him; he therefore hastened his withdrawal from Pilsen, which had indeed more the appearance of a flight than of an orderly march.

Before giving an account of the catastrophe at Eger, we desire to indicate the issue of the negotiations which Kinský had begun with France. King Louis and Richelieu both had full confidence in the truth of Kinský's declarations in regard to Waldstein's intentions, and this confidence could not but be augmented when they were informed of the tenor of the negotiations opened in June and August, 1633, between Arnim and Waldstein. In consequence of this information and because they were pressed to the immediate conclusion of a treaty with Waldstein, the King determined, on the 1st of February, 1634, to furnish to the Marquis of Feuquières detailed instructions in the matter. In case Waldstein should break with the Emperor he was to be offered a yearly subsidy of a million francs for the further prosecution of the war, and the King's support in obtaining for himself the crown of Bohemia. When Feuquières, in an attempt to obey his instructions, sent M. de la Boderie to Bohemia to conclude with Waldstein a treaty upon this basis, he was already dead.

The journey to Eger was performed by Waldstein, attended as above stated, by about 1,000 men, in two days; he was accompanied by Illo, Counts Trčka and Kinský, and

the wives of the two latter. On the way he came into collision with Colonel Butler, in command of perhaps two hundred dragoons. At his entry into the city he was in very ill-humor, for he had suffered for months with gout; its pains came tormentingly upon him at short intervals and rendered all action insufferable. In this fact is to be sought the reason why he wasted with his plans the time which he needed for prompt and decisive action; for such action a sound bodily condition is necessary.

Colonel Gordon was in command in Eger: he adhered to the Emperor, and would have opposed Waldstein's entry if the rumor had not preceded the generalissimo that he was advancing with more troops than he actually had. Gordon therefore deemed resistance useless. In the evening, after his arrival, Waldstein sent the son of his chancellor to the Margrave of Culmbach, and requested a personal interview that he might counsel with him in regard to joining the Emperor's enemies. As neither Gordon nor Butler belonged to those whom Waldstein could securely trust, Illo and Trčka, probably at his direction, called the two officers to them and demanded of them an oath that they would adhere to him and would receive no counter orders, even from the Emperor himself. Whether the two colonels refused the required oath, as is maintained in a contemporary pamphlet, we shall not further inquire; at least, however, Illo and Trčka separated from them without any suspicion, and were invited as guests for the evening with Gordon, who had his quarters in the castle. During the day, however, Butler and Gordon, who, meanwhile, had acknowledged each other as being of one mind in the matter, together with some subordinate officers of Trčka's regiment, took counsel in detail, and decided upon the assassination of Waldstein

and several of his closest adherents, having first rejected, as unsafe and not likely to effect its purpose, the proposition to simply make them prisoners.

At evening Illo, Trčka, Kinský, and a cavalry captain, named Neumann, presented themselves as guests at the castle, and were received there by Gordon, Butler, and Leslie, who had in the meantime taken care that the entrances to the castle should be guarded by trusty soldiers, who, at the decisive moment, admitted also a considerable number of dragoons, all Irishmen. When the supper was nearly over, these dragoons forced their way in, fell upon the guests, and slew them after the brief resistance which they all attempted. When this was done, Butler, attended by Captain Devereux and a number of soldiers, hastened to the house of the former Burgomaster, Bachhälbel, where Waldstein had established his quarters. In their rage they wounded the Duke's butler, who was just coming out of the chamber of his master, and forced their way into the room, where they found the dreaded man; he stood leaning against a table with no clothing but a shirt. Terrified by these men breaking in upon him, with the cry of "Rebels! rebels!" he started for the window, but on his way thither was pierced through by the captain. The body was then wrapped in linen and brought to the castle, where lay the dead bodies of the others who had been assassinated. In the morning the deed was made known in Eger, and the oath of loyalty to the Emperor demanded of all the officers present. None refused to take it.

Thus a deed had been done having for the Emperor the greatest advantage which could be conceived. By this one stroke he became master of his army, for only Count Schafgotsch attempted to place himself at the head

of the troops, and he was in this attempt captured and made harmless. The army was now subject to the Emperor, and remained so from this time forth. Ferdinand was at once discharged from his obligation of payment to his former marshal, to settle whose account, in the event of any peace which might be concluded, would have been to him scarcely possible. If one were inclined to marvel that the army, supposed to be bound to the lot of the Friedlander, so suddenly and so perfectly freed itself from him, this feeling of wonder would quickly pass away on learning that all the colonels and generals were won to the Emperor by the promise of magnificent rewards, and their attention directed to the landed possessions of Waldstein, which were all to be confiscated and conveyed to them. A booty of such extent as this satisfied, not only their demands for pay, but added the brilliant prospect of great wealth. What wonder is it then that when those concerned were left free to choose between the service of the Emperor and that of Waldstein, they abandoned the latter? Because this course was attended with greater safety and less scruples of conscience, Waldstein fell a prey to a counter-conspiracy which had been organized against him. He was a man of great executive talents, whose action would have left deep traces, if he had been favored by fortune and had attained to extensive dominion; for at that period the nations were made of a softer clay, which could be moulded at pleasure.

The occurrence at Eger caused an extraordinary sensation, and the advantage which the Emperor gained by it was soon evident to the world. And yet no hostile statesman charged him with having committed a crime, or intimated that his general had not formed a treasonable plot against him. The charges, afterwards published from the imperial side, were not questioned, and Khevenhiller,

in his great work, the "Annals of Ferdinand," as an accurately informed contemporary, expresses himself also for Waldstein's guilt; the contemporary historian, Chemnitz, also, who was in the pay of Sweden, intimates no doubt in the matter; and finally, also, the transactions between Feuquières and Kinský, which became known by the publication of the reports of the French ambassador, agreed thereto, and so the judgment of later historians is also condemnatory of Waldstein, although room is allowed by them for some doubt. Quite recently the question has been again subjected to a lively discussion, and we have, in the introduction * to this work, indicated the explanations which have been attempted. We have in our portrayal given expression of our conviction of his guilt by adducing the facts which tell against him.†

* The Author's Preface, Vol. I. of the translation.—Tr.

† The following, which, together with the note to page 25, made up the author's preface to his third volume, is inserted here in a note, as being better for the reader than in the form of a preface, which might be overlooked: "In closing this my third volume of the "History of the Thirty Years' War," I remark that the printing was nearly completed during my absence in February (1882) on a journey to Rome, undertaken for the purpose of study, so that I could not make use of the results of my investigations in the Vatican archives. In regard to the Waldstein question, I found much supplementary material, and especially instructive to me was a correspondence of the Papal Nuncio at the court of Vienna, Cardinal Rocci, to the effect that Piccolomini stood at the head of those officers who early adhered to the Emperor, and that it was he who led the counter-conspiracy against Waldstein in the army. The transactions in Vienna, which prepared the way for the marshal's overthrow, are also found pretty clearly stated there; but the account of the preparatory conspiracy among the imperialist officers is less satisfactory. We need not, however, long remain in doubt on this matter, as a trustworthy investigator of the Waldstein question is preparing for publication the correspondence relating to it." With reference to this, as also several other questions involved in the work, the reader should not fail to re-consult the admirable statements in the learned author's preface.—Tr.

CHAPTER VI.

THE BATTLE OF NÖRDLINGEN AND THE PEACE OF PRAGUE.

- I. The Frankfort Meeting and the Alliance of the Six Circles. II. The Battle of Nördlingen and its Consequences. III. The Negotiations of France with Holland, the Duke of Lorraine, the Upper Circles, and Sweden. IV. Peace Negotiations in Leitmeritz and Pirna. V. Transactions in regard to the Acceptance of the Articles of Peace. VI. Conclusion of Peace in Prague and its Terms. VII. Negotiations in regard to the Acceptance of the Peace of Prague, and especially with Sweden.

I.

THE first consequence of Waldstein's assassination was that the court of Vienna abandoned the hope of successful negotiation, and made exertions to strengthen the army for the energetic resumption of the war by another Spanish auxiliary force from Italy. Sweden and France made attempts at the same time to attach the German Estates more closely than hitherto to themselves, and thus still further clouded the prospect of peace. All hinged upon the position which the Elector of Saxony should take; his accession to the one side or the other would turn the scale, and both Oxenstiern and the Emperor labored therefore to win him to their respective parties.

The Swedish Chancellor had in the beginning of the year assembled the Estates of the confederated Circles in

separate meetings; he then called the whole to a common gathering in Frankfort-on-the-Main, to be convened on the 11th of March, in which all the six Circles—those of Swabia, Franconia, the Upper Rhine, the Westphalian, and the two Saxon Circles—should unite. Those invited showed a disposition to appear. Brandenburg especially desired to urge an alliance of these Circles, which, in the previous year, had not been brought to a close—that is, he desired this, provided that Sweden should not lay claim to Pomerania, but be satisfied with some other remuneration, perhaps with the Bishopric of Bremen, or with parts of Magdeburg or Mentz. For the purpose of persuading the Elector of Saxony to represent himself in the meeting, a deputation of the Lower Saxon Circle came to him with a request that he not only join in the movement, but that he entrust the direction of the common interests to Oxenstiern. Their attempt failed again; the Elector was the less able to harmonize it with his views of propriety, that a foreigner should assume such a position in the Empire, because he laid claim to this position for himself, and was only willing to send to the meeting envoys who should indeed participate in the transactions, not, however, as members, but simply to make propositions and receive explanations in response to them. In short, he desired to stand in the attitude of a foreign power. The meeting was attended by the Estates of the whole six Circles, though Electoral Saxony was represented with the above-mentioned limitation. Even from Silesia a deputation was present, while the Bohemian exiles too had their representatives there, for the purpose of preparing the way for the resumption of their old relations.

The meeting was formally opened on the 7th of April (1634), in the celebrated Römer, by Oxenstiern, who laid



AXEL OXENSTIERN,
Chancellor of Sweden.



before it the subjects of its future deliberations. These related to the way and manner of procuring the means for the further prosecution of the war, the conditions on which peace negotiations were to be admitted, how the King of France was to be satisfied, and whether Philipsburg should be conveyed to him in order to secure the continuance of his alliance; finally, how Sweden was to be compensated for its services.

The deliberations began in the usual dragging way, and were made still slower by the fact that some of those present brought up their private concerns and sought action in regard to them. Moreover, some of the most prominent members would not listen to any territorial claims of France and Sweden, and on this account the discussions, being really directed only to the war, came to no conclusion. This martial feeling was assailed by the propositions of the Saxon envoys, who demanded that the peace negotiations should be earnestly laid hold of, and that the successes hitherto achieved should not be allowed to mislead them in judging of the general situation. As the convention, or rather its leader, Oxenstiern, gave a negative answer to these demands, the Elector of Saxony declared himself ready to prosecute the war, but demanded, through his envoys, that the two Saxon Circles should come to his support and withdraw from the direction of Sweden. Here he raised his warning voice against alliances with foreign powers, evidently referring to Sweden and France. Oxenstiern's influence was strong enough to repel this assault, as Brandenburg was for the time on his side, and would not listen to a separation of the two Saxon Circles, but on the contrary desired to form a union with the four Circles of Upper Germany. Feuquières, the French ambassador, felt called upon to urge the

hastening of action in regard to the propositions which had been made, by expressly declaring that his King would demand the surrender of Philipsburg, though he would at the same time promise its restoration after the peace, together with that of the other places occupied by him in the Archbishopric of Treves and in Alsace. The convention then put to Oxenstiern the question as to the manner in which he desired that Sweden should be rewarded for its services, which question was afterwards followed by an offer of an indemnification in money, a perpetual alliance, and a surrender to Sweden of the Catholic territory which it now held.

The question and the offer Oxenstiern answered (August 8th) by saying that Sweden expected indeed a material remuneration, did not, however, wish permanently to retain the Catholic territory which it now held, because this was not conveniently situated, and hoped therefore that its allies would offer to the crown of Sweden, in exchange for this territory, some other which was better situated. Now came a rupture between the Upper German and the two Saxon Circles, the latter declaring that the Chancellor's answer evidently pointed to Sweden's desire for the possession of Pomerania, which land could not be given to it, because Brandenburg had an undoubted claim upon it. As Oxenstiern would not, with all the pressure of the envoys of Brandenburg and Pomerania, renounce this claim, the zeal also of the Elector George William for the common alliance of the six Circles cooled, and he now came forward for a union by themselves of the two Circles, which, in relation to their army and common treasury, should occupy an independent position.

Oxenstiern did not, therefore, accomplish his purpose

in Frankfort. He could neither succeed in effecting an alliance of the six Circles under Sweden's direction with unlimited control over its resources for war, nor could he now secure a decision that Sweden should be remunerated by the cession of Pomerania. The attention of the meeting in Frankfort was in the meantime called to the peace negotiations opened by Saxony with the Emperor at Leitmeritz, and if these had been quickly brought to their conclusion, a portion of the convention would have shown itself still less accommodating to the Swedish desires. When, however, the news of the battle of Nördlingen fell as a thunderclap upon the Frankfort meeting, party interests stood for the time silent in the presence of the common danger. The Saxon Circles showed a readiness to close the alliance under Sweden's direction, and Sweden rested satisfied with general assurances in regard to remuneration, and did not further insist upon an express promise of Pomerania. Upon this reciprocal yielding rested the alliance, which was finally concluded about the middle of September. It was determined that the four Upper Circles and the Estates of the two Saxon Circles—so far as the latter should join the alliance, which, in the case of Electoral Saxony, did not occur—should form each a confederation, and that both these should join the crown of Sweden and convey to its Chancellor the direction, though this direction of their common affairs was to have the concurrence of a special council, the members of which should be elected by the Imperial Estates. The common army was to be raised to 80,000 men, and the confederation to be bound together by the oath of its members.

What Feuquières effected at Frankfort remains still to be stated. It concerned Cardinal Richelieu to gain posses-

sion of fortified places on both banks of the Rhine, in order to secure at a future day the territory which he hoped to acquire against any invasion, and to this end he desired to obtain Philipsburg. Feuquières managed the matter, therefore, with the four Upper Circles, and, as early as the middle of July, brought them to make the concession; still he reported that it had cost him great labor, and that some of the Estates would have preferred to absent themselves rather than yield; that the Landgrave of Cassel had, however, rendered him the best services towards a triumph over the opposition, for which services he demanded a reward. The treaty for the cession of Philipsburg was concluded on the 26th of August. It is interesting to learn the manner in which France desired, before the battle of Nördlingen, to have the affairs of Germany shaped. Sweden should receive Pomerania, Oxenstiern the Duchy of Prussia, and Brandenburg should be indemnified with Silesia, Lusatia, and Moravia. Saxony should have Bohemia and Magdeburg, Horn the Bishoprics of Lubeck and Bremen, Bernard of Weimar should receive Upper Austria, and the Bishop of Würzburg should be restored. France desired to obtain for itself Metz, Verdun, and Alsace. The battle of Nördlingen broke up this plan of division—but only in so far as this, that France was afterwards concerned for its own enlargement, not for that of its allies.

II.

In March, 1634, the Emperor and his allies had at command the army which had been Waldstein's, part of which was in Bohemia, part in Silesia, the remains of

that of Feria and Aldringen—we say remains, because, during the winter, in consequence of fearful privations, the greatest part of the men were carried off by epidemic diseases, to which Feria himself fell a prey—and, in the western part of North Germany, of the army formerly commanded by Gronsfeld, now by Wolf of Mansfeld. Opposed to these troops were, in Silesia, the Saxons, Brandenburgers, and Swedes, all now commanded by Banér; in South Germany, Bernard of Weimar and Horn still remained; while, on the Lower Rhine and in Westphalia, about 27,000 men, Swedes and Germans, kept the scale of fortune preponderating in their favor.

After Waldstein's death the Emperor had entrusted the chief command of his troops to his own son, and thus fulfilled the latter's ardent longing. The mistake which he made in putting an inexperienced Prince in so important a position, Ferdinand sought to correct by placing General Gallas at his side; thus, in fact, giving to the latter the first position. A good part of the Bohemian army, strengthened by new enlistments, was concentrated, at the end of May (1634), at Pilsen, whither Ferdinand III. betook himself, and at the head of 30,000 men set out for Regensburg, the conquest of which by siege was the first mark towards which he directed his action. Bernard of Weimar had increased the garrison of the city to 6,000 men, and felt secure against its capture. But, as the siege was energetically prosecuted, his sense of security forsook him, and he deemed it imperative that he should unite with Horn, drop out of view the contest with the Bavarian and Spanish army, and approach Regensburg. The junction took place at Augsburg (July 12th); the united army of 22,000 men advanced against Landshut, and stormed the city, on which occasion Aldringen,

who now had the chief command of the Bavarian and imperialist troops there, having been sent by Ferdinand III. to the aid of the city, received a mortal wound. The command of the Bavarian troops, which, in union with the imperialists, continued the contest, Maximilian conferred upon Count Fugger, a Bavarian general. As Horn and Bernard of Weimar, on the 30th of July, left Landshut, they received the news of the capitulation of Regensburg.

After the taking of Regensburg, the imperial army marched along the course of the Danube, up the stream, and followed thus the lead of the enemy's generals, who were retiring before them. Gallas felt himself, however, too weak for striking a decisive blow, and so desired to await the arrival of the Spanish troops which were approaching from Italy; but before the junction he advanced to Nördlingen, which was held by a Swedish garrison, now in an extreme of distress. The danger for Nördlingen increased, when, on the 2d of September, the Spanish auxiliaries, under the command of the Cardinal Infante, Don Fernando, arrived before the city and united with the imperial army. The united army numbered now perhaps 36,000 men. Bernard and Horn thought that they ought to make no further delay in hastening to the aid of the city, and drew to themselves considerable additional strength, but were still weaker by a few thousand men than their antagonists. As Nördlingen could not be relieved in any other way than by offering battle to the imperialists, Bernard decided upon this course.

The battle of Nördlingen, which began on the 5th of September and raged on the following day also, was one of the bloodiest and most decisive of the long war. The

first day resulted favorably to the Swedes; but, on the second, fortune turned her back upon them, so that at midday Horn advised the Duke of Weimar to retreat. While the two generals were preparing for this, John Werth, a notable cavalry leader in the Bavarian service, and Duke Charles of Lorraine, who also fought at the head of the forces of the League, rushed upon them and caused among the troops a fearful confusion, which finally passed into a disorderly flight. Bernard was wounded, and but narrowly escaped capture, while Horn, with three generals, fourteen colonels, and 3,000 men were made prisoners. The number of the killed on the Swedish side was near 6,000, while the imperialist dead numbered but 1,200, and the wounded on the two sides were in the same ratio.

The defeat which the Emperor's enemies sustained at Nordlingen was not less, and perhaps was more, complete than that of Tilly at Leipsic, and can properly be compared only with that of the White Mountain. Had there been at the head of the imperial troops a superior general, who should have reaped adequately the fruits of the victory, these fruits would perhaps have opened to the Catholics prospects doubly as brilliant as were actually realized. Their very earliest measures, however, bore testimony that in the imperial headquarters there was no one who knew how to make use of the success and the time. Nor is this failure to be ascribed to the inexperience of the two chief generals, Ferdinand III. and the Cardinal Infante. The intemperance of their adviser, Gallas, who had become a mere drunkard and consumed his energy and discernment in wild carousing, is to be charged with it. At the first moment the news of the fearful defeat had a depressing effect upon the German

Protestants. Oxenstiern then spent his second sleepless night in Germany; but the defeat at least aided the transactions in Frankfort, by bringing the members of the convention, as we have related, to decide without delay upon a union with Sweden. Saxony, on the contrary, resumed with the Emperor the negotiations which had been interrupted.

After the victory at Nördlingen, the Infante separated his army from that of the Emperor and marched to Jülich, and there, in union with the bishops, took part in the defence of the Rhine against the Swedes and Hollanders. The imperial army was further reduced when Ferdinand III. sent about 7,000 men to Franconia, where they at first attained considerable successes. He himself marched at the head of the rest of his army towards the Rhine, and on his way took possession of Stuttgart. Instead, however, of rapidly proceeding on his way, he spent his time idly in this city, so that approaching winter found him still there. In Stuttgart a contest arose between the imperialists and the Bavarians in regard to the command. Maximilian did not hesitate to place his troops under the command of the King of Hungary, but there was another imperial general to whom he would not subject them. The quarrel took on considerable dimensions, but was, by the intervention of several confidential envoys, sent from Vienna, so far adjusted that the Duke of Lorraine, who now commanded the Bavarian troops, was to be placed under the immediate orders of the King of Hungary, while the remaining imperial generals were all to be made equal.

III.

The further advance of the imperial troops may also have been hindered by the fact that now the negotiations, some time before reopened by France, began to bear their fruit, and Louis was about to take up the war direct with Spain and the Emperor. In the first place, the alliance between France and Holland, upon the basis of taking the offensive, had become an actuality. After the death (December 1, 1633) of the Infanta, Isabella, who had independently ruled the Spanish Netherlands, this country returned to the immediate rule of Spain. This, Holland would on no account tolerate, and, following the persuasions of Richelieu, concluded with France a treaty (April 15, 1634), by which the former assumed the obligation to pay subsidies to the amount of two million francs yearly, and the latter to take up the war direct with Spain, both by land and sea, and to divide the conquests in case France should actually come to an open war with Spain. Richelieu determined at the same time to punish Duke Charles of Lorraine for his alliance with the Emperor, and on the day of the battle of Nördlingen carried out this determination. As early as the previous year (1633) he had, by act of Parliament, taken from him Bar le Duc, because the Duke had not discharged his feudal obligations for it, had then, in attendance upon the King, at the head of an army, invaded Lorraine and begun the siege of Nancy. The Duke, thus threatened in his possessions, had at the time, by the agency of his brother, Cardinal Francis of Lorraine, opened negotiations with Richelieu, which led to an adjustment, by which Nancy was to be left to the

King until the Princess Margaret, sister of the Duke and wife of Gaston of Orleans, should be surrendered. The French government desired to obtain possession of the person of the Princess, in order to institute a suit against Gaston's marriage, and to declare the same null and void. As Duke Charles could not deliver up his sister, because she had taken refuge in Brussels, he thought he could not, in the interests of his family, do otherwise than renounce his Duchy (January 19, 1634) in favor of his brother, the cardinal, and, with the troops left him, identify himself entirely with the Emperor's cause, in doing which, as we have seen, he rendered important services in the course of the year. The new Duke renounced his cardinalate, and, four weeks later, married his cousin; but as the King of France would not acknowledge the marriage and desired to seize his person, he took refuge with his wife in Florence, and abandoned the Duchy to his French oppressors.

On the 5th of September (1634) Richelieu crowned his persecution of the ducal house of Lorraine by a parliamentary act invalidating the marriage of Gaston and Margaret, declaring her two brothers to have forfeited their feudal tenures, and authorizing the King to indemnify himself with these—that is, of course, with Lorraine. Lorraine was now appropriated by the French, for, although Duke Charles now and then succeeded in entering it and maintaining his position there, these successes were but transient. The faithfulness with which he adhered to his alliance with Austria, in spite of threatened losses, formed in the end a strong bond of reciprocal attachment and sympathy between the Hapsburgs and the Princes of Lorraine, which, at a later day, became ever firmer, and finally culminated in the marriage of Stephen of Lorraine and Maria Theresa.

Trusting to the alliance with Holland, and the security with which his army might proceed in placing garrisons in the important places of Lorraine, Louis now ordered Marshal de la Force, with an army of 35,000 men, to approach the Rhine. The imperialists could not therefore pass this river without incurring the danger of a collision with the French. At the same time Louis sent to the Marquis of Feuquières the money necessary for the enlistment of 12,000 fresh troops in Germany, to oppose to the victorious enemy. This sending of money was the result of new negotiations between Sweden and the four Circles of Upper Germany, on the one hand, and France on the other, when the battle of Nördlingen made it advisable to form a more intimate union with France. Oxenstiern was at that time in desperation; he feared that Bernard of Weimar might unite with the Elector of Saxony, Sweden fail of its reward, and the two Saxon Circles dissolve the alliance he had made with them. He demanded, therefore, of Feuquières that the King of France should take part openly in the war, and send his troops over the Rhine. The French envoy did not decline this demand, but expressed the wish that Oxenstiern should send an ambassador to Paris to negotiate a new alliance. The Chancellor of Sweden obeyed this desire, and sent the Würtemberg chancellor, Löffler, together with the Palatinate counsellor, Streuf, to Paris, instructed to negotiate, not only in the name of Sweden, but also in that of the four Upper German Circles. Feuquières in triumph reported that the King could now gain possession of Alsace.

In fact, the negotiations which these two ambassadors opened in Paris placed a broad field before the French desire for extension. They bound themselves, in the

name of Sweden and the four Circles, to make no peace without the concurrence of France, and not to interfere with the Catholic religion in any territory which they should occupy. They received in return a promise of the support of 12,000 fresh troops for their service. In case Louis should himself break with the Emperor, and enter upon a campaign against him, Alsace was to be taken under his protection, while he might hold Breisach and also be at liberty to extend his protection to those Princes who should withdraw from their allegiance with the enemy, meaning chiefly the Rhenish Princes. Nearly the whole left bank of the Rhine was by these concessions surrendered to the King; the Germans themselves were to aid him in this magnificent acquisition, and receive their pay for this in a little money which he endeavored to keep in readiness for the support of their troops. Not so much as a reward was promised to the allies for their aid; and whence, indeed, could such have been obtained, since France would make no Catholic territory subject to them, and any reference to the lands of the Emperor possessed no charm for these negotiators.

On the 1st of November the negotiations at Paris were ended. The only question now was whether the treaty would be ratified by the four Circles and by Oxenstiern. The four Circles, at a meeting, which was held in Worms, December 28, 1634, decided to accept it. It cannot be denied that they most shamefully compromised the interests of their own country; when, however, it is remembered how they had been abused during the years 1626 to 1630, and that they had found their worst oppressors in their own countrymen, they are entitled to a milder judgment. He who is threatened with death, seeks to escape it at any cost, though the conditions of his

rescue may place even a more cruel end in prospect before him.

Oxenstiern, however, would not sign the treaty, because he did not find the interests of Sweden secured in it. France was therefore obliged to do something to win Sweden and the Chancellor, and so offered to Queen Christina an indemnification, which was left quite indefinite, and to the Chancellor the Electorate of Mentz. But these offers did not after all secure their end; the whole year 1635 passed without a successful termination of the negotiations, because Sweden would not be satisfied with phrases of mere general import. The result which was finally arrived at we shall state hereafter.

In pursuance of the treaty concluded with the four Circles, Louis XIII. sent his troops over the Rhine (end of December, 1634), and thus thwarted the besieging of Heidelberg, which place was hard pressed by the Bavarians. From this time forth France participated openly in the war against the Emperor. Meanwhile Bernard of Weimar also, strengthened by fresh recruits, advanced at the head of nearly 21,000 men, and, at the end of December, held a position between Frankenthal and Worms. As soon as France appeared on the theatre of war, the superiority of the imperial arms was a matter of the past. Nevertheless the imperialists succeeded in the beginning of the following year (January 24th) in capturing, by a sudden attack, the fortress of Philipsburg. The worth of the German soldiery, as compared with the French, which latter were but novices on the theatre of war, was brilliantly illustrated on this occasion. Their valor and intrepidity, as also their tactics, were acknowledged even by their enemies, and Cardinal de la Valette, who, notwithstanding his profession and rank, commanded as

general of the French troops, did not hesitate to declare that the Germans were far their superiors. This experience and skill they had acquired in their fratricidal contest. When the French, at a later day, attained to the same grade of skill, their only pre-eminence was in the fact that the Germans assisted them in the subjugation of Germany.

IV.

The negotiations for peace opened with Saxony by the Emperor in the beginning of the year 1634 were earnestly intended; they were, however, made use of for his treasonable purposes by the Duke of Friedland, who was then through his schemes and machinations rushing along the downward path towards his tragic end, and by his violent death they suffered an interruption. But Duke Francis Julius of Saxe Lauenburg, who had introduced Arnim's negotiations with the Friedlander, did not abandon his work of mediation when the Eger catastrophe occurred, but sought to reopen the channel of these labors for peace, and his efforts were willingly met by both sides. In view of the exhaustion of his lands and the separation of his war forces, for the contest with an enemy now threatening him on every side, it was a matter of great moment with the Emperor to win back the Elector of Saxony and have in him a reconciled neighbor and ally, with whose aid he might drive the Swedes from the Empire and bring about the longed-for peace. The Elector of Saxony, embittered by the oppressive and arbitrary proceedings of the Swedes and the disregard of his claims as head of the Protestants, was also ready to negotiate. The Em-

peror designated the city of Leitmeritz as the place of meeting, and sent thither Count Trautsmansdorff and Imperial Court Counsellors Questenberg and Gebhardt as his representatives, while the Saxon Elector represented himself by his Counsellors Miltitz and Oppel. The business began in this city, which was little less than a complete waste and unsupplied with the necessities of life, on the 15th of June, 1634—that is, nearly three months before the battle of Nördlingen, during the session of the Protestants at Frankfort.

The Saxon envoys declared at the beginning that the Elector negotiated only in his own name, and would not prejudice the rights of the other Evangelical Estates and those of kindred faith, but that the results secured should still be theirs if they should declare their acceptance of them, and that the treaty of Passau and the religious peace of Augsburg should, in all points in which changes should not be actually made by these transactions, remain a perpetual obligation. The conditions of peace properly, as proposed by the Saxon envoys, were twofold: they related partly to the Empire, partly to indemnifying Saxony for services rendered the Emperor in the year 1620. In the articles relating to the Empire they demanded: 1. That all ecclesiastical lands, mediate and immediate, which, on the 1st of January, 1612, had been in the hands of Protestants, should remain so in perpetuity. 2. That the Augsburg Confession should be acknowledged in the lands under Catholic rule and freely exercised, and that those who had been exiled for the sake of their evangelical religious faith should be allowed to return, which article had special reference to Bohemia and the other hereditary lands of the Emperor. 3. That the jurisdiction of the Catholic clergy over the adherents of

the Augsburg Confession should everywhere cease. 4. That the imperial court at Spire and the imperial counsellors at Vienna should be made up of Catholics and Protestants in equal numbers. 5. That for the future no confiscations by the Emperor should take place within the territories of the Estates of the Empire, and that the right of confiscation, in case its exercise should be necessary, should rest only with the local ruler of the land. 6. That the electoral dignity of the Palatinate should, after the death of the Elector of Bavaria, be restored to the children of the condemned Palsgrave, and that the Upper and Lower Palatinate should be restored to them at once. 7. Finally, that the indemnification of the Swedes should be by the Catholics alone. In regard to the payment of the Emperor's indebtedness to the Elector, which, with its accumulated interest, now amounted to over seven million thalers, the Saxon envoys demanded the hereditary conveyance of the Margraviate of Upper and Lower Lusatia, as also of the Archbishopric of Magdeburg and the Bishopric of Halberstadt, and, in case of the Emperor's not being willing to surrender these bishoprics, the cession of the district of Eger, or an equivalent portion of Northern Bohemia, and, finally, the assignment of certain incomes in Silesia.

It is to be supposed that the Emperor endeavored to settle with Saxony at as low a rate as possible, and would therefore but reluctantly consent to give up Lusatia. This question of indemnification formed the centre of gravity of the whole transaction and the dangerous rock on which it was threatened with wreck. The imperial envoys declared that the conveyance was in violation of the terms of Lusatia's incorporation with Bohemia, in which the Emperor, as also his son, Ferdinand III., had

pledged themselves by oath not to alienate any part of the Kingdom. Nor could Ferdinand, they said, convey Magdeburg and Halberstadt to be held by hereditary right, since they were not his by such right, and because he could not prejudice the claims of his son, the Archduke Leopold William, who had received a Papal appointment to Magdeburg, and had also been elected Bishop of Halberstadt. Instead of these grants, the Emperor's representatives offered the Elector the principalities of Hohenstein and Regenstein and all the money which the Dukes of Mecklenburg would be obliged to pay in order to secure a reconciliation. This offer was evidently in no kind of proportion to the demand, and, as the imperial envoys perceived that the Elector of Saxony would not be satisfied with it, but would insist upon the hereditary possession of the Margraviate which he held in pledge, they referred it to the Emperor for serious consideration, whether it would not be better to sacrifice Lusatia to the earnest desire for peace, rather than, by refusing this, to recommit the matter to the sword for decision. With reference to the fact that this Margraviate was incorporated in the Bohemian crown, and might not be disposed of without the consent of the Estates of Bohemia, they advised the Emperor to confer secretly with the most trustworthy official persons in Bohemia.

These counsels were in part viewed with favor by the Emperor, who authorized his envoys to offer the feudal tenure of Lower Lusatia to the representatives of Saxony. The demand, however, that the Augsburg Confession should be allowed in the Emperor's hereditary dominions, and especially in Bohemia, or in any of the frontier districts of this Kingdom, such as Eger and Joachimsthal, and that the return of the Protestant exiles should be

permitted, he promptly rejected, and was willing to make concessions only in the case of Silesia. He appealed to the principle contended for by the Protestant Princes, that the introduction of the religion of a land is an affair of the sovereign of that land, in regard to which his own will is to prevail without limitation. In like manner he scarcely allowed the question of the restoration of electoral dignity and of the Palatinate to be spoken of, and protested against an indemnity to Sweden at the cost of the Catholic Princes.

Between the self-seeking purposes of the Swedish policy, and especially of Oxenstiern, who, at the time of the deliberations at Leitmeritz, was endeavoring, in the meeting at Frankfort, to unite the Protestants more firmly against the Emperor, and the one-sided peace negotiations carried on by Saxony, there was no harmony. Oxenstiern therefore sought to hinder these negotiations, and ordered General Banér, who was stationed in Silesia, to invade Bohemia, not only that he might thus interrupt them, but that he might by this diversion force King Ferdinand III., who was occupied in besieging Regensburg, to raise the siege of that place. Although the Elector of Saxony at first advised General Banér against this expedition, sent a warning to the imperial envoys at Leitmeritz, and offered them his protection, he, nevertheless, in the end joined the Swedes. This he did less from a feeling of friendship towards them than from one of submission, because he had not yet come to an understanding with the Emperor, and desired not to fall prematurely into conflict with the Swedes. On the 14th of July he took Zittau, and then, in agreement with Banér, entered Bohemia, and the Elector marched, by way of Liebenau, Münchengrätz, and Jungbunzlau, towards Prague, while the

Swedes took possession of Leitmeritz and united with the Saxons at Melnik. After an unsuccessful attack, which they unitedly made from the White Mountain, upon the garrison of Prague, they withdrew, and afterwards left Bohemia, because they could not but apprehend there, on account of the battle of Nördlingen, an attack from an overwhelming force.

When the disquieting news of the approach of the Swedes came to Leitmeritz, the imperial envoys were obliged to think of their safety, and went therefore to the neighboring monastery of Doxan, where they urged their Saxon colleagues to join them, because they would not on any account, by allowing them to withdraw, adjourn the peace again to the distant future. The Saxons did not accept their invitation, but insisted that the imperialists should join them at Pirna, whither the Elector provided for them a free escort and protection. In fact, the news of the entry of the Swedes into Leitmeritz caused the Emperor's envoys to remove, on the 18th of July, from Doxan, and on the 19th they arrived at Pirna. At this place had settled many Bohemian exiles, who showed extreme hostility towards the imperial envoys and their attendants, so much so that the city authorities had great difficulty in procuring quarters for the suite and protecting them against abuse and actual assault. Many of the exiles left Pirna on hearing of the taking of Leitmeritz by Banér, and went thither in the hope of being aided by the Swedes in regaining possession of the lands which had been taken from them.

The transactions at Pirna, in which, at first, Arnim took part, were protracted into September, and finally, by the mediation of Landgrave George of Hesse, reached their conclusion in the drafting of a treaty of peace, which

served as the basis of that completed at Prague in the following year. In this draft the Emperor did his best to satisfy the Elector, and to make the acceptance of the peace possible also to the other Protestant Princes. The stone of stumbling, the Edict of Restitution, was not indeed fully removed, but its action was suspended for a series of years. Electoral Saxony was to retain without question, for fifty years from the date of the peace, all the institutions and ecclesiastical lands of which it had been possessed in the year 1620. The other Protestant Princes were to retain in like manner those ecclesiastical possessions which they held at the end of the meeting at Mühlhausen (1627) for forty years longer. The Elector's son, Duke Augustus, was to hold during his life the Archbishopric of Magdeburg, to which was also to be secured the right of a free election, together with all other rights. On the other hand, the existence of the Catholic cathedral chapters and benefices was to be secured. In regard to indemnifying the Elector, the following agreement was made: The two Margraviates of Upper and Lower Lusatia were to be conveyed to the Elector of Saxony as a hereditary feudal possession, but the Emperor and his successors should, as Kings of Bohemia, remain the supreme feudal lords and proprietors of these lands, and should also thereafter bear their title and armorial ensigns on their escutcheon. If the Electoral house in its male line should die out, then these two lands should pass to the male line of the Dukes of Saxe Altenburg; if these too should die out, then they were to pass to the Elector's daughter—still, however, only in the male line; in this case the King of Bohemia should have the right of choice whether to close the matter up by paying the debt to Saxony, or allow this line to succeed to the inheritance.

On the failure of the daughter's posterity, the two Margraviates were to fall back, without payment, to the Kingdom of Bohemia. Saxony was to promise, in the feudal contract which was to be executed, to protect the Catholic clergy in their chartered rights, and to restore to them that which had been taken from them during the anarchy. Furthermore, the Estates and subjects of these Margraviates were to be left unmolested in the exercise of their religion, whether it were the Catholic or that of the Augsburg Confession. Saxony was not to be obligated to contribute to the taxes of the Bohemian crown, except that, in case of a general stress caused by the Turks, or other enemies of the Kings of Bohemia, the old customary quota, or whatever should be agreed upon in place of it, should be furnished.

V.

The Saxon draft of peace articles was accepted by the Emperor, but not confirmed, because he declared himself under obligation to obtain for it the sanction of the Catholic Electors. The business was adjourned, and was to be resumed on the 13th of January, 1635, in the Bohemian city of Aussig, before which time Ferdinand hoped to receive the opinion of the Catholic Electors in regard to the terms of the articles of Pirna. Mentz, Cologne, and Bavaria—but not Treves, on account of its public alliance with France—were informed of the Pirna draft. The peace would have been very agreeable to the three Electors; but, when called upon to express their concurrence, they found many points to criticise. Maximilian did not feel himself adequately remunerated if only the

electoral dignity and the Upper Palatinate were left him: he demanded the cession of new territories for the damages he had sustained, and had turned his eyes towards the city of Regensburg and several other immediate imperial possessions. He even demanded that the Emperor should provisionally secure the satisfaction of his desires by assigning to him territory of his own, if no other were at his control. While the Elector of Bavaria fought against the peace articles only in his own personal interests, the Elector of Cologne attacked them on religious grounds. He objected that, in the deliberations in regard to a peace which related to religious interests, neither the Pope nor other ecclesiastical princes had been consulted, and that all the ecclesiastical lands which the Protestants had obtained possession of since the year 1555 were restored to them, and the Edict of Restitution abandoned. He desired therefore that the Emperor should refer the decision to the sword. Nor did the Elector of Mentz concur, though he brought forward his objections in a milder form, and, indeed, let them afterwards all drop, and defended the Emperor's longing for peace against his colleague of Cologne by a reference to the impossibility of a further resistance, unless, at least, they could get rid of a portion of their enemies.

Nor had the Emperor called upon the Catholic Electors only, for their opinion, but had also asked numerous theologians of Vienna whether he might, without damage to his conscience, conclude a peace with Saxony and give up the execution of the Edict of Restitution. The choice of these theologians and the lead of their deliberations he confided to Cardinal Dietrichstein. These men were placed in an unusually difficult position. They knew that the peace with Saxony involved the revocation of the

Edict of Restitution and the definitive alienation of Lusatia, and that large territories would at once and forever be adandoned to the Protestants. It was also, on the other hand, known to them that Louis XIII. was at the same time about ready to negotiate with Ferdinand in regard to a peace, if Alsace could be transferred to him, and that the Pope, by his Nuncio in Vienna, had offered for this his mediation. In case this offer should be accepted, no disadvantage to the Church was to be feared, but an advantage would result, for then Lusatia would remain to the Emperor. These considerations could not but affect the judgment of the theologians, and still more the suggestions of the Papal Nuncio, who labored zealously to satisfy France, and for this purpose addressed a memorial to the Emperor.

The twenty theologians whom Cardinal Dietrichstein had selected as counsellors appear, so far as can be judged by their names, to have been half of the Latin races—who were then somewhat numerous in the recently built Capuchin and Carmelite monasteries of Vienna, as also in the Jesuit College—and half Germans. As to the orders to which they belonged, there were fourteen Capuchins, Carmelites, Franciscans, and Dominicans, and six Jesuits. They were all, therefore, taken from the regular clergy. Lamormain was not in the number of those called, though he gave his personal opinion. All the theologians who did not belong to the Jesuit order agreed that the Emperor might with good conscience conclude the peace with Saxony on the conditions offered. Of the Jesuits, two concurred in this opinion, while the remaining four desired that the concurrence of the Pope be first procured. Two of these latter held that the Emperor could not, without damage to his conscience, assent to the articles, and at

the same time intimated that the Pope would decline to give his sanction. Lamormain's original opinion is not to be found; but according to the report of the Spanish ambassador, Castañeda, he was most zealously opposed to the peace and labored in the interests of France. The ambassador found no other explanation for his action than that he had received instructions from the general of his order, and that the latter might have been influenced by the Pope. This explanation was accepted in Spain as the true one, and it was therefore determined to return thanks, ironically of course, to the general of the Jesuits for the services which he had rendered to the King.

When the theologians had handed in their opinions, there came together (February 27, 1635) a number of the most prominent imperial counsellors, among whom were Cardinals Dietrichstein and Pazman, the Bishop of Vienna, Count Trautmansdorff, the President of the Imperial Council Strahlendorf, and Lamormain, to take counsel. Eggenberg's aid—for he had died in October, 1634—was wanting. The Emperor himself, also, kept away from this meeting, which could not but come to conclusions of extraordinary range of import, upon which the distant destinies of Austria and Germany were suspended. He had, early in the morning, summoned Cardinal Dietrichstein to him, and authorized him to say to the other counsellors "that he desired, in a matter of such transcendent importance, and one which stood in connection with the welfare of the soul, to form no independent determination. In order to disburden his own conscience, he should lay the burden upon his counsellors, and invest them with an authority for the exercise of which they would be able to render an account before the Divine

judgment-seat." No deed or utterance can place in so clear a light as these few words that want of self-reliance which grew upon the Emperor with each passing year of his life.

All the counsellors who spoke in the meeting expressed themselves in favor of the peace with Saxony, but Strahlen-dorf most decidedly of all, emphasizing the impossibility of mastering the heresy of Germany, and declaring any further prosecution of the contest to be pernicious. In conclusion the council advised the Emperor to continue the negotiations with Saxony—endeavoring, however, where it was possible, to effect a change in several articles. Ferdinand declared himself satisfied with the proposed changes, and shaped accordingly the negotiations which he sent to his deputed envoys for their closing transactions, who were now to meet in Prague, and not again in Aussig. These were Count Trautmansdorff, Baron Kurz, of Seuf-tenau, and Doctor Gebhardt.

VI.

The imperial and Saxon peace commissioners came together on the 2d of April, in Prague, and opened their deliberations in the splendid imperial council-chamber of the castle. The Saxons—Doctors Döring, Sebottendorf, and Opel—declared that the Elector accepted the articles, one and all, as agreed upon at Pirna, and they were therefore ready to sign them at once. The imperialists answered that Ferdinand could not ratify the conditions because he had not received the concurrence of the Catholic Princes, and must therefore propose some changes. Thus the business was begun anew: it related to the question of ecclesiastical lands; to the issue of a

general amnesty, and who should be excepted in it ; to the settlement with Saxony ; to the children of the Palsgrave Frederic ; to the alliance of Saxony with the Emperor, and to other matters, and continued several weeks, but finally terminated on the 30th of May, in the conclusion of a peace between the Emperor and the Elector.

In regard to the treaty of peace, to which, on account of its great range, we desire to refer more at length, we remark, first, that it related not merely to the Emperor and Saxony, but was designed to embrace all Germany. It provided, indeed, a redress for the reciprocal Catholic and Protestant grievances, which the Emperor and Elector had agreed upon and offered to the German Princes. Those who were satisfied with it were to be admitted to this peace. Against the others, and especially the foreigners, they were faithfully to support each other.

The first point decided was that in regard to the ecclesiastical lands. Those who were possessed of any Church lands whatever, up to the year 1627, whether they had obtained them before or after the religious peace of Augsburg, should retain possession of these for the next forty years ; or, in case they should be driven from them, were to have them restored. In order to prevent new disputes at the end of the forty years, the parties obligated themselves to prepare in advance the way of a peaceful settlement of the questions at issue. If such settlement should not be effected, the Emperor reserved to himself and his successors the right of adjustment by regular judicial proceedings. The Catholic Church was not in any wise to be diminished in its possessions, and no bishopric or monastery was to be taken from it. The Ecclesiastical Reservation was, therefore, to be perpetually valid or binding.

Next followed in the treaty the grants to be made to the Elector of Saxony. The See of Magdeburg was to fall to the Elector's son, Duke Augustus; four bailiwicks, those of Querfurt, Jüterbock, Dama, and Borg, were, however, to be detached from it and conveyed to the Elector, to be hereditary in his family; and the former Administrator of Magdeburg, the Margrave Christian William of Brandenburg, was, during his life, to receive from Duke Augustus a yearly pension of 12,000 thalers. In an appendix was further ceded to the Elector, as an indemnity for the costs of services rendered the Emperor in the years 1620 and 1621, the Margraviate of Lusatia. Ferdinand in this instrument maintained the right of his son, Archduke Leopold William, to the Bishopric of Halberstadt, to which he had been at the time elected, and declared also that he could not, as he desired quiet, tolerate in his own dominions the adherents of the Augsburg Confession, and would only make an exception in case of Silesia. This exception, which was made more specific in an appendix, was to the effect that the admission of the Augsburg Confession was to be granted only in those principalities which were not in immediate dependence upon the Bohemian crown; in all the immediate dependencies the Emperor reserved to himself the right of reformation. The Dukes of Liegnitz and the city of Breslau were in the instrument assured of forgiveness for their recent disloyalty.

In relation to the imperial chamber, it was conceded that its judges should be selected in equal numbers from the Catholics and the Protestants. The constitution of the imperial court council should be in accordance with a formal opinion of the Electoral College. In the matter of the Palatinate, which had been a thorn in the side for so



many years, the Elector conformed to the Emperor's view: the electoral dignity and lands were to be deemed a forfeit, and Maximilian was not to be disturbed in their possession; and yet the Emperor promised that, in case the children of the Palsgrave should properly humble themselves, he would grant them, as an act of grace and not as a debt, a princely support. The Dukes of Mecklenburg were to be received to grace, and to receive back their lands; and in like manner all the other Princes, Catholic and Protestant, so far as they were not expressly excepted, were to be reinstated in whatever possessions they had held in the year 1630. In order to force France and Sweden to relinquish all the places occupied by them, Saxony, and all who should accept this peace, bound themselves to render armed assistance to the Emperor. In like manner they desired to restore the Duke of Lorraine to his entire dominion as it stood in the year 1630.

It was observed above that only those Princes should be replaced in their possessions who had not been specially excepted. In regard to the latter, there was in the treaty a paragraph relating to the amnesty, and also an appendix devoted to specifications on the same subject. The Elector of Saxony labored at first to include all the Imperial Estates in the amnesty, and desired to make only the Palsgrave's children an exception. The representatives of the Landgrave of Darmstadt were less considerate. They had taken part in the deliberations at Leimeritz, and had now come also to Prague. They insisted that the Landgrave of Cassel, too, should be excluded from the amnesty, and that his possessions should be assigned to Darmstadt. Doctor Wolf, Darmstadt's representative in the conferences at Prague, pursued this subject through all the variations of the scale; he declared

that the Emperor had no fiercer enemy than the Landgrave of Cassel, the Princes of the Palatinate, and those of Weimar, and that he could secure quiet only by their complete ruin. He offered, in case his desires in regard to Cassel should be fulfilled, the alliance of his sovereign, with a strong auxiliary force. The Emperor would gladly have yielded to this demand, but he perceived that he would thus force the Landgrave to take refuge in the arms of France, and the desire not to put off the peace, by increasing its difficulties, moved him to decline these demands. The result was that the Palsgrave and those affected by the confiscations in Upper Austria and Bohemia were excluded from the amnesty, and besides these only a few princes and counts in the Empire who had rendered themselves particularly odious by their union with Sweden, especially the Counts of Löwenstein, George Frederic Hohenloe, the Counts of Erbach-Isenburg, the Duke of Würtemberg, the Margrave of Baden-Durlach, the Counts of Öttingen and Nassau, and a few other less prominent immediate Estates of the Empire. Nor even in case of these was the door of grace quite closed, and the Emperor was left free to punish them in this way in case he declined to exercise grace towards them. It was expressly provided in regard to the Weimar Princes that they be received to grace on condition of allying themselves with the Emperor and aiding him with their military force. Finally, all those were excluded from the amnesty—not, however by name—who were members of the council appointed by the German Estates to act concurrently with Oxenstiern.

One of the most important matters for which these peace articles provided, related to the army which the Emperor and the Elector desired to place in the field

against the common foe. It was prescribed that this army should be a unit, and should bear a name designating it as the army of the Emperor and Empire, that a part of it should be under the command of the Elector, and a part under that of the imperial general, which latter should also have the chief command. For the support of the entire army all the Estates of the Empire should be held pledged. All leagues, unions, and other federations were to be dissolved, the old unity of the Empire was to be restored, and its Princes to be obligated to obedience to the Emperor. It was provided in an appendix that, if the imperial army should number 60,000 men, 20,000 should be under the command of the Elector.

The Emperor hailed the conclusion of the peace—of which the ratifications were exchanged on the 15th of June—with supreme satisfaction. He was sincerely determined to maintain it, not to assault his religious antagonists in Germany, and no more to advance his own influence by violent measures. He abandoned every ambitious and intolerant thought, as far as Germany was concerned. Peace, peace was his only wish. To the plenipotentiaries who had conducted the negotiations he expressed his thanks in the form of imperial gifts, and he even enlarged his magnanimity to the Saxon negotiators—to Dr. Döring 30,000, Sebottendorf 20,000, and Dr. Oppel 10,000 thalers. It was supposed, also, that 10,000 thalers fell into Dr. Hoe's hands. He sought, at least, to render himself meritorious by his zeal for the peace, and by a pamphlet, in which he attempted to show that it ought not to be extended to the Calvinists. To the Pope, Ferdinand sent information of the conclusion of the peace in such a manner as to show him clearly that he attached no importance to his opposition, and that his confidence in him as the real vicar

of Christ had vanished. The Emperor made no attempt to conceal this depreciatory opinion from the Capuchin, Father Alexander, who was at that time residing in Vienna as a kind of confidential Papal agent, to whom he flatly declared that he could not trust the Pope, and felt bound decidedly to blame him for his alliance with France. The Pope might, as an Italian, be right in his enmity to the Hapsburgs, but, as head of Christendom, he was bringing decided harm to the Catholic interests by his partiality for France, even though this should not be shown in material aids. It would require the most convincing proofs to show that the Pope acted as he did for the purpose of disturbing Ferdinand's sentiment of reverence towards him and in order to bring him to such an utterance of his indignation.

VII.

It could not have been otherwise than that the fact of the peace negotiations, and the way thus prepared for an entire breach with Sweden and France, should create a great sensation in Germany. In general, the fullest success for these endeavors was desired, and only the Princes who had become too deeply involved with Sweden and France were opposed to them. In proof of this statement, we adduce the action taken by the prelates, nobles, knights, and cities of Brandenburg, when they were summoned by their Elector, in the beginning of February, 1635, and informed of the contents of the Pirna articles. All, without exception, besought the Elector to accede to the peace, join Saxony, and not to concern himself about the Swedes, if it should come to a break with them.

We may justly assume this declaration as an expression of the general sentiment in German States. It must indeed have become clear to every one that the French and Swedes were ruling in Germany as over a lordless manorial estate, that they were led only by a selfish interest, and that all their statements about the defence of German "liberty and the freedom of the faith" were but worthless falsehoods, by which they sought to reap still further advantages from the victims of their deception. There is no doubt that the aid of Gustavus Adolphus had saved Protestantism from great loss, if not from extinction, for which service, however, the Swedes, with the aid of the French, desired to pay themselves by the complete overthrow of the German state-system. The future of Germany was a hundred times more imperilled, through the subjection by France and Sweden of a portion of its population, than by that suppression of its internal development with which the dominion of Catholicism in the North threatened it.

On this ground the foes of Germany—for as such, from this time forth, both France and Sweden must be alike regarded—sought to defeat the endeavors for peace. Oxenstiern desired to bait the Elector of Brandenburg with Silesia, and thus retain him in the alliance; in fact, he abated his demands upon Pomerania, and gave the Elector hope of a portion of this province. But this did not help him; to the Elector, Oxenstiern's perfidy had become evident, since he had perceived that the hope held out to him of a marriage of his son with Christina was but a decoy.

More energetic were the efforts of France to defeat this peace. The ambassador Rorté, who was sent to Dresden, promised the Elector there a far more important exten-

sion of his territory than the Emperor had done, in case he should join France ; he promised too that Louis would maintain the right of Bohemia to elect its King, and would establish there the free exercise of religion. As these suggestions were not successful, and the Elector but hastened the conclusion of the peace, Rorté declared that his sovereign would not allow himself to be thus frightened from his purpose, but would still keep up the war with the Emperor for the protection of German "liberty."

The first care of the Emperor and the Elector of Saxony was to labor for the recognition of the peace by the German Princes, that they might thus bring about the desired union of their arms. The Emperor undertook the solution of this problem with the Catholics, the Elector with the Protestants. Upon being notified of the agreement effected in Prague, the Catholic bishops raised no more objections, but concurred in the peace, and bowed to the incontestable fact that they could not subjugate the Protestants. Only Maximilian of Bavaria placed difficulties in the way ; the further remuneration which he desired was not promised him, and he was not treated in the same manner as was Saxony. In the articles relating to the army of the Empire, it was provided that the general appointed by the Emperor should be chief in command, but that his immediate command should embrace but three-fourths of the army, of which the remaining fourth was to be placed under the command of the Elector of Saxony. To this provision Maximilian objected ; he desired a place not inferior to that of Saxony, and if the Emperor would avoid giving him mortal offence, he must decide to place likewise a fourth part of the imperial army, which should be made up chiefly of Bavarian troops, under his command. With this concession, Maximilian accepted

the peace, and published it in his dominions. The League now came to an end, and the soldiers which the bishops could raise were under immediate imperial command.

The problem which the Elector of Saxony had undertaken to solve was more difficult. The Protestants could not so easily be made to believe that the Emperor had definitively and sincerely abandoned all thought of their suppression, and that the assurances given in the peace of Prague were earnestly intended. But the efforts of Saxony, a conviction of the increasing distress which pressed upon the Emperor, and his need of peace, and then their frightful sufferings from the war, made still more intolerable by the reckless booty-system of the Swedes, rendered them more inclined to the offered terms of reconciliation, and, as the result, by the end of August nearly all the more prominent German Princes and the most weighty of the imperial cities had given notice of their acceptance. To enumerate: Brandenburg, several Saxon Dukes, the Dukes of Holstein, Mecklenburg, Lüneburg, Brunswick, Pomerania, and Würtemberg, the Princes of Anhalt, the Landgrave of Darmstadt, Margrave William of Baden, the cities of Hamburg, Lubeck, Frankfort, Ulm, Heilbronn, Worms, Spire, Strasburg, and others, and besides these were the most of the imperial counts and the knights of some of the Circles; in short, so numerous were the announcements, that it seemed as if only the Landgrave of Cassel, Bernard of Weimar, and the heirs of the Palsgrave would persist in their enmity. Remembering the sufferings of the years 1626 to 1630, and the execrations then uttered against Ferdinand II., none could have believed that friendly relations between him and the injured Princes could ever have been restored; and yet this was true, and was the merit of their former "deliverers,"

Sweden and France, who now as vampires were sucking the blood out of the German body-politic.

In addition to the gaining of the German Protestants, the Elector of Saxony had still another special problem to solve: he was to bring about an adjustment with Sweden. Had he succeeded, the war would have ended, for France could not have carried it on alone against all Germany. John George gave notice of the peace to General Banér, who was then at Magdeburg, immediately on the exchange of ratifications, and may at the same time also have informed Oxenstiern, who was then in Hamburg. The Chancellor was much perplexed by the news; for Sweden's danger lay not, perhaps, in the fact that the Emperor had found an ally, but rather in this, that the army under Swedish command in Germany, scarcely a tenth of which was made up of Swedes, was threatened with dissolution if the German Princes should forbid their subjects further to participate in this service, in which case Sweden would fail of any indemnification. He addressed therefore to the Elector of Brandenburg the earnest request not to accede to the peace; but receiving no good news of the latter's intentions, and well knowing that he could cherish no kindly sentiments towards him on account of the matter of Pomerania, he bit at last into the sour apple, and entered into negotiations with John George of Saxony, who sent a special envoy to him in order to dispose him favorably to the peace of Prague, and to come to an understanding with him in regard to the conditions on which he might be won to its support.

The offers which the Saxon ambassadors made to the Swedish Chancellor were most unfavorable. Not an inch of German territory should fall to Sweden or to Oxenstiern; the former was not, therefore, to receive Pomerania,

nor the latter Mentz. The statement was that it could not be demanded of the Protestants to give up their possessions, and that, since the battle of Nördlingen, the Catholics had again come into possession of their own territory. The Elector would only give assurance that in the course of a few years the Empire would indemnify the Swedes in money. This result was communicated to the Chancellor in Magdeburg, whither he had in the meantime travelled, and although he might have been quite sure of it before, since he knew the terms of the treaty, yet he was thunderstruck. At that moment a Brandenburg ambassador was with him, to whom he turned, with bitter complaints of the ingratitude of the Princes, who, but for the intervention of Gustavus Adolphus, would have been lost, and adjured him to dissuade his sovereign from the acceptance of the peace. When Blumenthal—for that was his name—inquired whether, in case of Brandenburg's accession to Sweden, the latter would renounce its claim to Pomerania, Oxenstiern declined to answer in plain terms, and thus broke the force of his reproaches, the justice of which would otherwise have been acknowledged.

The two Saxon envoys, Hans von der Pforten and Dr. Münch, who came to Magdeburg, and there had a conference with Oxenstiern and Banér, acted according to their instructions, and did not confer merely with these two leaders, but also with Count Brandenstein, General Lohausen, and Counsellor Schwallenberg, who were sent to them as representatives of Sweden. To their repeated urging that Oxenstiern, if not satisfied with the offer of a money indemnity, would state his conditions, it was answered that it was not the proper time to conclude a peace, and he could not therefore accede to their wish. The same view was expressed by Oxenstiern when the envoys

afterwards took their leave of him. The peace, he said, should not have been concluded without calling in the four Upper Circles and Sweden; the lots of some of the Princes, the Landgrave of Cassel, for instance, were by no means secured, and Sweden was treated outrageously, being simply ordered to give up Magdeburg and Pomerania, both of which provinces it had wrested from the Emperor. Finally, he declared that he would send a special embassy to the Elector. The envoys accepted an invitation of Lohausen for the evening, where they met the most of the German officers of the army stationed at and near Magdeburg, who complained bitterly that they were to be turned out upon the street, their services unpaid, nay, even proscribed, on account of their alliance with Sweden. It was in vain that the envoys labored to remove from their minds the erroneous impression that they were to be proscribed; their embitterment rose to such a pitch that the envoys even felt in fear of falling into an Eger carnage.

When John George was informed of the Chancellor's intention to send to him a special embassy, he was perplexed as to whether he should receive this or not. He referred the matter to the Emperor, giving at the same time his own opinion that the negotiations would lead to nothing, that the desire on the Swedish side was merely to gain time, and that it would therefore be best not to receive the envoys. The Elector was in favor of striking the blow without delay at Sweden, and calling upon all the German officers and soldiers, by imperial mandate and at the peril of proscription, to leave the Swedish army. He, however, delayed this action, and even granted an audience to Brandenstein, Lohausen, and Schwallenberg, when they came to him. They placed before him, in detail, the

reasons why Sweden could not accept the peace of Prague. The chief of these was, that Sweden was in intimate alliance with the four Circles of Upper Germany and with France, and could not, without their concurrence, come to a conclusion of such breadth of import. The ingratitude with which the Swedes would be treated in Germany, if they should be thus dismissed without recognition of their services, the envoys stated at length. The Elector, even with these representations, adhered to his earlier conclusions; only as an extreme would he consent that Sweden should hold Stralsund until the stipulated indemnity should have been paid.

As the offer of Stralsund restored in part the sunken hopes of Oxenstiern, he again sent Schwallenberg to the Elector to ask him whether he would intervene for the settlement of the claims of the Swedish-German army, and how he desired, finally, to have the indemnification of Sweden provided for. In order to win him, Oxenstiern offered to renounce in his favor the Bishopric of Magdeburg, which the Elector, in accordance with the terms of the peace, claimed for himself and his son. Thus called upon for an unequivocal answer, John George declared that he could propose no other indemnity than a sum of money, the amount of which he requested the Chancellor to fix. To this answer the latter rejoined that Sweden would be satisfied with nothing short of a territorial acquisition, and deemed this claim as fully justified as that of the Elector, who, although he had fought against the Emperor, was rewarded with Lusatia and four bailiwicks from Magdeburg. With this declaration and a demand in regard to the payment of the Swedish-German army, Oxenstiern sent General Lohausen and Colonel Krakow

to John George, who at this time showed himself not disinclined to the satisfaction of the claims of the army, but would still assure Sweden of only a money indemnity. He at the same time called upon these two high officers, who appeared before him in the name of the Germans serving in the Swedish army, to join their countrymen in service under the imperial banners, and offered to receive them one and all, with retention of rank, into the imperial army. When these offers were communicated to the rest of the colonels and other officers, they were highly indignant; they would not listen to a mere money compensation or a preservation of their rank, but had their covetous eyes fixed upon certain landed properties, the possession of which had been assured or conveyed to them by Sweden. With one voice, therefore, they declared that they were not satisfied with the offer, and should remain true to Sweden.

The obstinacy with which the Elector of Saxony refused to yield to the desires of the Swedes was not entirely the result of his own convictions, but partly that of Brandenburg's persuasions. George William would accept the peace of Prague and yield his objections to the limitation of the amnesty * only on the condition that no part of Pomerania, or even Stralsund, should be alienated, but suggested instead the port of Wismar, on the coast of Mecklenburg. Having taken this hostile attitude against Sweden, he informed the Emperor that he had opened to him (the Emperor) all the passes on the Havel, and had sent all his cavalry, except three companies, to join the Saxon troops. In his new zeal he went so far as to reproach the Elector of Saxony with trifling away his

* The reference is doubtless to the disregard of the rights of the family of his brother-in-law, the Palgrave, in the amnesty provisions.—*Tr.*

time in transactions with Sweden, and demanded that the Swedes should be attacked, and the sooner the better. It is therefore evident that Saxony was not allowed by Brandenburg on any account to yield to Sweden's territorial demands.

Notwithstanding all this, however, there was still another and last attempt at an agreement between Sweden and Saxony, which took place at Schönbeck, whither were sent for this purpose from the Swedish side Major-General Vizthum and Colonel Mitzlaff. In this instance Sweden dropped its claim for a territorial indemnity, and demanded : (1) remuneration in money for services rendered ; (2) a return of the war expenses to which individual Estates of the Empire had obligated themselves ; (3) the settlement of the indebtedness to the Swedish soldiers ; and (4) the pledging of several cities in security for the fulfilment of these conditions. It is perceived that Sweden desired to hold a number of places merely as pledges of payment ; it was, however, feared that these possessions might be perpetual, as no party was able to fulfil the first and second conditions. All were, however, compelled to admit that in this instance Sweden had reduced its demands to their lowest extreme. Saxony offered in return the payment, once for all, of 2,500,000 thalers, by which all demands of whatever kind should be liquidated, and only Stralsund should be pledged as security. The Elector was kept from all further concessions by the exertions of Kurz of Senftenau, who had come to him as imperial ambassador, and who, following the example of the Elector of Brandenburg, urged him promptly to break off the negotiations, prosecute these further only with the German colonels and other officers, and offer them a full amnesty and two million thalers.

The danger that Sweden would be defeated of all compensation could not have been more threatening than it was. If this measure had been managed by skillful diplomatists and openly supported by the Elector of Brandenburg, the officers might perhaps have been won to it. This did not occur; the anxiety, however, which tortured Oxenstiern can scarcely be described; he feared, indeed, for his personal safety, and had on this account journeyed to Wismar. The Elector followed, finally, the counsel of the imperial ambassador, and broke off the transactions, because he was convinced that he should not be able to come to an agreement with the other party. The breach occurred on the 12th of October, at Egeln, which place was forced by an attack there made upon the Swedish garrison to capitulate. By this, Banér was left exposed to an immediate assault from Saxony.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ELECTION OF FERDINAND III. TO THE IMPERIAL THRONE, AND DEATH OF FERDINAND II.

- I. The Endeavors of France to strengthen its Alliances. II. The War in the Year 1635. The Transactions of France with Bernard of Weimar, with Sweden, and with Hesse Cassel. III. The War in the Year 1636. Battle of Wittstock. IV. The Imperial Diet at Regensburg. The Election of Ferdinand III. Death of Ferdinand II. V. The Imperial Family.

I.

WHILE Sweden followed with solicitude the transactions which ended in the peace of Prague, and saw only in the German-Swedish army a protection against its unpleasant consequences, France labored to strengthen its relations with Holland and with some of the Italian Princes. The new treaty with Holland was concluded on the 8th of February, 1635. It obligated the two parties to the raising of an army of 30,000 men for the contest with the Spanish government in the Netherlands, and agreed as to the division between themselves of the territory which was to be conquered. A few months later (July 11th) France closed a treaty of alliance with Savoy, Parma, and Mantua, the design of which was the conquest of Milan. In this also each party's share of the booty was settled in advance. France—for which Milan lay too distant—was to receive Casale for its

part from Mantua, and from Savoy some Piedmontese valleys, which Richelieu probably designed to exchange for Savoy itself. The open assault of France upon Spain was begun on the 30th of May, a few weeks before the conclusion of this treaty.

As long as France occupied with its garrisons only the fortified places on the left bank of the Rhine, especially those in the territory of Treves, the Emperor did not regard this as an open breach of the peace. When, however, the French made their assaults on the other side of the Rhine, he could no longer pass these over in silence, but sent one Lustrier to Paris to make complaint of this action and demand the withdrawal of the French garrison from Philipsburg, which place had also fallen into the hands of the French. The dissimulation which marked at the time all diplomatic intercourse was brought out in the answer which Lustrier received. The King, it intimated, had only garrisoned some cities of Germany for his own protection, and it would surely be better that these should be in his hands than in those of the Protestants, for he would defend the rights of the Catholics, and had none but kind intentions in the occupation. It was the design of Louis to secure, if possible, the whole left bank of the Rhine to the sea: as long as he could be aided in the quiet pursuit of this by the suicidal action of the Germans, he pursued his advantage; when this could no longer be done, he resorted to violence.

Lustrier turned to account his observations in Paris by sketching brief, but sharply outlined, portraits of its prominent personalities and circumstances, which he sent to Vienna. His sketch of the King is not flattering: it represents him as a timid, melancholy, pious, and credulous prince, with a cold, reserved, and solitude-loving

nature. He pictures Cardinal Richelieu as a perfidious, cunning, arrogant, revengeful, and, at the same time, a timid man. He praises the King's brother, the Duke of Orleans, as a man of a good intellect and of generosity, but represents him as fickle and profane, and as devoted to gaming and sensuality to such extent as to have damaged himself in mind and body to the point of utter rottenness. This sketch is true to the nature of the man who was then endeavoring to form a coalition with Austria, in which he hoped to find a support for his rebellious designs against his brother. The French troops won no regard from the imperial ambassador: he acknowledged, indeed, their valor, but deemed them so wanting in endurance as scarcely to equal a German army of half their numbers. This defect was, indeed, removed, as already indicated, by the schooling which they received in the course of the war.

When it became known to the King of Spain that France designed to invade the Netherlands, he fell into a violent rage, which he did not, however, vent by preparations for defence against his enemy, but by fierce invectives against the Pope. He expected from the head of the Church—so he wrote the Pope—that he would take measures and make declarations worthy of his exalted station. He declared that it would be an unprecedented thing, and a supreme grievance to Christendom, if the King of France, who called himself His Most Christian Majesty, should be allowed, under the very eyes of the vicar of Christ, and with his evident foreknowledge, to conclude a treaty with heretics and support them to the damage of the Church, and if, indeed, the peace should, by the intervention of the Papal ambassadors, and not without their sharing the guilt of the act, suffer damage,

and the Catholic Princes be reduced to impoverished wanderers. He hoped that the Pope, in view of these occurrences, would not neglect his duty to make use of the power of the keys and threaten the King of France with the authority of the Church, as other Popes, for far less offences, had done.

To some it may seem in Philip rather simple that he should attempt to secure in his contest with France a victory, or at least avert a loss, by a resort to the weapons and penalties of the Church; to us it appears as the last shriek of a policy which was governed as much by worldly as by ecclesiastical interests. From this time forth it must have been perceived in Spain that their own interests alone must control the mutual relations of States, and that the religious differences were not to stand in the way of the conclusion of an alliance with an enemy of another faith. The Pope was not changed in his attitude by the sharp letter of Philip; he remained still hostile as ever to the Hapsburgs, though his enmity may have become less active, as this princely house proceeded in the path of its decline. ✓

II.

c The Elector of Saxony was, about this time, in command of an army of more than 40,000 men. This consisted in part of his own troops and in part of the contingents of the Upper Saxon Circle, including those of Brandenburg and also a few regiments of imperialists. It was in numbers superior to the army of the enemy stationed at Magdeburg, and, what was more important, its discipline was not relaxed as that of the enemy had become



through the attempts made upon its officers. The result was that Banér withdrew to the North, leaving only a garrison in Magdeburg. If the Saxons had but been commanded by a superior man, Banér's force would doubtless have been destroyed, as Duke George of Lüneburg had declared himself ready to join the Saxons. But from the want of ability in the chief command and on account of the opening of the inclement season, the Saxons did not advance upon the enemy, and Banér was enabled to hold the field.

The exertions of Banér were also supported in the domain of diplomacy by the French ambassador, St. Chamond. This diplomat went to Germany to persuade Oxenstiern to sign the treaty which, as yet, bore only the signatures of the four Upper Circles, and on his way thither labored to prevent some German Princes from acceding to the peace of Prague. He attempted also to win back the German regiments stationed in Westphalia, which had formerly belonged to the Swedish army; and as he controlled large amounts of money, he succeeded in his purpose, and these regiments placed themselves under the command of Field-Marshal Kniphausen, and were again subject to the direction of the Swedish crown. The most important result, however, which France obtained for Sweden related to Poland. The armistice, which some years before had been concluded between Sweden and Poland, was to expire on the 1st of July, 1635, and it was of moment that this should by all means be extended. If this should not be done, then Sweden would be obliged to call its ablest officers from the theatre of the German war. Cardinal Richelieu sent therefore the Marquis of Avaux to Poland and offered his mediation in the matters at issue between Poland and Sweden.

Avaux's plausible nature and his bribes gave the Poles a peaceful feeling, although their chances were as favorable as they could have been for the acquisition of Livonia, and a treaty of peace was accordingly concluded (September 12th), making it possible for Sweden to bring into Germany the army which had been stationed on the Vistula to repel the assaults of Poland, and thus to strengthen Banér's force. This treaty affected the Emperor's mind unpleasantly, and it was but a small compensation for this that the Poles sent a few thousand Cossacks to his aid, who were to find their pay in the booty which they should take upon German soil.

The situation assumed a somewhat more favorable aspect in South Germany as the result of the activity of the cavalry leader, John Werth. This swordsman had, by his own merit, risen from a private to the rank of colonel. That stormy violence of his nature, which caused him everywhere to rush heedlessly upon the foe, made him the most fearful and the most feared of enemies. His very name caused a dread to come over the antagonist. He may well be called the forerunner of Blücher, whom he was unlike only in his want of that culture in the schools which his eminent successor enjoyed. He could not, indeed, even read or write. In the beginning of the year Philipsburg had fallen into the hands of the imperialists. This bold cavalry leader next succeeded in driving the French out of Spire; to these results he added others. Duke Charles of Lorraine advanced over the Rhine into Alsace, and thus gave rise, among the people of Lorraine, to the hope that he would succeed in wresting his lands again from the French. Meanwhile a band of Spanish troops, under the lead of Count Rittberg, attempted to capture, by a surprise, the Elector of



Treves, and thus to put an end to his traitorous connection with France. This succeeded. The Elector was taken and delivered to the Emperor, who had him conducted to the New City, Vienna, and there held for ten years a prisoner. The chapter took in hand the administration of the archbishopric, so far as this was not occupied by French garrisons, and entered into friendly relations with the Emperor. The capture of the Elector was the outward occasion of the open breach between France and Spain.

Meanwhile the Duke of Lorraine made an attempt to advance from Alsace into Lorraine, but was stopped by Marshal Laforce, and then endeavored to obtain possession, as far as possible, of the fortified places in Alsace. In the beginning of July he succeeded in entering Lorraine. His intention was here to bring on a decisive battle with the enemy; he could not, however, carry out his plan, because Laforce withdrew, and so he advanced to Rambervilliers, and remained there for two and a half months in a fortified position, while Laforce was at Luneville. In every contest Werth distinguished himself in such a manner that his person alone outweighed a regiment. The possibility of winning more brilliant successes than hitherto lay before the Duke of Lorraine, when, in October, he effected a junction with Gallas.

The imperial general, in connection with a Bavarian auxiliary corps, had, since the spring, operated and executed his tactics successfully against Duke Bernard of Weimar, who had, by a resolution of the four Circles of Upper Germany, been declared the marshal of the confederation. He took Kaiserslautern and invested Mentz, though he was obliged to withdraw from the latter city when Bernard of Weimar was joined by a French corps

under de la Valette. Both armies spent the summer in all sorts of manœuvres and skirmishes. Sometimes one was on the right bank of the Rhine, then again both, until in September, when the French with Bernard crossed again to the left bank, to which Gallas now followed them. This indeed showed the superiority of the imperialists; which appeared more decidedly a few days later, when, step by step, they forced the enemy back, until the latter finally established himself in Metz. Thus Gallas was able to approach the Duke of Lorraine, and form a junction with him at Hellecourt on the 20th of October. The united army numbered nearly 40,000 men. The expected results were not, however, attained, for such was the want of provisions that a fearful famine broke out among the troops; to this thousands fell victims, and the leaders lost their ambition for energetic action. Finally, Gallas determined to retire, and accordingly broke up his camp on the 23d of November and withdrew to Zabern.

Cardinal Richelieu had looked forward to the war, in 1635, with high hopes, and had therefore thrown off his mask with reference both to the Emperor and to Spain, and now saw that all his calculations had failed. Aided by the peace of Prague, the united imperial and Saxon forces had driven General Banér back to the Baltic coast, and now the united army of the Duke of Weimar and the French had fared no better. The war had even been transferred to French soil. The Cardinal now labored to prepare for greater results during the coming year by seeking to bring about a firmer union of the Duke of Weimar with France, and so gave heed to the suggestion of Cardinal de la Valette, who repeatedly declared that no success could be hoped for unless the King should have also a German army at his control. A treaty was there-

fore concluded at St. Germain with the Duke of Weimar, by which the King bound himself to the yearly payment of four million francs, in return for which the Duke was to hold in readiness an army of 18,000 men. The title of marshal was at once bestowed upon him and the landgraviate of Alsace granted him. France was, therefore, willing to renounce this acquisition in his favor, which renunciation was not at that time very grievous, since Louis was hard pressed in his own territory. Bernard was obliged to lead the army under French direction; he was required unconditionally to obey all the orders of the King, notwithstanding any orders to the contrary which might come to him from the Swedes or the four Circles. The Duke was therefore to employ his talents as a commander to the use and advantage of France, and, in behalf of French interests, his army, which itself had no knowledge of the actual tenor of the treaty, but simply knew that Bernard, as an ally of France, was aided with French subsidies, must permit its blood to flow.

In like manner Richelieu sought to make Sweden tributary to his end. Oxenstiern had not ratified the treaty concluded in Paris by the four Circles in 1634, and he, in the following year, went himself to Paris and concluded at Compiègne a new treaty with France, which the Regency in Sweden refused to ratify, because they were unwilling to part with their right of making peace at their own discretion with the Emperor. The Chancellor was himself in doubt whether the federation with France would be wholesome in its working, and whether, in view of Saxony's action, a peace with the Emperor were not to be preferred, and Richelieu had therefore to labor not only to win the Swedish Council to his views, but also to

remove Oxenstiern's doubts. To this end he sent the Marquis of St. Chamond to the Chancellor, and M. d'Avangour to Sweden. Chamond was to labor also for an alliance with Brandenburg and Cassel, and offer the two Princes subsidies for the support of 18,000 men, the command of which should be left to themselves. The negotiations with Brandenburg failed of success; those, however, with Cassel perhaps succeeded, as they led to a provisional treaty, by which France was bound to a yearly payment of 160,000 thalers, and which was afterwards definitively concluded (October 21, 1636) and the amount of the subsidy raised to 200,000 thalers.

When Avangour arrived in Stockholm, he found the Regency still unwilling to sign any one of the treaties already concluded, and desiring instead to make a new one. Oxenstiern made similar difficulties; he repeated to St. Chamond with emphasis that Sweden longed for peace, from which latter, however, he received but dissimulation in reply. If, he said to the Chancellor, Sweden desires only protection for the German Protestants, it may conclude a peace, for their interests are now secure; but if it desire to make conquests on German soil, it can effect this only with the aid of France, and should not therefore delay to conclude the alliance. Oxenstiern finally agreed to this, but demanded that war should be openly declared against the Emperor, and that the dissembling pretexts, as though France were but acting for the protection of the Ecclesiastical Princes, should be dropped. The result was that two drafts, a French and a Swedish one (March 30, 1636), were made, the latter by Oxenstiern himself, and this was finally accepted by France. In Sweden itself the ratification was deferred through this and most of the next year, and was not in fact executed until near the end of

October, 1637. The delay may have been grounded in the fact that with a portion of the Council the opinion prevailed that the interests of Sweden did not lie in the oppression of Germany, or that this could not be kept up for a length of time, and that a peace with the Emperor would be preferable to an alliance with France. Another part of the Council waited in order to obtain the highest bids for their assent. The ratification when made was dated back to the first of August, 1636, because the annual subsidy of a million francs, which France had agreed to pay, was to be reckoned from that date. The remaining articles of the treaty provided that the war should be carried on in common against the house of Austria, especially against the Emperor, for the protection of German "liberty" and the Baltic and North Seas, and to be continued until a just peace could be secured. Sweden was to invade the hereditary possessions of the Emperor, meaning Bohemia and the other lands, and France was to advance from the Rhine to it. The parties were bound to negotiate only in common and to aid each other as much as possible in obtaining German allies.

It may not be without interest to the reader to learn that Richelieu at the same time attempted to conclude an alliance with the Pope, and to persuade the latter to enlist 15,000 men, to have their basis of operations in Upper Italy, with the purpose of holding the Spanish there in check and rendering it more difficult for them to send troops to Germany. In order to gain the Pope for this alliance, which must have resulted in a violent collision between the latter and Spain, Richelieu placed before him the prospect of acquiring Naples. Urban VIII. admitted that he hated the Hapsburgs, and desired to drive the Spanish from Italy, but he would not contribute to the

complete ruin of this house. His nephew, Cardinal Antonio Barberini, who had been won to the French interests, labored, however, to bring him to a concurrence in this plan, and finally obtained from the Pope a promise that he would arm. It does not, however, appear that he made even an attempt to carry out this purpose, but that in the course of the year he offered his services in the mediation of a peace. Cologne was selected as the place where the future conference was to sit ; but neither the Emperor nor France attached any importance to these negotiations, although they did not wholly reject them, and so the Papal endeavors at mediation were without results.

III.

France, having formed more intimate relations with Sweden, and with the Landgrave of Cassel, and Bernard of Weimar, and having thereby obtained control of a considerable portion of the forces of Germany, felt able to open the war in 1636 with better prospects. The theatre of the war was, as in the previous year, divided in two parts. In one, the French and Bernard of Weimar carried on the contest with the Emperor and Maximilian of Bavaria, and, in the other, the Swedes under Banér stood opposed to the Saxons, Brandenburgers, and imperialists. The Swedish general did not rest, but as early as January, having been strengthened by the army which had previously been sent against the Poles, entered upon his march southward and encamped again at Magdeburg. Thence he soon passed over the Saale into the Saxon territory, and harassed the Elector by various expeditions. When finally the latter advanced against Magdeburg, Banér, feel-

ing too weak for the defence, abandoned the ruins of this city to his antagonist. Nevertheless the Elector greatly rejoiced that he had come into possession of it, because it had by the peace of Prague been ceded to his house. The further operations took a shape favorable to the allied Saxons and imperialists. Banér was forced to withdraw to Lüneburg, and the imperial general, Morzin, extended his advance march into Pomerania, though he was compelled by the Swedish general, Wrangel, again to retire. In the beginning of September the Saxons again united with the imperialists and passed the Elbe at Tangermünde. Banér, who saw himself endangered by this movement, hastened up, dispersed at Perleberg several imperialist regiments, and then attempted to throw himself upon the rest of the imperial and Saxon troops, having already thwarted their attempts at forming a junction with the Brandenburg contingent. The Saxons, under the lead of their Elector, sought to repel this attack, and to this end occupied a secure position at Wittstock, which made a front attack by the Swedes impossible. By a brilliant manœuvre, however, Banér seduced his enemy from this position, and drew on a battle (October 4, 1636), in which the Swedes stood like an iron wall and repelled every assault. The imperialists, however, upon whom the burden of the contest chiefly rested, still kept up the hope of victory; but a successful flank movement of the Swedes threatened them in the rear, and decided the day against them. The loss of the Swedes in killed and wounded was placed at 5,000, that of the imperialists and Saxons at 11,000, to which latter must be added still several thousand prisoners—8,000 it was said—all their cannon, a great part of their baggage, and all the silver plate of the Elector.

The defeat at Wittstock was one of the heaviest that



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either of the contending parties had suffered during the long struggle. The glory of the Swedes for achievement in war, which, since the battle of Nördlingen, had lost its lustre, now burst forth again in all its splendor. They had won a complete victory over a far more numerous army, and the consequences to the imperial cause appeared in the fact that, notwithstanding their desire for peace, a portion of the Princes of Lower Germany were obliged to follow in the triumphal train of the Swedes.

During the same year Field-Marshal Götz was at the head of the Bavarian army, and his operations were chiefly on the territory lying between the Rhine and the Weser. After having intimidated the Landgrave of Cassel, and thus made him feel more inclined to negotiate with the Emperor, he marched victorious through this region and took possession of Paderborn and other important places. Meanwhile John Werth, at the head of the troops of Cologne and a part of those of Bavaria, attempted, in concurrence with the forces of the Spanish Netherlands, to establish himself upon the Maas and force the city of Liège to capitulate. After a vain attempt at this, he withdrew thence, on the 9th of August, with the purpose of joining the Cardinal Infante, and supporting him in his intended invasion of France. The enterprise was attended with brilliant results; Werth everywhere defeated the enemy, captured their supply trains, and then advanced with the Cardinal Infante to the neighborhood of Paris. A panic spread in the city, many of the inhabitants took refuge beyond the Loire, regarding themselves as unsafe short of that region. If the Cardinal Infante had quickly advanced, as Werth advised, Paris would perhaps have fallen into his hands; he loitered, however, and gave Richelieu time to add considerably to his

strength, so that Louis XIII. soon had an army of 50,000 men at Compiègne. Against such a force nothing more could be effected, and so the Bavarians and Spaniards were in the autumn again obliged to withdraw from France.

At the end of 1635 Gallas was at Zabern, and was obliged to measure strength with the forces of Bernard of Weimar and Cardinal de la Valette. He did not begin his operations until late in the ensuing year, perhaps because he must await the arrival of the King of Hungary, who did not set out from Vienna until May 14th, and then tarried for weeks without urgent reasons in South Germany. Bernard's strength was at this time scarcely 7,500 men, nor was de la Valette specially strong. Gallas might, therefore, by a rapid advance, have gained important advantages; but he was wanting in penetration: instead of advancing, he retreated, could not even give support to Zabern, and this place was forced by the enemy to capitulate. The imperialists were finally strengthened by the arrival of 8,000 Cossacks, who had made thither their devastating march through all Germany to join Gallas on the Rhine. These men made upon him, however, large demands for pay and refused him obedience. He sought therefore to get rid of them, and, in fact, a great part of them returned to Poland, and the rest were scattered or lost in the expedition. The Emperor had received nothing but damage from these auxiliary troops, and thousands of curses fell upon him on account of his Polish allies. Gallas now, however, in spite of all this, was somewhat fortunate in his operations. He united in Franche Comté in September with the Duke of Lorraine; and yet, instead of attacking Cardinal de la Valette and the Duke of Weimar, who stood with their

forces united against him, he went into a fortified camp, which example the enemy followed, though Gallas at the same time used his opportunity for some successful assaults. In the latter half of October he broke up his camp and took by storm the strongly fortified Mirabeau, though he was obliged, on account of the inclement season, to prepare in the beginning of November for a retreat. The news of the unfortunate battle at Wittstock crippled his remaining energies, and at the end of the year he withdrew to the right bank of the Rhine and took up his winter-quarters in the Black Forest. If the incursion into Burgundy had been supported by a simultaneous advance of the Cardinal Infante, the imperial army might have recovered themselves during the winter on the soil of France; instead of this, however, all sorts of hardships were again laid upon the people of Germany.

IV.

While the campaign against Sweden closed with a decisive defeat, and that in France did not fulfil its opening promise, there sat at Regensburg an Electoral Diet, which the Emperor had called for the purpose of accomplishing the work that he had in vain attempted in the year 1630. He felt that his health was failing, and it was not now under the impulse of his ambition but that of his heart's better desire, that he requested the Electors to choose his son as his successor on the throne of Germany. By the peace of Prague he had entered into friendly relations with the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg; both were ready to accord his wish, and, as the same was also true of the Catholic Electors, with the exception of him of Treves, there was nothing specially in the way of the call-

ing of the Diet. The Emperor arrived in Regensburg on the 7th of September. During the following days came in person the Electors of Mentz, Cologne, and Bavaria, while those of Saxony and Brandenburg appeared by their envoys. The peace was the first subject of deliberation, and all agreed that they would offer peace to the French and Swedes, provided that they should make no demand for the cession of territory. The question of a general amnesty was also mooted, and in regard to this too the Emperor was inclined to make, as far as Germany was concerned, every concession. When it came finally to the election, and the exclusion of the Elector of Treves as an enemy of the Empire was agreed to, the Emperor was seized with so violent an illness as to give rise to the apprehension that he might not survive till morning. On this account it was determined to hasten the election, and yet several weeks passed before the action was really taken (December 22, 1636). The articles drawn up for the successor of Ferdinand II. confined the imperial power to still narrower limits than hitherto, and provided that no sentence of ban should be pronounced without the previous concurrence of the Electors.

The election passed by so smoothly as to have vexed not a little the enemies of the Emperor, and it is not a matter of wonder that both France and Sweden refused to recognize Ferdinand III., and that even after his father's death they addressed him only as King of Hungary. The election was at least, much as it was criticised, a fortunate one for the Hapsburgs, for it may be with certainty assumed that, if Ferdinand II. had died before it had been effected, the German Electors would not have withstood the various influences and suggestions of France, and would not have chosen a Hapsburg. Glad

that he was now relieved of this concern, the Emperor entered upon his return journey from Regensburg, though the state of his health made extreme care necessary, for he had improved but little since his attack. Great lassitude and turns of fever consumed his strength, and convinced him that death was near. As might have been foreseen, the journey caused him too much exertion, and he arrived with swollen limbs in Vienna, where the preparations which had been made for a festive reception had been laid aside in advance of his arrival. For some days he attended the sessions of the privy council, and read and endorsed, even the day before his death, many petitions, but often, however, sent for his confessor to confer with him on religious subjects. At evening he took a repast, then prayed an hour, laid himself down to rest, and awoke breathing heavily and burning with fever. He was seized with the feeling that the agonies of death were upon him, deemed himself to be dying, took leave of his wife, who remained near him, and called for his confessor. When Lamormain came in and gained from the physicians the conviction that death was near, he directed the Empress, the imperial household, several men of distinction, the physicians, and the priests, who had meanwhile gathered around the sick man's bed, to retire that he might discharge his official duty. He received from the heavily breathing sufferer his confession in general terms, gave him the sacrament of the Supper, and then pronounced over him the prayer for the dying. It was in receiving the communion that the Emperor uttered his last words; after this he lay in an unconscious state till morning, and about 9 o'clock in the forenoon of February 15, 1637, drew his last breath.

We gave, at his first introduction to the reader, a de-

tailed sketch of Ferdinand as to his education, knowledge, and characteristic traits, and in the manner in which we have represented him in action we have tried to indicate his later development. If we restate in few words our conclusions, which have received a hundred-fold confirmation in the facts related, they will amount to this: that Ferdinand was a pious and kind ruler, whose power of thought and action were directed wholly to the conquest and extinction of his religious opponents, and were in this work exhausted, while in all other questions of decisive and profound import he moved but on their surface, and dreaded the labor which it would cost to master them. His endeavors were not directed to the acquisition of might and dominion. He would always have been contented with that which he inherited from his ancestors. The steps which he took for the restoration of the imperial dignity, if indeed he took any such, were not the issue of his convictions or desires, but the result of Waldstein's progress, which he simply accepted. His want of ambition is apparent in his dread of exertion. As his life was strictly moral, and bore many indications of kindness of heart, it cannot but be regretted that his memory is reviled, and that not unjustly, in history. The first occasion for this was offered by his execution of vengeance for the Bohemian insurrection, not merely upon its authors, but by the most fearful confiscations throughout the whole country. It was not, perhaps, his original intention to change so radically as he did the ownership of the property, but the growing demands of the war, the limitless laxity of his financial administration, and the insatiable rapacity of his immediate servants, partisans, and high officers, urged him ever onward in this declivitous path. He did nothing himself, but still allowed things so

to proceed that his religious and political opposers, so far as his power extended, lost all security of property, and a state of things grew up such as may be supposed to have existed in the days of the tribal migrations. The curses uttered against him in Bohemia were echoed in tenfold reverberations through Germany, for in his name confiscations were there pronounced as far as to the Baltic and North Sea, and requisitions made, scarcely the half of which would have been needed if he had managed with proper economy and remained lord and master in fact, and not merely in name, over his army and his officials. He would then perhaps have attained to those results to which his marshal, Waldstein, for a time aspired in his behalf, and which, if permanently maintained, might have made his name a brilliant one, and secured a milder verdict, though not a justification, of the manifold severities of his action. The imperial power did not under him, however, rise from its state of decay, but sank, after a transient gleam, into deeper decadence. All the distresses which came, either directly or indirectly, from him, served only to aid foreign powers in attaining to dominion on German soil and to bring complete derangement into the home system of government. In judging of him afterwards, no regard was paid to his personal good traits; his action in matters of state alone was taken into the account. This was indeed quite just, for a prince must be measured by another rule than that applied to the private man. The unfavorable judgment of Ferdinand's entire administration is founded chiefly on the disorderly conduct of his finances; and this has been attributed to his military mismanagement: the latter was not, however, the sole cause of his wretched financial state. His limitless generosity must bear an equal share of the blame of his bankrupt exchequer.

His favorites were overwhelmed with presents. Prince Eggenberg carried off the lion's share; his income is said to have risen in the end to 400,000 thalers annually. Ferdinand was equally liberal to the priesthood and monasteries, the incomes of which he augmented by the most lavish gifts. It was not enough for him to raise the old institutions from their state of decay and clothe them in new lustre; numerous orders owe to him their introduction into Austria. Of these are the Barnabites, the Camaldulites, the Paulites, the Barefooted Carmelites, the Reformed Augustinians, the Benedectines of Montserrat, the Servites, and the Irish Franciscans. For the applications of all these old and new orders which were constantly addressed to him, he always had a well-filled purse, and yet he never attended properly to the other needs of the State. The spiritual orders showed their gratitude for his generosity by making him and his family affiliated members of their associations; this was done especially by the Cistercians, the Oliveites, and the Carmelites. Probably the rest of the orders also followed this example.

V.

Of the five children of Ferdinand's first marriage, that with the Bavarian Princess, Maria Anna, four survived him. His eldest son, Charles, the heir presumptive of the throne, died in the year 1619, and his second son, Ferdinand III., became his successor. A third son, Leopold William, born in the year 1614, he destined for the Ecclesiastical Estate, and heaped upon him in his earliest youth the highest dignities of the Church. This son re-

ceived the Bishoprics of Passau and Strasburg, which became vacant on the resignation of his uncle, Leopold, and afterwards the Bishopric of Halberstadt and the Archbishopric of Magdeburg, finally, the dignity of Grand Master of the Teutonic Order and the Bishoprics of Breslau and Olmutz. All these ecclesiastical honors were bestowed upon Leopold without his ever having received consecration. We shall hereafter meet him upon the battle-field, for, without loss of his rank as a prelate, his brother afterwards gave him the command of the imperial troops.

Of the Emperor's daughters, the elder, Maria Anna, born in 1610, was married in the year 1635 to the Elector Maximilian of Bavaria. The Elector lost his wife in the beginning of this year, and as neither he nor his married brother, Albert, had children, he hastened to lead home a second wife, whose youth might perhaps bring him the much-desired heir. His suit for the hand of the Emperor's daughter was received with favor in Vienna, since the alliance was thus secured and the possibility opened of appropriating the Electorate in case this marriage should not be blessed with children, and the Neuburg agnates could be subjected to the ban in case of making war upon the Emperor. At the desire of her father, the daughter, educated in piety and obedience as she had been, yielded her hand to the bridegroom, who might almost have been her grandfather, and always remained so true to the obligations which she had assumed that her husband never had any reason to regret his choice. The marriage was celebrated in Vienna, whither Maximilian, for the sake of economy, travelled by way of the Danube, and, in order to be consistent in his whole economic system, carried with him from Munich all the needed articles of food and furni-

ture for his table, so as to limit his expenditures to the exact amount necessary for the consumption of himself and his suite. Maria Anna was to her husband a faithful wife and careful nurse, and, as she gave him a son, she fulfilled his most earnest desire, and thus preserved the Bavarian Wittelsbachers from the peril of extinction.

The second daughter of Ferdinand II. was married, a few weeks after her father's death, to King Ladislas of Poland.

The Emperor's second wife, Eleanor of Mantua, had no children. Upon her husband, for whom she cherished an extraordinary love, she exerted great influence, and yet she cannot be charged with misusing it and employing it—except in the single justifiable case of the Mantuan inheritance—in questions of state policy. Her step-children were jealous of her; they lacked that devotion and love, which indeed is felt only towards an own mother. In consequence of this, and because she was not on good terms with the wife of her step-son, the Spanish Princess, she lived, after her husband's death, secluded, for the courtiers turned their faces towards the rising sun. The young Emperor treated her with due consideration, but assigned to her, in order that variances with his wife might be avoided, a residence in Gratz. She was not, however, contented there, and returned afterwards to Vienna.

In the will which Ferdinand II. had drawn up in the year 1621, he defined how he desired that his children should be provided for, and did the same more fully and added still other details in a codicil of the year 1635, in which he directed that all his hereditary kingdoms and principalities should remain forever undivided. Thus he laid a lasting foundation for the Austrian monarchy. He

desired to secure each of his successors against the claims which younger princes might make for the conveyance to them of territory and to save them the pain which he himself had not been spared; for he had been forced by his brother, the Archduke Leopold, to divide with him.

Ferdinand II. survived all his brothers and sisters, although he did not attain to the age of sixty years. Of his sisters, two in succession had married the King of Poland; a third, Sigismund Bathory, Prince of Transylvania; a fourth, Philip III., King of Spain; a fifth, the Grand Duke of Tuscany. How these family alliances aided him in his struggle with the Bohemian insurrection appears in the course of our narrative. The two brothers who arrived at the age of manhood, the Archdukes Leopold and Charles, entered the priesthood, and both were made bishops. Leopold became weary of his spiritual dignity, and was occupied with thoughts of marriage. He hoped to be able to remove the only obstacle which lay in the way of his plan—for he had already received the subdiaconate—by a Papal dispensation, and his hope did not deceive him, for Pope Urban gladly contributed to the division of the possessions of the Hapsburgs, which were required by the just demands of Leopold. Tyrol and other lands of Hither Austria, which the Emperor Ferdinand I. had left to the son who bore his name, became, as the latter and the other legal heirs died without having entered into its possession, the inheritance of the Styrian line—that is, of Ferdinand II. and his two brothers, each of whom was to have a third of it. As the Archduke Charles had, however, renounced his part, and had, in the year 1625, made an agreement with Leopold, by which he conveyed to him the Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and a part of the lands of Hither Austria, and reserved for himself the other part, though

he gave Leopold its administration, the latter afterwards constantly complained of insufficient income, and asked the conveyance to him in full proprietorship of this part also ; to which demand the Emperor yielded, and upon this basis the settlement of the inheritance took place in 1630. Even before this, on the 19th of April, 1626, Leopold, having previously resigned the Bishoprics of Passau and Strasburg, had married Claudia, widow of the last Duke of Urbino and daughter of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, from which marriage had sprung two sons and two daughters. He himself died on the 13th of September, 1632, when his eldest son was but five years old. The widow had, therefore, for several years administered the government as her son's guardian.

The Archduke Charles was first Bishop of Breslau, then of Brixen, and finally Grand Master of the Teutonic Order. In the year 1624 he was called to Spain, and was to have been intrusted with the regency of Portugal, but death overtook him there before he entered upon the discharge of his official functions.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE RISING POWER OF FRANCE.

(1637—1643.)

I. Ferdinand III. and his Marriage. II. The Campaigns of 1637, 1638, and 1639. III. The Transactions of Bernard of Weimar with France; his Death and its Consequences. IV. The Transactions of the Emperor with the Landgravine of Cassel. The Imperial Diet at Regensburg. V. The War in Germany in 1640 and 1641. Transactions with the Guelphs. Brandenburg's Neutrality. VI. The Insurrection in Catalonia and Portugal and the Disquiets in France. VII. The War of the Year 1642. Deaths of Richelieu and Louis XIII. Death of the Duke of Olivarez.

I.

FERDINAND III. was born in the year 1608, in Gratz.

He inherited from his mother a feeble constitution, which was, however, by a careful physical education, in riding, hunting, and swimming, so strengthened that he enjoyed, in later years, an average bodily vigor. He was of larger stature than his father, had black hair, and, in outward appearance, was more like his paternal uncle, Maximilian of Bavaria, than like his parents. To his mental training was given the needed attention; but as his capabilities, so were also his attainments, less than his father's. He seems not, however, to have been wanting in linguistic talent, if it is indeed true that he was able to utter his thoughts more or less adequately in six languages. But however much the son may have been inferior in intellect,

he was in one regard his father's superior: he was frugal, and put an end to the unreasonable expenditures of the court. This alone made his administration infinitely better than the preceding one, and compensated a thousand-fold for the want of natural gifts. It is said that a disagreement arose quite early between father and son, and that the latter was not wanting in covert utterance of censorious observations on the bad financial management. But he had been educated to such an unbounded reverence for his father, that we ought scarcely to believe such a mere report, though there may be a grain of truth in it. The Jesuits felt mistrustful in regard to his future course. It is said that his confessor, who belonged to this order, complained to Ferdinand II. that his son confessed in general terms, and entered too little into his particular sins. It is at least true that Ferdinand III. fell short of the scarcely attainable religious zeal of his father; nor did he allow the Jesuits to exercise any influence whatever upon his government; but still, in other respects, he followed the Catholic traditions of his predecessor.

When he ascended the throne, the new Emperor had been for six years married to his cousin, the Spanish Infanta, Mary. The son of James of England had originally made suit for the hand of this Princess, but on the Spanish side this was never earnestly entertained; the negotiations were dropped, and Philip was free to dispose at pleasure of his sister's hand. As his father had already conceived a desire for her marriage to the son of Ferdinand II., and this was known in Vienna, the Emperor determined—though indeed reluctantly, for the bridegroom was two years younger than the bride, and was then still very infirm in health—to ask her hand for his son. At this early time a half-way promise was made



EMPEROR FERDINAND III.



him, though the marriage-contract was not settled till seven years later. This provided for a dower of 500,000 crowns. The Princess was allowed to take with her a numerous suite of maids of honor, female servants, laundry and serving maids, a physician, an apothecary, a phlebotomist, and other people of the kind, and to retain her previous confessor, the Capuchin monk, Diego de Quiroga, although the Emperor would gladly have placed a Jesuit at her side. It was understood that she would set out upon her journey to Vienna on the 7th of January, 1629, so that the marriage might be expected to take place perhaps in March.

Her departure was, however, put off, because the King of Spain desired to accompany his sister to Barcelona, and the money needed for the journey of the court was not at the moment at hand. It was concluded, therefore, that it must suffice for the time to execute the marriage by procuration on the 21st of April, and let the Princess remain in quiet at home. The representations and prayers of the imperial ambassador, Count Khevenhiller, in regard to the unreasonable delay of the journey, and the offence thereby committed against his sovereign, effected nothing; the King even demanded that the Princess should wait for the confinement of his wife, the Queen, which was expected in October. A sense of gratitude to Spain caused a feeling in Vienna that these desires must be deferred to, and consent was given that the journey should be delayed until the 1st of December; but even this stipulation was not fulfilled, and the royal party did not set out until December 26th. There was a better reason for delay than those political ones and the others which were assigned: this was found in the discomforts of the journey. The roads were in so wretched a condition that

they could make daily but five to six Spanish miles, which are shorter than the German,* and they found the most miserable accommodations in the towns through which they passed. For instance, in Gaxamexos, where they remained over night, there was no house with a whole roof, so that, according to the report of the imperial envoy who travelled with the royal party, it snowed into the bride's sleeping-room. Philip accompanied his sister to Saragossa, where he took his leave, and committed the charge of the entire company to the Duke of Alva. Instead of proceeding on his way, however, he tarried fourteen days in this city, ostensibly to obtain information in regard to a pest which was said to have broken out at some place on the route. Thus the Infanta reached Barcelona on the 8th of February, 1630, and as the ships were not in readiness for the voyage, they remained there more than four months. Here they finally took ship on the 12th of June. When they came near Toulon, the Princess desired to obey the wish of her sister, the Queen of France, and meet the latter there. But as Anna had no permission from her husband and Cardinal Richelieu to make this visit, Mary had to pursue her journey to Genoa in order to see her sister, Anna of Austria. Here again the company was detained for a whole month, during which time a contest was waged day by day between Alva and Khevenhiller as to the direction which the journey should now take. Alva desired to travel by way of Milan and Graubunden, but Khevenhiller wished to avoid this way on account of its insecurity. The matter was finally decided by taking the route by Naples, where again nearly three months of delay were filled up with constant disputes about the prece-

* The German mile is about four and a half English miles.—TR.

dence which the Duke of Alva, the Viceroy of Naples, and the Duke of Alcala each claimed for himself. On the 25th of October they were finally ready to leave Naples; but the Infanta put off the departure to the 20th of November, on the pretext that the great heat made travelling dangerous. Against this repeated delay, which was finally extended to the 12th of December, Khevenhiller protested, in the presence of the bride, casting the blame upon the Duke of Alva's counsels, and at the same time produced an order of King Ferdinand III., authorizing him to cause his wife, without any delay, to proceed on the journey, to withdraw her from all interference from her Spanish attendants, and to put an end to their authority. If Alva had not yielded, it would probably have come to a break, and Khevenhiller would have travelled alone, as the Infanta would not have been given up to his charge; but his energetic action ended the delays. The journey was resumed on the 18th of December, pursued a diagonal course through the Italian peninsula, and then along the Adriatic by land to Ancona. Arrived here, the Duke of Alva desired to return with the Infanta to Naples, on the pretext that the vessels furnished by the Republic of Venice for the passage were not free from the pest. Khevenhiller felt again compelled to act with energy, and addressed a letter to the Infanta, in which he expressly branded the pest rumors as lies, on the ground that the Venetian authorities denied the existence of any danger of the pest. He declared himself ready even to institute an examination of the ships, and, if he found them fit for their purposes, to place his own wife and child, who had made the journey with them, on board of one of them and send them on in advance to Trieste.

The examination revealed nothing dangerous to health

in the condition of the ships, and so Khevenhiller sent his wife and child ; but, as he returned from the vessel and was about to step upon the shore, he was threatened with death by the guard in case he should do so, on the ground that he had come from a place infected with the pest. The ambassador was in a critical situation. He would and must land, and determined at the instant to spring upon the guard, whom he threw, after a brief struggle, into the sea, and took refuge in the house where the Infanta had her lodgings and where she had witnessed from the window this painful scene. The health officer of Ancona exhausted himself in apologies to Khevenhiller, declaring that only the common people were forbidden to land, and that the order was applied to him only by the guard's excess of zeal for the performance of his duty. But the suspicion was too well grounded that the Duke of Alva's hand was in the play, and that he desired to rid himself of the imperial representative by the pretext that the quarantine forbade his landing.

Thus robbed of all excuses, Alva must finally consent to the departure, which then took place on the 24th of January, 1631. Two days later the ships landed in Trieste, where the Infanta, who from the date of her marriage by procuration had borne the queenly titles, was greeted by the Emperor's brother, to whom she was then formally delivered by Alva. At a station of their journey further on she was received by the Archduchess Claudia, the wife of Leopold, and accompanied on her way—the question as to whether she might be permitted to sit with the Queen at meals having been previously decided. The decision was in the affirmative, on the ground that Mary was not yet Empress, and the Grand Duchess belonged to the family. On her arrival at Mürzzuschlag she learned that her husband

desired to greet her on the Semmering,* and that his chief steward, Count Thurn, at the head of a number of high-born cavaliers, was coming to meet her, and begged permission to offer his salutation. When she had given her assent, about thirty splendidly dressed young noblemen presented themselves, one of whom, by the special manner in which he made his obeisance, drew the Queen's attention. Whether she had been secretly informed who it was that greeted her, or recognized him from his portrait, she quickly answered his greeting by an equally profound courtesy, and thus made known her suspicion that she was greeting in the cavalier her own husband. Ferdinand had chosen this form for the first interview.

Nearly fourteen months had been consumed in making the journey from Madrid to Mürzzuschlag, and surely many of our readers will not comprehend the many delays, and will have sought special reasons for these, or charged the Queen with an utter want of will to control her Spanish attendants. The cause is not, however, to be sought in the bride's apathetic nature, but in certain prepossessions unfavorable to her destined husband. Some one in Spain, who enjoyed her confidence, had given her a description of her husband quite to the disadvantage of both his outward form and his endowments of mind, so that the Princess shrank back from the meeting, and sought to put off as long as possible the moment she so much dreaded. The first meeting with him convinced her that the depreciatory description of her husband's exterior had been an exaggerated one: his aspect was neither finer nor uglier than that of most men; and that his mental gifts were not of so low an order as she had

* A mountain on the frontier of Styria, at the point where the cavalcade passed into Lower Austria.—TR.

been made to believe, she could a few moments later learn from the conversation, which they carried on with each other in the Spanish language. Without being gifted, he often showed a judgment better than that of his father, and it is certain that in private intercourse the impression which he made was a good one as to the amiability of his nature. As he was from the first acquaintance entranced with his wife, and the Princess herself, kept hitherto in a cloister-like retirement, now developed some of that vivacity which characterized her sister Anna, Queen of France, and charmed her husband by an amiability quite unexpected, their married life was, from its first moment, pleasant, for the Queen, moved by the sincere admiration and love of her husband, cordially reciprocated his fondness.

II.

At the time of his father's death, Ferdinand III. was in Regensburg, whither he had called together several generals for consultation in regard to the next campaign. At the moment of receiving the intelligence of the Emperor's death, he started for Vienna, where he gave his first attention to economic measures of finance. The expenses of the court had, in the last years, amounted to a million florins, which he reduced to 394,000, less than the half. He gave the first position in his court to Count Maximilian von Trautmansdorff, whom he appointed to the place of chief steward, that formerly held by Prince Eggenberg. The new premier distinguished himself by his integrity, his clear judgment of the involved relations, and a corresponding executive force. Ferdinand III. retained most

of the other servants of his father in the places which they had severally held, so that, with the exception of its economic tendencies, the new administration moved on in the way of the previous one.

The campaign of the year 1637 opened on the Rhine with success to the imperial arms. The Bavarian general, Werth, was directed to move from the Netherlands up the Rhine, and unite with General Götz, of the imperialists. On his way he took the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, and thus forced the French to abandon their positions in the Electorate of Treves, as they had already been driven from the cities of Coblentz and Treves. To this success was added the conquest of Hanau. On the southerly section of the theatre of the war, things did not shape themselves so favorably. Here Bernard of Weimar came in collision at Ray on the Rhone with the imperial army under Mercy and the Duke of Lorraine, and defeated it (June 22d.) The Emperor endeavored in various ways to repair the ill consequences of this defeat; he gave the command of the army of the Rhine to Piccolomini, who now collected all the available forces, and ordered the most incapable of his generals, Prince Savelli, to oppose the Duke of Weimar in his advance to the Rhine; but he could not by all these measures hinder Bernard from passing the stream at Rheinau with 12,000 men. The passage was especially fortunate in this, that Werth, who was called to aid the resistance, arrived too late. Here, however, the victorious career of Bernard had, for the present, an end, for the enemy, whose numbers increased daily, forced him again to retire beyond the Rhine.

On the Elbe, also, the fortunes of war inclined to the Emperor's side. At the beginning of the year, Banér had taken Erfurt and Torgau and threatened Leipsic; but the

imperialists and Bavarians, under the command of Geleens, Hatzfeld, and Götz, finally formed a junction on the left bank of the Elbe and threatened to shut Baner up in his camp. The latter saw himself compelled to retreat beyond the Elbe and the Oder, and, instead of meeting Wrangel, as he had hoped, at Landsberg, came into collision with Galas, who had hastened on in advance of him with the main army. From this imminent peril Banér saved himself by an artifice: he caused a report to be circulated that he was going to withdraw to Poland, and sent forward his wife and a portion of his baggage in this direction. Galas hastened to get the start of him, and thus enabled him to begin without hindrance his retreat to the Oder, then to form a junction with Wrangel at Schwedt, and seek a secure place of refuge in Stettin. In the ensuing autumn the Swedes suffered great losses in Pomerania from the imperialists; they were obliged to evacuate one place after another, and although they could not be entirely dislodged, they nevertheless forfeited the entire advantage which Banér had won in the previous year at Wittstock.

In the course of the year 1637 the last Duke of Pomerania, Boguslas, had died, and thus the moment had arrived for Brandenburg to claim its hereditary right. The Emperor supported the claims of the Elector, so far as he was able; but Sweden resisted with all its power: and so the possession of Pomerania remained the apple of discord between the two powers in all the later years of the war. During the same year died one of the fiercest foes of the Emperor, Landgrave William of Hesse Cassel (September 21st), of a slow fever, which the calumny of the day attributed to poison given him by a man hired for the purpose at Vienna. His widow, Amalie Elizabeth, as guardian for his minor son, Lewis VI., seized the govern-

ment, the administration of which the Emperor had put into the hands of Landgrave George of Darmstadt. As General Götz was attempting to carry out the decree against the disloyal Landgrave, Duke George of Lüneburg interposed, and secured for her an armistice by which was conveyed to her the regency in behalf of her son, upon the condition that she should accept the peace of Prague and abandon all hostile alliances.

With still another Prince the Emperor concluded, in the course of the year, an adjustment in the hope of thus removing him permanently from the ranks of his enemies. This was Duke Eberhard of Würtemberg, who had followed his father in 1633 and joined the Swedes, and afterwards, in consequence of the battle of Nördlingen, had been obliged to seek a refuge outside of his Duchy. Ferdinand II. was unwilling at first to include him in the peace of Prague, but at a later period permitted the consideration of the question of his restoration to favor, which was affirmed in the autumn of 1637. The Duke was required to bind himself to leave all his fortifications, except that of Hohenwiel, which was occupied by a Würtemberg garrison, in the hands of the Emperor until peace should be concluded, and to provide for the support of the imperial garrisons. The commandant at Hohenwiel refused, however, to conform to these conditions, because he was not only in the service of the Duke, but in that also of the King of France; and the restoration of the Duke might have been defeated, if he had not cleared himself of the suspicion that this refusal was in obedience to his orders. Thus, in spite of many delays, an imperial decree (August 27, 1638) gave him back his land and dissolved the provisional government which the Emperor had established.

The Emperor attempted also to solve the contested question of the Palatinate by agreeing, at the end of 1637, to the proposition of Charles I. of England, and endeavoring to inaugurate in Brussels some measures in preparation for a response to it. The proposed conferences were not, however, held, and an attempt made, in the year 1638, by Charles Lewis, son of the late Palsgrave, to take possession of his hereditary lands by force, also failed, so that this matter remained still as before.

The campaign of the year 1637 did not result in the defeat of the Emperor, as was expected in France. Plans were laid, therefore, to bring about such result in the ensuing year; and to this end Richelieu energetically prosecuted the war against the Emperor and his cousin, the King of Spain. Nevertheless the allied forces of the French and the Piedmontese in Italy were several times, in the beginning of the year, beaten by the Spanish, and their situation grew still more serious when the widow of the Duke of Mantua, who owed her possession of this Duchy to the intervention of France, entered into a secret understanding with the widow of Amadeus, who was also, as regent of Savoy, endeavoring to dissolve the French alliance. Though Spain did not at the time gain either of these Princesses, it was evident that the French must in the struggle in Italy depend upon their own strength.

In the North, the French army advanced into Artois, hoping that the Hollanders would support them in this campaign by an invasion of the Spanish Netherlands. The Cardinal Infanta, however, managed the defence with equal skill and fortune, and, being supported by the imperial general, Piccolomini, foiled the endeavors of the Hollanders and French; and the latter fared still worse in their invasion of Spain itself, they having laid siege to

Fontarabia and suffered a defeat. All these failures were, however, compensated by the result of the German campaign, which turned out adversely to the Emperor.

Richelieu had given the Duke of Weimar the most lavish support, in order that he might have an army of sufficient strength to effect the conquest of Breisach, and thus establish himself on the Upper Rhine. Bernard opened the enterprise by the siege of Rheinfelden, which he was, however, obliged to abandon, because the imperial troops under Savelli and Werth were drawing near. On the 28th of February the imperialists had forced the enemy to withdraw from Rheinfelden; but as Savelli had his troops dispersed in the neighboring villages, Bernard took advantage of this carelessness, attacked the scattered enemy, and obtained a complete victory. Almost the whole imperial staff fell into his hands in the second battle of Rheinfelden. John Werth was taken to France and confined there, first in Vincennes, afterwards in Paris. Savelli succeeded in making his escape, and was still, notwithstanding his notorious incapacity, employed for a short time in the imperial service, and then finally relieved.

After the defeat at Rheinfelden the imperial garrison of the place still attempted to hold it as long as possible, but was forced, on the 24th of March, to capitulate. This capitulation was followed four weeks later by that of Freiburg, upon which Bernard prepared for the siege of Breisach. General Götz attempted, and for the time with success, to furnish the garrison with provisions; but a powder explosion destroyed these supplies. An attempt to repair this loss was also successful, and Bernard was forced to abandon the siege when Götz approached with his army for the relief of Breisach. Bernard had mean-

while, by the addition of French auxiliaries, increased his army to 16,000, to which force an army of 18,000 stood opposed. He might with this small difference against him have put off, by a continued manœuvring, the decision, but the approach of the Duke of Lorraine threatened to enclose him between two fires. In this situation he resolved upon a sudden attack of the combined forces of Götz and Savelli, and defeated them at Wittenweiher (August 9th). The Emperor was so provoked by this defeat, that he ordered an investigation. In the meantime the Duke of Lorraine arrived; but Götz, who now, by the receiving of fresh auxiliaries, commanded 16,000 men, instead of supporting him, left him alone, and he was defeated in the battle of Taun (October 15, 1638). Then Götz, four days later, desiring by all means to save the distressed town, advanced to the attack himself, but was beaten and forced to withdraw.

Although Breisach could not now be held, still the garrison, under its very able commander, Captain Reinach, energetically defended it, and manifested thereby the rarest spirit of sacrifice. Distress in the fortress finally rose to a fearful pitch; to quiet hunger, bread was made of bran, and the bark of ash and oak trees and soaked leather were eaten, as also the flesh of dogs, cats, and rats; human flesh too was consumed. About 5,000 men were carried away during the last weeks of the siege, chiefly by hunger. The pestilential effluvia which spread from the unburied dead compelled the captain to a capitulation, which, after several days' negotiation, was concluded on the 17th of December, and allowed the garrison to march out with flying colors. When the soldiers came forth from the fort, many had no longer the strength to carry their sabres, and many died while, in the heat of

their hunger, they devoured the offered food. As governor of the fortress, the Duke appointed Major-General Erlach, whose special zeal in the service had made him the subject of remark.

The campaign against the Swedes—which, as will be remembered, was confined to Further Pomerania—ended quite as unfortunately as that on the Rhine. Intoxicated with the advantages already won, Gallas had become careless, and thereby contributed, as also by many other faults, to the dissolution of the imperial army, so that Banér, who meanwhile had been strengthened by new enlistments, was able to pass over to the offensive, in which he achieved repeated successes. Although Gallas had at that time united the troops of Saxony and Brandenburg with his own, and had thus become stronger than his antagonist, yet he did nothing to wrest from him the places which he had won, but withdrew finally to Bohemia and Silesia into winter-quarters, without any further pursuit of Banér. The Princes of the Lower Saxon Circle, in spite of the stipulation in the peace of Prague, that they should accede to the Emperor, made no resistance, but remained for the time neutral. Duke George of Lüneburg labored specially for the neutrality, and afterwards, in the beginning of 1640, actually joined the Swedes, and the Duke of Brunswick followed the example.

After the resultless close of the peace negotiations which were begun at Cologne, there was, at the end of the year, another attempt made in Hamburg, where the imperial ambassador, Count Kurz, met the Frenchman, Avaux, and the Swede, Salvius, in order to unite upon the basis of a peace. After a few weeks, Kurz reported to the Emperor that he could cherish no hope of a successful issue, because the Swedish envoy represented that

he could do nothing without the concurrence of France, and Avaux excused himself on the ground of inadequate instructions. Furthermore the latter demanded the issue of letters of safe conduct for all the German Princes who were to be connected with the transactions, in which letters should be inserted all the titles and dignities claimed by them, even though the Emperor did not recognize these, and had yet to negotiate in regard to the claimants' right to them. Ferdinand would perhaps have yielded these formal points, had not the French stated still other demands, which made it clear as the sun's light that they were concerned only to gain time. Kurz labored to win at least the Swedes, and offered them Stralsund and the Isle of Rügen, in which offer there was but the one limiting proviso, that Brandenburg should concur in it. This overture foundered upon the rock of Brandenburg's non-concurrence, and the Hamburg conference ended without results.

Banér continued in the following year (1639) his forward movement, passed the Saale at Halle, occupied Zwickau, and besieged Freiburg, but was forced, after having suffered a check there, to withdraw again to Zwickau. On the 14th of April he defeated the imperialists at Chemnitz, and by this victory broke up the Saxon army. He now moved to the Elbe, assaulted Pirna, and revealed his intention to make an incursion into Bohemia. Gallas prepared to repel the attack, and concentrated his forces from all sides at Prague, but could not, however, prevent the Swedes from occupying successively Tetschen, Leitmeritz, and Melnik, and advancing, after a successful engagement, before Prague itself. Banér now began the siege of this city, but could not take it, such was the valor of the defence, and withdrew, because he did not deem

himself equal to the relieving force of the imperialists which was approaching under Hatzfeld. The Emperor now appointed his brother, the Archduke Leopold William, commander-in-chief of the army in Bohemia. He arrived in Prague towards the end of September, and was obliged soon to lead the defence against Banér, who again advanced before the city. On the 29th of October the latter retired again to Leitmeritz, having, during his stay of several months in Bohemia, subjected its northern part in all directions to contributions. These events compelled the Emperor to collect his resources for the war chiefly in Bohemia, and to give little attention to the defence of Silesia. At the end of the year Neumark fell into the hands of the Swedes, and the picture which the imperial general, Wolf of Mansfeld, gives of the hostile feeling in that province makes it almost inconceivable that all there was not lost.

During the same year Piccolomini, at the head of the imperialist and Spanish troops, gave battle to the French at Diedenhofen. The battle took place on the 7th of June, and the French were beaten and suffered great losses. This success was in a measure an offset against the loss of the naval battle of Dunkirk, in which the Spanish were beaten by the Hollanders. The Emperor was now threatened with a loss which he felt more deeply; the ties which had held the Duke of Lorraine to him became gradually relaxed. Ensnared in the toils of the charming Countess de Contecroix, the Duke desired to marry her, and, as she hoped by the mediation of France to secure a dissolution of her first marriage, she attempted to win him to the side of France. As the result of these persuasions, negotiations were opened between the Duke and Richelieu, which ended in his passing over to the French side.

This attachment was, however, of extremely short duration, for, while the new alliance was still incomplete, the Duke resolved to ally himself again to the Emperor, and did in fact change his alliance, so that Ferdinand escaped with nothing more than the fright.

III.

After his conquest of Breisach, the Duke of Weimar could without danger make an incursion into South Germany, and thus aid Banér's plan of a union with him in Austria. But instead of proceeding in harmony with this far-reaching design, he attempted first to fortify himself by further conquests in Alsace, and thus realize the dominion assured him by the treaty of St. Germain. He awakened in this way, however, the extreme jealousy of Richelieu, who had never been in earnest in the treaty; for, by the clause which stipulated that Bernard should employ, only at the King's pleasure and in obedience to his orders, the army which was supported by French money, it was his purpose to defraud Bernard at the decisive moment of the fruits of his victories. After the brilliant successes of the past year, the clashing designs of Bernard and Richelieu—the former expecting to hold Alsace for himself, the latter to annex it to France—could no longer remain concealed. The Cardinal attempted to prepare the way of attaining his end by calling upon the Duke to surrender Breisach to the King, so that the commandant and the garrison might take the oath of allegiance. In this demand he could not of course appeal to the treaty made with the Duke, but referred to that concluded in the year 1634 with the Circles of Upper

Germany, in which it was expressly provided that Alsace should be placed under the protection of France, and that Breisach should be surrendered to the same. On the contrary, Bernard could claim that this treaty was cancelled by the later one with him.

In order to gain his end, Richelieu authorized Count Guébriant, who commanded the troops operating in conjunction with Bernard, to open conferences with the latter and move him, by friendly words and overtures, to appoint a Frenchman to the command of the fortress, and to place in it a garrison partly made up of French soldiers. Guébriant appears to have pursued no earnest negotiations with Bernard, for on his first intimation in relation to Breisach, the latter declared that he would go to Paris himself, and there confer in regard to this matter and the future campaign. Some of his friends sought to dissuade him from the taking of this journey, on the ground that in France he would be powerless against the French demands, and would be obliged to surrender Breisach, the pearl of his future possessions, to the French. Even the widowed Palsgravine, Elizabeth, added her warning to that of others, and advised him not to let Breisach go out of his hands. Bernard was the more accessible to these counsels because he expected to reap for himself, and not for France, the fruits of his successes. He abandoned, therefore, the purposed journey, but awakened thereby the severest indignation in Paris. Instead of going himself, he sent General Erlach, and through him demanded the subsidies stipulated in the treaty, and furthermore requested a special aid, which request could meet no special favor, since Erlach was not empowered to make any offers in regard to Breisach.

Richelieu finally granted the subsidies on the condition

that the Duke should bind himself in writing to guard, in the King's name, all the places which he should occupy, and especially that, in case of his death or capture, Breisach should be placed in the King's possession. At this time Erlach was secured by a pension of 12,000 francs to the French interests; for, even though it be not true that he bound himself by an oath to hold Breisach for France, in case Bernard should be removed by death, he did nevertheless promise, in the presence of several of the French ministry, that, in case of Bernard's accidental death, he would, at the peril of his life, defend Breisach for the King's service. Count Guébriant now also made of Bernard the same demand which Erlach had been instructed to make. A very animated interview now took place between the two generals. Bernard appealed to the treaty of St. Germain, which assured to him the possession of Alsace and made no mention of the surrender of any places in it. Guébriant maintained that the Duke had the right to hold his conquests only under the same conditions by which he held his marshal's staff—that is, under the supremacy of France. The next day (July 22, 1639) Bernard handed the French general a written declaration, in which he claimed for himself the independent possession of Alsace and a part of Upper Burgundy, conquered by him, and offered the King of France only the remainder of the conquests made from Spain. This frank statement could not but convince the Cardinal that the Duke was fighting the Hapsburgs in his own interests.

Richelieu would on no account rest satisfied with this; for, if he allowed a result, which could have been secured only by French aid, to pass to the good of others, he must make up his mind that the world would subject both him and his King to ridicule. He feared also that Ber-

nard was planning the formation, in Germany, of a party of his own, to which he would attract a number of Protestant Princes, and then treat independently with the Emperor. All this was equally to the disadvantage of France, and the Cardinal determined therefore to pursue an energetic course, and still, if possible, to avoid a break with the Duke. At this time the latter, who had long suffered from fever, fell, on the 14th of July, seriously ill at Hünigen, caused himself, however, to be conveyed thence to Neuenburg, where his troops were just at that time passing the Rhine. In spite of all medical means, his illness was evidently growing worse, so that he was not left in doubt as to its fatal termination. As he was not disposed to leave the fruits of his conquests to be gathered by the French, although he owed these to their aid, he made a testamentary provision by which Alsace was to pass into the possession of his brothers. In the case that no one of them should be willing to bear the burden of this dangerous gift, France was to retain it to the time of a general peace, after which it was to return to the Empire. He entrusted the lead of his army to four men—Major-General Erlach, the Count of Nassau, and Colonels Ehm and Rose; and he did not direct as to the dominion to which it should be subject. On the 18th of July he breathed his last. In him departed one of the most gifted and brilliant of men, and his talents call for a tribute of admiration. It is to be lamented, indeed, that his achievements did not result in the good of his people, but on the contrary to the advantage of foreigners, and so condemn themselves. To be just, however, we must admit that it was at that time difficult, if not impossible, to find and to keep the right way.

Bernard was scarcely dead, when Guébriant hastened

to Breisach in order to win the officers there for the King, and, without regard to the will (for of this he had as yet no knowledge), to bring Alsace into the possession of France. In Breisach he succeeded in learning the contents of the will, and sent a copy of it immediately to Paris, although it ought first to have been opened in the presence of the Dukes of Weimar, for which purpose they were to have been summoned. Disorder broke out in the army; nor, in view of the army's four-headed command and the fact that it belonged to no country, but had been kept together by Bernard's personality and the French subsidies, was anything else to have been expected. Further, the troops demanded payment of their dues. If these should not be paid, something worse was to be feared—perhaps the dissolution of the army; and, if this should occur, the expectations of the high officers, that the war would procure for them splendid positions, would have to be dismissed. In order to escape this fate and to give the army in the prospective transactions with France a secure position, Erlach took thirty thousand pistoles from the treasures which the Duke had left, and settled, by the aid of his own credit and that of several other high officers, the demands of the men. All the high officers now united in sending to Paris a negotiator, through whom they offered their services to the King, on the condition that the treaty concluded by Bernard should be acknowledged as valid, and the payment of the subsidies, as hitherto, should be continued. After many delays, a treaty was finally closed (October 9th) between France and the leaders of the troops. In this the King was acknowledged as head of the army, the officers were confirmed in their places, and in the fortresses of Breisach and Freiburg the half of each

garrison was to be French. Erlach was to be Governor of Breisach and Ochonville; a Frenchman was to be associated with him. On the first of November the leaders took the oath of loyalty to the King, who thus came into possession of all the advantages which Bernard had won by his arms in Alsace. King Louis conferred the chief command of the army at first upon the Duke of Longueville, afterwards upon Count Guébriant, and, after the latter's death, upon Marshal Turenne.

The Dukes of Weimar, when they learned the contents of their brother's will, desired indeed to take possession of the inheritance, but when they perceived that in maintaining it they should incur the hostility of both France and the Emperor, they could not bring their energy up to the pitch which would be necessary in order to circumvent the French in their machinations. They finally agreed to convey all their claims to Duke William, so that, with the concurrence of the King of France, he might assume the command of the army and take possession of Breisach; his requests were, however, all in vain; the King never relinquished the advantages which he had won.

Louis XIII. and Duke William were not alone in their efforts to win the army of Bernard for themselves. Sweden, the Emperor, and Charles Lewis, the son of the unfortunate Palsgrave, made like attempts. The Swedish demands were at once rejected, since neither Queen Christina nor Oxenstiern offered any pay to the orphan regiments. In the Emperor's interests the business was conducted by one Hausner of Wandersleben, who offered the leaders a full amnesty and large pay. There was also sent from Vienna an agent to negotiate with Duke William of Weimar, and win him to the same plan. But

these endeavors were all fruitless, because the officers knew the Emperor's destitution of money, and feared that the fulfilment would be late in realization, if, indeed, the promise should even be kept at all. The Palsgrave could offer a better prospect, because he was permitted in the negotiations to refer to his uncle, Charles I. of England. In fact, he travelled from London, where he was sojourning at the time of Bernard's death, to France, with the design of proceeding to Breisach and gaining to his purposes the army, with the officers of which he maintained some relations. It was not his design to take possession of Alsace for himself. He wished to exchange it for the Palatinate, and had already obtained the concurrence, in this plan, of Spain, into the service of which power he designed to enter with his army. Richelieu had no suspicion of this understanding; he knew only the Palsgrave's designs in regard to the chief command; this alone was enough to lead him to watch his steps and have him arrested, which he did on his arrival at Moulins (October 14, 1639). In spite of all the Palsgrave's protests, and the interposition of the English ambassador, he was conveyed to Vincennes, and there imprisoned. His treatment was afterwards mitigated, but he was not set at liberty until a year later, and then only upon binding himself to undertake nothing against the interests of France.

IV.

In the midst of the disquietudes of war and the clash of arms, the Emperor labored unceasingly to quiet one or another of his enemies by peace negotiations. He made special efforts to satisfy the widowed Landgravine of

Hesse Cassel. By long negotiations, undertaken at the instigation of Duke George of Lüneburg, and which were continued into the year 1638, he had conveyed to her, as guardian of her minor son, the government of his possessions, and thus endeavored to gain her to his cause. Richelieu was not a little embittered when he learned the issue of these negotiations, and now labored with redoubled zeal to thwart them. The French envoy, M. de la Boderie, was directed to use every exertion to retain the Landgravine in her alliance with Sweden and France, or, in case this should fail, to bribe Melander, the commander of the Hessian troops, and the other officers, and thus bring them over to the French service. These endeavors did not at the time have the desired success. The Landgravine did not break off her relations with the Emperor, and the latter made these easier by authorizing the Elector of Mentz to persuade her to the acceptance of the peace of Prague, even allowing her to state her own conditions. She demanded that the settlement should embrace, not merely the Lutheran, but also the Calvinistic, Estates of the Empire, and that the latter should, for all coming time, be included in the religious peace.

The Lutherans, as well as the Catholics, had hitherto opposed this demand; now a portion of the latter were willing to recognize the Calvinists, and especially the Elector of Mentz advised the Emperor to concede the Landgravine's demand. The imperial council did not, however, concur in this advice, and the Emperor inclined to their side; but as Mentz persisted in his view, and this was shared by Bavaria and by some of the German bishops, and as finally some of the Vienna theologians who were consulted joined in it, the Emperor gave the permission to conclude the treaty by conceding this demand

of the Landgravine. When she was about to transfer her troops to the imperial service, she raised the objection that she had now again entered into negotiations with France. She was in perplexity as to the manner in which she should break with the Emperor, since he was about to remove her convenient pretext by giving way. At that time General Melander was at the head of her troops. He was a patriotic man who did not share the French tendencies of his mistress, and he afterwards entered the imperial service. The Landgravine finally swallowed the French bait, and concluded with France a treaty (August 22, 1639), by which she was to receive 200,000 thalers annually and a pension for her son, and she on her part was to support 7,000 men for the war against the "King of Hungary." In harmony with the demands of this treaty, she broke off all further negotiations with the Emperor, who did not therefore reap the expected reward for his concession.

During these transactions, the Elector of Mentz summoned a meeting of the Electoral College to take counsel with his colleagues as to the ways and means of bringing about a general peace. The Diet was to be opened on the 20th of June, 1639, in Frankfort-on-the-Main, was, however, in consequence of its removal to Nuremberg, put off to the 4th of January, 1640. None of the College, except the Elector of Mentz, appeared in person. They represented themselves by envoys, as did also, besides them, a number of the higher Imperial Estates. The Emperor sent but one ambassador to Nuremberg, who was charged with securing the greatest possible support of the imperial arms from the Estates in case of peace not being attainable. In the negotiations for peace the largest concessions were to be offered, and only in case of the hereditary lands of the Emperor was religious freedom to be refused.

The Elector of Mentz attempted now, in conjunction with the ambassadors of the other Estates of the Empire, to turn the Landgravine of Hesse Cassel and the Dukes of Lüneburg and Brunswick from their hostile alliances and persuade them to accede to the common cause; his letters, however, were answered only by negations or falsehoods. The Bavarian envoy reported that his sovereign had entered into relations with France in order to ascertain what advantages the latter country hoped to reap from the war, and, in case he should not succeed in obtaining a frank reply, to recommend again the acceptance of the treaty of 1630. Meanwhile the Nuremberg meeting perceived that no progress could be made towards preparing the way of peace unless the convoking Princes of the Circles should also take part in the meeting, so as to secure for it a more impressive dignity. The Emperor, when requested to concur in this enlargement, thought it would be better to summon an Imperial Diet, gave the Elector of Mentz the needed authorization, and the Diet was called for July 26, 1640. The German people, who everywhere longed for peace, and did not share the desires of individual Princes, greeted with joy the calling of the Diet. Only a few Princes were concerned for that which the people earnestly longed for, and there was such an indifference in representing themselves in the Diet as had never before been known. Only a single Prince, Margrave William of Baden, appeared in person at Regensburg, and the Emperor was obliged after his arrival to open the business with the envoys of the absentees, who nearly all, according to the court custom of the day, came later than himself. Some of the Princes were, indeed, in a distress which almost surpasses description, and did not overstate the fact in apologizing that

they could not travel on account of the hardships which the war had brought upon them, and were obliged to send representatives.

The business was opened on the 23d of September. When measures for the restoration of peace were under consideration, Ferdinand offered to admit to the future Peace Congress those Princes who had hitherto been hostile to him. He proposed for the satisfaction of the Swedes the payment to them of twenty-five tons of gold, and to pledge Stralsund and Rügen in security for this sum.* The amnesty question led to the most heated debate. The majority of the Estates demanded the full restoration of all the Estates of the Empire, and would consent to special action only in the case of the Elector of the Palatinate. Anspach, Würtemberg, Anhalt, and the imperial cities refused to concur even in this limitation, and declared themselves for a general and unlimited amnesty. In this demand they did not obtain concurrence, and the proposition of the majority prevailed, to which the Emperor also finally gave his assent. In regard to Brunswick and Hesse Cassel, he expressly declared his readiness to include them in the amnesty, if they would abandon their relations with the enemy. The further deliberations related to the support of the imperial army, in which the Diet showed itself conciliatory and willing to submit to contributions and the billeting of soldiers.

A motion was made in the Diet that the Emperor should give letters of safe conduct to Sweden and France

* Twenty-five tons of gold is the expression used. A ton of gold was 100,000 thalers, florins, or crowns, whichever might be the unit in the monetary system of the country. There is nothing to indicate which is meant; but the amount offered would be 2,500,000, either florins, thalers, or crowns —if florins, the sum would be small; if crowns, it would not be large.—Tr.

for the envoys who should take part in the future peace negotiations. Ferdinand was in harmony with this desire, but received from France a scornful response, because the French minister was not pleased with the tenor of the imperial letter. The deputies of the Guelph Princes* and the Landgravine of Hesse Cassel, who had been admitted to the Diet, although their sovereigns were acting a hostile part, proposed, instead of inviting the French and Swedish envoys to the place of the future negotiations, to admit them directly to the Diet itself. They made this offer evidently to introduce confusion into the affairs of Germany and paralyze the Emperor's influence. This motion was by Electoral Saxony indignantly repelled, and this negative opinion was adopted by the majority of the Diet. Nevertheless the peace party endeavored in every way to gain the Guelphs and Hesse Cassel. The representatives of these Estates were called upon to mention their grievances, and were promised every possible redress. The envoys of the Guelphs now came forward with their desires, and demanded the cession of the Bishopric of Hildesheim and the Fortress of Wolfenbüttel, which had been garrisoned by imperial troops, as also the removal of some causes of complaint concerning religious matters.

It had been determined in the Diet to discuss in general the grievances which existed in the Empire, and deliberate in regard to measures of redress. The two parties, therefore, called upon each other to make their respective statements, so that the business might be entered upon. The Protestants began: they complained that the Catholics regarded the religious peace as a mere toleration on their part, and as not of perpetual duration ;

* The Princes of the Brunswick lines.—Tr.

that its disputed points were settled elsewhere than in the Imperial Diet; that Protestant owners of the former Catholic foundations were denied seats and votes in the Diet; and, finally, that the reformation of mediate foundations was forbidden. To the grievances on the score of religion were added some in relation to political and military matters; the excessive assessment of war taxes and the support of garrisons were objected to; and, finally, in connection with the administration of justice, some objections were made relatively to the jurisdiction of the imperial council. Some of these grievances had been provided for by the terms of the peace of Prague, and their repetition was not therefore in place.

The Catholic Estates had really no desire to state their grievances, but, as they were obliged to do so, complained first that the religious peace of Augsburg had been violated towards them by the seizure by the Protestants, of numerous foundations, their refusal to restore these, and their threatening others with a like fate; that in contested cases they were defenceless, because the Protestants would not acknowledge the jurisdiction of the courts; that in the bishoprics which the Protestants had appropriated they were not admitted to the canonicate, and suffered a like exclusion in the Protestant imperial cities, where they could not rise to any municipal or other official positions. This persecution, they said, extended itself even to matters of business, so that Catholic burghers were placed at disadvantage and compelled to emigrate. Further, the Catholics, they said, were denied the right of propagating their religion, which the Protestants everywhere fearlessly exercised. The grievances of their ecclesiastical antagonists were dismissed by the Catholics partly by the remark that relief had already

been provided for some of them; some they attempted with more or less sincerity to deny, but they especially defended themselves against the charge of not having regarded the peace of Augsburg as valid. In fact, the reproach of the Protestants, as they maintained, had in this respect no meaning, because the transgressions which the latter had committed against the provisions of this peace formed the chief subject of the complaints of the Catholics, and probably the Catholics were quite sincere in the assurance which they gave that they desired to observe these provisions. The Protestants did not leave these complaints unanswered. They expressed their gratification in the admission made, and declared themselves satisfied with them. In other points they stated their demands in clearer and more moderate terms. The parties had, indeed, grounds of mutual complaint, which could, however, be removed only in case of a sincere mutual readiness to abstain from further offences, and this readiness was finally brought about by the long-continued evils of the war. The language employed at this Diet was moderate. One special point was that the Catholics ceased to contest the Protestants' right of existence, and now demanded only equal rights with them.

The deliberations had been protracted until the month of June, 1641. At this time the representatives of Brunswick and Hesse Cassel brought forward again their former demands for an unlimited amnesty, with a desire to renew the old contest. No answer was given them, and two months later they renewed their expression of the same solicitude, and requested at the same time the evacuation of Wolfenbüttel. The Emperor had before declared that he would give up Wolfenbüttel as soon as the war would permit this; being now again pressed on

the same point, he felt the more offended because he perceived that neither Brunswick nor Hesse Cassel sincerely desired to come to an understanding. He notified therefore the envoys of these Princes that their safe-conducts were ready, and commanded them within fourteen days to return home.

To the offer of safe-conducts for the ambassadors to the future peace negotiations, an answer was received from Queen Christina, in which she proposed the cities of Münster and Osnabrück, instead of Hamburg and Cologne, as the places of meeting. The Emperor agreed to this, as also to a postponement of some months. On the 10th of October, 1641, the Diet finally closed its session by the reading of the imperial speech of prorogation, in which were stated the subjects of deliberation and the results thereby reached. In relation to the amnesty, it stated that it could not be applied to the hereditary lands of the Emperor, nor to Magdeburg, which had already been given to Saxony, nor to the lands of the Palatinate, and that it would not come into force in case of the other Estates which had been excluded until they should have made their reconciliations with the Emperor. The grievances relating to religion were to be settled at a Diet of Deputies to be called soon, all executive action in relation to matters of religion was to cease, and the religious peace to be everywhere in force. For the maintenance of the imperial army, 120 Roman months were granted,* and the acceptance of foreign military service and the rendering

* This is the only passage of the work, thus far, the application of which I have not *supposed* that I understood. The best conception which I can obtain of it is that the Diet agreed upon the existing or some general system of supporting the imperial army, which was to be in force for ten years—that is, 120 months—and might at the end of this period be revised.—TR.

of aid to the enemy were forbidden. After the reading of this paper, the Emperor closed the Diet, and a few days afterwards returned home by vessel on the Danube. It cannot be denied that at this time the desire for peace gathered nearly all Germany about the Emperor, and that a great portion of the Estates showed a loyalty which for a long time had been supposed to have vanished. It was apparent that a national unity was in preparation, and that if the war should be continued, the German Princes would not be chiefly in fault.

During the sitting of the Imperial Diet was published a book, which, at a later day, attracted much attention, entitled: "Dissertation on the Condition of the Roman Empire," by Hyppolitus a Lapide,* under which pseudonym a certain Chemnitz—though we do not know which of the men who bore this name—concealed himself. He attempted to prove that the obedience which the Estates rendered to the Emperor was not a duty resting upon law, but the consequence of a slavish yoke, which the Emperors of the house of Hapsburg had laid upon them, and that this house ought therefore to be exterminated. The imperial rule should be reduced to naught, in order that German "liberty" might flourish. Illusory as were its arguments and reasoning processes, and greatly as they served the use and profit of the foreign oppressors who labored for the demolition of the German state-system, it must be admitted that the views laid down in the book were not imaginary, but that many German Princes, consciously or unconsciously, allowed themselves, many decades of years ago, to be led by them. So far as is known, the book at that time produced no

* Latin : *Dissertatio de Ratione Status in Romano Imperio.*

effect, and least of all upon the Diet itself. It contained, however, the portrayal of a state of things, of the actual correctness of which thousand-fold proofs may be found.

V.

We have stated that at the end of the year 1639 Banér was in Bohemia, whither he had retired before the imperialist forces as far as Leitmeritz. The two opposing armies were nearly equal; each numbered over 20,000 men. When the Archduke Leopold William desired (February, 1640) to pass the Elbe, Banér went as far as Melnik to meet him, supposing that he had come thither to cross the river. The only result, however, was that the imperialists passed the Elbe at a point higher up. The further manœuvres of the Archduke were fortunate in their results, so that Banér suffered great losses, and was obliged to retreat to Zwickau, from which place he attempted to effect a junction with the troops of Hesse Cassel and Lüneburg. One of his subordinate generals, however, having been beaten in battle, he was obliged to withdraw from Zwickau also before the pursuing Archduke. But he now succeeded in forming a junction with the German contingent referred to, as also with the corps of the late Duke of Weimar, commanded by the Duke de Longueville. This raised his army, which consisted chiefly of Germans, though under French and Swedish command, to about 40,000 men. At Saalfeld the two hostile armies stood over against each other for nearly three weeks, both suffering from deficiency of some of the means of subsistence, and neither inclined to the attack. Banér first withdrew, and the Archduke followed him,

and now threatened Hesse Cassel and Lüneburg with an invasion. The Landgravine and George of Lüneburg demanded the return of their troops for their own defence. The former now took refuge in negotiation, sending word to the Archduke and to Piccolomini, who was with him, that she desired peace. There was on the imperial side a ready appreciation of this offer, but the forward movement was not allowed to be checked by it. The imperialists pushed on in disregard of Banér, who was encamped at Waldeck, as far as Höxter on the Weser (September 29, 1640), and took this city after a four days' siege. They then advanced to Paderborn, and later to the aid of the Elector of Mentz and the Landgrave of Darmstadt, for their protection against the Swedes, and then went into winter-quarters in Franconia, Bavaria, and Swabia.

Banér took advantage of this fact for a bold expedition. He advanced in mid-winter to Franconia and the Upper Palatinate, and thus gave rise to the supposition that his design was upon Regensburg, where the Imperial Diet was then in session. The Emperor, who shared this impression, took the necessary measures for defence, particularly in the matter of strengthening the garrison, and summoned thither troops from all directions, among which were those under Piccolomini. Banér had meanwhile reunited with the corps of the late Duke of Weimar, from which he had but just separated, and which was now commanded by Guébriant. With a force now numbering 18,000 men, he broke up his camp at Regenstauf, on the 21st of January, 1640, and moved towards Regensburg, in which movement he was favored by the fact that the Danube was frozen over, and the Swedes could pass it without difficulty. A sudden thaw, however, and the flow of ice which attended

it, put an end to this advantage. The imperial army, which was gradually gathering about Regensburg, repelled all further assaults, and Banér was obliged (January 27th) to withdraw without results to Cham, and again separate from Guébriant. If this expedition had succeeded, and Regensburg had fallen into his power, he would then have invaded Austria and joined with George Rákóczy, Prince of Transylvania, who would have played the part of Bethlen over again.

In Regensburg it was feared that Banér might direct his retreat by way of Bohemia, and a part of the troops concentrated there were sent thither. The Swedes did, indeed, enter Bohemia, but with an insufficient force, so that a passable defence could be made against them. The Archduke, in the meantime, pursued Banér with the body of his troops, and attempted, in connection with Piccolomini, to besiege Neuenburg am Walde, in which Banér had placed a strong garrison. After a brave resistance the place was taken, and the defenders—several thousand men—made prisoners. Meanwhile Banér had gained so great a start, that all their attempts to overtake him were vain, and he reached Zwickau, where General Taupadel, with 6,000 fresh troops, awaited his arrival. Guébriant had withdrawn to the neighborhood of Bamberg.

These successes of the imperial army, during the first months of the year 1641, would have justified a more decided action; but any plan of this kind was foreign to the thoughts of the generals, who desired only to obtain a secure defensive position between Leipsic and Neuenburg, and leave all beyond this to chance, and chance did continue to favor them. Banér was obliged to retreat still further, and arrived hopelessly ill in Halberstadt.

The hardships of the winter campaign and a gluttonous living had exhausted his energies, and he died on the 20th of May, 1641. He left a property of a million thalers as savings of his marauding expeditions in Germany.

After Banér's death a mutiny broke out in the Swedish camp. The colonels would obey the leaders designated by Banér only in case their own demands were satisfied. They came afterwards to an agreement, and recognized General Torstenson as Banér's successor. The imperialist generals took advantage of this interval and the death of Duke George of Lüneburg, which had occurred shortly before (April 2, 1641), to negotiate anew with the Guelph Princes with reference to a reconciliation. The Princes agreed to this, but still continued covertly to act the part of allies of Sweden. The Archduke and Piccolomini attempted the relief of Wolfenbüttel, in which attempt they were, however, defeated by the Brunswickers, Swedes, and French (June 29, 1641), though the Guelphs also suffered great losses, and now for the first became earnest in their negotiations. Duke Augustus went to the imperialist camp, and immediately thereafter a conference with reference to adjustment was opened in Goslar, and the work was the more zealously prosecuted because Piccolomini in spite of it continued hard to press the Dukes, so that an agreement was effected on the 16th of January, 1642, which was consummated on the ensuing 16th of April. In this treaty the Dukes of Brunswick and Brunswick-Lüneburg accepted the peace of Prague, renounced all alliances with the enemies of the Emperor, and agreed to furnish provisions and munitions of war at fair prices. They were promised also the full use of the larger Hildesheim foundation until the conclusion of peace, and Wolfenbüttel was to be restored to them. They were

to enjoy also, in addition to the neutrality, such aid and advantages as were granted to but two other Princes—those of Bavaria and Saxony—from the imperial side.

The Emperor had thus gotten rid of one enemy, but had, in consequence, lost the alliance of one princely house which, since the peace of Prague, had remained true to his interests. The Elector of Brandenburg, George William, had died in 1640, and his successor, Frederic William, had promised indeed to continue the alliance; but still, in the following spring, he had offered his neutrality to the Swedes, although he denied this when Ferdinand III. came, by means of intercepted letters, to the knowledge of the negotiations. He perceived, perhaps, that without the Emperor's aid he would not succeed in wresting the whole of Pomerania from the Swedes; he desired, therefore, no longer to bear the expense of a useless war, and earnestly pursued the negotiations with Sweden, so that on the 24th of July, 1642, an armistice of two years was concluded, which secured the Elector in his neutral attitude, provided the Emperor should acknowledge this. The Emperor could not, without injury to himself, show him any hostility, and thus the Mark of Brandenburg enjoyed already the blessing of peace, for which the rest of Germany sighed in vain.

VI.

While Brandenburg withdrew from its alliance with the Emperor, France had strengthened its connection with Sweden. The Hamburg treaty was to come to an end in 1641; in view of which, Richelieu, in 1640, made arrangements looking to its renewal, and sought also to extinguish

the indignation which the Swedes had so deeply felt at the manner in which the French had taken possession of the army of the Duke of Weimar. Rorté was sent to Stockholm to open the negotiations, and secured the signing of the new treaty on the 30th of June, 1640. He effected first a renewal of the Hamburg treaty, and made provisions for the possible conclusion of an armistice of several years' duration. France desired to conclude such a one with the Emperor on the basis of present possessions, which, had it been conceded, would have deranged the affairs of Germany more than the most unfavorable peace could have done. Their successes in the war had, indeed, greatly raised the demands of the French.

The war which France carried on in Italy and against the Spanish Netherlands, in the year 1640, abounded in single instances of success; nevertheless none of the results attained to were to be compared to the blow which Spain received during the same year by the insurrections in Catalonia and Portugal. By this the country's resisting power was permanently paralyzed; not only so, but the King was ever after unable to support the Emperor with adequate subsidies. The cause of the Catalonian insurrection existed in the hatred which the people of this district had always cherished towards the Castilians, and which now broke forth anew as Olivarez directed that the soldiers stationed in Catalonia should be provided for at the expense of the province, and the latter committed numerous robberies and murders when this provision was refused them. The embitterment rose with each day; in a hundred different places violent demonstrations occurred, which finally resulted in large bands of soldiers falling upon and plundering whole districts. When now a few thousand day-laborers went from their native mountains

to Barcelona to hire out as reapers, this hatred against their Castilian oppressors broke forth among them also, and, feeling that their numbers were such as to assure a victory, they excited a tumult (June 17, 1640), which led to the assassination of the Viceroy of Catalonia and the release of the prominent Catalonians who had in the course of the late troubles been thrown into prison. The spirit with which the rioters were animated was exhibited in plundering the vice-regal palace. Here a clock fell into their hands with the figure of an ape attached to it, which, when the clock struck the hour, showed movements of the hands and eyes. On observing this, they thought they had the devil before them, made him a prisoner, and took him before the inquisitorial court of the city.

The tumultuous movement of Barcelona was repeated in all the cities of Catalonia; the Castilians were everywhere maltreated or slain, and, finally, it was with difficulty that the Spanish regiments maintained their position in Perpignan. The endeavors of Olivarez to put down the insurrection, by the appointment of a new Viceroy in the person of the Duke of Cardona, a native Catalonian and a man of ability, did not result as was desired, and the government was obliged to arm in order to put down the movement by force, which naturally excited the Catalonians to a still greater summoning up of their resisting power. They sought aid from France, and Richelieu gladly listened to their application, and replied that the King would approve of the formation of a Catalonian republic, and take it under his protection. The negotiations led finally to the conclusion of a treaty between the representatives of Catalonia and the French ambassador, which provided that the King of France should send them the necessary officers for their own troops and also a corps

of 8,000 men, in return for which the Catalonians obligated themselves, in case they should ever be reconciled to Philip IV., never to fight against France.

At the same time that the news of the conclusion of this treaty reached Paris, came also other news still more pleasing to Richelieu's ambition; it was that of the insurrection in Portugal. During the sixty years of the union of this province with Spain, the connection, although every man of penetration deemed it both a natural and an advantageous one, because it was only by this that the peninsula of the Pyrenees could maintain its just position, had been borne as a heavy yoke. Provincial antagonism, however, in the Portuguese was never stifled, and increased in consequence of the Spanish misgovernment to the grade of invincibility. As early as the year 1630 secret transactions were begun between some Portuguese magnates and the French ministry, which would at that time also have led to an insurrectionary movement if the Duke of Braganza had but possessed the courage to place himself at its head. The example of the Catalonians now incited the Portuguese. The Duke's intendant organized the conspiracy, and, on a given signal, the rising took place in Lisbon, and triumphed almost without bloodshed. The Duke of Braganza was proclaimed King, and the Spanish dominion was at an end. The favorable news from Portugal caused Richelieu to form a still closer alliance with Catalonia (January 23, 1641), by which this province bound itself perpetually to France, with the condition that its rights and liberties should be preserved.

These two insurrections which, by forcing the King to apply his means to their suppression, inflicted such heavy wounds upon Spain, were to be imitated also in France, where the Dukes of Bouillon and Guise united with the

Count of Soissons to assail the King, for which purpose they in return had the promise of Spanish money and troops. The fortress of Sedan was the central point of the movement; this was aided also by the Emperor, who sent General Lamboy with 7,000 men to support the insurgents. Louis sent against their united forces Marshal Chatillon, who, however, suffered at Fournoi (July 6, 1641) a decisive defeat. But the Count of Soissons fell in the battle, and neither Bouillon nor Guise was of equal power with him, because he belonged to the royal family, and so the insurrection could not spread further. Bouillon came to a reconciliation with the King, Guise took refuge in Brussels, and the insurrection was suppressed soon after its outbreak. The next year the Marquis of Cinq-Mars, a royal favorite, inexperienced and moved by an irrational self-love, entered into an understanding with Spain, by virtue of which Gaston of Orleans and Cinq-Mars were to be placed at the head of an army received from Spain to fight the Swedes. In the treaty it was specially emphasized that this was not directed against the King; but surely the King would have suffered the defeat of Richelieu's exertions, if the alliance had ever become a reality. Cinq-Mars and his adherents sought at the same time to win the King to favor a peace with Spain and incite him against Richelieu, and even to get rid of the latter by violence.

Perhaps Louis would have yielded to these suggestions if Cinq-Mars had better managed his cause, and not alienated the King by his ridiculous exhibitions of vanity and ignorance. Then came the news that the French troops had sustained, in their contest with the Spanish Netherlands, at the hands of the new Regent, Francesco de Mello (the Cardinal Infante, Ferdinand, had died in December, 1641),

considerable reverses, and had lost some fortified places, and that Marshal Guiche had been beaten (May 26, 1642) at Honnecourt. This defeat put an end to the King's peaceful inclination. He perceived that nothing but decided action could raise France above Spain, and he therefore followed more closely the policy of Richelieu. Chance threw into the latter's hands, at this time, a copy of the treaty which the vain Cinq-Mars had entered into with Spain, and he hastened to send it to the King. The result of this was that a prosecution was instituted against the favorite and his associate, de Thou, and Gaston of Orleans was spared only because his admissions supplied the needed evidence against the arraigned. The result was that the death-penalty was adjudged to, and executed upon, both prisoners.

Such was the fortunate development of the external relations of France (which were indeed scarcely affected by its internal conspiracies) as to make it easily explainable why Richelieu did not decline peace negotiations. He might now, indeed, hope for the acquisition of Alsace, having established himself there. He concluded a preliminary treaty with Ferdinand III., by which Münster and Osnabrück were fixed upon as the assembling-places and the 25th of March, 1642, as the time of the meeting of the parties for deliberation. On this occasion France abandoned its resistance to the imperial title of Ferdinand III.

VII.

The Emperor, France, and Sweden had agreed to enter upon peace negotiations, but had concluded no armistice, because each party hoped, by the fortunes of the battle-

field, to be placed in a position to dictate the terms of peace. The war in 1642 opened with a decided advantage on the French side. Guébriant inflicted at Hulst (between Kempen and Krefeld) a defeat upon the imperialists under Lamboy. The imperialists, commanded by Hatzfeld, drew to themselves the Bavarian troops, and assigned to John Werth, who had finally been exchanged for Horn, the command of the cavalry. An attempt had been made in France to alienate him from his country, and seduce him to treason against it in case he should be placed in command of a division of the imperialist army. He gave a half-way promise of compliance. The event, however, showed it but a pretence, for he rendered the full measure of his duty. Hatzfeld was, by various reinforcements, enabled to assume the offensive. He formed a junction with the Spanish Regent, Mello, and advanced against the Netherlanders, under the Duke of Orange, who in turn called Marshal Guébriant to his aid. At the small city of Zons, the two armies stood inactive against each other, until finally the Hollanders separated from the French and retired. Guébriant did not, however, direct his march to France, but to Lower Saxony, there to take up his winter-quarters.

The unfortunate issue of the battle at Hulst awakened in the Electors of Mentz, Cologne, and Bavaria the thought of placing a separate army in the field, the control of which should be entirely disconnected from that of the imperialists and which should have for its end chiefly the protection of their own territories. It was desired that the Bavarian, Franconian, and Swabian Circle should be assigned to the Elector of Bavaria; Hatzfeld was to remain with his corps on the Rhine, but to obey the directions of Mentz, Cologne, Treves, and Pfalz-Neuburg; while the immediate

forces of the Emperor were to be withdrawn into the imperial hereditary lands. The whole project was wrecked through the opposition of Franconia and Swabia, which refused to pay their war contributions to Bavaria alone.

This year the Swedes opened the war against the Emperor by marching under Torstenson's lead to Silesia for the purpose of advancing thence into the territories of Austria. The Swedish general obtained at Schweidnitz a victory over the Duke of Saxe-Lauenburg, who, in the Emperor's behalf, defended Silesia, made the Duke a prisoner, and then advanced into Moravia, where he took the fortress of Olmutz, after a brief resistance. Here he left an efficient garrison and returned to Silesia, reduced Oppeln and stormed Brieg, where, however, his fortune was arrested by the faithfulness and ability of Ranft, the commandant. Meanwhile the Archduke and Piccolomini gained time to march with their troops to Silesia to put an end to the further progress of Torstenson. The latter, deeming himself too weak to fight the imperialists, retreated before them and awaited the arrival of fresh troops from Sweden. When these came, he united also with the Swedish generals, Königsmark and Wrangel, passed over the Elbe, and appeared before Leipsic, which he immediately blockaded. When pursued by the Archduke, who reached the place on the 1st of November, the Swede raised the blockade, withdrew, and took a position at Breitenfeld, in the very place where, in the year 1631, the decisive battle had been fought between Gustavus Adolphus and Tilly. The imperialists, including the Saxons, numbered 22,000, the Swedes 20,000 men. The Archduke felt himself compelled to risk a battle, because he could only in this way prevent a union of Torstenson with Guébriant, who was approaching. Thus, then, came on

at Breitenfeld, on the 2d of November, 1642, a fierce contest, in which, by the precipitate flight of the cavalry of the left wing of the imperialists, the infantry of this wing was left without protection, and, in spite of its stout resistance, was almost entirely destroyed. After this success the hostile masses threw themselves upon the right wing and inflicted upon it a similar fate. Those not killed or wounded were made prisoners. The Archduke was said to have fought as bravely as a common soldier, and at last to have been overpowered and forced to flight. Piccolomini also escaped at the head of 1,500 men, fled to Bohemia, and appointed Komotau as the gathering-place of the men who had escaped capture. It is said that only a third part of the army remained.

The defeat at Breitenfeld threatened the Emperor with greater perils than he had ever been exposed to, for whence should come the means for the raising of a new army? If he, nevertheless, rose above these dangers, the cause is to be sought in the fact that the German Princes, with the exception of Hesse Cassel and Lüneburg, were friendly, or at least not hostile, to him, and that they did not therefore think of joining the Swedes and French in their efforts to overthrow the head of the Empire. Scarcely had the Emperor received the news of the defeat, when he made an unusually energetic attempt to fill the thinned ranks of his troops, called upon the Estates of his several lands to make sacrifices which they had never before made, and thus before the end of the year raised his army again to such state as to command respect. His task was rendered easier by the fact that Torstenson, instead of moving to Bohemia, occupied himself with the siege of Leipsic, and Guébriant separated from him because he was obliged to secure himself against Hatzfeld

and Wahl. Meanwhile the Emperor instituted at Roky-
can an investigation of the causes which led to the loss of
the battle at Breitenfeld, which resulted in a decision that
to the early and causeless flight of Madlot's regiment was
chiefly to be ascribed the shameful issue. The regiment
was therefore disbanded, the captains and lieutenants
were all capitally executed, as also every tenth man, as
determined by lot.

We turn now to the peace negotiations which, accord-
ing to the agreement, were to have been opened on the
24th of March, 1642. They had made no beginning,
because the French and Swedes delayed in accepting the
imperial and Spanish letters of safe-conduct, and raised
all sorts of objections to them. In his desperation the
Emperor determined to send the Provincial of the Order
of Preaching Friars, George of Herbertstein, to Paris to
appeal to Richelieu's conscience and to warn him of the
curse which he was inviting by favoring the Protestants
and the bloody war. In case he should not find the Car-
dinal living—it was known in Vienna that he was sick,
and he had actually died before Herbertstein's arrival—he
was to address himself in like manner to Cardinal
Mazarin, who, it was presumed, would succeed Richelieu.
He was to give solemn assurance that the Emperor would
keep inviolate the statutes of the Empire, and a warning
against the oppression of orphans and the seizure of their
possessions—to declare that God would surely visit such
beginnings with punishments. This warning related to Al-
sace, which, after the division made between Ferdinand II.
and his brother Leopold, belonged to the latter, and now,
since his death, to his minor children. The Emperor de-
sired, as is apparent from these statements and the other
contents of Herbertstein's instructions, to persuade the

King of France to make peace without giving up to him any part of Alsace, and to have him extend the peace also to Spain, and then to turn his arms against Sweden in case the latter should refuse a reasonable pecuniary indemnification.

We have already stated that, on Herbertstein's arrival in Paris, Richelieu was no longer among the living. The Cardinal, to whom France owed its successes—for he not only kept the State finances in order and had always the needed means at command, but had held in check the factious spirit of the French magnates, suppressed regardlessly the insurrections which they, on manifold pretexts, projected, and, whether with or against the imbecile King, wrought out these successes—sank, in the midst of his triumphs and exertions, under a load which his exhausted constitution could no longer carry. He took leave of the King, and having used the occasion to exhort him to perseverance in the home and foreign policy which he had entered upon, and specially commended to him Cardinal Mazarin, died December 4, 1642. He could justly claim before his death that his whole course of action had aimed at the greatness of France, and would in this find its justification. He had at least made a splendid contribution to the development into a harmonious unity of the condition of his native country. The power of the nobility he had finally broken, and France from his time forth moved on unchecked by internal feuds in the way which his ambition and his equally useful vanity had marked out. If external power is the highest aim of government to which a people should aspire, then Richelieu belongs to the greatest of statesmen, for to this he led the way. On any supposition he occupies a place of eminence, for



JEAN ARMAND DU PLESSIS,
Cardinal and Duke of Richelieu.



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no people whose power is not in process of growth, or which is not able at least to repel successfully every invasion, can expect a prosperous future.

Louis XIII. followed the counsel of his dying minister. He kept Richelieu's servants in their former places, and called Cardinal Mazarin into his council. He changed so far his administration of the government as to mitigate somewhat its rigor towards the nobility; several of them he released from prison. The King was no longer able to give a definite direction to his internal policy, for he too was approaching his end, and hastened therefore to bestow a somewhat general pardon upon his internal adversaries. He died on the 4th of May, 1643. After his death his widow, Anna of Austria, conceded to Cardinal Mazarin the unlimited power of Richelieu, and conducted herself, though not without a conscious aim, as a weak and capricious woman, and, as was to be expected, her government could not be held to its previous consistency and firmness. The way, however, which the great Cardinal had entered upon was not abandoned, and when Louis XIV. took it in hand, he could without hindrance continue the policy of Richelieu.

It but showed the simplicity of the imperial cabinet that it thought by an appeal to religion and conscience the French would be brought to relinquish the booty for which they had expended millions of money and the blood of hundreds of thousands. In the Middle Ages an appeal of this kind to the religious sense sometimes called forth unexpected and unselfish action. Perhaps Ferdinand II. might have been, in a similar case, capable of such an act. But French policy had for three centuries shown itself open to no such considerations. Perhaps this was the last religious appeal ever made by one of two great hostile



/ powers to the other with any hope of success. Mazarin, however, soon settled it. Cold and brief was the answer which he returned to Herbertstein. It was simply that France could not separate itself from its allies, and would confer with the Emperor only in the Congress. /

With less fame than Richelieu, Olivarez, the chief minister of Spain, closed, nearly at the same time, his career. From the time of the insurrections in Catalonia and Portugal, which so severely affected Spain, complaints against him were multiplied. He was charged with arbitrary action in relation to the royal revenues. Numerous instances were cited in which he had acted only in his own interests and those of his friends. Reference was made to the fact that, by uniting many dignities in his own person and by royal presents, he had secured a yearly income of 432,000 ducats. The hatred against him rose when, in the financial stress of 1642, he could devise no way of relief to himself but to corrupt the coinage, by which he revealed to every one the consequences of the bad financial management for which, according to the universal opinion, he alone was responsible. His numerous enemies would not have so soon effected his overthrow, since the King implicitly trusted him, if the Queen, Isabella, who was offended by the course which he and his wife pursued towards her, had not joined them. She had repeatedly complained to the King of Olivarez; but her request had been refused, until one day, just at the time when the outward misfortunes were accumulating, with her son, the Infante Balthaser, in her arms, she went to meet the King, and entreated him to dismiss his minister, as otherwise their offspring would perish. This appeal and the numerous charges brought against the minister by courtiers and court ladies, finally exhausted the King's

patience, and he dismissed him, on the 17th of January, 1643, from his service, and assigned him a residence distant from Madrid. The beneficent results of this decision which had been expected in Spain did not follow. There was a failure to perceive that nothing but economy could restore order to the finances, and that for this purpose an end should be put to the war in Holland and a better form given to the administration in Spain. The successor of the dismissed minister, the new favorite, Don Luis de Haro, effected no improvement of the situation.

CHAPTER IX.

THE LAST YEARS OF THE WAR.

(1643—1648.)

- I. The War of 1643 and 1644. Rákóczy. II. The War in Bohemia, Moravia, and Austria in the Year 1645. III. The Elector of Bavaria in his Contest with the French in the Years 1644 and 1645. IV. The War in the Year 1646. V. The Armistice between Bavaria, France, and Sweden, and its Consequences. VI. The Campaign of 1647. VII. The Campaign of 1648. The Taking of the Kleinseite of Prague.

I.

THE year 1643 opened with the vain endeavors of the Duke of Würtemberg to force the fortress of Hohen-twiel to surrender to the Emperor. The garrison bravely maintained itself, and harassed uninterruptedly the surrounding country by expeditions and surprises in quest of booty. General Erläch also made sorties from his secure position upon the Bavarian troops, and all the efforts of Field-Marshal Mercy to force him from this position were unsuccessful, and especially so because Mercy had to defend himself against Guébriant also, to which defence he was not equal until after he had formed a junction with Hatzfeld at Dünkelsbühl. Guébriant took his position, in February, 1643, between Cannstadt and Waiblingen, where he was attacked and beaten by General Werth. Würtemberg at this time suffered fearfully under the burdens and devastations of the war. The limitless entangle-

ments of German relations at the time are alone a sufficient commentary upon the fact that the Duke of Würtemberg, in spite of his reconciliation with the Emperor, secretly supported the French, allowed them to make enlistments in his land, and received from them a pension of 6,000 francs. Guébriant was so weakened by his defeat that he was finally forced, closely pursued by Werth, to withdraw to the Rhine. After a few weeks' rest for the recovery of his energies, he roused himself up and moved, in face of the foe, to the Lech, with intent to carry the war into Bavaria. Mercy and Werth, however, hedged up his way, so that, after several unsuccessful manœuvres, he determined upon the siege of Rotweil, which place he had in vain attempted to take in the opening of the summer. On the 16th of November, 1643, the garrison was compelled to capitulate; Guébriant, however, who, during the siege, had had an arm shot to pieces, lost his life from an unskillful operation. Count Ranzau assumed, provisionally, the command. The Bavarians, in union with the imperialists and the Duke of Lorraine, marched to Tuttlingen to attack the French-Weimar army; and here, on the 24th of November, occurred a battle in which the enemy, not being prepared for the attack and quite off their guard, were completely annihilated. The slain numbered 2,000, the prisoners 6,000; much gold and silver was taken, and with this the amount in readiness for a month's pay of the troops.

Upon the Eastern war theatre there had been attained meanwhile, by the sacrificing spirit shown in the hereditary lands of Austria and by the Emperor's endeavors, such a state of the army, that Piccolomini, at the head of a force of 12,000, left Bohemia in February, 1643, and was able to prevent General Torstenson from taking Frei-

burg. The Swede withdrew then to Lusatia, whither the imperial general pursued him. The Emperor had now made important, but at the same time very unfortunate, provisions in regard to the chief command of his troops, and these may be regarded as the cause of the defeats which were now multiplied. He permitted Piccolomini to transfer his abilities to the service of Spain, and, in the place of Archduke Leopold William, who renounced the war service, appointed again, as commander-in-chief of his army, Count Gallas, who was justly named the "Army Corruptor."* According to the commander's plan of campaign, the imperial army under his command was to assume the offensive, while Hatzfeld was to operate upon the Weser, and Götz upon the Oder. Although Gallas commanded a stronger force than Torstenson, he was unable to prevent the latter's invasion of Bohemia. The Swede advanced before Prague, bombarded the city, marched then to Chrudim, where he offered battle to Gallas, who declined it, and then set out upon a march to Moravia, where he captured a few small cities, among them Kremsier and Tobitschau, but was at Ungrisch-Hradisch repulsed with considerable loss. While the Moravians were, by the Swedish hostilities, subjected to untold sufferings, and the imperialist troops too inflicted upon them the severest hardships, Gallas concluded with Torstenson a convention for the mutual exchange of prisoners, which is not without its interest, as showing the relative value then placed upon an officer and a private soldier. The lieutenant-general was valued at 15,000 ducats, the field-marshal at 10,000 thalers, the lieutenant-field-marshal at 3,000, general quartermaster at 2,000, the colonel at 1,000, the simple musketeer at 4, and the

* Heerverderber.

cavalry private at 8 thalers. Meanwhile a portion of Torstenson's men, under Wrangel's command, made their way as far as Brunn; afterwards Torstenson himself marched against this city, and as Gallas hastened to its relief, a battle seemed unavoidable. Suddenly, however, the Swedish general broke up his camp (September 8, 1643), and marched to Holstein.

The occasion of this retreat was the outbreak of a war between Denmark and Sweden. Christian IV. had finally given the reins to his long-standing jealousy of his Northern neighbor, and was negotiating with Poland and the Emperor in regard to an alliance preparatory for war. The secret of these negotiations was betrayed, and Sweden, by an understanding with France, had determined to anticipate the attack. Torstenson was called in haste to Holstein, and closed therefore an armistice with Gallas. This the Emperor ratified, but, when informed of the expedition of Torstenson against the King of Denmark, he directed Gallas to pursue the Swedes, and gave a similar order to Hatzfeld. Towards the end of the year 1643 Torstenson was in Holstein; Gallas did not enter upon the pursuit until the summer of 1644, marched into Kiel, and there formed a junction with a Danish corps. He showed, however, no inclination to measure strength with Torstenson, and the Danes therefore again left him. Gallas then learned that his antagonist designed to return to Silesia to renew the war in the lands of the Emperor, and he too determined upon a return. He was, however, entirely wanting in both sagacity and decision, was drunk every day, and never had control of his own mental actions. During his march he suffered great losses, and finally, in January (1645), with scarcely 2,000 men, reached Bohemia, whence he had gone forth with 22,000.

Almost equally disastrous was the fortune of the Spanish in the year 1643. The Duke d'Enghien was entrusted with the command of the troops which were to operate against the Spanish Netherlands, and achieved a brilliant victory on the 19th of May, at Rocroi, over Don Francesco Mello, which resulted in the almost entire destruction of the Spanish army. Enghien followed up his advantage, and invested Diedenhofen, which, after a siege of several weeks, fell into his hands. In Spain and Italy the hostile forces remained in nearly even balance. By sea, however, Admiral Brézé achieved near Carthage a complete victory (September 3d).

During the Danish campaign of Count Gallas, Ferdinand was obliged to confront a new enemy in Hungary. Prince George Rákóczy had, like Bethlen, perpetually stirred up a feeling in the Emperor's enemies and frequently given them hope of his aid. In doing this he might be sure of support in Hungary, since every Diet, and especially that of 1638, had stirred up new dissensions between the Catholics and the Protestants. At this last Diet, the Palatine, Eszterhazy, desired to resign his office, because its dignity had recently been greatly narrowed. The Estates, however, both Catholic and Protestant, took his part, and the Emperor could not do otherwise than request him to withdraw his resignation, and this, on account of Eszterhazy's great services, he did gladly. Ferdinand, in the autumn of 1642, summoned a new Diet for the sole purpose of receiving its advice as to the measures which he should take to repel the Swedish invasion; but when the Protestants insisted upon first bringing forward their religious grievances, he dissolved the Diet, and thus increased their hostile feeling. This favorable moment Rákóczy seized upon to strengthen his relations with France and Sweden.

When Torstenson, in June, 1642, had occupied Olmutz, he sent a messenger to say to him that he was inclined to take up arms against the Emperor in case France and Sweden would support him with money and men. In response to this offer, Torstenson sent two colonels to him, who agreed with him in regard to the draft of a treaty by which the possession of his dominion was guaranteed to him, the support of 3,000 infantry and yearly subsidies of 200,000 thalers for the first year and 150,000 thereafter were secured to him. In the ratification of this treaty, which did not take place until 1644, it was promised the Prince that if either he or his heirs should be expelled from the country, a yearly pension of 40,000 thalers should be paid them. The allies labored to procure for him a permission from the Sultan to carry on a war against the Emperor; as this, however, was not effected until the end of December, 1643, Rákóczy delayed the attack, which he would otherwise have entered upon before the ratification of the alliance. At a Diet, called at Weissenburg in January, 1644, he requested and received both money and troops, marched to Hungary, and summoned the inhabitants of the country, by a manifest (February 17, 1644)—employing the usual accusation that the Emperor did not respect their religious and political liberties—to arms against him. First streamed the infantry of the Sabol district to his standards, then the other districts also declared for him as he advanced, and these were followed by the cities of Kaschau, Eperies, and Leutschau, and soon also the cities of the Hungarian mountains.

Against this invasion of Rákóczy, Ferdinand opposed the troops which remained in Moravia and Silesia after Gallas's departure for Holstein. These were commanded by Götz and Puchheim, and numbered perhaps 20,000, to

which were added about 8,000 Hungarians under Eszterhazy. The greater experience of the German troops in war and their better discipline prevented Rákóczy from effecting anything, although he had 70,000 men under his command; indeed he was compelled, in the month of June, to withdraw beyond the Theiss, by which movement he surrendered the mountain cities, as also some others, a prey to the Emperor. A new attempt to advance was followed by another retreat, and thus the war ended in the Emperor's advantage, because he reconquered a considerable portion of the territory which had been taken from him. During the struggle Rákóczy offered peace, under conditions, however, which were unacceptable, and yet the Emperor entered into the negotiations. Meanwhile the contest still raged, and perhaps the Prince would have succumbed to the imperialists if Ferdinand had not recalled that portion of his forces which was under Götz's command. As the army of Gallas was nearly all lost in its return march from Holstein, and Torstenson was in pursuit, the Emperor was obliged at all hazards to think of the security of Bohemia and remove thither a part of his Hungarian forces. It was on this ground that he prosecuted the more earnestly the peace negotiations in Tyrnau, and in this he was so far supported by the Turkish government that the latter, at the urgent request of the imperial ambassador, withdrew the permission which it had given to the Prince of Transylvania to carry on the war.

II.

The Emperor had assigned to General Hatzfeld the duty of bringing together the fragments of Gallas's army and strengthening it by new enlistments. As the result

of these endeavors, the number of the troops rose, and was still further increased by the arrival of General Götz. When, in addition to this, Bavaria sent General Werth and Colonel Spork for the same purpose to Bohemia, thus increasing the army to about 16,000, there might be hope of being able to offer effective resistance to the enemy's force, which numbered but about 15,500 men. The Emperor himself went to Prague, that he might by his personal authority inflame the zeal of his subordinates. Torstenson, however, succeeded, in the presence of the imperial army, in marching from Eger, by way of Pilsen, on as far as Budweis, whence he intended to push his way into Austria, and perhaps to direct his march against Vienna. The imperialists under Götz pursued him in haste, and overtook him at Jankau, about ten miles from Tabor, whither he had marched to meet them. Here, on the 6th of March (1645), came on a battle, in which the imperialists sustained an entire defeat, the blame of which seems to have been chargeable in part to the fact that Generals Hatzfeld and Werth did not follow out the commands of their chief general. Only about 7,000 men of the combined army of Austria and Bavaria escaped; the rest were slain or captured. Götz was among the slain. The Emperor, on receiving the news of this fearful battle, retired by way of the Upper Palatinate to Regensburg, and thence into his German hereditary lands. From here he sent out calls to the Estates of all his dominions for new auxiliaries, and addressed a like request to Maximilian of Bavaria, offering him as a pledge of payment, in case he should concede that which was called for, a part of Silesia or Bohemia. Had it not been impossible for Maximilian, in view of the threatened attack upon him by France, to accept the offer made him, Bohemia would have suffered

a division. The Emperor even applied to the Pope for a subsidy. The Papal throne had meanwhile changed its occupant: on the 26th of July, 1644, Urban VIII. had died, and Innocent X., who was not unfriendly to the Hapsburgs, had succeeded him. A hope of success was therefore at this time cherished. It was, however, an illusion; the Pope would supply no money, to which determination he was moved as much by fear of France as by his own avarice. The Emperor was therefore thrown upon his own resources; and the result showed that these were sufficient, for he did not allow himself to be so outrageously plundered as his father had done.

Torstenson, after his victory at Jankau, marched into Moravia, and not, as was expected, into Upper Austria. He made conquest, without much effort, of most of the cities there, and finally reached Krems, which he also occupied, and extended his movements on the left bank of the Danube. The abuses, hardships, and plunderings which the inhabitants of this range had now to suffer were indeed frightful; but they no longer excited any sensation, for the people had become accustomed to such a lot. Torstenson drew near to Vienna, assaulted the Wolfschanze—a strong bridge-head on the Danube—and forced the garrison to surrender it (April 9, 1645), but could expect no further successes unless Rákóczy should join him. Vienna might then be threatened, as in the year 1619, only that it now no longer had its numerous burghers and disciplined troops with their marshal, Buquoi.

On the news of the battle of Jankau, Rákóczy hastened to break off his negotiations in Tyrnau and renew his alliance with Sweden and France (April 22, 1645). He now sent a few thousand mounted men under his son's command to Moravia, in order to relieve the fortress of



Olmütz, which was besieged by the imperialists, and then himself entered upon the march, in which he had the support of some troops sent on by Torstenson, under Douglas, by the aid of which he first took Tyrnau and then threatened Presburg. The Swedish general had meanwhile abandoned his designs upon Vienna, and given his first attention to the besieging of Brünn, in order, after having effected, as he hoped he should, the capture of this city, he might, in connection with Rákóczy, advance against Vienna. But Brünn was, by the imperial general, Desouches, with the warmest support of the burghers and students, brilliantly defended, and Torstenson suffered very considerable losses, which caused him to greet with joy the reinforcement brought him by Rákóczy's son. The Transylvanian Prince himself followed with the rest of his troops; but the days of the alliance with him were already numbered. The Sultan was irritated that Rákóczy paid so little attention to his repeated command to make peace with the Emperor; this he now renewed for the third time, and threatened the Prince with an invasion of Transylvania. Rákóczy now yielded, and concluded with the Archduke Leopold William—who had resumed the chief command, and advanced against him at the head of 15,000 men—a treaty of peace (August 8, 1645) on very favorable terms. In this were ceded to him the possession of seven Hungarian counties and large landed estates.

Notwithstanding this peace and Torstenson's being obliged to raise the siege of Brünn, he did not abandon his plan in regard to Austria, but advanced against Stockerau. As the Archduke, however, carefully guarded the right bank of the Danube, the Swedes could have attempted the passage of the river only at the cost of great losses.

When Leopold William then left Austria with a portion of his troops, in order to aid the Elector of Bavaria against the French, Torstenson also withdrew to Bohemia and thence further northward. The cities which he had seized in Moravia remained indeed in the hands of the Swedes, but Torstenson's plan for breaking up the imperial dominion came to naught.

Even before the Swedes retired to Bohemia and when Austria's threatened peril was not yet past, the Emperor lost one of his most tried and upright allies, the Elector of Saxony. John George had, in accordance with the terms of the peace of Prague, faithfully joined his arms with those of the Emperor, and contributed after the year 1635 more or less to their successes. The unfortunate course of the war, and especially the defeat at Jankau, in which some thousands of men whom he had sent to the Emperor's aid were lost, moved him to follow the example of the Elector of Brandenburg and come to a separate settlement with Sweden. On the 31st of August (1645) he notified the Emperor that he had been forced to conclude with the Swedes an armistice of six months. When we learn the terms of the arrangement, we perceive indeed that force must have been applied to him and that he yielded only to escape a worse fate. He was obliged to agree himself to hold his passes open to the Swedish troops, to supply them with grain, and, besides this, to pay 11,000 thalers monthly.

III.

Thus moved on the alternating events of the war in 1644 and 1645 in Austria. In the beginning of 1644 Maximilian of Bavaria directed his field-marshal, Baron

Mercy, to fortify his frontier on the side of Switzerland and to dissuade the Swiss, in the Emperor's name, from rendering aid to the French. Mercy first besieged the city of Uberlingen, which was held by the French, and on the 10th of May forced it to capitulate. During this siege there broke out among the garrison of Breisach a mutiny on account of their unpaid wages. The French marshal, Turenne, however, who now made his appearance on the German war theatre, entered Breisach with 10,000 fresh troops, and suppressed the mutiny. Mercy then invested Hohentwiel; but as the siege was likely to be tedious, he simply left a few troops for blockading the place, and appeared before Freiburg, which he forced on the 28th of June to a surrender. Turenne, who was at the time near, could not attack him because he felt too weak; but two days later, when Enghien joined him with 9,000 men, he advanced hastily over the Rhine and assaulted (August 2d) the Bavarians in their strongly fortified position at Uffhausen. The fighting was kept up for several days, and ended in the withdrawal of the French after they had sustained great losses.

Mercy then marched to Villingen, and afterwards to Heilbronn, where he formed, on the 6th of September, a junction with an imperial corps sent to his aid under Hatzfeld's command. Meanwhile Enghien occupied Philippsburg, and Turenne Worms. The latter now threatened Mentz. Mercy advanced in haste to relieve this city, and sent 700 mounted men ahead to aid the citizens in the defence. This regiment was not, however, admitted into the city. The Elector had fled, having conveyed the administration to the Cathedral Chapter, and they had agreed upon the terms of a surrender to the French. Thus this city passed into the hands of the Emperor's

enemies. Previous to this, Mannheim, Spire, and Oppenheim had capitulated. Mercy wrested Mannheim again out of their hands, as also several other places; but his further progress was prevented by the strengthening of the French army and the recall of Hatzfeld. Furthermore the Elector of Bavaria forbade his general the further descent of the Rhine to unite with the Spanish troops; he was only permitted, at most, to join the Duke of Lorraine, in case the latter might be inclined to assault Mentz.

When Gallas, at the end of 1644, entered upon that fatal return to Bohemia, Ferdinand applied to the Elector of Bavaria for aid, which was accordingly rendered by the sending of 5,000 men. But the instructions which Maximilian gave to his court chamberlain, Mändl, whom he sent to Vienna, showed that the strain upon his endurance had nearly reached the limit of its tension. He urged the Emperor to conclude a peace, and declared that he would hold out no longer unless the Emperor would assume a portion of the support of the Bavarian army. Maximilian saw himself in extreme danger. If the enemy invaded his possessions, as Gustavus Adolphus had done in 1631, such was the exhaustion of his own means and those of his imperial lord, that he could no longer hope to defend himself; he was deliberating whether he could not better secure himself by a separate settlement with the French. They were ever ready to come to his aid and protect him in the electoral dignity, if he would but give up the Emperor, and thus make it easier for them to keep possession of Alsace. The Elector may be charged with a want of patriotism for being willing to abandon the Emperor and the Empire in his anxiety for his own existence. He did, however, only

what all other Princes did ; he acted at least openly, and would yield only to superior power.

Ferdinand gave at the time nothing beyond empty assurances, and on these Maximilian was obliged to defend himself against Turenne in the campaign of the following year, which the latter pursued with the greater earnestness when he heard of the imperial defeat at Jankau. Mercy at first retired, in order to form a union at Nördlingen with Werth, who was hastening forward to meet him ; he then moved against the enemy, who was encamped at Mergentheim. In a council of war he asked the higher officers whether he should attack the enemy—received an affirmative answer, and made the assault. Turenne was unprepared ; he had yet to gather his scattered regiments, and the result was that Mercy achieved (May 5th), with the help of the unequalled Werth, a brilliant victory. The armies numbered each about 10,000 men ; only 1,500 mounted men of the French, with Turenne at their head, escaped. More than a fourth part of the army were taken prisoners, great numbers were slain or wounded, and the rest were dispersed. Turenne alarmed the Landgravine Amalie by marching to Lower Hesse and demanding aid from the Swedish general, Königsmark. This victory had the good result for the Emperor that Maximilian gave up the thought of abandoning him.

Turenne meanwhile united with the Hessian troops and with Königsmark, and advanced to meet Mercy, who was pursuing him, and to whose force 5,000 imperial troops, under General Geleen, were to be joined. As Enghien had also brought his fresh troops into union with the French marshal, he now commanded about 24,000 men, and was still, after Königsmark left him, superior to

the Bavarian general. Trusting to his greater force and his military talent, notwithstanding the heavy blow which this had received at Mergentheim, he assaulted his antagonist at Allerheim, near Nördlingen, on the 3d of August, 1645. The French army was commanded by Turenne, Enghien, and the Duke of Grammont; the German, by Mercy, Werth, and Geleen. In the beginning the battle was not favorable to the French. Enghien's relentless obstinacy cost thousands of lives to no purpose. The Germans, however, sustained a severe loss, as a musket-ball pierced Mercy and laid him lifeless; thus the army's unity of command was broken. Exasperated by the death of the esteemed leader, Werth rushed with his usual impetuosity upon the right wing of the French and routed it; but this success was more than balanced by the defeat of the German right wing. Here the regiments of Hesse and Weimar had executed a brilliant assault, which resulted in the loss of the battle for the Germans. Werth retreated in tolerable order to Donauwerth with what was left of the army.

The French had suffered considerable losses, indeed nearly as great as had their antagonists, and were therefore able to make but small use of their victory; they could only occupy a few cities. Enghien went to Paris on account of illness; Turenne withdrew in the beginning of October to the Rhine, because he learned that the Emperor designed to send a portion of his troops to the aid of the Bavarians; indeed the Archduke Leopold William was advancing along the Danube upward to Bavaria. Geleen, who was appointed in Mercy's place to the chief command, after his union with the Archduke and Gallas with their 5,300 men, pursued the French, but was unable to overtake them, as he had hoped to do, be-

fore their passage of the Neckar. Thus the French gained an unassailable position between the Rhine and Philipsburg. The Hessians, who had covered the retreat of the French army to Philipsburg, here separated from them and returned home. The Landgravine now employed these men in the execution of a long-cherished plan. In the so-called contest of the Marburg inheritance, which her husband's father had instituted against Margrave Lewis of Hesse Darmstadt, the Emperor had, in the Diet of Regensburg, in 1623, decided in the Margrave's favor. The Swedes had given her permission to seize upon the lands which had been taken from her father-in-law, and she therefore sent her troops to besiege Marburg. She designed, not merely the conquest of this place, but the occupation of the whole territory which belonged to Hesse Darmstadt, and she had in this plan the concurrence of Sweden.

IV.

The rigor of the winter of 1645-1646 did not prevent the belligerents in Bohemia and the adjacent lands from an early opening of the campaign. The Swedes increased their army in Bohemia to about 20,000; it was commanded by Gustavus Wrangel. When the Emperor had obtained the desired aid of the Elector of Bavaria, his force was superior to that of the Swedes, and Wrangel was under the necessity of withdrawing in February from Bohemia. Then Leopold William also withdrew with the imperial troops, and occupied the section between Hof and Baireuth. Meanwhile the Emperor endeavored to win back the Elector of Saxony, to whom he sent

Prince Lobkowitz, a son of the former chancellor of Bohemia, for the purpose of persuading him to give notice to the Swedes of his desire to terminate his armistice with them. The Elector was indeed inclined to affirm this request and join the Emperor again; he did not, however, do this, because his council, and especially his wife, urgently dissuaded him from this measure, and he went with a heavy heart to renew the armistice with Sweden when the time of its stipulated termination arrived. At a later day the Emperor repeated the attempt with the Elector, and this seemed to be tending to a happy issue, when the unfortunate turn taken by the war again alarmed the Elector.

Meanwhile Wrangel had continued his retreat. He passed the Saale, seized Paderborn, and showed a desire to proceed to the Rhine that he might there extend a helping hand to Turenne, who, after his withdrawal to Philipsburg, was domineering on the Middle Rhine. The Archduke pursued General Wrangel, while the Swedish general, Wittenberg, attempted, by an expedition to Silesia, to bring about a division of his forces. This purpose was not gained, because the places garrisoned by the Swedes in Lower Austria and Bohemia had already been taken by the imperialists there, who could now be sent to defend Silesia against Wittenberg. The Archduke marched to Hesse, in order to aid the Landgrave of Darmstadt against the Landgravine of Cassel, and in this march came very near the Swedish camp at Homburg, on the Ohm. There was brought on, however, only a cavalry engagement, as the Archduke hastily withdrew on account of a want of provisions. Turenne and Wrangel could now form a junction without opposition, which they did in the beginning of August. They outnumbered, at this

time, by 10,000, the united Austrians and Bavarians; and regardless of the latter, who were encamped on the Ridda, the French and Swedes advanced in divided columns towards Bavaria, in order, by laying waste this land, to force the Elector to conclude an armistice and abandon the Emperor. The Archduke guessed the enemy's purpose, marched in pursuit, but took a circuitous route, and arrived upon the Danube too late to prevent them from occupying Lauingen and Donauwerth.

Maximilian took the necessary measures for the defence of his land, and also warned the city of Augsburg to enter into no neutrality negotiations with the enemy. In fact the Catholic and Protestant citizens united with equal bravery in the defence of the city when it was besieged by the French and Swedes. Finally, the Archduke, on the 12th of October, came on with 30,000 men to the relief, and thus forced the enemy to raise the siege and withdraw towards the Danube. Bavaria was not long spared; they again advanced over the Lech and wasted the land with fire and sword, while the Archduke could not cross the river because they so strongly guarded the fords. When he finally, however, succeeded, the autumn was too far advanced for the greater operations of war. Moreover, he was just at this time called to Vienna, and left Gallas in chief command. In Spain the Infante Balthazar, the only son of Philip IV., and heir to his throne, died on the 9th of October, 1646, and the Emperor deemed it proper to counsel with his brother as to what he ought to do in case the Spanish royal house should become extinct. The Emperor's wife, the Spanish Princess Mary, had also died in May of the same year, and we may add here that after a widowhood of two years he married a daughter of the deceased Archduke Leopold of Tyrol.

Wrangel took advantage of the confusion caused by the departure of Leopold William, whose representative, Gallas, was not at the time at his place, and instituted a marauding expedition against Bregenz, in which place the nobility and abbots of Upper Swabia had taken refuge with their treasures. He took this city on the 4th of January, 1647, and secured as booty all the valuables which were found there, including cannon, munitions, ships, provisions, and precious treasures, amounting, as was supposed, to four million florins. The Elector of Treves, whom the Emperor had in 1645 set free because the French had made this a chief condition of the opening of peace negotiations, and who, when released, had pledged himself to be loyal, had already several times begun treasonable transactions with the French, and now, during this and the following year, openly continued these by surrendering to them several more of his fortified places.

V.

Cardinal Mazarin desired Turenne to make an incursion into Bavaria, chiefly for the purpose of forcing the Elector to conclude an armistice and leave the Emperor in complete isolation. The frightful sufferings to which the land was exposed so depressed the spirit of Maximilian that he no longer repelled the thought of a separation of his destiny from that of the Emperor, but called his privy council to Wasserburg, whither he had fled from Munich, and demanded their official advice as to his future course. The majority advised negotiations with France, and even his wife, the Emperor's sister, who was present at the council,

expressed herself in this sense. On the other hand, one of the Bavarian ambassadors at Münster, probably Haslang, sent a letter expressly cautioning the Elector against any connection with France, and encouraging him to persevere in his fidelity to the Empire. The Elector did not give due heed to this warning, and determined to treat separately with the French, both in his own behalf and in that of Franconia and Swabia. The business was to begin at Ulm the middle of January, 1647, where appeared not only the Bavarian ambassadors and those of the Circles named above, but also two Austrian commissioners, who, under instructions from the imperial ambassador in Münster, Count Trautmansdorff, were to propose a general armistice. In February arrived the French ambassadors, Tracy and Marsilly, and the business was opened by a proposition from the representatives of Bavaria, Kittner and Schäffer, that the armistice be extended also to Austria, in which, however, they were not supported by the envoys of Austria, who were unwilling that a peace should be concluded between France and Austria unless Spain should also be included in it, and who would not therefore promise a complete neutrality in any further contest between the belligerents. On the 15th of March the terms of a cessation of arms were agreed upon, by which Bavaria surrendered Heilbronn to the French, and Memmingen and Uberlingen to the Swedes, to be held until the conclusion of peace, and the arms were to rest in Bavaria, Swabia, and Franconia. In this armistice was included also the Elector of Cologne, Maximilian's brother.

The Emperor had, as early as the end of the year 1646, fearing that Maximilian would desert him, authorized Count Gallas to effect the transfer of the Bavarian army

to the imperial service, and had addressed to the most eminent generals, Rauschenberg and John Werth, special letters, in which he invited them to enter his service. His design was to prevent the French from securing, whether with or without the Elector's consent, these troops, as they had done in the case of Bernard of Weimar. This apprehension was not without its grounds; if Maximilian, for economy's sake, should discharge a part of his troops, it would be easy for the French to draw to themselves these discharged men by the offer of better pay.

Maximilian played into the Emperor's hands by appointing Count Gronsfeld to the command of his army in place of Field-Marshal Geleen, whom he relieved from duty, and thus offended Generals Rauschenberg and Werth, who had entertained hopes of the place. The imperial ambassador in Munich, Count Khevenhiller, indicated indeed the wrong which the Elector had done the Emperor. In an audience granted him, he not only bitterly criticised the armistice, but declared that the Emperor knew how to secure the services of the Elector's troops, and was not indebted to the offer which the latter made when he discharged them. Ferdinand III. set up thus his claim to the sole right of control over the united army of Bavaria and Austria; he had without reserve given utterance to the same view as early as the year 1640, expressly declaring in a mandate which he sent at that time to the Bavarian officers, that the army placed under the command of the Bavarian Elector "belonged wholly and absolutely to him" (Ferdinand). The Emperor's right to assume control of the Bavarian army cannot indeed be denied; nor can it, on the other hand, be denied that the course which he pursued to this end was want-

ing in the element of loyalty to the rights of one of the Estates.

Meanwhile Werth had personally assured the Elector of his fidelity, and had then gone to Landshut for the purpose, in accordance with his sovereign's command, of informing the officers summoned thither as to his future course. When he reached Landshut, however, he directed the colonels of all the cavalry regiments to march to Vilshofen, and caused the same order also to be issued to the colonels of the foot regiments. His hope was to enter upon the march to Bohemia, and there to effect a junction with the imperial army. But the whole plan was wrecked in its inception. The colonels found out what the design was, and refused obedience; nor were the soldiers any more willing to enter a service so poorly paid as that of the Emperor. Werth was compelled, in company with the general quartermaster, Spork, to fly for his own safety, and was glad to escape with his life. Instead of an army of 20,000 men, these two cavalry leaders arrived alone in Bohemia, but had, nevertheless, a splendid reception by the Emperor, and were advanced to the most honorable positions. The failure of the plan caused great bitterness between the courts of Vienna and Munich. Maximilian reproached the Emperor with ingratitude; the latter asserted his right to the Bavarian army.

VI.

Maximilian's withdrawal from the Emperor affected the latter less painfully, because Spain, which had been fighting France with varying fortune since 1645, concluded, in the beginning of 1647, an armistice with Hol-

land, and showed itself inclined to acknowledge the independence of the latter country, and thus became free to turn all its strength against France. The loss of Holland's aid compelled Mazarin to recall the French soldiers from Germany to the French frontiers, so that the Emperor had only the Swedes to fear. His troops in Bohemia, now commanded by Melander of Holzapfel—Gallas had died in April, 1647—were raised to 25,000 men, and the Emperor placed himself at their head and advanced for the relief of Eger, which city was besieged by the Swedes. But he arrived too late, and was obliged, through want of provisions, to withdraw, although his army exceeded that of Wrangel in the number of its men. Wrangel pursued the retreating imperialists, and a severe engagement took place at Triebel between them and a division of the Swedes, in which the latter suffered considerable losses (August 25, 1647). The Swedish general was himself now intent upon making an assault; but the imperialists retired before him, and, as he was too weak to force his way further into Bohemia, he waited impatiently for the return of General Königsmark, whom he had sent in the beginning of the year to Westphalia. He retired at first to Tepl, to which place the imperialists pursued him (September 13, 1647), and then left Bohemia on receiving the news that the Elector of Bavaria had given notice of the close of the armistice, had again joined the Emperor, and sent 10,000 men to Bohemia. The imperialists, led by Holzapfel, and the Bavarians, by Gronsfeld, advanced to Zwickau, and were inclined there to offer battle. A battle was, however, not brought on, because the leaders could not agree as to its plan. The campaign of 1647 might have had for the Emperor a brilliant conclusion if Holzapfel and Gronsfeld had thrown themselves energetically



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upon Wrangel, for the Swedes were so reduced by the hardships of the war and by their losses that they might have been driven back to the Baltic. Instead of this, Holzapfel marched to Lower Hesse, in order, as General Montecuculi maintained, to force from the Landgravine of Hesse Cassel the payment of her arrears to him. It should not, however, be overlooked that Holzapfel acted, in his expedition to Lower Hesse, in response to an urgent appeal of the Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, and that he would not have been supported by Gronsfeld in the pursuit of the Swedes, because Maximilian had forbidden the latter to accompany the imperialists beyond the Weser.

We must now explain what it was that moved the Elector of Bavaria to notify the French and Swedes of the termination of the armistice concluded at Ulm. The relations between him and the Emperor had, after the planning of the conspiracy by Werth, become unpleasant; but the old regard for the Hapsburgs was not thereby extinguished in his heart; and his wife, too, doubtless exercised a specially moderating influence over him. Moreover, he was irritated by the dogmatic and disrespectful course pursued at the Congress of Osnabrück by the Swedish envoys, who paid no regard to his, or the Catholic, interests; and he was further tormented by his concern lest the Emperor should settle the matter of the Palatinate to his disadvantage. All this contributed to prepare the way of Count Khevenhiller, who sought untiringly to reunite the broken thread of his relations with the Emperor. The declaration also of a servant of tried and unsuspected fidelity, the old chancellor, Dr. Richel, had great weight. Richel declared that Bavaria could not remain neutral, but must join either the Emperor or the

French and the Swedes; if it did the latter, then Germany, Austria, and the Catholic religion would in these lands be destroyed, and the Elector would be covered with everlasting shame. A letter from the Catholic Imperial Estates in Münster finally determined his position. In this it was urged upon Maximilian's conscience as a duty that he again attach himself to the Emperor's cause. He determined, therefore, and now nearly all his council and his wife advised him in this sense, to renew the contest with the Swedes, and to treat with the Emperor as to the terms of a renewed alliance. The matter was settled in Passau on the 2d of September, and it was provided that the Emperor should furnish the Elector with a monthly subsidy of 21,000 florins, and pay 300,000 florins as an indemnity for the damage done by the soldiers in consequence of Werth's mutiny. Maximilian then notified the French and the Swedes of the close of the armistice. In Paris, however, he let it be known that he would still maintain the cessation of arms with France if the latter would withdraw its troops from the Swedes. It scarcely needs to be mentioned that the French replied by a notice of the termination of the truce.

By the union of Bavaria with the Emperor, the issue of the campaign of 1647 was rendered on the whole favorable. Whether things would, in the following year, turn out still better depended upon the procuring of the needed money.

There could be no more dependence placed upon Spanish aid. Philip IV. was suffering from a new and severe calamity. In the spring of 1647 he had successfully defended himself against the Duke d'Enghien, who, on the death of his father, which occurred a few months before, had assumed the title of a Prince of Condé. He

had forced Condé to withdraw from the siege of Lerida, and there was then hope in Spain of rising above all difficulties; an insurrection, however, which first broke out in Sicily, and then in Naples, extinguished this hope. The fisherman, Masaniello, who had led the Neapolitan movement through to victory (July 7, 1647), was, indeed, assassinated a few days later; but this only led to a fearful anarchy, of which the Prince of Guise sought to take advantage, causing himself to be chosen by the Neapolitans as their Duke. Mazarin at first favored his attempt, but was unwilling to convey to him the dominion of Naples, because he desired to secure this for the brother or uncle of Louis XIV. Mazarin did not therefore render the Duke an adequate support, and thus made it possible for the Spaniards to sow discord among the Neapolitans and organize a counter-revolution, as the issue of which Naples fell back into their hands, and the insurrection was ended. In these events lay the reason that in the beginning of 1648 the Emperor could not count upon any aid from Spain.

VII.

Holzapfel was wounded at Marburg, and the Emperor conveyed the chief command (January 14, 1648) to General Lamboy; but the latter soon after gave it up again into the hands of his predecessor, who had recovered from his wound. The Swedes had united with the French under Turenne, and thus forced the imperialists and Bavarians to retreat. Between the leaders, Holzapfel and Gronsfeld, there was unceasing contention as to the direction which the retreat should take—the former

desiring to cover Bohemia, the latter Bavaria. They were, however, obliged to continue retreating until they reached the Danube, and then to pass this river. On the Lech, between Rain and Landsberg, they finally made a stand, and the enemy advanced against them from Donauwerth. Their fighting men numbered 38,000; the women, children, and baggage-men which followed the camp rose to the astonishing number of 127,000 human beings, who, like hungry wolves, fell upon, plundered, and exhausted the lands through which the army marched. On the 17th of May a battle was brought on between the Austrians—who, in the meantime, had taken their station at Zusmarshausen—and the Swedes, the latter supported by the French. The slaughter was great, and Holzapfel was mortally wounded; whereupon Montecuculi assumed the command. It was not till after this that the Bavarians came to the aid of the Austrians, who, meanwhile, had lost their baggage and their money-chests. Montecuculi accomplished wonders of valor, and his men too fought equally well; but Gronsfield, who now took the command of the two armies, would not risk the continuance of the battle, but withdrew to Augsburg. When the Emperor received intelligence of the losses at Zusmarshausen, he recalled Piccolomini—who had meanwhile been made Duke of Amalfi—from the Spanish service, and made him commander-in-chief of his army.

The united forces of the Emperor and Bavaria remained a few days in Augsburg, in the hope of preventing the enemy's passage of the Lech. Gronsfield, however, despaired of this, and determined to retire to Ingolstadt, and limit himself to the defence of the Isar. The Elector, in a letter to the Emperor, imputed the blame of this retreat, and the consequent abandonment of the

defence of Munich, to the cowardice of several imperialist colonels. Bavaria was fearfully devastated by the Swedes on account of the notice which had been given of the close of the armistice; the French behaved with greater mildness. In Prague, where the Emperor then was, it was feared that the Elector would again conclude an armistice, and Ferdinand therefore sent him a sum of money for the support of his troops. Meanwhile the two generals abandoned their plan for the defence of the Isar, because the water was so low that the enemy would have no difficulty in crossing it, and retired to Braunau on the Inn. When, on the 4th of June, this further retreat was entered upon, Gronsfeld was arrested by command of Maximilian, who blamed this general chiefly for these sad results, and General Enkevort was put in his place. On the 9th of June, Piccolomini arrived, and was jubilantly greeted by the men. Maximilian left his residence, and went first to Wasserburg, afterwards to Braunau, and finally to Salzburg, having been driven from Braunau by an insurrection of the peasants there.

The French and Swedes followed their antagonists, and made attempts, both at Wasserburg and Mühldorf, to pass the Inn, but were prevented by Piccolomini, who bravely supported the peasantry. Wrangel and Turenne were obliged to retreat over the Isar, and now the imperialists pursued them in return. The two armies stood over against each other at Mamming almost the entire month of August, until the failure of provisions forced Prince Piccolomini to pass the river, for the purpose of assaulting the enemy, or at least of cutting off his supplies. The latter, however, retreated by way of Landshut to Erding, which place he reduced to ashes, after having there committed deeds so shameful as to

have awakened in that degenerate time a general sensation of horror. He then proceeded to Munich, which he blockaded. Piccolomini followed him but tardily. At Feldmoching, Generals Enkevort and Werth succeeded in surprising Marshal Wrangel, slaying several hundred mounted men and capturing large booty. Nothing decisive was, however, effected, although the enemy now continued his retreat as far as the Lech. This was, however, but a feint, for he suddenly crossed the Altmühl, entered the Upper Palatinate, and thus betrayed his purpose to advance into Bohemia and join Königsmark. Piccolomini was in pursuit of them, when, in the beginning of November, a courier brought him the news that peace had been concluded on the 24th of October at Münster. Thus ended the war on this theatre.

While Wrangel, in the month of May, was carrying on his operations against the imperial army, General Königsmark separated from him, and moved at the head of 4,000 mounted men, by way of the Upper Palatinate, to Bohemia. He there occupied the cities of Taus, Klattau, Schützenhofen, and Bischofsteinitz, gave them up to plunder, and prepared afterwards the same fate for other places, especially Falkenau. These successes were possible only because the imperialists under Piccolomini were upon the Inn. The peril for the Emperor increased when the Palsgrave, Charles Gustavus, with 4,000 men and 20 cannon, advanced to Bohemia, and when, finally, also General Wittenberg came on with a corps from Silesia. Königsmark, by an understanding with the Palsgrave, determined to assault Prague, and employed for this purpose the counsels and directions of one Ottowalsky, who had been a lieutenant-colonel in the imperial army, and now offered himself for this service. He advised Königsmark to make an

attack upon the Hradschin, though it is doubtful whether this would have been successful but for the aid of a stratagem. The commandment of the imperialist troops in Prague, Count Colleredo, had sent out 200 mounted men to meet the enemy and bring intelligence of their strength and the direction of their march. These cavalry men fell every one into Königsmark's hands, and he would only promise to spare their lives upon condition of their betraying to him the watchword which should open to them the gates of the city. With some of these he now sent on in advance 300 of his own cavalry under Ottowalsky's command, who, in the night of the 26th of July arrived at the Staubgate, and by the use of the watchword were admitted into the city. They took possession of the gate, and thus opened the way to Königsmark's men, who closely followed them into the Hradschin. This success was completed by the occupation of the Kleinseite. There was in Prague so little preparation for the assault, that the Swedes had only to meet the opposition of a few sentinels in capturing in their palaces the most prominent dignitaries, among whom were Cardinal Harrach and Chief Burggrave Martinitz. The commandant of the garrison, Count Colleredo, would also have fallen into their hands if he had not saved himself from capture by a hasty flight. An imperial ensign brought to the Old City the first news of the entry of the Swedes, and the inhabitants, thus alarmed, took defensive measures, for which they secured the needed time by closing the bridge. Colleredo sent by couriers to the nearest imperial troops, calling them to the defence of Prague, which call was answered by General Buchheim at the head of 3,500 men as soon as possible. The inhabitants with the greatest devotion took part in the defence; the students of the

University, under the lead of a Jesuit father, vied with the soldiers both in persistence and intrepidity. Indeed 200 monks even took upon themselves the holding of a somewhat perilous post. Lieutenant-Colonel Conti conducted with much skill the work on the fortifications, kept the failing ammunition replenished, had the tower-bell cast into cannon, and in this way that part of Prague which lies on the right bank of the Moldau repelled for the time the attacks of the Swedes. Afterwards, however, Wittenberg's corps, which had joined Königsmark at Prague, assaulted from Gallows-Hill the New City on the right bank of the river. As Wittenberg did not immediately attain his end, he retired from Prague, and directed his action against Tabor, and this city, with the riches of many noblemen and burghers, which had been sent thither for safety, fell into his hands. On the 19th of September he resumed his march towards Linz with the design of moving the peasants of Austria to an insurrection; but when his plan failed, he did not dare press forward by way of Krumau, because the Emperor had, by various precautions and by the call of a small force from Piccolomini's command, provided adequately for the defence of Upper Austria.

Meanwhile the Palsgrave, Charles Gustavus, arrived (October 3d) at Prague, and the Swedes armed for an energetic assault, in which Wittenberg, who had returned with his corps, also took part. They advanced to the city walls; but as the people of Prague still continued successfully to defend themselves, Charles Gustavus began to negotiate with them, offering them the best terms if they would but surrender. His offer was repelled; he attempted, on the 25th of October, to storm the city, and forced his way through a breach which had been made in

the walls; but the besieged defended themselves with desperation, and contested step by step the ground, showing a heroism of so true a type that the Swedes were at last compelled, with great loss, to withdraw. The assaults were not again renewed with equal energy on the following days, and on the 3d of November came the news of the Peace of Westphalia, and all peril to the city was past. During the siege the Swedes had lost 5,000 men; the losses of Prague and its garrison did not exceed 700. The Swedes had signalized their presence in Bohemia not only by the plundering of the land, but also by the sack of the section of the city which they occupied. The most noted piece of booty which they carried thence was the precious Gothic translation of the Four Evangelists, by Bishop Ulfilas.

Thus the Thirty Years' War closed in the same city where an unfortunate act had supplied, not, indeed, the real cause of its beginning—for a thousand other circumstances had called into belligerent action the religious parties—but yet its immediate occasion. Sufferings not to be measured had reached their termination; the numbers who in the course of this war perished by the sword and other violent means, with those who fell a prey to hunger and want, mount up to the millions. In many sections scarce a third of the original numbers of the people were to be found; everywhere they were reduced by at least the half, and numerous cities had scarcely a sixth of their former population, while some were in utter desertion.

CHAPTER X.

THE WESTPHALIAN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

- I. The Frankfort Diet of Deputies. The Opening of the Congress at Münster and Osnabrück. II. Beginning of the Business Proper on June 11, 1646. Demands of the French and Swedes. Trautmansdorff's Activity. III. Draft of a Treaty between the Emperor and France. Deliberations in regard to the several Points of the Draft. IV. Signing of the Peace: its Contents. V. The Carrying-out of its Determinations.

I.

THE Imperial Diet at Regensburg had determined that on the 1st of May, 1642, a Diet of Deputies should assemble at Frankfort-on-the-Main. This meeting was delayed until the following year. The deliberations turned first upon the conditions of peace, and then passed over to the amnesty, a few voices being raised in favor of one so general that even the Palsgrave's children should be fully restored. Thomas Rowe, the English ambassador at the imperial court, demanded, in a note which he handed in at Frankfort, their complete restoration, and charged the Elector of Bavaria with thwarting, by his stubbornness, all adjustment. It became then generally known that the Emperor had offered King Charles of England the restoration of his nephews if he would reimburse the Elector of Bavaria the millions for which the Upper Palatinate and the electoral dignity had been given him. Irritated by this statement, Maximilian declared that he would re-

nounce both if the sum were paid him. But as neither Charles, nor the Emperor, nor the Palsgrave either would or could pay the money, the matter remained as it was, although even at this time some Protestant voices were raised for the full restoration, though without any thought of indemnifying Maximilian.

In the further deliberations the deputies of the Princes and the city councils demanded that they, as well as the Electors, should be admitted to the peace negotiations; to this the Electors would not consent, on account of the necessity of observing secrecy. Not until after it was determined that the religious grievances should not be discussed in Münster and Osnabrück, but be taken up six months after the conclusion of peace, would the Electors, and especially Maximilian, yield to the desire of the Princes and city councils. This Diet, which came together in 1643, was further continued also in 1644 and 1645. Its transactions related to judicial reform, and especially to the imperial chamber and the increase of the salaries of its justices and who should pay them. The introduction also of a new calendar was taken up, which Bavaria specially favored; but the Protestants had all sorts of objections against this Papal innovation, and the subject was therefore allowed to drop, and in mixed districts double holidays would have to be observed as before. The further transactions related to the imperial court council, to which the Protestants raised the objection that it was subject to the Emperor and still interfered in the settlement of religious grievances. They demanded, therefore, that it be deprived of jurisdiction in religious questions until it should be constituted equitably for the parties—that is, half of Catholics and half of Protestants. The representatives of the Catholic Electors voted with the Protest-

ants for the admission of Protestants into the imperial council, and so respected the wishes of the latter. Finally, this Diet raised the question; whether it would not be more suitable to transfer its sessions to Münster and Osnabrück. The Council of the Princes decided in favor of this course; the electoral envoys proposed a dissolution of the Diet, and the decision was left to the Emperor. Ferdinand declared himself for the transfer in case the Diet would conduct its deliberations in concurrence with the imperial ambassadors and refrain from all immediate intercourse with foreign powers. In pursuance of this decision, the Diet of Deputies, as such, was dissolved in the spring of 1645, and continued its action only in the peace negotiations.

The opening of the peace negotiations between the Emperor and his enemies was, as already stated, fixed for the 25th of March, 1642, and the cities of Münster and Osnabrück as the places of the sitting; but neither in this year nor in the next did it take place. It was not until the year 1644 that in the former of these cities the following assembled: The Papal Nuncio, Chigi, and the envoy of the Republic of Venice, which two were to act as mediators between the contending parties, and thus facilitate the work of pacification; as imperial ambassadors, the Count of Nassau and Dr. Volmar; as representatives of France, Counts Avaux and Servien; as plenipotentiaries of Spain, Savedra, Zapata, and Lebrun; then the Catholic Electors, and later also the Catholic Princes. In Osnabrück appeared, in the name of Sweden, John Oxenstiern, son of the Chancellor, and Salvius; in behalf of France, Baron de Rorté, after him M. de la Barde, and still later M. de la Cour; then the representatives of the several Electors; and, finally, were represented the council of the

German Princes and the imperial cities. The first utterances on both sides related to the troublesome subject of etiquette. The first contest was over the question whether, in meetings of the whole, the precedence belonged to Spain, and what marks of honor were due to the representatives of the several powers. Count Avaux claimed, immediately after his arrival in Münster, the precedence over Spain; and when he desired to go forth in company with the other envoys to meet the Nuncio, whose arrival was expected, he caused himself to be attended by twenty armed noblemen, that he might remove the Spaniards by force in case they should not concede to him the precedence. The result was that the Spaniards, who were unwilling either to stand behind the French, or to impede the pacification, always endeavored to avoid meetings with their competitors for the precedence, and when accident brought them together, immediately withdrew.

Now began the strife between the representatives of the chief powers as to the ecclesiastical seats. The Nuncio was not satisfied with simply sitting at the head of all the envoys; he desired that his place should be distinguished by a canopy. The imperial envoys wished their seats to stand before those of the French; the latter, however, would not tolerate any distinction between the two, but demanded that their seats should stand in one and the same line, and on this condition were willing to concede to the Nuncio the first and to the chief imperial envoy the second rank. This point having been settled in the sense of the French, a tedious contest had to be fought through against the claims of the minor powers in regard to the ceremonies to be observed in their reception. The Venetian envoy demanded that the French ambassadors, in case of his visiting them, should, on his withdrawal, attend

him, not merely to the last step of the stairs, but to his carriage; whereas Avaux was willing only to accompany him half-way down the stairs. As the imperial envoys, however, showed him of Venice the required civility, the French were also obliged to do the same.

Scarcely had the Venetian ambassador obtained his demand for the same honor which was shown to the great powers in case of visits, when the envoys of the Independent Netherlands demanded also this consideration, and the French, though they did this with increasing displeasure, were obliged to yield. Now came up the question of titles. The envoys of the great powers were addressed as "Excellency," which title was given also to the Venetian ambassador. The envoys of the Netherlands now demanded the same, and their example was followed by those of the Electors. In the end all these demands had to be conceded, because the Emperor and the King of France were in a kind of contest with each other, in which, after a little resistance, they hastened to give way to the smaller powers in order that they might the better control their inclinations. John George of Saxony alone felt a pride in adhering to the old system of titles, and forbade his representatives the use of the new title. Still other contests relating to ceremony were either settled at Münster and Osnabrück, or their decision, to the great offence always of one of the contestants, adjourned. The reader will be able from these hints to make out a picture of the diplomatic intercourse of that day.

Before the settlement of these questions of etiquette the peace negotiations proper had been opened, and their progress was only delayed when the tempers of individual Princes were embittered by wounds inflicted upon their vanity. Soon after Avaux's arrival in Münster, the

Nuncio came, and communicated to him the instructions of the imperial envoys, and demanded his. As Avaux, however, did not design to open the deliberations until his colleague, Servien, should arrive, he for the time refused this demand. When Servien came, the imperialists and French exchanged their letters of authorization; while the Spanish, on the contrary, hesitated, and particularly on account of the title of Navarre, which the Spanish King had used. The days followed along in succession without results, and the French relieved their irksomeness by renewing the discussion of those questions of etiquette which have been mentioned. In a meeting which was to take place with the Swedes, they desired to concede to Oxenstiern a full equality of rank, demanding only that the Swedes should begin by making the first visit, while Oxenstiern wished this to be determined by lot. It was finally decided that the French and Swedes should greet each other at a point between Münster and Osnabrück, that the Swedes should arrive first on the ground, and the French, on the other hand, make the first visit.

The French envoys, in their reports to Cardinal Mazarin, repeatedly referred to the significance of Maximilian of Bavaria, and the necessity of endeavoring to win him at whatever price to the interests of France. Mazarin recognized the justness of this estimate, and authorized his envoys to propose the erection of two new Electorates: that for the Palatinate—which was therefore to be stripped of its ancient electoral dignity—and that for the Archbishopric of Salzburg.

II.

When months had passed by and no advance step in the direction of peace could be taken, because the French envoys objected to the form of the Spanish instructions, and consequently delayed to bring forward their demands, the Nuncio, Chigi, finally lost his patience, because he did not think that this pretext in regard to Spain ought to stand in the way of entering at least upon the transactions with the Emperor. Pressed by him, Avaux, in the beginning of March, 1645, handed in his propositions; but they were so general as to make it but too clear that they were designed only to protract the negotiations. It was not until the 11th of June that the French envoys handed in at Münster their demands in detail. The Duke of Longueville was added the following month to the representatives of France in Münster. The Swedes at the same time presented their demands in Osnabrück. The French propositions were these: The Emperor should proclaim a general amnesty and restore everything to the condition of 1618; the Imperial Diet should, in all matters relating to taxes, war and peace, new laws or the interpretation of old ones, have a decisive voice, and their action should always be unanimous. Further, there should always be granted to the Imperial Estates the right to form alliances among themselves and with neighboring Princes; the election of the Roman King should never again be made during the life of the Emperor; and, finally, an adequate indemnity should be provided for France, Sweden, the Landgravine of Hesse Cassel, and other allies. In what this should consist was not stated. The following were the Swedish demands: An unlimited amnesty,

which should be extended to the Austrian lands, and should therefore restore the confiscated property, and the admission of the Calvinists into the imperial confederation. Their other demands were but a repetition of those of France, though they stated some of these with greater precision of detail. It is worthy of remark that the Palsgrave was not mentioned in connection with the amnesty: he was indeed tacitly included; his position, however, was such as to merit a special reference to his case. That this was not done, gave room for the supposition that the French and Swedes were disposed to protect only their own interests to the neglect of those of the Palsgrave, which supposition, as the sequel showed, was just.

It is perceived that the requirements of Sweden and France, aside from the satisfaction of their own claims, were directed to permanent provisions, which were inconsistent with any well-regulated system of government. If the action of an Imperial Diet could not be valid unless the vote were unanimous, then there could never again be a valid act of the Diet; and if the alliance of the individual Estates with foreign powers was to be permitted, then treason against the Emperor was legalized. Sweden and France designed to play the part in Germany which Russia at a later day carried out in Poland. The Emperor would not concede these demands, and was especially irritated by that intimated for the indemnification of his enemies: he deemed himself to have a better right to make such a claim. He caused his rejection of the French and Swedish claims to be stated to the deputies of the German Imperial Estates at Münster and Osnabrück, and this was soon followed (November 29th) by the arrival of Count Trautmansdorff, whom the Emperor had sent to Münster invested with extraordinary powers:

Ferdinand bound himself to observe all the conditions of peace which he should enter into.

Of Trautmansdorff, who now played the most prominent part in Münster, and whose merit it was to procure a peace with conditions most favorable for Germany and Austria, French pens have sketched a picture of such accuracy that we find in it nothing to change. He was, it is said, a large and very ugly man; but the defects of his external appearance were overbalanced by his clear perception and the ingenuousness and uprightness of his character. Astonishment was felt in Münster that he, who held the first place in the Emperor's confidence, should have held himself so long aloof, and left a clear field to his enemies; but the merit and unselfishness of his conduct were so much the more prized.

His arrival at Münster would soon have been made the occasion of a delay in the transactions, if he had not exorcised the peril by a sally of wit. The French envoys had made of him the demand that he visit them immediately after visiting the Papal Nuncio, and thus concede no precedence of rank to Spain, and did not, until he had made this promise, make him, as was customary in case of newly arrived ambassadors, the first visit. As he was, however, unwilling thus to slight the Spanish envoys, he slipped out of the noose by declaring that he designed, first, to visit his friends (that is, the Spanish representatives), then the indifferent or neutral (that is, the Nuncio), and, last, his enemies (of course the French), and in this order he made his visits. Against this evasion, which did not prejudice the French claim to precedence, the French envoys could make no complaint, however much they might chafe at Trautmansdorff's course.

Trautmansdorff, after his arrival in Münster, avoided

all those roundabouts which concern mere forms, and opened at once the business relating to indemnification by offering France, Metz, Toul, and Verdun (which, indeed, without the Emperor's consent, had belonged to it for nearly a hundred years), and then Pignerol and Moyenvic, refusing, however, the cession of Alsace. The French envoys delayed in answering this proposition, and Trautmansdorff departed for Osnabrück, in order that, if he should succeed there in an attempt to effect an agreement with Sweden, he might thereby bring a heavier pressure to bear upon France. It was not impossible that the Swedes might come to a separate understanding, for the hatred which had grown up against them everywhere in Germany had risen to a fearful height. Queen Christina referred to this in an interview with the French minister in Stockholm, Chanut, and added, as a consoling but significant remark, that she only feared an attack from the German army officers, and especially Königsmark, upon Sweden, though a united movement of this kind was impossible in the mutual jealousy and discord which there prevailed.

Arrived at Osnabrück, the imperial ambassador requested of the two Swedish envoys a declaration in regard to the demands of their Queen, but received only evasive answers, which showed clearly that the attempt to separate the Swedes and French was not likely to succeed. This now became evident when, on January 7, 1646, the Swedes brought forward their demands; they claimed Lusatia, of which they held a part in possession, Pomerania, Camin, Wismar, Bremen, and Verden, and the pay due to their army. They certainly would not have claimed so much had they not been supported by an understanding with France. After an absence of two

months, Trautmansdorff, having accomplished nothing, returned to Münster, where the French envoys had declared to the Papal and Venetian mediators—this occurred also on the 7th of January, 1646—that they insisted upon the cession of Alsace, Sundgau, Breisgau, Breisach, the four forest bailiwicks, and Philipsburg. The offer of a part of Alsace they declined, and insisted upon a cession of the whole land, because they had the concurrence of all the Imperial Estates except the Emperor, and were sure of that of the Tyrol line from which it was to be taken. Maximilian of Bavaria now concurred in the loss of this land to the house of Austria, because, without satisfying France, he saw no possibility of peace, and to this now hoary-headed man, weary of war, an immediate peace was the object of his most earnest longing.

The Emperor laid the question of the cession of Alsace and Sundgau before his privy council, and they declared in favor of it, because the means of its reconquest were not at hand; he therefore concurred, and two days later (February 28, 1646) informed Count Trautmansdorff and the Elector of Bavaria of his determination. Maximilian, however, felt that the Emperor had not yet sacrificed enough; he desired that he should still give up Breisach to the French, and instructed his envoy at Münster to declare to Count Trautmansdorff that he would not be able to effect a separate settlement with the French unless he should relinquish to them Breisach also. That there was generally in Germany a growing sentiment of concession towards France—in this French gold doubtless did its part—appeared in the fact that the College of the Imperial Estates at Münster, when the question was laid before it by the imperial ambassador, responded favorably to the satisfaction of France, while the same college at Osna-

brück rejected all the claims of Sweden to territorial indemnification, though they did not grant the Emperor the means of carrying out this resolution. In April (1646) Trautmansdorff offered to the French Alsace and Sundgau ; but they refused on any account to give up Breisach, and gave only slight hope that they might yield a little in some of their other demands.

While these questions of indemnity were under consideration, the Imperial Estates * went on with the discussion of their mutual grievances, taking up anew the questions

* NOTE.—The reader should keep fixed in his mind, as he proceeds with this account, a general picture of the parts, relations, and incidents of this great Congress, which sat in Westphalia for nearly four years for the pacification of Europe. Münster may be regarded as its general place of assembly. There were the neutral mediators, Prince Chigi (the Papal Nuncio) and Contorini, the Venetian envoy ; there were the chief representatives of the German Empire, and of France. Spain, and some other powers less directly concerned. The envoys of Sweden and the protestant Princes were at Osnabrück, a short day's ride by carriage northward from Münster, which distance was a matter of small account in those far-off days, when time was not, as it now is, an element of calculation. In the Diet held at Regensburg in 1636, twelve years before the peace, steps were taken by the Imperial Estates looking forward to this Congress. The further consideration of the subject was adjourned to an Imperial Diet to be convened in Frankfort in May, 1642. This meeting, having effected some important preliminary agreements, adjourned to Westphalia—the Catholic portion to sit at Münster, the Protestant at Osnabrück, neither, however, as a part of the Congress proper. There were, therefore, four bodies in session, in any one of which a proposition might be introduced and then carried to the others for action. Besides the chief representatives of a power which were in one of the places, there were others present at the other place, so that all parties were represented at both places. The chief representatives, too, passed back and forth between the two cities when they deemed this necessary. At the signing, and once at least previously, all were assembled in Münster. The treaties themselves being concluded, the matter of execution was the subject of negotiation in Nuremberg, where the final closing up of the business took place in July, 1650—about fourteen years after the first preliminary movement made at Regensburg for the Congress.—TR.

which had been discussed at length at Frankfort and Regensburg. The Protestants in their memorial declared themselves against the Ecclesiastical Reservation, claimed for themselves the right of reforming the mediate monasteries, protested against majority decisions in the Diet in questions of religion, demanded the restoration of Donauwerth and the religious freedom of Protestant subjects of Catholic Princes, while they declined to concede the same to Catholics living among them. The Catholics were willing to give up only those ecclesiastical foundations, whether mediate or immediate dependencies of the Empire, which the Protestants had held up to the year 1627, and this they would only yield for forty years from the date of the conclusion of peace and on the condition that the Catholics should not be deprived of the right of suing for the possession of these institutions. The question also came up in the Congress whether the envoys of the King of Portugal and the Duke of Lorraine should be admitted; the admission of the former was favored, that of the latter opposed, by France, while the imperial envoys took the opposite view. Discussion was now also had of the demands for indemnification made by the Landgravine of Hesse Cassel, and the French envoys declared, with apparent frankness, that they should not support such large claims, so that their reduction might be with certainty expected.

Trautmansdorff went again (April 14, 1646), and was followed by Servien, to Osnabrück, for the purpose of persuading the Swedes and Protestants to moderate their demands. While he attempted to win the latter to an acknowledgment of the Ecclesiastical Reservation, he succeeded in bringing the former so far as to declare that they would be satisfied either with all Pomerania or with

the half of it, together with Bremen and Verden. This was one step towards a final agreement, for the Emperor might hope to obtain from the Elector of Brandenburg a release of his claim upon a part at least of Pomerania. The hope of a speedy conclusion of peace which might be drawn from Sweden's yielding its territorial claims, was again obscured by the high demands which envoys continued to make in the question of the amnesty; they desired to have this extended to the lands of Austria, so as to restore the exiles to their possessions. The Emperor, when informed of the modified terms of the Swedes, declared himself willing to make the year 1627 for religious and 1630 for political matters his starting-point; he would thus refuse the return of the exiles and the restoration of their estates, as also religious liberty in his lands, with the exception of Silesia, for in 1627 it existed only in this province. The territorial claims of Sweden he was willing to settle by the conveyance of Hither Pomerania, Verden, and Bremen, and to indemnify Brandenburg for its loss by the cession of the Bishopric of Halberstadt. He was ready to restore to the son of the Palsgrave Frederic the Lower Palatinate, and to establish for him an eighth Electorate. When the College of the Princes and also that of the imperial cities were informed of these offers, they raised all sorts of objections to them; both favored an amnesty which should extend back to the year 1618, and which should include not only the subjects of the Emperor, but also the Palsgrave and the Margrave of Jägerndorf. They stirred up the Swedes to an obstinate resistance, and clouded again the hope of peace.

The large demands of the Protestants threatened not only the Emperor, but also the German Catholics, and so the latter determined to draw the extreme boundary-lines

of their concession and present these in a counter-declaration. The ecclesiastical property of which the Protestants had taken possession after the Peace of Passau, they were willing to concede to them for one hundred years, reserving, however, the subsequent right of suit for them, and during this interval the holders might have seats in the Imperial Diet. In regard to the mediate institutions, 1627 should be taken as the normal year. In all questions of the Imperial Estates, except those of religion, a majority vote should be decisive. These concessions did not satisfy the Protestants; the envoys of Electoral Saxony only occupied a medium ground, which took into account the imperial interests: they proposed that 1624 should be taken as the normal year, and that the Emperor should not be required, but simply requested, to tolerate the Protestants. The attitude of Saxony brought the imperial cities afterwards to accept 1624 as the normal year, which view several of the Princes concurred in.

The persistency of the Protestants, in their desire to place religious and property rights in Austria where they stood before the counter-reformation and confiscations of Ferdinand II., by which the ownership of real estate would be thrown into still greater confusion, decided Trautmansdorff to come as soon possible to an agreement with the French. He offered them successively, in place of Breisach, Zabern, Benfeld, and Philipsburg, and finally even the demolition of Breisach; and when all this did not avail, he put to them, through the mediators, the question whether, in the case of the cession of Breisach, the Emperor could reckon upon their support in the matter of the Palatinate. In this respect his mind was put to rest. France offered not only to accept the imperial propositions relatively to the Palatinate, but also to pro-

cure Sweden's acceptance of them. This assurance, and the continued obstinacy of the Protestants, led him finally to offer to the French, Breisach, Neuenburg, Benfeld, and Zabern; in response to which offer he received their declaration that they would relinquish their claim to Breisgau and the four forest bailiwicks. He further requested Avaux and Servien to labor with Oxenstiern, who had arrived at Münster on the 4th of July, 1646, for a moderation of the Swedish demands and the recognition of 1627 and 1630 as the normal years, and also to bring him to the support of the Emperor's position in regard to the Palatinate. But the Swedes not only renewed their former claims, and demanded now again Silesia, but the French supported them in these and raised their own. To this breach of their promise made to the imperial ambassador, they were led by instructions from Cardinal Mazarin, who desired to wait for the issue of the war with Spain before he should fully bind himself. Irritated by this position of the French, Trautmansdorff went to the Duke of Longueville, where he also met Avaux, and in severe terms charged the ambassadors with treacherously giving up the Catholics to be ruined, and promoting the ambition of the Turks for conquest. Reproaches against the sharers of a common faith, grounded as they were, did not entirely fail of their end, and this may have influenced the French to ask for new instructions, and fourteen days later to change their position. They were now again willing to rest satisfied with the offered cessions, to acknowledge 1624—which would protect the imperial interests—as the normal year, and adhere to their promise in regard to the question of the Palatinate. The Catholic Estates came afterwards to their views, and accepted the year 1624.

III.

In harmony with their changed attitude, the French envoys went to Osnabrück, in order to bring the Swedes from their high demands. These would not, however, listen to their suggestions; they demanded all Pomerania, and desired that the Emperor indemnify Brandenburg with a part of Silesia. The Queen of Sweden, however, was anxious for peace, in order to be relieved of the oppression to which Oxenstiern was subjecting her. Christina hated this man, although he had formerly been a faithful and devoted servant of her father; but he had been transformed into a selfish and ambitious man, had set aside all regard for her, and had thus wounded her just pride as well as her vanity. At her command Salvius and the younger Oxenstiern appeared, in November (1646), at Münster; but, although their instructions procured for them a kind reception with the imperial envoys, they introduced their business with the same demand, in regard to the restoration of the exiles, that had always been rejected by the Emperor, and conducted themselves otherwise unyieldingly, although they did not make the former exorbitant demands. This led Count Trautmansdorff to confine his negotiations to the French envoys, and in connection with them he elaborated a general draft of articles of peace to which the Swedes and Protestants should adjust themselves. They came to an agreement upon the following points: (1) Sweden was to receive either all Pomerania or the half of it, together with Wismar, Bremen, and Verden. (2) The Palsgrave was to be restored in the Lower Palatinate. (3) Hesse Cassel was to receive back what it had lost by the Mar-

burg judicial decision and 600,000 florins, which sum the Ecclesiastical Electors and Princes were to pay. This draft left the question in regard to the pay of the Swedish army open. It now remained to win the concurrence of the parties to this agreement.

The imperial envoys began this work by sending to the Swedes a paper, in which they stated what indemnity they were willing to allow to Sweden, and another to the envoys of Brandenburg, in which the Elector was informed that he must content himself with Further Pomerania, and for the part that was to be ceded to Sweden he should receive Halberstadt and two million thalers, which sum the Imperial Estates would pay. Shortly before this they had rejected with decision the suggestion of the envoys of Brandenburg that the Emperor should indemnify the Elector from Silesia. As neither the envoys nor the Elector returned a favorable answer to this communication, the Electoral College wrote to the latter, hoping, by an appeal to the sacrificing spirit which the Emperor had manifested towards France, to move him to renounce his right to Hither Pomerania, and intimating that, in case of his refusal, all Pomerania would be given to Sweden. The Elector could not conceal from himself the great danger with which further resistance threatened him, and that the required cession of territory was in fact measurably compensated by the offer of Halberstadt. In spite of all this, he would not yield, and so gave a negative answer. No regard was paid to this from the side of the Emperor. Volmar was sent to Osnabrück, and there offered to the Swedes (January 6, 1647) all Pomerania, with which they declared themselves satisfied. The Brandenburg envoys, perceiving the serious aspect of the case, asked for a delay until an envoy sent to the Elector

should return. He brought, indeed, the renunciation of his right to Hither Pomerania, but claimed in return Halberstadt and Minden, the expectancy of Magdeburg, and, for the interval before this should come into his possession, the incomes of the Bishopric of Osnabrück and 1,200,000 thalers. Trautmansdorff, however, replied that the Elector must content himself with the expectancy of Magdeburg and Camin, to which the Swedish envoys also agreed. Brandenburg was obliged therefore to be satisfied with the offer, unless he was willing to stand forth from his neutral position; for this alternative the Elector had no desire.

After the settlement of the affair of Sweden and Brandenburg, came on that of the Palatinate, which the imperial envoys brought first into both the College of Electors and that of Princes. On the 19th of March (1647) they informed the Emperor that the Electoral College, Brandenburg excepted, had expressed themselves in favor of the conveyance of the Upper Palatinate and the electoral dignity to Bavaria, and had proposed the creation of an eighth Electorate for the Palsgrave. The College of Princes, and finally also the imperial cities, concurred in this action, and so it was decided that the Palatinate house, whose ambition had contributed to all the later sufferings, must incur for this the loss of a portion of its possessions. Sweden hesitated in its concurrence, but yielded a few months later to the persuasions of France.

It was now the turn of the Landgravine of Hesse Cassel to have her demands for indemnification considered. She was supposed, on account of her alliance with France and Sweden, to have come at the time to an agreement with these powers, which was thought to relate to an increase of territory. She demanded an enlargement at

the cost of her cousin of Darmstadt and some Catholic ecclesiastical foundations. The Emperor was only willing to grant her the Abbey of Hersfeld, a part of the County of Schaumburg, and a sum of money, and to promise a compromise of the case of the Marburg inheritance. She was obliged to content herself with these offers, as France would not support her in any larger claims; by the aid, however, of Sweden, the pecuniary indemnification was raised from the smaller sum first proposed to 600,000 thalers.

The French had agreed with the imperialists in regard to making 1624 the normal year. This agreement was contested by the Protestant Estates, who handed in a counter-declaration in response to the letter of the Catholics addressed to them. They desired to make 1621 the normal year, thus offering no concession. The imperial cities—Donauwerth was specially named—should be restored to their original condition, and the ecclesiastical foundations which they had taken possession of since 1552 should remain theirs forever. They were willing only to grant that the Emperor, in his own countries, should be requested simply, not required, to tolerate the Protestants. They however sent to Münster a deputation—this went thither at the same time with the Swedish envoys—which was more moderate, and consented that 1624 should, with some limitations, be the normal year, but still demanded that the ecclesiastical property which they had taken possession of since the Peace of Passau should remain perpetually theirs. In response to these and other declarations and demands, Trautmansdorff handed in, December 6, 1646, a kind of ultimatum under the title of "Ultimate Compromise Propositions."* In this the treaty of Passau was

* Endgiltige Vergleichsvorschläge.

affirmed, 1624 was declared to be the normal year for the possession of ecclesiastical property, whether mediate or immediate, and in relation to Halberstadt only was an exception made in favor of Brandenburg. All, therefore, who had been ejected from their possessions since 1624 should be restored to them. On the other hand, the Catholics also should forever enjoy all ecclesiastical foundations, in immediate or mediate relation to the Emperor, of which they had been seized in the year 1624, and therefore the accession of any Catholic bishop or prelate to Protestantism carried with it, as a consequence, the immediate loss of his position and income. In the imperial cities the relations in religious matters should remain perpetually as in the year 1624. The Emperor would not, in his own hereditary lands, allow any limit or rule of conduct to be prescribed, and would claim the right of reformation, but would, nevertheless, consent that Protestants of the higher ranks should retain their free right of residence to the year 1656, and might from time to time thereafter return to visit their estates. A majority vote of the Imperial Diet should not rule in religious questions, but should be decisive in all other matters of the Empire.

On the 7th of February, 1647, the conferences between the imperial envoys and the Protestant Estates were held in regard to this ultimatum, and the latter did not even yet show the desired spirit of concession. While they did not concede religious freedom to their own subjects, they claimed this concession from the Catholics, and especially from the Emperor, that he should permit the free return of the exiles. When, meanwhile, it became known that the Elector of Bavaria was inclined to sever his fate from that of the Emperor and conclude an armistice, the Protestants became still more obstinate, and renewed

demands which they had previously dropped. On the 27th of February they sent to Count Trautmansdorff their ultimatum, which made him so angry that he would not even listen till the reading of it was completed. The Catholic Estates assured the Emperor of their most earnest adherence, in case he should not yield but continue the war, and sent at the same time a letter to the Elector of Bavaria, calling upon him to attach himself to the common cause, and blaming his recent wavering. Negotiations were opened with France, in order to secure protection from the French in case a contest with the immoderate demands of the Protestants should be necessary. The French envoys were, indeed, not wanting in promises, which, had the extremity arisen, might have been followed by deeds, for they were not willing to contribute to the ruin of the Catholics.


Trautmansdorff sent to Salvius his answer to the Protestant ultimatum, which latter had not indeed been entirely without effect, for the imperial ambassadors made a few further concessions having reference to the facilitating of emigration and the sale of their lands by Protestants still remaining in Austria. He also called to him the representatives of the Protestant Estates, and gave them an earnest warning, in which he reproached them with being indifferent to peace and only desiring the extinction of the Catholics, in which he had reference to their demand for the toleration of Protestants in the lands of Catholic Princes. Nevertheless his antagonists maintained their position, and demanded in another paper the permission to build a number of churches in the Austrian provinces in which their kindred in the faith might assemble. As the Swedes supported the relentless course of the Protestants, the imperial envoys declared the transactions

with them to be broken off so long as they should persist in demanding religious liberty in the Emperor's hereditary lands. This declaration greatly terrified the Protestants, but few of whom were willing that things should proceed to an extremity, and they went, accompanied by the Swedish envoys, to Münster, in order to reopen the negotiations. The whole Congress had, since the month of June, been assembled at Münster, and it was possible to hope that a sense of the need of peace would there achieve its triumph.

This hope was not immediately realized. The envoys of France still found their interests in stirring up the Protestants, because they desired to conclude peace not only with the Emperor, but also with Spain, and wished to force upon the latter the acceptance of the conditions which they had offered. They desired, therefore, to bring a pressure to bear upon the Emperor. Indeed the envoy of Altenburg, Thumbshirn, who had hitherto earnestly labored to further the Protestant claims, now raised his voice for peace, and that too not without reproaching Sweden; and yet the imperial ambassadors felt called upon to inform the Emperor that they had but little hope, and that the Protestant envoys were gradually returning home. Trautmansdorff himself returned to Vienna in July, not thinking at the time that the work of pacification was in so great peril as afterwards appeared. He handed the Emperor a memorandum in justification of his entire procedure throughout the negotiations, and received Ferdinand's acknowledgment in the instructions which he sent on to his ambassadors still remaining in Münster. The Emperor instructed them to keep matters in the state in which Trautmansdorff had left them. Volmar went to Osnabrück, whither the Swedish envoys and most of the

Protestant representatives had returned, and did as the Emperor had directed ; but the wavering of France caused the business to draw itself for months lazily along, until finally, on the 28th of February, an earnest beginning was again made, several points were agreed upon, and the result was reduced to writing. Thus in the course of the following months an agreement was reached in regard to the religious and political differences of the Empire, the case of the Palatinate, and the Hessian decision.

The greatest difficulty was encountered over that paragraph near the close which begins with the words "Tandem omnes," and which, according to the proposition of the imperial envoys, was to settle this, that a full personal amnesty was to be granted in the hereditary dominions of the Emperor, but no restoration of their estates, and that they could not return home unless they became Catholics. This was the question upon the solution of which, in the sense of the Protestants, the greatest weight had hitherto been laid, in which, with some wavering, the Swedes had supported them, and which, in spite of repeated counsellings and interchanges of letters, no compromise had been effected. It was not simply the cause of religion itself which led the Swedes to interest themselves in the exiles; their sense of gratitude was also concerned. In the armies with which they had fought the Emperor, thousands of those who had been driven from their homes had served, numerous exiles had risen to high places in them, and the Swedes had been able under all circumstances to rely upon their fidelity and devotion. Could they now cast to the winds the assurances with which they had hitherto baited them and secured their self-sacrificing services, and now and forever condemn them to a homeless life? Just this is what they



did. One of the imperial envoys, Crane, afterwards gave utterance, in an interview with the Protestant envoys, to the charge that they had been bribed by the Emperor with the offer of 600,000 thalers to desert the cause of the exiles. This charge was believed by the Protestants, disseminated by the exiles themselves, and such an obloquy was thus heaped upon the Swedes that Queen Christina, in the year 1651, caused a letter on the subject to be written to Crane, inquiring whether the statement was based upon truth. The latest investigations in the Austrian archives do not confirm Crane's statement. The 600,000—400,000 thalers were charged in the account of future imperial contributions, and only 200,000 actually paid by the Emperor—were granted for the evacuation of the places, especially Olmutz, held by them in the lands of Austria.* The Swedes and the German Protestants did not, then, abandon the cause of the exiles because they were paid for it, but probably because they could not bring themselves to the point of a counter-sacrifice in their behalf.

Finally came up the question of the arrears of pay of the armies. The Swedes, the Emperor, and the Elector of Bavaria each brought forward such a claim, and then the Landgravine of Hesse Cassel came hobbling along behind with a like one. The Swedes demanded twenty million thalers; the Estates offered them two millions. The former came down to ten, and the latter rose to three millions. They finally agreed upon five millions. The business with Sweden was closed in August, 1648, having been adjusted in triple papers,

* This is therefore an acquittal, probably founded upon the author's own recent studies in the archives, of the Swedish envoys in the Westphalian Congress, of this grave charge made against them and the Emperor.—Tr.

drawn up on the 6th of this month, Salvius and Oxenstiern having affirmed by hand-striking that they would abide by the agreement. The signing was, however, delayed for the completion of the negotiations with France.

The French negotiators had meanwhile been offended because the imperial envoys refused to concede their further demands, and resolved to break off the negotiations. Servien went for this purpose to Osnabrück, designing to come to an agreement with the representatives of the Estates there, and then lay this as a law before the representatives of the Emperor. The Estates at Osnabrück agreed to the proposition, and completed, on the 15th of September, their articles of peace, in which, however, notwithstanding the French suggestions, all desirable regard was exercised towards the Emperor. Servien returned to Münster, and now requested the imperial envoys "at once" to sign the articles agreed upon in Osnabrück, which the latter, however, refused to do until the Estates in Münster should have voted upon them. The Estates at Osnabrück would not consent that their agreement should be voted upon in Münster, and declared that if any change should be proposed they would enter a complaint before the Emperor. Maximilian of Bavaria, who now valued nothing above peace, and for this reason had supported the action of the Estates at Osnabrück, wrote the Emperor, threatening that if his envoys should refuse to sign the Osnabrück treaty, he should himself sign it and protect his land against further devastation.

IV.

Although the Emperor might have had cause of complaint at the slight shown him, he submitted to the humiliation, and authorized his envoys to sign the Osnabrück articles. On the 6th of October Volmar made this known to the Estates, and awakened in them a joyful surprise, for they thought the Emperor to be so obstinate that he would not conclude peace until France and Spain should have come to an understanding. Volmar now expressed the wish that the Swedish plenipotentiaries should come to Münster, that all the articles might be signed at the same time. At the last moment, however, the Swedes hesitated as to the closing up; they had turned their attention anew to the Bohemian exiles, and desired also to roll the burden of supporting their army during the coming winter upon other shoulders, to the making of which demands they had been stirred up by the success of their arms in Bohemia. The indignation of the Estates and the intercession of Servien, however, caused them to yield, and the peace was signed by all the negotiators in Münster on the 24th of October, 1648. Although the signing was all done at one and the same place, yet the draft of the Swedish peace was dated at Osnabrück. The French and Swedish peace agree in the contents of many of their articles; for instance, those relating to the restoration of the Palsgrave and many other restorations, and those which regulate the political relations of Germany. They differ in the articles which provide simply for the satisfaction of the French or Swedish claims. Thus only the Swedish instrument has the articles which

relate to the satisfaction of Sweden, Brandenburg, and Brunswick, and those which provide against religious disputes in Germany; while only in the French treaty is mention made of the advantages conceded to France and of the settlement of Italian matters. Two days after the signing of the peace, the Imperial Estates, at the demand of Sweden, prepared an address to the Emperor requesting a mitigation of the terms of the article, "*Tandem omnes*," and thus sought for the last time to relieve the lot of the exiles. It scarcely needs to be stated that this step brought no relief; the destiny of Bohemia and Austria went on developing itself as the Emperor had marked out its way. On the day of the signing, the peace was proclaimed through the streets of Münster by blasts of trumpets, a solemn religious service was held, congratulations were exchanged among the ambassadors, and the firing of salvos was continued through the day.

We shall here, at the risk of some repetitions, state the most important points secured in that instrument, to which history has assigned the name of the Peace of Westphalia, and which exerted the mightiest influence upon international relations up to the time of the French Revolution.

To France was secured the perpetual possession of the Bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, as also Moyenvic and Pignerol, with the right to keep a garrison in Philippsburg, and finally Breisach, Alsace, with its ten imperial cities, and the Sundgau. The Emperor bound himself to gain the assent of the Archduke Ferdinand, of Tyrol and Spain, to this last-named cession. France made good to the Archduke this loss by the payment of three million francs. Although it was not expressly provided

that the connection with the Empire of the German provinces ceded to France should be dissolved, yet the separation became, as a matter of fact, a complete one. The Emperor did not summon the Kings of France to the Diets of the Empire, and the latter made no demand for such summons; for although they would gladly have taken a position to which they were justly entitled in the assemblies of the Estates of the Empire, yet a free possession was to them preferable to one hampered by feudal obligations. In relation to Italy, the French treaty provided that the peace concluded in 1631 should remain in force, except the part relating to Pignerol.

Switzerland was made independent of the German Empire; but the Circle of Burgundy was still to form a part of the Empire, and after the close of the war between France and Spain, in which the Emperor and the Empire were to take no part, was to be included in the peace. No aid was to be rendered to the Duke of Lorraine against France, although the Emperor and the Empire were left free to mediate for him a peace.

Sweden received Hither Pomerania, including the Island of Rügen, from Further Pomerania the Island of Wollin, and several cities, with their surroundings, among which were Stettin, as also the expectancy of Further Pomerania in case of the extinction of the house of Brandenburg. Furthermore, it received the city of Wismar, in Mecklenburg, and the Bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, with reservation of the rights and immunities of the city of Bremen. Sweden was to hold all the ceded territory as feudal tenures of the Empire, and be represented for them in the Imperial Diet. The Bavarian, Burgundian, and Austrian Circles were released from contributions to make up the five millions to be paid to the

Swedish army, for which only the seven other Circles were to be responsible.

Brandenburg received for its loss of Pomerania the Bishoprics of Halberstadt, Minden, and Camin, and the expectancy of that of Magdeburg as soon as this should become vacant by the death of its Administrator, the Saxon Prince, although the four bailiwicks separated from it were to remain with Saxony as provided in the Peace of Prague. Mecklenburg-Schwerin was granted, in place of Wismar, the Bishoprics of Schwerin and Ratzeburg, together with other advantages. The house of Brunswick-Lüneberg was to renounce its right to the coadjutorship of Magdeburg, Bremen, Halberstadt, and Ratzeburg, and, in return for this renunciation, was to alternate with a Catholic prelate in the possession of the Bishopric of Osnabrück in such manner that in each instance after the death of a Catholic bishop, a younger prince of the house of Lüneburg was to be named for the place, so as to receive the episcopal incomes, and *vice versa*. Brunswick was to be released from the obligation of a contribution imposed by Tilly, and be indemnified with a monasterial estate. Hesse Cassel received the Abbey of Hersfeld, four bailiwicks of Schaumburg, and 600,000 thalers, together with a confirmation of the compromise of the Marburg inheritance question, which was agreed upon in April, 1648. Margrave Christian William of Brandenburg, former Administrator of Magdeburg, was, according to the terms of the Peace of Prague, to receive 12,000 thalers yearly as an indemnity for his loss of this position, which sum, however, had never been paid, and he was now to receive instead of it the bailiwicks of Zinna and Loburg for life, and the payment, once for all, of 3,000 thalers.

To Duke Maximilian of Bavaria was conveyed the Elec-

torate, together with the Upper Palatinate, to be hereditary in his family of the line of William, for which he, on the other hand, was to surrender to the Emperor the account of the 13,000,000 florins which he had made for the execution of the sentence against the Palsgrave Frederic. To the Palsgrave, Charles Lewis, son of the proscribed Elector, was given back the Lower Palatinate, while a new Electorate, the eighth, was created for him. The Emperor assumed the obligation to pay to the brothers of the new Elector the sum of 400,000 thalers, and his sisters each a marriage-gift of 10,000 thalers. There were numerous provisions relating to the restoration of the Dukes of Würtemberg, the Margraves of Baden, and the Counts of Nassau and those of Hanau to several parts of the territories which either belonged to them or were contested.

A general amnesty was indeed provided, and every one was to be restored to the possession of the lands which he had held before the war. This general article was, however, limited by various special provisions, as that in relation to the Palsgrave, and was not to be applied to Austria at all. The hereditary subjects of the Emperor received an amnesty only for their persons, honors, and dignities, but could return to their homes only by submitting to the laws of the land—that is, by accepting the Catholic faith. The restoration of their estates could only be claimed by those who had lost these by their accession to Sweden or France—that is, those whose losses had occurred since 1630 or 1635. We are not informed how many noblemen, if indeed there were any, who were still in possession of their estates in 1630 and lost them afterwards in this way; there could at most have been scarcely a half-dozen of these, if there were indeed so many. Baron Paul von Khevenhiller, who in the last years of the war

rendered important services to the Swedes, was, by express provision, restored to the possession of his lands. He was the only one of the Austrian or Bohemian exiles whom the Swedes rewarded for services rendered to them.

Specially important are the sections which relate to the settlement of religious grievances. The treaty of Passau and the Augsburg religious peace were confirmed; the 1st of January, 1624, was fixed as the time which was to govern mutual reclamations between the Catholics and Protestants; both parties were secured the right to all ecclesiastical foundations, whether in mediate or immediate connection with the Empire, which they severally held in possession on the first day of January, 1624; if any such had been taken from them after this date, restoration was to be made, unless otherwise specially provided. The Ecclesiastical Reservation was acknowledged by the Protestants, and Protestant holders of ecclesiastical property were freely admitted to the Imperial Diets. The right of reformation was conceded to the Estates, and permission to emigrate to the subjects; while it was at the same time provided that, if in 1624 Protestant subjects of Catholic Princes, or the reverse, enjoyed freedom of religion, this right should not in the future be diminished. It was specially granted for Silesia that all the concessions which had been made before the war to the Dukes of Liegnitz, Münsterburg, and Oels, and to the city of Breslau, relating to the free exercise of the Augsburg Confession, should remain in force. Furthermore, the Emperor promised that the Protestant nobility of those principalities of Silesia which were immediately subject to him, as also those of Lower Austria, should not be forced to sell their lands and emigrate, if they would but behave

themselves quietly and discharge their duties. The jurisdiction of the imperial chamber and the imperial court council was recognized, and only in cases where the parties were of the different religious faiths, the counsellors chosen to sit upon them were to be half Protestants and half Catholics. Finally, the Reformed—that is, the adherents of Calvinism—were placed upon the same ground with those of the Augsburg Confession; and it was provided that if a Lutheran Estate of the Empire should become a Calvinist, or the reverse, his subjects should not be forced to change with their Prince.

After the religious grievances were disposed of, which was done only in the Swedish instrument, the difficulties of a political nature in the Empire were settled in both the Swedish and French treaties. The first stipulations affirmed all the immunities and chartered rights of the Estates; it was then provided that the Estates might exercise their sovereignty in both spiritual and temporal matters. They were to have their votes in the decision of all questions of the Empire and the right to form alliances with each other and with foreign powers, provided only that these were not directed against the Emperor or the Empire. The Imperial Diet was to be convoked six months after the peace should be ratified, and thereafter as often as should be necessary. Commerce was to be freed from all the burdens imposed upon it during the war.

Finally, the peace articles made provisions in regard to the troops. Much concern was then felt in Germany as to the acceptance of the peace by the various sections of the army; it was feared that the soldiers, who had for years led an unbridled life, would not content themselves with their small pay, but would form their plots, expel

their officers, and finish up the plundering of Germany. The treaty specified that the conclusion of peace should be proclaimed by heralds to all the troops, and that all hostilities should cease. All prisoners were to be discharged, captured places to be evacuated by the captors, and payment made to the Swedish soldiery at fixed times. In order to give greater stability to the peace, it was directed that it be made a perpetual law of the Empire, placed in the imperial capitulation of election, serve as a rule of conduct to the entire judiciary, and take precedence of all other laws, charters, and judicial decisions.

As a charming tale of days long past sounded in the ears of the peoples of Germany the news that a peace had been concluded which would finally put an end to their ineffable sorrows, and the poets, who had hitherto celebrated the victories of their several parties, now united their poetic powers in numerous songs in praise of the peace. Of these none speak so to the heart as the apt and simple words of the gifted hymnologist, Paul Gebhard, which we here insert :

Praise God ! the joyful sound goes forth,
The Heaven-sent word of peace
Echoes our country all around
And bids the slaughter cease.

The spear and sword now have their rest ;
Seize, Germany, thy lyre,
And sing thy hymns, thy very best,
In full and joyful choir.

Light up once more thy saddened face,
Look up to God, and say :
O Lord, Thy great and wondrous grace
Remains still sure to-day.

Ye castles, speak, which ruined lie ;
Ye cities—soot and stone—
Ye raise our hearts to God Most High
As naught on earth had done :

Ye fields, that once were duly sown,
Grew fair by gentle rains,
But now to tangled forests grown,
Or barren, heathery plains :

And you, ye graves, filled with the dead,
And bloody sweat of men :
Of men, their like we have but read,
On earth they're never seen.

The Peace of Westphalia has met manifold hostile comments, not only in earlier, but also in later, times. German patriots complained that by it the unity of the Empire was rent; and indeed the connection of the States, which even before was loose, was relaxed to the extreme. This was, however, an evil which could not be avoided, and it had to be accepted in order to prevent the French and Swedes from using their opportunity for the further enslavement of the land. A change in these relations and a new unification of Germany, as shown by the experience of our days, was not possible until an entire revolution was wrought in public opinion, so that religious differences should no longer be regarded, and one of the Princes became strong enough to place himself at the head of the party of union and put down all opposition. This transformation of the public relations was not to be wrought by a turning of the hand; a century's experience was needed to bring it about: the whole people had to be educated, by further sufferings, to aspire after unity as their highest ideal aim, with the same obstinacy and spirit

of sacrifice with which the earlier Catholics and Protestants strove for each other's subjection.

The religious parties also made objections to the peace. The strict Catholics condemned it as a work of inexcusable and arbitrary injustice. On this ground the Nuncio Chigi protested against it, and Innocent X. declared in a bull all those points of the peace which made special concessions to the Protestants to be null and void. He also rejected the creation of an eighth Electorate, on the ground that the number, seven, was originally fixed upon by the Holy See. The dissatisfaction of the Protestants was chiefly with the recognition of the Ecclesiastical Reservation. They complained also that their brethren in the faith were not allowed the free exercise of their religion in Austria. Their hostility was limited to theoretical discussions, which soon ceased when Louis XIV. took advantage of the preponderance which he had won to make outrageous assaults upon Germany, and even the Protestants were compelled to acknowledge the Emperor as the real defender of German independence. It was therefore but a few years after the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia when that remarkable revolution took place which brought the Emperor and the Protestants to each other's support, while the Catholics attached themselves to the cause of France, and so adopted the policy of the German Union.*

* In order to understand this allusion, the reader will need to recur in mind to the author's account of the Union of the German Protestant Estates, formed in 1608, the policy of which was to take care of its own supposed interests, regardless of the weal of the Empire. The author here represents the Catholics as pursuing the same mistaken policy, by joining with the French, in the times of Louis XIV., against the Protestant Estates of the Empire.—Tx.

There remain a few words to be added to indicate the end of the contest which involved Holland, the Duke of Lorraine, Spain, and France.

The war between Spain and the Independent Netherlands was ended many months before the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia. The statesmen at the Hague perceived that if France obtained the dominion of the Spanish Netherlands, they would have in their new ally a neighbor far more dangerous than Spain had been, and so Holland had therefore concluded, a year earlier, an armistice with Philip IV. The conclusion of the peace was long delayed by French intrigues ; but when Spain resorted to an artifice, and gave out that an agreement was about to be entered into with Louis XIV. by which the Infanta Maria Theresa should be given him in marriage and the Netherlands added as her marriage portion, the Hollanders were much frightened, and in order to prevent such a union of France and Spain, closed with the latter power, on the 30th of January, 1648, a peace in which Philip IV. consented to acknowledge the independence of the United Netherlands.

The Duke of Lorraine would gladly have concluded a peace with France, if the Duchy could have been restored to him ; but this Mazarin would do only on the condition that all the fortifications should be demolished, Lorraine laid open to France, and all the cities which the King claimed surrendered to his possession. To this condition the Duke would not consent, and so his case was not decided in Münster, but the Emperor and the German Princes were authorized to act as friendly mediators in bringing about an adjustment between the Duke and the King of France.

The war between Spain and France was still waged,

but became less threatening to the former, because France, soon after the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia, was torn with internal disquiets, and was unable to carry it on with the necessary force. Spain won back Catalonia and Naples, and only Portugal maintained a permanent independence. In 1659 peace was finally made, the two ministers, Mazarin and Haro, having met for the negotiations on the island formed by the Bidassoa, the river which forms the boundary between France and Spain. In this so-called Peace of the Pyrenees, Philip IV. ceded the remainder of Artois and several places in the Spanish Netherlands to France. An adjustment was here made with the Duke of Lorraine in harmony with the conditions which had been offered him in Münster. The Dukes of Lorraine were from this time forth grasped in the iron arms of France, and were compelled to renounce the independence of which they had dreamed.

V.

The peace was indeed signed, but it was long before its blessings came to the tortured people, because its conditions were not fulfilled, either on the side of the Emperor or the Estates, and thus occasion was given to both the Swedes and the French to live at the cost of Germany. It was not until January 1, 1649, that a convention was formed in Prague between the imperial plenipotentiary, Prince Piccolomini, and the Swedish generalissimo and heir presumptive of Sweden, Charles Gustavus,* by which

* The hasty reader may have his mind confused by the application of the term Palsgrave (which he has met with only in connection with the unfortunate Frederic) to Charles Gustavus, Palsgrave of Zweibrücken. Frederic's son

it was determined that the Emperor should pay, for the support of the Swedish garrisons in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, 32,000 florins monthly, until the restorations stipulated in the peace were carried out in Germany, the ratifications exchanged, and the first quota of Sweden's indemnity and the 200,000 thalers should have been paid. The Emperor delayed to make the payment for which he was bound; the Swedes did not therefore evacuate Bohemia until the end of 1649. Olmutz and other neighboring places they did not surrender to the imperialists until the 6th of July, 1650.

Still greater difficulties and dangers beset the carrying-out of the peace in Germany. The Palsgrave, Charles Gustavus, gave the envoys of the Imperial Estates in Münster to understand that the peace ratifications could not be exchanged until Brandenburg should have executed its renunciation of Hither Pomerania in favor of Sweden; until all the restitutions in the Empire should have been made; until the 600,000 thalers should have been paid to Hesse Cassel, and 1,800,000 thalers, being the first instalment of the 5,000,000, together with the 200,000 thalers, should have been paid to Sweden; nor until Spain's stipulated renunciation of Alsace should have been handed in; nor, finally, until the Spaniards should have surrendered Frankenthal, which they had held since the year 1623. It cannot be said that these demands were unjustifiable, and yet it was difficult for Germany to meet them. The financial stress was such in the exchequers of the German

and heir was Charles *Lewis*. Charles Gustavus first appeared prominently on the war theatre in the last fighting at Prague. He was cousin of Queen Christina, and heir presumptive to her throne. Hence his prominence in the execution of the terms of this peace. On the Queen's abdication, in 1654, he became King of Sweden.—Tr.

Princes, that it could not be known when the needed sums could be at command ; and apprehension was entertained that Spain would neither renounce its claim to Alsace nor surrender Frankenthal, since it was unwilling to conclude a peace with France. Nor did the observance of these conditions even depend upon Germany. The non-fulfilment of the Swedish demands carried in it the danger of further exhaustion from the continued obligation to harbor the French and Swedes. The damage incurred in consequence of keeping the Swedish army on German soil was more than equal to another five millions in addition to that which was agreed upon ; this army cost the Empire about 120,000 thalers for each day. Its number was placed at that time at 68,000 men, not including its immense numbers of camp-followers—women, children, and servants—which must all be fed.

The Estates answered the Palsgrave's demands with promises ; and as these were sincerely intended, the exchange of ratifications took place on the 18th of February, 1649. The envoys of the Emperor and the Estates now sketched a plan for the gradual evacuation of the places garrisoned by the Swedes and French ; but the Palsgrave, who was then sojourning in Minden, rejected it, and adjourned the decision to a meeting of the generals of the two sides—that is, the Swedish, French, and Hessian on the one side, and the imperialist and Bavarian on the other—which was to take place at Nuremberg. The consequence was that Münster was gradually almost emptied, and the envoys went to Nuremberg to take part in these transactions. At this time was effected, in Nuremberg, the so-called "Interim Compact," which, after long hesitation, was signed by the imperial ambassadors on the 21st of September, 1649. In this it was provided that

the various restitutions of land and people should take place within the three periods which had been fixed for the discharge of the soldiers. A deputation from the two religious parties was to decide the cases involving the several restitutions, and should not be dissolved until all the cases were disposed of. In regard to the five millions payable to the Swedish army, it was decided that the first three millions should be paid at intervals of fourteen days, and that, in each instance, certain places should be freed from their garrisons and the troops discharged. The fourth million was to be paid in six months, and the fifth in a year, and some security was to be given for this. As many places were relieved of their garrisons soon after this compact, and a way was prepared for diffusing the blessings of peace, the imperial general, Prince Piccolomini, thought that the signing ought to be celebrated by a festive meal. The splendor of this, and the costliness of the meats and drinks provided, elicited the astonishment of the burghers of Nuremberg, and also made a pleasant impression upon the minds of the invited guests. The hall in which the peace banquet was served was brilliantly lighted, and four orchestras quickened the enjoyments of the guests. The food was served in four courses, each of which consisted of 150 dishes. Then came the fruits, which were placed upon the table in covered silver plates; then followed the confections. The drinking to the health of the Emperor and the Queen of Sweden, as also to the success of the peace, called forth lively utterances, while firing from fifteen cannon was kept up. At the close of the banquet the generals present enacted a sham battle. They had their muskets and small arms brought into the hall, chose for their captains Piccolomini and the Palsgrave, Charles Gustavus, made Field-Marshal

Wrangel corporal, while the rest of the generals and high officers were simple musketeers. Now they marched around the tables and then to the castle, where they discharged the cannon. On their return march they were jocularly dismissed by Colonel Kraft, on the ground that peace was now restored, and discharged from the service. The poor were not forgotten on this occasion; two roasted oxen and wine in abundance were offered them.

There was an attempt also to bring about an Interim-Compact with the French envoys, which, however, they declined to enter into unless the Spaniards should surrender Frankenthal, or unless Constance, Heilbronn, or Ehrenbreitstein should be given them in security of such surrender. The Estates finally agreed to give up to France the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, because they would not, as would have been most natural, assume the costs of besieging Frankenthal. But the Emperor refused to confirm the agreement, and so this was for weeks an apple of discord between the parties, and the French army remained a burden on German soil. There would have been many an occasion for the renewal of the war by the Swedes and French, and a further prosecution of their tyrannical oppressions of Germany, if the Queen of Sweden had not sincerely desired peace, and by her instructions checked the desire of war in her representatives, and if the internal relations of France had not made the preservation of peace desirable. The representatives of France and Sweden handed in therefore the draft of a new treaty of evacuation (February 19, 1650). This was afterwards accepted, with some modifications, by the imperialists, and, as a treaty between the Emperor, the crown of Sweden, and the Imperial Estates, became a part of the final settlement, and was subscribed June 26, 1650.

In this instrument the payment of that part of the Swedish indemnity which was still due was assumed by the Estates, a city was surrendered to the Swedes as security for the payment, and 7,000 thalers monthly granted for the support of a garrison placed there. With the French ambassadors a final settlement was not agreed upon until July 2d, which is therefore properly regarded as the close of the wearisome negotiations. The French abandoned their demand for the delivery of Ehrenbreitstein as a pledge for the surrender by Spain of Frankenthal. Thus this and some other contested points were settled, and the Empire was, in the course of the following months, evacuated by the vampires. Piccolomini celebrated by another banquet and by brilliant fireworks the close of these transactions. The contest in regard to Frankenthal was settled by the offer to Spain of the free imperial city of Besançon. This offer was accepted, and the city was then incorporated into the County of Burgundy. Frankenthal was, however, evacuated by the Spaniards, and came back into the possession of the Elector of the Palatinate.

Finally, all the difficulties which obstructed the way of peace were overcome, and peasants and burghers could securely return to their occupations, and might, with uplifted hearts to God, praise Him for His goodness. Not so joyfully, however, did the Swedish garrisons receive the news that their dissolution was at hand, and that they must thenceforth sustain life by toilsome labor. Their wives and children, who had followed them around, and had become accustomed to their vagabond life, shrank back from the comfortless future, and cursed the authors of their impending trials. It need not, therefore, be a matter of wonder that from the discharged soldiers

numerous bands of robbers were formed, that these pursued, on their own account, the trade that they had formerly carried on under the cover of military law, and that commerce became again unsafe on the highways. A summary and pitiless justice, however, put an end to this evil ; and to this justice thousands of the former warriors and heroes of the faith were offered in sacrifice.

CHAPTER XI.

CONDITION OF THE ARMY DURING THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

Enlisting. Taking the Oath. Sub-divisions of the Regiments. The Earlier and Later Pay. Subsistence. Progressive Positions. Arrangement of the Troops in Camp. Uniforms. Standards. Camp-followers. Plundering of Peasants and Burghers. General Oppression. Use made of their Plunder by Officers and Soldiers. Devastations of the War. The Cruelties attending these.

THE armies employed during the Thirty Years' War were made up entirely of enlisted men. The enlistment was entrusted by the Princes to experienced soldiers, to whom were given commissions as colonels or captains. These officers came to an understanding with each other as to the places whither they should severally go, and there they enlisted those who offered themselves. Each recruit received a small advance payment, which in the beginning was deducted from his wages, but at a later day was not charged to him. When a place of muster was appointed, either for the enlistment or filling up of a regiment, preparations were at the same time made to receive the recruits, the needed supplies were procured, so that the men enlisted might receive proper care, and especially beer and wine were brought thither by the quantity. At a later time this provision was discontinued, and the enlisted troops were left to the resources which the places of muster—chiefly the imperial and other large cities—could

supply. On the day on which the men were received and the weapons, such as they were not themselves obliged to bring with them, were delivered to them, the army regulations were read to them, which they were required to accept under oath.

These regulations contained the directions and rules of conduct for the soldiers. They were required to lead an honest life, attend divine worship, abstain from intemperate eating and drinking, and not to rob or treat with violence the common people. Severe penalties were provided for mutiny, cowardice, and other offences against soldierly duty: these were, to be put in irons, run the gauntlet, lose a member, to suffer death by hanging or shooting. In case of mutiny by larger sections, resort was had to decimation. In the beginning of the war the common soldiers sat by deputies of their own election in judgment over their fellows; soon, however, special courts-martial, presided over by a judge-advocate, came in place of this system. Sentences were executed by the provost-marshals and their deputies.

The cavalry regiment was divided into companies, each numbering usually one hundred men. The regiment of foot consisted of ten battalions, the usual number of each being three hundred men. These were either musketeers, who carried heavy fire-arms, or pikemen armed with pikes eighteen feet long. The pikemen and musketeers were combined in the same battalions, though there were battalions consisting of musketeers only. At first great importance was attached to the pikemen, and they were paid more; in the course of the war, however, the unwieldiness of their weapons elicited more and more criticism and derision. They were, however, retained, and were not abandoned till the close of the seventeenth, nor in the

Austrian army until the beginning of the eighteenth century. The cavalry were armed with the sabre-lance, a short pike, and pistols. In the course of the war a distinction came to be made between the cuirassiers, the arquebusiers, and the dragoons; the last named were but mounted pikemen, or musketeers, who fought on foot also as well as mounted. In addition to these, the Polish, Croatian, and Hungarian cavalry occupied, in the Austrian army, a peculiar position.

Besides the infantry and cavalry, the artillery advanced, after the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, from year to year to a position of increased importance. The Bohemian army numbered, in the battle of the White Mountain, more than 20,000 men, and yet had but ten pieces of artillery; but this ratio was afterwards greatly changed in favor of the artillery, which in all the later battles assumed a controlling position.

The support of an army cost relatively far more during the Thirty Years' War than it now does, and varied greatly according to the circumstances of the belligerents. For instance, a prince whose authority was recognized, and whose finances were well regulated, paid considerably less than one whose situation was not so favorable. The wages which Maximilian of Bavaria, or the Elector of Saxony, paid at the beginning of the war to their troops may be assumed as normal. The Elector of Saxony made up the battalion of 120 pikemen, or so-called men of double pay, and 180 musketeers. Of the double-pay men, four received 20, four 18, four 16, four 14, forty 12, and forty-eight 9 florins a month. Of the musketeers, forty received 10, sixty-five 9, and seventy-five 8 florins. The pay of those above the rank of privates, and especially the officers, was far higher. The pay of the cavalry cap-

tain was 174, that of the lieutenant 80, and that of the ensign 60 florins per month. If Saxony be taken as the standard, the cost of maintaining a regiment of cavalry, including the incidental expenses, might be estimated at about 260,000 florins a year, that of a regiment of foot at about 450,000, the expense of twelve cannon for the same period at 60,000. The pay of army commanders was much higher than that of the lower officers; from 1618 to 1620 it was between 2,000 and 10,000 florins per month, and remained equally high afterwards.

During the war the pay of soldiers advanced considerably, which had its ground chiefly in a bad coinage and the consequent diminution of the value of the coin. An order of the imperialist colonel, Verdugo, of the year 1627, directs as follows for his regiment for each week: For the colonel 500 thalers, for the lieutenant-colonel 150, for the cavalry captain 100, for the lieutenant 40, for the ensign 35, for the quarter-master 12, for the corporal 9, and for the private 4 thalers. Similarly Verdugo arranged in regard to the foot-soldiers, with only this difference, that the private received weekly a little over 2 thalers. In addition to this pay, the foot-soldier must be supplied with wood, salt, light, and place of rest. If their board was supplied, the half of their pay was deducted.

The arrangements for the care of the army, which proceeded directly from Waldstein, were far less liberal. We offer as an example an order of Waldstein, issued at the end of the year 1627, for Schleswig-Holstein, according to which the colonel received weekly 300 florins, the lieutenant-colonel 120, the captain 75, the lieutenant 25, the chaplain 10, the sergeant 8, the common soldier 2, together with lodging, wood, salt, and light. In addition

to this, a horse was to have 12 pounds of hay daily and 2 bundles of straw each week. In case the payment of money should be too severe for those of whom it was demanded, it was allowed them to furnish the under-officers and privates with provisions instead of money. The common man must have 3 pounds of bread, 2 of meat, and 3 quarts of beer daily; the corporal double the amount, and at the same rate of advance to the higher posts.

The demand reached its highest point in the case of an imperial cavalry captain, made in the same year (1627) in the County of Schwarzburg. He demanded for himself 300 florins, and for each company of men 540 florins, 900 bushels of oats, 10 loads each of hay and straw, 18 bushels of rye, 12 of wheat, and 15 of barley, 1 ox, 2 fat hogs, 2 calves, 4 fat wethers, 15 geese, 50 pounds of fish, the same amount of butter, and 200 eggs.*

From these orders it is perceived that the demands for money and products of the soil had, even in the first years of the war, reached an extreme point.

The demands of the army of the League and that of the Swedes were far less, which was also true in the imperial army after Waldstein's assassination. If it be asked what payment was actually made by the Princes, the answer must be, that those of the League, up to the time of the landing of Gustavus Adolphus, did not quite keep their promises, and yet did this as nearly as possible, as did also some of the leading Protestant Princes of Germany. It was otherwise with the imperialist and Swedish troops. The imperial troops were regularly paid only so long as the promised pay had not risen to its extreme

* In the above, the amount of the demand is approximated. The scheffel, about the same as the English sack, is put at three bushels, etc.—*Tr.*

height, and Spain, by its subsidies, bore the chief burden, or the Bohemian confiscations supplied the necessary means. This was not the case after the year 1625, when Waldstein was entrusted with the enlistment of the army. From this time on to the year 1634 the Emperor remained in debt to his troops for almost their entire pay. That, notwithstanding this, they remained under the standards, is due to the fact that they were maintained partly by requisitions made in enemies' lands, and partly by the transportation from the Emperor's hereditary lands of produce which was not made use of in Vienna, and further because a great part of the contributions levied upon friends and foes was distributed among them, and because, finally, their robberies were not punished. The high officers were, after Waldstein's assassination, indemnified by the conveyance to them of the greatest part of his landed possessions. Afterwards, and especially after the death of Ferdinand II., there was better order, and the means were at least partly at hand to support and pay an army, which was not so numerous and which had not been allured by such brilliant promises. It was with the Swedish army much as with the imperialists. As long as Gustavus Adolphus lived he found in the subsidies of his allies and in the contributions which he imposed the means of regular payment. After his death the needed money was wanting, or was squandered, and so the unpaid dues of the army accumulated from year to year, and, as we have seen, the payment of this indebtedness formed one of the most important points in the peace negotiations in Westphalia.

As there was no regular paying of the army, and the troops lived chiefly on the regions in which they were stationed by contributions pressed out of the people, so the extended stay of a regiment in a city or section of

country was equivalent to its complete ruin. Some complaints, which were made in the year 1627 against the imperial army at a time when the injured party was so simple as to hope for compensation, state with exactness the amounts of the contributions which, either in money or in money's worth, were exacted of them, and thus enable us to measure the greatness of the distress. The Counts of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen reckoned their payments during this year at 605,360 florins; the Counts of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt made theirs 666,638 florins; the city of Halle reckoned its money contributions for the years 1625 to 1627 at 430,274 florins, and in September, 1627, stood helpless before a new demand of 177,000 florins. The Archbishopric of Magdeburg was obliged to pay within the two years ending with 1627, 687,000 florins. Similar demands, higher or lower, but as ruinous to the parties, could be brought forward by the hundred. Bohemia fared most hardly; its individual cities were exhausted, as well by the confiscations which they adjudged upon their own burghers as by the contributions raised in the years 1621 to 1624, which, to adduce a single example, exceeded, in the little city of Hohenmauth, the sum of 200,000 florins.

In the course of the war the organization of the army was developed by an increase of the numbers of officers, so that these became nearly the same as in the eighteenth century. Besides the commanders-in-chief; there were previously only field-m Marshals, general quartermasters, and colonels; there were now also generals of cavalry and lieutenant-field-m Marshals, and the lower places were in like manner multiplied. The highest rank was that of lieutenant-general, by which title the highest military rank was designated, as representing the reigning Prince

and real leader of the army. Thus Tilly, as Maximilian's representative in the army of the League, Gallas and Piccolomini in the imperial, and the Palsgrave, Charles Gustavus, in the Swedish army, bore the title of lieutenant-general. The arrangements in the regiments, the places in the companies, and the position of the orderly-sergeants, attained to their final development, and produced in the army organization an internal harmony and unity of weapons which were wanting in earlier armies.

In the placing and handling of the troops there occurred, in the course of the war, the most decided changes. In the beginning of the war, the foot was drawn up in deep squares, each containing several battalions—often, indeed, an entire regiment (3,000)—and the cavalry were similarly ranged. From this arose great difficulty in the management of the troops in battle, as there could be no such thing as a decisive, impetuous charge; and so is explained that slowness of movement in the beginning of the war, both sides conceiving themselves as simply acting on the defensive. Gustavus Adolphus introduced into the sluggishly moving machinery of war a new force, by drawing up the infantry but six men deep, cutting up the great sections into small bands, proceeding in like manner also with the cavalry, and practising his men in sudden assaults instead of mere defence. He advanced in a corresponding degree the appreciation of firearms, increased the number of cannon in his army, and improved their construction by having them made shorter and lighter, so that they were more easily transported and brought into action.

There was no symmetrical uniform at the time of the Thirty Years' War; neither in the color nor in the cut of the garments was any correspondence apparent, nor could

this have been, since, from the side of the various governments, with the solitary exception of France and Holland, no provision was made for the army's needs. Most of the troops were, during the greater part of the time, like a horde of beggars or famishing vagrants ; nothing but their arms indicated their occupation. At times, however, they were indeed adorned with fine fabrics and with gold and silver, especially when they had just taken great booty in a marauding expedition. Since this was imperatively necessary for the purpose of distinction during a battle, each soldier put on something before he entered the contest, such as a white or red band upon his arm, hat, or cap, with green twigs or other marks. As these could easily be assumed or laid aside, it sometimes happened that prominent prisoners escaped by quietly exchanging their marks of distinction for those of fallen enemies, and thus slipping away. In battle the troops kept near their respective standards ; each battalion of foot had one of its own ; attached to a short staff was a heavy piece of silk adorned with allegorical figures and Latin mottoes. The cavalry standard was smaller, and was called a cornet. The ensign, or standard-bearer, was always carefully selected, and the colonel, on delivering to him the flag, admonished him to look upon it as a bride or a daughter : in case his right hand should be shot away to take it in his left, on the loss of this to seize it with his mouth, and, when no way of escape should remain, to wrap himself in it, and die an honorable death.

The greatest difference between the armies of the Thirty Years' War and those of a later day is found in the fact that soldiers then took their wives and children with them. Even in the very beginning of the war the number of women which followed the regiment was nearly

equal to that of the men which it contained. It was reported of a newly-enlisted regiment in 1620 that it marched with 3,000 men strong from its place of muster, and was followed by 2,000 women. The colonel was unwilling to allow this, and directed the ferrymen, when they were to cross a river, not to allow the women to pass. But there was raised such a fearful wail on both sides of the stream, the women crying for their husbands, and these demanding their wives, who had in possession their shirts, shoes, and other articles, that the colonel was finally compelled to abandon his purpose. At a later day the number of the camp-followers was increased beyond all belief by the multiplication of children, so that in the last years of the war the numbers in the camp must be placed at three and four times that of the combatants, as appears in an example taken from the history of the war. The wives of the soldiers washed, cooked, and performed in general all kinds of service for their husbands, dragged along in the march their children and all those utensils which could not be taken upon the baggage-wagons, and took part in plundering the peasants and burghers by the way. In this respect the most shameful acts of violence were committed; no chest or box was safe from them, and, when they passed from one quartering to another, they forced those whom they plundered to deliver up their horses for the transportation of the plunder. No cunning of the peasants and burghers could conceal their savings from the keen scent of the soldiers. All that was not in quite inaccessible or perfectly concealed places fell into their hands, so that the robbed often thought that nothing short of witchcraft could have betrayed the place of concealment. Such were the atrocities committed upon their victims by these robbers, that the old chroniclers have

produced nothing more frightful even in regard to the Huns, Avars, and Mongols. They would unscrew the flint of a pistol and screw up the thumb of the unfortunate in the place; they would skin the bottom of the foot, sprinkle salt in the fresh wound, and then make a goat lick the salt off; they would pass a horse-hair through the tongue, and draw it slowly up and down; they would bind about the forehead a knotted rope, and draw it constantly tighter with a lever. If an oven was at hand, they would force their victim into it, kindle a fire in the front of it, and compel him to creep out through this fire. They often bored holes in the knee-pans of those whom they would torment, or poured disgusting fluids down their throats. To these thousand-fold torments were added, in the case of matrons and maidens, the basest outrages. No woman was secure against the beastly violence of the soldier, and nothing but flight or defence could in some instances save them. When the robbers had, by torture, compelled the surrender of hidden treasures, when their lust of plunder was satisfied, and their inhuman desires quieted, they completed the proof of their vandalism by destroying that which they could not carry off.

The war had disseminated, even among the peasants, some military knowledge, which they sought to utilize, when the enemy drew near, by conveying their goods to some place capable of concealment or defence by art. Thus the people of Aspach, when they learned that the enemy was approaching, took refuge in a field of large extent, surrounded by a growth of beech and protected by high thorn-bushes, so that the inside could be reached only by creeping flat upon the stomach. There grew up, during the war, a fierce hatred between the peasants and the

soldiers, which led to frequent murders and man-slaughters. It may be asked whence the peasantry gathered the courage to return, as they did, to their oft-robbed houses, and why they did not prefer, in their desperation, to pursue for themselves the robber's trade. Aside from the fact that the Princes endeavored, so far as they were able, to keep the peasantry upon the soil, the love of home wrought this miracle, that they preferred, rather than yield to desperation, to till their fields armed to the teeth, and contend for their teams with the robbers who attacked them.

Still more destructive than with the peasantry was the effect of the war upon some of the cities, and that too even before the forced contributions had assailed their prosperity. This came by the deterioration of the coinage which gradually grew up during the Thirty Years' War. After the coinage of light weight, which took place under Frederic's reign in Bohemia, this example was, as we have related, followed in a much larger measure by the Emperor, and by the clique to whom he had committed the coinage, and although this indefinitely adulterated coin was called in, yet there could be no return to a well-regulated monetary system. The German Princes resorted to like devices, and the unhappy issue of these undermined the general thrift. When the war was raging everywhere in Germany, the wealth of the cities was ever an object of the soldiers' most fervid longing. The poorly fortified cities had to submit to be completely plundered by contributions; those better fortified had to sustain repeated sieges, the results of which were often adverse, and they were threatened with the fate of Magdeburg.

The relation of the soldiers to their wives varied in

strength and cordiality according to the persons; in general they were rude alliances, which accident formed and dissolved. If a soldier was dissatisfied with his wife and justly charged her with a crime, he might surrender her to the loose followers of the camp, who, in the most degrading way, abused her at pleasure. For the better order of the numerous band of servants which followed the regiments, there was connected with each a number of loose women, who, in marching into new quarters, were expected to take care that the disorderly bands which were subjected to them did not force their way in before the soldiers and appropriate the provisions furnished for the camp. In battle the camp-followers were placed in the rear of the army, so as to be enclosed by the baggage-wagons, and thus fortified against attack.

In regard to the gluttonous lives of the soldiers during the Thirty Years' War, we have evidence from thousands of witnesses, and, if further proof were still desired, we have it in the above-stated ordinances of Waldstein's army. Such ordinances could, however, have been maintained literally by those for whom they were prescribed but a very short time, and then their unmeasured demands would have to give way, to be resumed when the opportunity should be more favorable. The longer the war continued the less frequently would these favorable days return, and hunger and distress were often the lot of whole sections of the army. In the alleys of the camp, pale and hollow-eyed faces were met, in every tent lay the sick and the dying, and the air in the neighborhood was made pestilential by the bodies of the dead scarcely concealed in burial. It was indeed the sudden change from superabundance to extreme want which so hardened the hearts of the warriors that, in the pressure of their momen-

tary sense of need, they did not shrink from the most shameful deeds. Of the numerous extraordinary contributions exacted by the colonels, and which they could use only in part for the army, they put a part into their pockets, and the captains followed their examples. One of the chief complaints which the Electors raised against Waldstein's army was, that the Italians who had places in it every year sent great sums from the savings of their robberies to Italy. This complaint was just, and explains why so many Italians sought their bread in Germany. The common soldiers could not send their savings home through the medium of the merchants, and so we read that they preserved in their belts the gold-pieces which they had stolen, or wore upon their breasts their gold and silver, cast into plates, and then in battle lost these in the same way in which they had won them. The Swedish colonels and generals of a later day pursued this course still more basely than did the imperialists, those under Waldstein alone excepted. We have related of Banér that at his death he left perhaps a million thalers accumulated by this kind of robbery. Wrangel equalled him in avarice, and was violently agitated when the conclusion of the peace put an end to his robberies. Count Königsmark collected so great an amount in gold and valuables, that he, who had been penniless in the beginning, left his family a yearly income of 130,000 thalers.

When it is perceived that the armies were regularly paid and well supplied with provisions for scarcely a third part of the long period of the war, and that they were for this reason thrown upon exactions, plunder, and accident for their support; when it is considered how by their tyranny the peasants and burghers were bereft of all their means, how the cities and villages were laid in ashes, or at

least in desolation,—it becomes easy to conceive why a great portion of the lands were gradually depopulated. In the front rank stands Bohemia, the population of which may have been at first about 2,000,000. According to a census instituted in 1653, five years after the end of the war, the number of the population had sunk to 700,000, and half of the houses in the cities were unoccupied and were falling into decay, and half of the soil was untilled. This appalling desolation was even exceeded in some other places, especially in Central Germany. A census, ordered in the County of Henneburg after the war, showed that this district had lost 75 per cent. of its population and 66 per cent. of its dwelling-houses, while the loss in horses, cows, and goats was 80 per cent. All other parts sustained similar losses, and it will not be too much to say that all Germany lost at least the half of its population and more than two-thirds of its movable property. To this is to be added the damage suffered in regard to morals and culture. The schools, which had once been so good, were now, chiefly for want of teachers and pupils, shut up, and Germany was, in this respect, behind its Western neighbors. It required almost more than human exertion to rise from this deep decay, to renew the paralyzed industries, repair the intellectual losses, and keep step with the West. Time has shown that Germany did not shun this task, and that it has brilliantly repaired its losses.

CONCLUDING CHAPTER.

BY THE TRANSLATOR.

The Place which the Thirty Years' War occupies in the World's Educational Progress. Review of the War. The Treaties of Westphalia as a Common Law of Europe. The Point of Departure for further Development. Retrospect.

THOSE statements of fact which we call history are of little value except as they bear upon the practical questions of government and social and private life, or the scientific one of an evolution tending towards a purposed end in the world's social state. The most stupendous and systematic array of the facts of human history which has ever been produced by a single mind—Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire"—seems to view these as a series of fortuitous events. Its author makes no attempt to trace a plan of development running through the ages which he so majestically surveys. He looks upon the epoch of the Antonines as that happy era in which, had their destiny been submitted to their own choice, all men would have chosen to spend their allotted period upon the earth, thus treating all occurrences as a confused series which accident had diversified by alternating at random brighter with darker spots, the brightest being seventeen centuries before the great historian's birth.

Are historical students, then, to be properly regarded as children amusing themselves with a kaleidoscope, or

are they thoughtful persons observing with supreme interest the progress of a section of the great drama of the universe? We take the latter view, and raise the question, What place does the Thirty Years' War occupy in this historic drama?

Aside from the Jewish and Christian books and that mystic divine power by which they came attended, the Greek and Roman culture became the largest element which Christianity appropriated. How the Greeks had previously profited by the learning of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, Phœnicians, and others need not here be stated. The most obvious extrinsic contribution ever made at any one time to the preparation for the spread of the Christian system was that inaugurated by Alexander the Great in the scheme of colonization which formed a part of his plan of conquest. By this, Greek civilization was planted in the midst of Asiatic barbarism, and had more than three centuries to grow before its aid would be demanded for the spread of the coming religion. During this time copies of the Hebrew writings, which had been translated into Greek by order of Ptolemy Philadelphus, one of Alexander's successors in Egypt, were multiplied, and were brought by Israelitish colonists into the Greek settlements, which were in the meantime dispersed from the borders of India to the West of Europe.

After the impulse given to his system by the personal presence of Jesus, his apostles and disciples prosecuted the work in the way of their Master's example of public and private teaching, the Jewish synagogues within the Roman Empire furnishing their points of support. This method of propagation was continued almost exclusively for three centuries, after which time persuasion began to be reinforced by the commands of the magistrates, which

tendency grew until conversion by governmental authority became rather the rule than the exception. The Church settled what was to be believed, and the people were required to accept it as their faith.

There have, indeed, always been protests against the authoritative procedure of the Catholic Church. Reference was made to this fact in our Introductory Chapter, and nothing need be added here except that these protests have appeared in the quiet lives and teachings of certain sects which have propagated themselves in seclusion and secrecy, also from some violent local or more general outbreaks, and more or less always from pious men, not unfrequently in the priesthood, who have perhaps lacked the courage openly to oppose what they regarded as erroneous, and have therefore contented themselves with living in an exemplary manner and teaching what they could of sound doctrine.

The propagating process was largely that of converting kings, princes, or tribal heads, of whatever name or grade, who then brought their people to accept the new religion, which must then take on the form given it by the supreme authority of the Church. Not to repeat the mention of earlier local ruptures, there was, near the beginning of the sixteenth century, a general rising against this leadership, or, more properly, against certain extreme or corrupt measures proceeding from the leadership of the Catholic Church. The seceding party, or rather parties, set up for themselves on precisely the same principle—that is, that the religion accepted by the prince must control the people. Thus the faith finally formulated at Augsburg in 1530, and called the Augsburg Confession, was accepted and enforced in Germany, while more or less independent modifications of this creed prevailed in France, Switzerland, Holland, and England.


We have observed that the Protestants retained the principle that the religion of the prince should govern that of his people. The exceptions to this rule will but affirm the rule itself. The Reformation moved with such momentum and violence as to disregard the princely power where the princes had not preceded it or been carried with it into Protestantism. The provinces ruled by the house of Hapsburg furnish the best examples. The great body of the people, nobles, burghers, and peasants, joined the evangelical movement, and the princes were either too weak or too prudent to attempt their conversion. The nobles of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary were strong, and their sovereign, who usually combined the imperial dignity with this sovereignty, must proceed by way of regulating Protestantism, and circumscribing its spread, rather than by attempting to suppress it. The Royal Charter, to go no further back, which Rudolph II. had been forced to grant, Matthias evaded wherever he could do so. The government needed the help of the smaller sects, such as the Bohemian and Moravian Brethren, so that reasons of state led to the toleration of these sects. Some great nobles, acting on economic grounds, kept the Anabaptists, whose thrift enabled them to pay nearly double the rent of other tenants, on their manorial estates, so that more than the half of some 20,000 of these poor people lived upon the grounds of a single lord, whose contempt for their doctrines did not blind him to his own interests.

The only other limitations to princely authority over the religion of the people are those found in the provisions of treaties, of which the main ones concerned at this point of time are those of the religious peace of 1555.

Nor would the parties, on a close examination, be found

to differ so fundamentally in principle, as has sometimes been supposed, as to the authority by which their doctrines were to be settled and their laws enacted. The Catholic Church settles its doctrines by its œcumenical councils, the Protestants by councils of theologians. In both instances, in lands where either system is established, the princes are the chief executives; they accept doctrines prepared for them by men appointed partly by princely authority, and enforce them upon their people regardless of the latter's personal convictions. It is true, indeed, that those princes who took the evangelical side in the Reformation derived their faith from a few men, of whom Luther was foremost, who drew it, as a profound personal conviction, directly from the Bible, and imparted like convictions to others. Such was the impetuosity of this movement, that it carried about the half of the entire Western Church with it, and within the German Empire, as some have roughly estimated, nearly nine-tenths. These were moved, doubtless, partly by a true faith in the new doctrine, partly repelled from the Church by its corruptions, and partly borne along by the current, not well knowing whence or whither. The people crystallized in hostile sections.

Rigidly orthodox writers of either section have treated the other as all wrong, while they have regarded their own party as quite in the right. The several divisions which have come to rank under the general name of Protestants even to this day call upon each other to unite against the Catholics as their common foe. The Catholics have fully reciprocated this treatment. This tends to injustice and to corrupt the facts of history. He who writes on either side with this bias will never write strict truth. We should never attack or defend a mere name.



Catholics are not pagans, and yet Protestant writers have often made them worse than pagans. They have the elements of Christianity, though corrupted, and corruptions may be found also among those who are not called Catholics. The highest claim that Protestants ought to make is, that they are the van of the army of Christian civilization.

Before making the application of this general statement to an understanding of the period of the Thirty Years' War, we shall outline, by way of episode, a theory of progression in society corresponding with the facts of history. We shall enter into no debate with those who do not admit a plan, or design, in creation, and in the progressive evolution, individual and social, of that which has been created. There are few such, and there would be none if all men would but candidly survey the whole body of facts within the range of their apprehension.

It is clear that each plant and animal has its own organization, according to which it is developed from its germ to its maturity, and which survives through its decay and to its death. If the life-period of a plant, a tree, or an animal be a day, a week, a month, a year, two, a hundred, or a thousand years or more, as in case of the great trees of California, this all lies still within the range of human observation, and is so uniform, and has been so thoroughly explored, that a result can be predicted almost as well as described from the past. So, too, of species as well as of individuals. It can be known how each species is affected by changes of climate, soil, and the arts of culture, both as to their physiology, and, in case of the animal creation, including man, as to that indwelling intelligence which belongs to it. Nor, although the whole period of this planet's historic occupation by

man has been so infinitely brief, as compared with its own age, to say nothing of that of the system to which it belongs, or the universe of matter of which this system is a part, have there been wanting rational theories as to the origin, development, periods, and final extinction of the parts of the material universe itself.

In one province, however, a process of evolution is going on, the tracing of which more nearly concerns us than does that of the planetary and stellar universe, while its facts are more obvious to our apprehension: it is that of the *grand total of human society*.^{*} The law of progression is that each individual shall hand over to his posterity what he has acquired in knowledge and moral habit, and that this transmission shall form an infinite series. If, indeed, immortality be the destiny of man, as has been maintained by the wise and good of all historic ages, then it must be admitted that the period of our observation in this field is infinitely brief; it is, however, long enough to show whither society is tending. Nor does our purpose require us to show that this tendency has always been uniform; it is enough that it is clearly traceable in Christendom, and its germ, Judaism.

We have referred to the streams which were poured

^{*} Herbert Spencer ("Education," Appleton's ed., p. 65) claims that human history is of little importance in education. He seems to regard that as most important—animalcules, for instance—which lies back nearest the germ from which higher natures, like our own, have been developed. Mr. Spencer is not, indeed, wanting in self-appreciation, and ought therefore to reflect that if the rest of the race should place him where this estimate of their historical value places them, he would be unknown. It would seem as if those great men who have taken skeptical views of Christianity had thereby disqualified themselves for the appreciation of that providential plan which is so clearly discoverable in the progressive evolution of the Christian system in its application to our race.

into the reservoir of Greek and Roman culture previous to Alexander's colonization, to the preparation made by this system for the promulgation of Christianity, and then, finally, to its propagation by persuasion, and by this, in alliance with governmental authority, down to the outbreak in the beginning of the sixteenth century and the settlement made between the contending parties in 1555.

Let it here be further added that this evolution has, notwithstanding the violence, oppression, and bloodshed attending it, been as natural, according to the constitution of the human individual and that of society, as is the growth of the oak from its germ in the acorn to its majestic maturity at the age of two centuries. As the one is so constituted as to extend its roots both downwards and laterally for its own nutriment and the resistance of the storms which sport among its branches, so is the other such in the very nature which the Creator has given it, that, when fed with the divinely provided doctrine, it is nourished and strengthened by the contests necessary for the maintenance of that doctrine in its natural supremacy and its subjective appropriation by the individual mind.

We shall not dogmatically assert that the Creator might not have constituted society so that it would have needed no progression, though we are inclined to the negative. This much is clear: society's conservative is stronger than its revolutionary force. Nor is it easy to conceive how it could have been held together at all without an advantage in favor of the existing order. Possession is law, and will, as a rule, hold against all claims which are of simply equal justice with that of the possessor, and often for long periods against those founded in superior right. The reader can test this observation by an attempt to con-

ceive a state of society—it would not be society—in which the unjust possessor should have no advantage over the equally unjust claimant. None can doubt that, in Christendom at least, all revolution—we refer not to violent outbreaks simply—has been in the direction of right or justice. It will therefore be evident that society will grow stronger as it approaches that justice which is the end of revolution, for the conservative and revolutionary forces will be ever approaching their ultimate unity. Whether this state will ever be reached on this earth, or even elsewhere, we shall not attempt to decide.

This fact in the structure of aggregate humanity has supplied, on the one hand, the choicest weapon in the hands of those who scoff at all divine oversight in the affairs of our race, and, on the other, the incentive to the fanatical to make premature assaults upon existing institutions. The one class cannot conceive how a just God could leave justice to evolve itself progressively, instead of making it every moment supreme; the other rushes into irrational and useless attacks upon all wrong and supposed wrong, because he is assured that all must in the end be made right, and he must have this done *now*.

Nor can it be deemed unnatural that a long-standing tenure, though ever so unjust in its nature, comes to be regarded by the possessor himself as an absolute right. Thus the Roman Catholic hierarchy and the princes who recognized it deemed themselves, no doubt, deeply and permanently wronged in the Protestant secession. Nothing short of this supposition will explain the inextinguishable enmities of the Thirty Years' War. The Catholic Church had yielded, the century before, only because it could not enforce its claims, and negotiated for the holding of what it still possessed only because it could not

regain by arms what it had lost. Nor can we perceive, on the assumption that religion is to be taught and enforced by the State, any very decisive reason why this might not as well be dictated by the Catholic hierarchy as by any other governmental authority. If the Protestant doctrine suits us better, we may nevertheless properly inquire, what is the value of Luther's doctrine of justification by faith in the hands of a clergy appointed by the State and having no practical belief in their own creed? It wrought wonderfully when taught by those who believed it. It cannot, indeed, be doubted that the Papal power exercised a wholesome influence for the restraint of the turbulent princes and nobles of the Middle Ages, and was adapted to do so until the individual Christian consciousness of princes and people should have attained to a more advanced stage of development. But the better doctrine of Protestants no more proves that Protestantism would work better as a state system than the regulating action of the Papacy as a balance-wheel in the European Middle Ages proves that this is the true organic form of the Christian Church. We have therefore to seek the final cause of the revolution which substituted Protestant State Churches for the sole sway of the Papal hierarchy in that divinely guided evolution of social humanity which is working out progressively the complete emancipation of the individual mind. This works by gradation.

We turn aside here to make the remark, that we know of no truth in the domain of natural religion which opens so vast a range of contemplation, and is adapted to awaken in the mind of the devout Christian philosopher so profound an admiration of the providential plan of the world's progress, as this, viz., that tenure is law, and, in a certain sense, divine law, until a higher divine right shall

have had time to establish its claim. The reader might spend his life, were it a thousand times longer than it is, in contemplating and admiring the applications of this law of social progress.

We have now before us, in the parties to the Thirty Years' War, two, or, to state the case more accurately, several claimants to the control of the religious doctrines and worship of the people. All were wrong. They were fighting and negotiating for a possession which of right belonged to neither. In regard to the proposition of the Spanish minister, Count Olivarez, that the Palsgrave should allow his eldest son to be brought up a Catholic at the court of Vienna, and that the latter should then be invested with his hereditary possessions and the electoral dignity, Mr. Gindely very aptly remarks that, with all his pitiable conduct, Frederic never descended so low as to make merchandise of his children's religious faith. And yet this is in principle just what was done from the Reformation down, in the convention of Passau, in the religious peace of Augsburg, throughout the Thirty Years' War, and in the negotiations of Westphalia. If princes did not literally deal in their own children's religious beliefs, they did deal in those of their subjects, including themselves and their children, and that just as freely as one can deal in any goods and chattels. Nor is this system quite extinct in Germany to this day; for, although sovereigns interfere less than formerly, yet this trade is carried on in families, and, where the husband is of one faith and the wife of another, they often agree that the sons shall be educated in the faith of their father and the daughters in that of their mother, and this becomes a legal contract. So, too, in case of the numerous illegitimate births, where the parents hold different creeds: there

is a race between the clergy of the two faiths for the first possession of the child.

We have in the above statement the whole matter in dispute, so far as it was a religious contest (for it became variously complicated with the ambitions of sovereigns) of the Thirty Years' War.

Nor was this claim of the princes to the control of religion more than the logical sequence of that which they made to the persons of their subjects. They could freely negotiate the sale or purchase of lands and people, or give them in pledge for the payment of indebtedness. Indeed they can scarcely be said to have admitted that the people had any rights except those which their princes conceded to them. In the diets the sovereigns represented, not the people, but themselves.

Nor did the Protestant princes take a very different view from that of the Catholics as to their right to control the doctrines, worship, and, to some extent, the persons of their subjects. The two were alike in this: that they held themselves bound to tolerate each other only so far as they had formed treaties to this effect, and consequently both refused to tolerate the Calvinists, because neither had agreed by treaty to do so; and the Lutherans were as intolerant towards the Calvinists as they were towards the Catholics.

We have then the princes of both parties claiming the absolute right of control over the religion of their subjects. This they had, however, limited by treaty stipulations which both had violated. They could not be satisfied without a trial of strength. Each was strong in a certain vague but obstinate sense of right. The old Church had, in addition to its conviction of the truth of its doctrines, settled by councils, from that of Nice to that of Trent,

and the apostolic descent of its episcopate and clergy, with their head seated in the Eternal City, a certain pride of title to dominion which had acquired the strength of thirteen, or, as they would say, sixteen centuries of growth. How profoundly the hierarchy, with its deep-rooted sense of divine right, which sense was shared, if not in some instances excelled, in the bosoms of members of the great princely houses, felt the injury when a young revolutionary power shot up with volcanic violence from their midst, seized their old episcopal and monastic foundations, with their great landed domains and edifices, and administered these in the interests of the revolution, no imagination can at this day exaggerate. The Church had indeed waxed old and lost its vigor, but this had just been repaired by a new force which had sprung up in its own bosom and proposed to conquer for it the dominion of this earth. Ferdinand II. and Maximilian of Bavaria had been educated in the first college established by this order in Germany, and may be regarded as in a certain sense executives of the society in the Empire. These two men were the great Catholic personalities of the war.

The rival power felt equally strong, though in another sense. It was the rapid but sturdy growth of a successful revolution. It had, too, its memories ; these had the strength, not of age, but of freshness. Its champion had stood undismayed before the greatest of Emperors in the Diet of the Estates of the Empire, and, when called upon to retract his teachings, had declared, "I cannot do otherwise, so help me God, Amen," and then in a few years had carried the greater part of the Empire with him. They had taken possession of the old institutions of the Church, and were administering them in the new interest. So far as the relative strength of the parties had been

tested, the result was in their favor. But the parties had concluded a peace; they had consented to a mutual limitation of the obligation which their Master had imposed upon his disciples to preach the gospel to every creature, and had established, at Passau and Augsburg, certain lines of action which they might not transgress, the Master's command of unlimited proclamation to the contrary notwithstanding, and within which limit they designed to hold every man in spite of his own honest convictions.

The terms of this religious peace were arbitrary and unnatural, and could not well be kept by either party. The Protestants had gone on acquiring other endowed institutions—bishoprics, monasteries, and the like; and then more recently the Catholics had aroused themselves to the work of recovering their lost lands and people. Much had already been done. The Jesuits were working by their schools. Ferdinand had fulfilled his vow to expel heresy from Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola. Rudolph II. had pronounced, in 1607, the ban against the imperial Protestant city of Donauwerth, and Maximilian of Bavaria had executed the sentence by the forcible conversion of its people to Catholicism. The Protestant Union had been formed in defence against such acts, and the Catholic League in counter-defence. Matthias was resisting the concessions which his predecessor had made to the Protestants, and had thus brought on a violent rising, first in Bohemia. The test of strength was inevitable. It came in the war of which these volumes give account.

Ferdinand II., if we make no search for the power behind the throne, was the leading person in the first part of this contest. His views controlled the last acts of his im-

perial predecessor, and his career offers to the contemplation of the thoughtful student one of the most impressive pictures of history, and scarcely needs the aid of the historic artist's brush beyond the simplest narrative. By nature formed for bigotry, and confirmed in his native tendency by education, at the early age of seventeen years he took the above-mentioned vow, and entered upon its execution. This fairly accomplished, the crowns of Bohemia, Hungary, Austria, and the Empire are successively placed upon his head, though the dominion which these crowns implied was still to be won. Matthias would have yielded; Ferdinand would not. Left by the Emperor's death in 1619 in sole sovereignty, he cherished no thought of peaceful settlement, except at times when his cause was hopeless, and then only on the condition that Maximilian, whom he could trust to maintain his interests as a sovereign and a Catholic, should act for him. Nor did the Bohemians think of negotiation, except at moments of forlorn hope; and neither party was peacefully inclined, except when the other was bent on war. They fought; Ferdinand won, and never did conqueror show more perfectly that he regarded the persons, property, and opinions of the vanquished as at his disposal.

The Emperor proceeded at once wholly to revoke the concessions which his predecessors had made. He claimed that his subjects had forfeited these, and might now be dealt with at his pleasure. It was a grave charge against the marauding Protestant general, Count Mansfeld, that he refused to pay a personal debt because he supposed his creditor to have lost its written evidence. Ferdinand captured, not a note of hand given to an individual, but the charters which defined his obligations to the citizens of a kingdom, and then acted—and that, too, upon the

advice of his spiritual counsellors—as if no such had ever existed and his subjects were strictly his property. All must become Catholics or leave his dominions, and the perpetuity of this state of things was, as the Emperor supposed, provided for by law. He failed to carry out his plan only in Hungary, which was no part of the German Empire, and in the little German principalities of Silesia and Lusatia.

Ferdinand was aided in his bloody work of settling with the Bohemians by Maximilian of Bavaria, who, acting in the Emperor's behalf, had promised them that their lives at least should be spared. This promise was the one obstacle in the way of carrying out the scheme of execution which the Emperor's counsellors had drawn up for him, and the way taken to surmount it was unworthy of the two sovereigns. Maximilian, on being applied to, showed no desire to hold Ferdinand to the promise; and the latter, as though his obligation were to the indifferent agent who had made it, and not to the parties to whom it had been made, proceeded without scruple to the work. Thus men who might have escaped by flight were enticed to remain for the executioner's axe.

The native and educated bigot now appears in his littleness, as drawn in sharp outline by his own conduct. The sentences are laid before him. He is a Christian monarch, and must be merciful. He resorts, therefore, to the Church for light and comfort, and vows a pilgrimage to Maria-Zell. Mercy swells, according to his capabilities, in his heart; and though he allows the penalties to be executed in their full and barbarous severity in most of the cases, he mitigates their rigor in a few, especially in that of Count Schlick, who was to have had his right hand cut off and then to have been quartered alive. He de-

cides that the Count shall first be beheaded and *then* have his right hand cut off after death ; but whether the mercy was exercised towards the condemned or his executioner is not so certain. We do not hear of the Count's returning thanks for the favor. Ferdinand now urges haste in the execution, because he desires that some time shall intervene between this and a visit which he intends to pay to the people of Prague, and then, with a golden crown worth 10,000 florins to lay upon the altar at Maria-Zell, he sets out on his pilgrimage thither.

The ally to whom was committed the work of subduing the insurgents of Silesia and Lusatia, the rough and drunken Protestant, John George of Saxony, would not perform his task except on the condition that he should be allowed to leave his own religion free in those lands. Ferdinand, in order to save his ally, yielded. John George, in receiving the submission of the people, gave them this assurance, and took care afterwards that it should be kept. So should Maximilian have done.

The fiat had gone forth which was, with these exceptions, to free Ferdinand's lands of heresy. Law, judgment, and execution were his, and all were adjusted to his purposes. As the result, he lost half his people in the attempt to secure the nominal conformity of the other half, and those who remained to him were, until they lost all spirit, in an almost perpetual state of insurrection.

In the year 1623 the war might perhaps have ended ; but Ferdinand had surrendered Upper Austria to Maximilian of Bavaria in pledge of payment for the latter's services, and had executed an obligation to redeem the pledge by giving its holder the lands and electoral dignity of the Palsgrave Frederic. Maximilian insisted on the redemption of this pledge, and at this point his ambition must bear the chief

blame of the continuance of the war. This blame will, however, be divided between him and Ferdinand, according to the doubt which we may cherish as to the latter's ever having been sincere in his intimations of a willingness to restore the Palsgrave. To cite no other instance: he was quite lavish at the Diet at Regensburg, in 1622-23, in declaring publicly his kind intentions in regard to Frederic. He agreed to leave the whole matter to the decision of the Electoral College, and yet he was at the same time privately executing a covenant with Maximilian that he would carry out his promise to him in spite of any judgment of the Electors in favor of the Palsgrave and his agnates. Nor was this covenant, in view of the opinions of the several Electors, superfluous. All had been consulted but Brandenburg, and all had consented to the transfer; but their real views, had these been independently expressed, would have been as follows: In favor of it—Cologne, own brother of him to whom the Electorate was to be given, and the King of Bohemia, that is, Ferdinand himself, to whom this transfer would restore his lost province of Upper Austria. Opposed—Mentz, Treves, Brandenburg, Saxony, and, of course, the Palsgrave, who alone of the five was an interested party. It is then by no means certain that any other intimations of Ferdinand favorable to the Palsgrave were earnest.

It is clear that the war could not have stopped in 1623 without leaving the Catholics with decided advantages already gained. They had inflicted the death-blow upon Protestantism in all the lands then united under the crown of the Hapsburgs, except Hungary and the little principalities of Silesia and Lusatia, and had crippled it in these. They had weakened their antagonists in the rest of Germany by carrying on the war in the lands of the latter,

while their own remained comparatively untouched. If the electoral dignity and the whole Palatinate were to remain in Maximilian's possession, or the Upper Palatinate in his and the Lower in that of Spain, there would have been five Catholic against two Protestant Electors, and this large and rich district would have been quickly revolutionized to Catholicism. And, finally, if in any way a peace had been patched up in these circumstances, the Catholics might at their convenience have renewed the struggle and completed the subjugation of the Protestants.

But the war did not stop there. New alliances were introduced; old ones were strengthened. The Catholics were triumphant. Christian of Denmark, the leader of the Protestant allied forces, was driven from the field, and was glad to conclude at Lubeck a peace which was sufficiently favorable to himself, as the beaten party; but where did it leave poor Protestantism in Germany? Extinction was before it and threateningly near.

The Edict of Restitution had already a few months before this received the imperial sign-manual. Not only had it been proposed to demand the restoration of all ecclesiastical property which the Protestants had acquired since the Convention of Passau, but all, at whatever time acquired, which was held immediately of the Emperor. The Electors of Bavaria and Mentz (Schweikhard), to whom this proposition was submitted, praised it, but declared it premature,* which declaration involves a world of meaning; it can scarcely indicate less than that they deemed the time to be near when this and whatever else they might choose could be demanded, though it were the unlimited dominion of Catholicism. Even Saxony, whose sovereign had been second to none but Maximilian

* The author's word is "verfrüht."

in restoring to Ferdinand the possession of his crown-lands, was not to be spared in the reclamations of this edict.

A change was, however, coming; it did not come too soon. But before passing to this, the reader may well consider for a moment how near the end of Protestantism might have been but for this turn of affairs on the war theatre. The author says that Gustavus Adolphus saved Protestantism in Germany from extinction.* If in Germany, why not in the world? Already there was little of it left among the other great peoples of the continent. The feeble Swiss republics, Holland, Denmark, the Scandinavian peninsula, and the islands of the Baltic, alone would have remained to Protestantism, except the island of Great Britain, which, it is needless to say, would have been its only stronghold. Ferdinand was already negotiating the sale to Spain of some of the Baltic lands. In the little settlements which had just begun to be formed in the wilderness on the Atlantic coast of North America, Protestantism might have been extinguished, if the Catholics had but given up their quest of gold and entered upon the work.

The King of Sweden had long since been invoked by the Protestant powers of Germany, and now seemed to perceive that he must either attack the triumphant and advancing party in Germany, or prepare to defend himself against it at home. He preferred the former. Events on the theatre of the war favored him; otherwise the man, whom our author can compare with none known in history except with Alexander the Great, would have failed. Ferdinand's great marshal—whom he could not

* "Ohne ihn wäre der Protestantismus in Deutschland zu Grunde gegangen."

control, but who led him at will—occupied, doubtless, with some magnificent scheme of personal ambition, was, at this moment of triumph to the Catholic arms, developing a rivalry which was about to burst into open hostility to Tilly's command. Maximilian and the Princes of the League were even contemplating a break with the Emperor and an alliance with France. They all united in demanding Waldstein's removal. The two Catholic armies balanced and paralyzed each other. The Emperor and his advisers at Vienna and Madrid, thoughtless of the defeat in preparation for them by their own allies, were expecting without difficulty to elect Ferdinand III. as his father's successor to the Empire, and arrange for gathering and enjoying the ripe fruits of a final victory. For this purpose a Diet was called, which met at Regensburg in June, 1630.

At that day these Imperial Diets were the theatres of not only the domestic, but also the foreign diplomacy of the Empire; and Mr. Gindely says that at this one was fought the greatest diplomatic battle of the seventeenth century. Maximilian, advised and favored by Richelieu, was successful, the imperial party was defeated in its chief hopes, Waldstein was removed, and the Electors unanimously refused to elect the Emperor's son. The Catholics, in their separate councils, took up the Edict of Restitution, and resolved to carry it into execution, and, although they agreed to confer at Frankfort with the Protestants on the subject, they regarded this as but a matter of form, and intended to make no material concessions.

Soon after the opening of the Regensburg Diet, Gustavus Adolphus had landed on the Baltic coast with 13,000 Swedes. His advances were steady; his forces accumu-

lated. By the first of September, 1631, he had formed alliances with a number of the Protestant Estates of Germany, including their leader, John George of Saxony, one of the Emperor's chief allies. Had this Prince chosen in the beginning to take the other side, Ferdinand might have lost all his crowns, and yet he drives this ally into the Swedish camp by stupidly calling upon Tilly to enforce the Edict of Restitution against him, and to demand his continued alliance. Stupidly, we say, and yet his logic, and doubtless his sense of right, required that he should make no exceptions in favor of friends. He miscalculated the strain which John George's patience would bear. Breitenfeld follows, almost annihilating the imperial army. At this moment the Protestant and Catholic Estates were together at Frankfort in negotiation, and not even the loss of Tilly's army moved the Catholics from their purpose to execute the Edict, though they had to fly precipitately from the city to escape capture by the King of Sweden.

Thirteen of the thirty years had devastated the Protestant lands; seventeen years were still to come, completing and equalizing the exhaustion of the parties, before peace should again bless them. A little over a year of this time remained to the Palsgrave and the King of Sweden, but this was to be an interval of events. It was to throw much of Catholic Germany into the hands of the Protestants, to restore to them most of their own, to arrest the execution of the Edict, which was designed to give to the Catholics large ecclesiastical possessions, and to defeat and slay the veteran Tilly. It was to develop in the mind of Gustavus Adolphus a dangerous ambition, and, in those of his allies, distrust of him; it was to restore Waldstein with greater than imperial pow-

ers to the command, and to close with defeating him and slaying his great antagonist on the field of Lützen, November 16, 1632.

Of the seventeen years of war after Breitenfeld, a little over five remained to Ferdinand II., and these were years of anxious but unsuccessful endeavor for peace. A nominal peace was indeed concluded between the Emperor and John George, and offered to all others; and that it was not accepted by all the parties, these two sovereigns and the Elector of Brandenburg are to be blamed. The Emperor would permit no toleration to Protestants within his own dominions, except in Lusatia and Silesia. He desired for the remainder of his life a rest, unbroken by any whisper of religious difference. But the Peace of Prague, had it been accepted, would have proved but an armistice. It did not give up the Edict of Restitution; it merely suspended its operation for forty years, and made provision for settlement or new hostilities at the end of this period.

The Protestant Estates had learned by long experience to be suspicious of Ferdinand's sincerity. They regarded themselves as being by these stipulations merely tolerated, rather than acknowledged as an equal party, and their suspicions were fomented by Richelieu and Oxenstiern. But the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg were chiefly at fault that this imperfect treaty was not accepted. The Swedes had been the actual deliverers of Protestant Germany. If in process of time they had become robbers, they only did as the native Germans had done. There was no absurdity in their being rewarded, as Bavaria and Saxony had been for less costly and less effective services. The plea that they were foreigners had little force, since reigning houses had often been for-

eigners, and yet had become as natives, and had not been subject to objections on this ground. And yet Saxony and Brandenburg, especially the latter, would have driven their Swedish deliverers unrewarded from the country. Reasonable action—for Oxenstiern was alarmed at the prospect—would have closed the war on the basis of the Peace of Prague in 1635, and saved the country thirteen years of further devastation, robbery, and butchery.

The Emperor had found, in 1637, quiet in the grave, and not, as he had hoped, in the acceptance of the Peace of Prague. He had doubtless felt deeply and painfully conscious how hard it is to stop a war when once under way. Other attempts at peace followed; but in that one which finally succeeded we shall doubtless have to give the Ecclesiastical Elector of Mentz the credit of greatest activity. He conferred with other princes; conceded to the desire of some that the peace, when concluded, should embrace also the Calvinists; advocated this and other concessions, which may be deemed liberal for the time; called a meeting of the Electors at Nuremberg, which was followed by the Diets of the Estates at Regensburg and Frankfort, by corresponding preliminaries on the part of the foreign allies of the parties, by the Congress in Westphalia; and, finally, as related, by the peace itself.

What did this peace settle, and what do we learn in regarding it from the closing years of the nineteenth century? These questions may be answered without separating the one from the other.

It was clear that neither party could extinguish the other except at the risk of expiring with it. They must live side by side, and act their respective parts in the solu-

tion of the world's social problems. That their rivalry has given an impulse to exertion which would have been wanting if either had survived alone, and borne the sole sway, will scarcely be questioned by intelligent students of history. The one is society's conservative, the other its progressive force. Protestantism, as a State religion, is a failure. It is an attempt to combine discordant elements—the free exercise of religion and its control by the State. Religion can develop itself fully only by its inherent power and in freedom from State control, and the Church can be kept together by force only where that force is complete and absolute, as in the Catholic Church, with the State as its executive. The present condition of Germany confirms this view. The Catholic Church holds together much better than the Protestant, because the latter is neither the one thing nor the other. Here we see the providential plan for keeping the elements in a kind of aggregation until the more potent working of a free religious movement shall come to absorb them.

No existing facts contradict this statement. The eminent lights of the Protestant State Churches, and the piety of their rank and file, so far as this exists, are a free development, and not a product of the State. The State does nothing, can do nothing, of the kind. Indeed this remark may be applied also to the Catholic Church; for we have no right to doubt that this too has its thoughtful, devout, and pious men, ill-adapted as it is to produce them. Nothing lies beyond the penetrative power of a free religion. It is, and always has been to some extent, naturally developed in reflective minds in State Churches themselves, and the perpetual din from the various bodies of separatists, each of which emphasizes some wholesome truth, pervades the masses of the public, and controls

more or less the lives of multitudes who never separate from the Churches in which they were born. Thus the bishops of the Anglican Church, including its primate, and the prominent men of the German, French, Swiss, and other Protestant State Churches, forgetting their official connection with the State, and acting out their religious emotions, have either joined or sanctioned such movements as the World's Evangelical Alliance, and have in various ways, beyond that which the State demands of them, swelled the volume of free religious power.

Our remark, that religion can develop its full force only in absolute freedom from the State, may be misapprehended. It is not directed against religious establishments as one of the stages in the providential plan of evolution. A man may know that these are wrong in principle, and not destined to perpetuity, and yet tremble to assume the place of Providence and declare that they should now be dissolved. This no large-minded, thoughtful man would dare to do. It seems most probable that State Churches will expire by natural processes; that the Creator's design is to hold them together as they are, only with a gradual relaxation of their attachments, until independent bodies shall be prepared to receive their disbanding forces and march on with them in the procession of progress. Such tendency is even now too evident to be questioned. There may be violence, there may not; but the Peace of Westphalia seems to have ended what may be properly called religious wars. These treaties, indeed, became the common law of Europe, and remained so until superseded by the great revolutionary movement at the close of the eighteenth and opening of the nineteenth century. In the world's history there has probably never been a code of treaty provisions which has exercised anything like so

large and enduring a sway as that known as the Peace of Westphalia, which closed this war.

As to the settlement of territorial questions by this Congress, nothing need be added. In regard to religion, it settled nothing new. The war had shown by a decisive test that neither party could be exterminated, that lines could only be drawn which they must not transgress, and the religious peace of the previous century was reaffirmed and only modified. The Reformation in the first half of the sixteenth century is the era which has been regarded with deepest interest in the devout contemplation of Christians. But it should not be forgotten that the Reformation was not established until this was done by the Peace of Westphalia. Thenceforth was to be developed a new principle, which we venture to state as follows:

Religion—we may embrace with this also all personal convictions on any subject whatever—is a matter of the individual judgment alone, and cannot, from the nature of the case, be properly furthered otherwise than by instruction. Parents are the only natural instructors. They may seek counsel and aid, but cannot delegate their trust, or shuffle off their duty. The child's good should be their sole ultimate motive, and their own pleasure and material profit but incidents. In order to arrive at moral and religious truth, they are bound earnestly to use all the means which lie within their reach for the formation of their own belief and practice, the teaching of their children and the persuasion, of others, and, where they find any room for decided doubts, to impart their impressions to their children and others with the exact amount of doubt which exists in their own minds. Nor should a doubt be cherished which might be removed,

and, least of all, by a public teacher. Conscientious inquiry will not stop short of this goal. Here comes in properly an invocation of divine aid to supplement the teaching and change the bias of the learner's mind. This is a spiritual process above any ever delegated to man. Authority is rightly used only as auxiliary to instruction, and to fix attention upon it. Conviction is the mind's own act, or it is not conviction at all. Lamormain's theory—"Severe pressure will bring the people to their reason"—and Ferdinand's practice of sending an auxiliary military force with the priests whom he sent out to convert the Protestants, wrought only submission, not conviction. The armed force did the work.*

The only proper action of government is to protect the whole people in all legitimate development, in the exercise of freedom of opinion and practice, so far as this does not overstep the bounds of a decent morality. It must, to this end, restrain vice and crime. Only one thing more can it do, that is, defend religion by a common day of rest in its interests. But the persons who carry it on are to be distinguished from the government itself. They have the religious obligations of all men, and should be examples in this respect. Further, each corporate branch of government may be provided with religious instruction and worship for themselves at the public expense, and especially does this become an obligation in case of soldiers and sailors, whom the government takes away from their home provisions for worship. Government may, indeed, provide instruction and defray its expenses by taxation, and may include morality and religion among the subjects of this instruction, and is bound to do so;

* Vide Vol. I., pp. 411-412.

but this will necessarily be such as shall be dictated by the average convictions of each community. Even in this, therefore, the government need not, and may not, invade the territory of free conviction.

This is the true relation of government to religion. This view had received no development at the era of the Thirty Years' War. It was dimly foreshadowed in the mind of George William of Brandenburg.* It had been conceived in England and in her American colonies, but was not contemplated in any action of the Westphalian Congress, though this was really the greatest tributary to the development of religious freedom; it chained the contending parties, that the people might be free to solve in the future their own problem.

The Reformation in Luther's time is not studied too much, or prized too highly, as an epoch in history; but to be understood as a segment of the historic time, it must be supplemented by a study of the period of the Thirty Years' War. This is the Chinese wall which separates that which precedes from that which follows; until we have surmounted this we can never reconnect in thought the parts which it severs. English history is a whole, unbroken by any series of events which so completely cuts off its past from its future. The same is true of France, Italy, and the Peninsula. But for Germany this period is a kind of Chicago fire. It swept all before it, spread soot, ashes, and brambles over every landscape, and reduced humanity to barbarism. Development must begin anew.

Is there a point within the range of history from which we can, by a survey of a period of thirty years, receive so

* Vol. II., p. 105.

profound an impression as from the Peace of Westphalia, or, better perhaps, from the peace banquet of 1650 in Nuremberg? How appear the reckonings of human ambition? Ferdinand II. was perhaps chiefly ambitious of a life of repose in the bosom of the Church. He sought this by ridding his lands of heresy, which was to him the only source of disquiet, and from the beginning of his reign, at the age of seventeen years, to his death, at fifty-eight, he enjoyed scarcely a moment of the rest which he longed for. And yet, had he been ambitious only of exact justice, his reign might have been a peaceful one. Maximilian of Bavaria, at the age of thirty-four years, played the prelude to the Thirty Years' War by executing Rudolph's sentence of ban against the city of Donauwerth; in 1623 his ambition was chiefly blamable for the continuance of the war, and it raged for twenty-five years longer. During this long period he often tired of the contest, was inclined to a separate peace, once concluded such a one, hastened the action of Ferdinand III. at Münster by threatening to act independently, and died at past seventy-eight years of age, but a single year after the last war forces had been disbanded. How must this closing peaceful year of his life have been saddened as life's sunset rays shone upon the blank desolations of the Germany which he loved? We can only imagine what were this thoughtful man's reflections.

Then we but repeat the error of that day if we regard only the princes. The reflections of each nobleman, burgher, artisan, and peasant were but repetitions on a humbler scale of those of the princes. The aged had spent more than half their active lives amid scenes of war, the younger the whole, and might almost feel, in

the strangeness of the change, as did the aged prisoner released from the Bastille, who desired permission to return and end his days within its gloomy walls.

Brilliant ephemera appeared and disappeared during this period. Henry IV. of France saw indeed the rising clouds, though he left the scene before the outburst of the storm. Richelieu arose, lived just long enough to inaugurate, for Henry's sombre son, France's career of glory, and both died leaving the "Grand Monarch" in embryo to carry out the scheme. Gustavus Adolphus saved German Protestantism, and fell near Leipsic, where, two centuries later, Germany's greatest missionary institution was organized and called by his name in memory of the rescue which his genius, whether under the promptings of piety or ambition, or both united, had wrought, which name we have just seen reinscribed in the Leipsic jubilee of the year 1882. Waldstein—to characterize him by a figure which allies him with his own astrology—appeared as a blazing comet, and withdrew. Such was the hazy obscurity in which all relations were enveloped, that many an upright prince—the Electors John George and George William, and Duke Bernard of Weimar are instances—failed to find and keep their true positions. The result was cast in the mould of the Westphalian Congress, there to be held until a greater issue, just then being inaugurated across the British Channel, should have been wrought out in England and the New World, to be spread thence over the earth.

In this, too, religion was largely, if not chiefly, concerned, and some of its greatest lights of all time were then burning, especially on the side of non-conformity. Cromwell had entered upon his career; Milton was adding the

charm of his poetry to the argument of his prose; Howe, Baxter, and Owen were clearing up the mysteries of theology and illustrating piety; and John Bunyan was dreaming for the enlightenment and cheer of coming generations. The names of Sir Walter Raleigh and Algernon Sidney may be added to these. Their deaths on the scaffold for the free expression of their opinions, as well as Bunyan's twelve years in Bedford Jail, do not, indeed, speak well for freedom in England, but they commend the more highly that instinct of right which hazarded life in its utterance.

The Anglican Church had also its talent and piety. Its high places had never been reserved, as had those of the Continent, for the emolument of incompetent scions of princely houses. Its public men were at this time some of them marvels of ability. Hooker died indeed eighteen years before the opening of the Thirty Years' War, but his great work on Ecclesiastical Polity lived as the guide of future ages of his Church, and such men as Jeremy Taylor were in the episcopacy to carry it into effect. While the Peace of Westphalia was yet unexecuted, Charles I. was beheaded at Whitehall, perhaps the firmest martyr that ever sealed by his death his faith in a despotic kingly government. Thus, on the Continent and in England, was prepared the way of the development of free religion and free government. Who shall say that, human nature being what it is, contests of less dimensions would have answered the end? In a sense, this may be true, and yet the reasoning involves a practical absurdity. The American Civil War might have been avoided if the value of the slaves had been offered and accepted—that is, if two impossibilities had been overcome. The Thirty

Years' War might have been prevented, or shortened, if the parties had agreed, which they could not. In both instances—though we cannot illustrate by a counter-experiment—we have reason to believe that the contest stopped just where the best foundation could be secured for an unhindered growth. In the Republic the population and strength were undiminished, and there was no danger of a renewal of the struggle. In the Continental Empire of the seventeenth century, population was reduced to the half, and that half to semi-barbarism, deserts and forests occupied the places of fruitful fields, villages and cities, but from that moment Germany began to rise to the first rank of culture and thrift. It is a nation of teachers at home, and is dispersing itself as a power among all nations abroad. Thus while Providence is sending England ahead with the best mould for the recasting of the nations, it sends the Germans next to supply the most abundant material for the formation and lead of their rank and file.

The reader may think that he discovers in the above review an indifference to the fundamental distinctions of religious faith. Nothing could be further from the truth. We hold the New Testament, as interpreted by each mind, under the guidance of its own best light, to be the true and final creed of Christendom. Three grand steps in the development of Christianity towards this creed are more or less distinctly noticeable from the epoch of the foregoing history to the present day. In the era of the Thirty Years' War the faith of the people was settled by force, and largely on the battle-field. In the free countries of Christendom this method soon shaded down into that of intellectual combat by mutual attack and defence, and this is now in turn giving way before that earnest and

active faith which builds itself up, in both personal and church life and doctrine, without attack upon others, and in the full confidence that the organized error, which might thrive in the conflict of arms and polemic disputation, will yield before the onward march of the truth and spirit of the Christian system actualized in human life. We may expect the next act in the drama to be a still higher development of this tendency.

APPENDIX.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

SUPPLEMENTARY SKETCH.

IN the beginning of July last, while occupied with the translation of Professor Gindely's account of Gustavus Adolphus, the translator suggested to him in a letter the desirableness, for American readers, of a little greater fulness in the sketch of this remarkable man. The letter reached the Professor late in his summer retreat in Lief-land, in the Russian Empire; his answer did not come to hand until September, and his addition to the account not until near the end of October, after the plates for that part of the book for which it was to have been substituted had already been cast. It was therefore determined to drop out of this addition, so far as possible, those statements which substantially repeat matter already in plate, and insert the remainder as an appendix. It is as follows:

The birth of the subject of this sketch was hailed with joy by the Swedes, because it secured them against the claims of the Polish branch of the house of Vasa, to which the succession really belonged, and which they desired to exclude on account of its adherence to the Catholic Church. At his baptism he received the name of Gustavus, which seemed more significant, because, by a transposition of its letters, it became Augustus. His father, who was a prudent and practical prince, provided

for the education of his son by calling for this purpose distinguished men of his own and other lands. John Skythe, a man of much travel and experience, and Helmer von Möerner of Brandenburg, took charge of his education in the languages and sciences, while Count de la Gardie, a gentleman of French extraction, was his military teacher. The high order of the prince's gifts made easy his instructors' tasks. Besides his mother tongue, he understood also the Latin, Greek, German, Dutch, Italian, Polish, and Russian languages, and to some extent spoke them. He was fond of reading the weightier books, chiefly, of course, those relating to his occupation. Thus the writings of Hugo Grotius, especially his treatise on the "Right of War and Peace,"* and Xenophon's "Anabasis" received his highest appreciation. His father, who attached great importance to his religious education, wrote out for him a special memorandum, in which he exhorted him "above all things to fear God, honor his father and mother, show a fraternal regard for his brothers and sisters, and in his future position always to do that which was just and good."

The great development of the young Gustavus early inspired the family with confidence as to his future. His father was proud of him, and from his tenth year onward allowed him to take part in his councils and audiences, and sometimes even to give his answers. The reports of foreign ambassadors are replete with praise of his intellect in general and his discernment in difficult questions in particular. When, in the year 1620, he travelled in Germany, and visited Heidelberg, the Duke of Zweibrücken gave an account of him which was filled with utterances of admiration. His great talents were early shown in military mat-

* *Tractat de Jure Belli ac Pacis.*

ters. At the age of sixteen years he requested for himself, though without success, the chief command in the war in which his father was engaged with Russia. A year later he was permitted to take part, at least, in the war which had broken out in Denmark. He was daring even to rashness, and showed himself not only a brave soldier, but a calculating marshal, for he strove to comprehend and master the difficulties of the whole theatre of the war. His military talents were afterwards applied to the making of reforms in war matters. He employed himself in the improvement of the artillery and in the classification of the several kinds of troops, and he invented methods for drawing them up in battle order. He owed his great successes in part to the rigid discipline and strict morals which he introduced into his army, and which, as far as possible, he maintained in his brilliant triumphal expedition in Germany. While the troops of the Emperor and his other antagonists led but a vagabond life, he had morning and evening prayer kept up with his men, distributed hymn-books among them, and before each battle held a solemn divine service. The most stringent orders protected against plunder the people of those regions whither he led his armies; his soldiers were provisioned by his well-planned commissary system; and the peasants and burghers were subjected only to those demands which were absolutely necessary. As he provided food, so did he also clothing for his men. He furnished them with fur-lined coats, he kept tents in readiness to protect them against the inclement weather, and secure to them a more humane existence. Low and slanderous speech, drunkenness and gaming, were banished by rigid penalties from the camp-life. Nor did he tolerate loose women; he insisted that those girls who followed the army should each be connected

with some soldier by marriage. In short, in his army he maintained an order and a conduct which no one could exact who did not himself try to live a blameless life and to keep his pleasures within the limits of a Spartan simplicity. That the temperance and moral purity of his army gave way after his brilliant successes in Germany, is, by many witnesses, incontestably proved ; but the King, nevertheless, withstood, so far as was possible, the then prevalent insubordination, in which effort he was ably supported by his officers. No one attained to the position of an officer without having distinguished himself by merit in the lower service. Nor was higher promotion bestowed either by favoritism or chance, but according to merit.

The passionate love which Gustavus Adolphus conceived in his youth for the beautiful Countess, Emma Brahe, was not at first reciprocated ; she showed herself, indeed, indifferent to his addresses. Upon his assurance, however, that his intentions were honorable, and that he desired to take her home as his wife, she returned his love, and held correspondence with him by letter. Although he might indeed then have followed his inclination, he applied, through a friendly prince, the Duke of Lauenburg, for the consent of his widowed mother, the Queen. Her answer was a full recognition of the merits and virtues of Emma Brahe, but nevertheless advised against her son's marrying a Swede, and desired that he defer his decision for a few years until the war, then just begun with the Russians, should be closed. The Queen's advice was listened to, and she gained her point. Gustavus Adolphus, by devoting himself zealously to the administration of the kingdom, extinguished his love for Emma, and afterwards sued for the hand of the sister of the Elector of Brandenburg, because, in his view, this alliance might aid him in his contests with Poland.

The father of Gustavus Adolphus died in the year 1611, while the son was engaged in the war with Denmark. The young King endeavored, therefore, to hasten the termination of the war, because his involved relations with Russia and the hostility of Poland threatened him with new perils. He concluded a peace with Denmark, which was attended with some small advantages to Sweden.

The war with Russia was brought on by Gustavus Adolphus' desire to enlarge his own territory. Russian affairs became complicated after the extinction of the dynasty of Rurik. This state of things the young King sought to use for his purpose. The new Czar, Michael Romanoff, resisted this attempt. The war ended, in 1617, greatly to Sweden's advantage. Russia gave up its possessions on the Baltic. But now the difficulties were pressed from the side of Poland. King Sigismund desired not only to defend Liefland* against the Swedish attacks, but to urge his claim to the Swedish crown itself. At first Gustavus Adolphus evaded the war by an armistice; but in the year 1620 he seized his weapons, not merely for the defence of his own crown, but in order, by the conquest of Liefland, to deal his enemy a death-blow, and thus defend what was to him the sacred cause of his faith against menacing Catholic aggression. His faith and his life too would be imperilled by defeat; great advantages and lasting fame would reward a triumph. Conviction and ambition were with him, as with other great men, the guiding-stars of his life. Success was on his side. Poland was

* The Russian war brought on the Polish. Liefland (Livonia) was one of those provinces on the Baltic which the Czar Michael had promised to Gustavus Adolphus, in the peace just concluded with him, but of which the latter was not yet in possession. The Polish King opened the war in order to anticipate his rival on this ground, and prepare the way to the acquisition of Sweden itself.—Tr.

obliged, in 1622, to conclude an armistice, and to cede to him Liefland. It may be maintained that, from this time forth, ambition gave a definite direction to his determinations, for although it is not easy to look into a man's soul, and state with certainty what are its springs of action, to tell where ambition and conviction act in harmony, or where the former obtains the upper-hand of the latter, still it may with certainty be maintained that Gustavus Adolphus was moved only, in his earlier years, by these two springs acting in concert. When he had become conscious of his own strength and had learned his enemies' weakness, he yielded to his ambition the controlling part, and, although he still represented himself to his adherents as the avenger of the injustice which they suffered, he was fully conscious that he was avenging them in his own interests. In this light he appears, not as an ideal hero of the faith, but as a man subject to this universal human infirmity. The merit of his achievements in behalf of the partners of his faith remains, therefore, undiminished, for without him Protestantism in Germany would have perished.

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